Walden Pod – Details, episodes & analysis

Today we continue our exploration of the conceivability argument, covering the best response in the physicalist arsenal, and why it doesn't help physicalists escape the hoard of zombies in the end.

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Today we discuss David Chalmers' conceivability argument against physicalism: the zombie argument.

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Today, we discuss the idea that understanding a concept is not a matter of knowing a definition. As philosopher Michael Huemer argues, our main access to a concept comes “not through directly reflecting on the concept, but through activating the dispositions that constitute our understanding.” 

The Wittgensteinian view of concepts explains how it’s possible that we know how to competently use terms even though it is so hard to successfully analyze them. I can’t provide a perfect conceptual analysis of knowledge (no one can), and yet I have no issue using the term and understanding what it means. Not only can I competently use words that I can’t analyze, I can reject proposed analyses as insufficient, like the justified true belief analysis. That’s because I understand the meaning of the concept, despite the fact that I can’t define it. 

“Indefinability of words is perfectly normal," Huemer argues, "since understanding is not constituted by knowledge of definitions. The best way to convey a word’s meaning is through examples.” 


Language & Meaning: Crash Course Philosophy

Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer

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One note from Huemer on the Wittgensteinian view of concepts and the contrasting Lockean view: "I think what I have to say about concepts is like some stuff that Wittgenstein said, but I don’t actually care how well it matches Wittgenstein’s views. I also don’t care, by the way, whether the 'Lockean theory' matches Locke’s views. You have to add in caveats like this whenever you mention a major philosophical figure, because there are always people who have devoted their lives to studying that figure and who, if you let them, will give you all sorts of arguments that the famous philosopher has been completely misunderstood and never really said the things they’re famous for saying." 

What is knowledge? What does it mean to know something? Today, we discuss the defeasibility theory, which adds a fourth condition to the famous "justified true belief" analysis of knowledge. We also touch on Gettier cases, certainty, and what contemporary analytic philosophy is all about (the answer may surprise you!). 


For even more epistemology, check out the new series on Counter Apologetics about mistakes atheists often make about epistemology. 


Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer

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We take a short break from our epistemology series to talk about the hypothesis of indifference, a limited God, natural teleology, pan-agentialism, and how value-orientation in the universe is not binary but rather comes on a continuum.

For reference, Paul Draper (1989) characterizes the hypothesis of indifference as follows: “neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by non-human persons.” 

If the audio sounds different than usual, that's because I recorded this as a video and edited it slightly differently as a result. You can watch the video on YouTube here 

Check out the series on atheism and epistemology over on Counter Apologetics here

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This is part one of a series about epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge and justification. When does something count as knowledge? How can we be justified in accepting mathematical truths, moral truths, and truths about the external world? Can I trust my perceptual faculties, my memory, my ability to reason? Can I know anything at all? 

Today, we're discussing internalism vs. externalism about knowledge and justification. We also touch on the person-based nature of justification, giving others the benefit of the doubt, and empathy on the epistemic landscape.

Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer 

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Perspective Philosophy and I speak about metaethics, intervening in wild animal suffering, veganism, the toll of working in a slaughterhouse, ethical intuition, moral disagreement, and a few metaphysical questions about contingency and necessity. 

Full interview here

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“On panpsychism, how can there ever be unconsciousness, like in the case of dreamless sleep?” As far as objections go, this is a pretty weak one, but I decided to take the opportunity to talk about death, sleep, states of unconsciousness, and how panpsychists see the mind and its place in nature. 

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Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

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Philip Goff and Dustin Crummett debate psychophysical harmony, God, axiarchism, pan-agentialism, natural teleology, and explore some neglected terrain between theism and the hypothesis of indifference. What are our options in explaining the fine-tuning of consciousness? 

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Twitter @waldenpod @Philip_Goff @dustin_crummett

Dustin's Channel

Mind Chat

Music by ichika Nito & Whalers. Used with permission.

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When did consciousness first evolve? If physicalism is true, we’d expect it to have evolved gradually, just as other complex biological phenomena evolved gradually. But the transition from feeling nothing to feeling something couldn’t have been gradual. No matter how minimal a conscious experience is, if it’s “like something” to exist – anything at all – it’s not like nothing at all. On reflection it seems hard to imagine anything other than a sharp border between non-experiential reality and experiential reality. On the other hand, complex physical states are not sharp: they admit borderline cases. If we remove one atom at a time from a given brain state, it will eventually be vague or indeterminate whether or not the organism is still in that physical brain state. So if consciousness is just a kind of physical state, we’d expect consciousness to follow suit. Since it seems impossible that there could be a borderline case of consciousness – it’s either like something for a creature or like nothing – we have reason to think that physicalism is false. 

Michael Tye - Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness

David Papineau’s review of Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness in NDPR

Nino Kadic - Phenomenology of Fundamental Reality

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Support at patreon.com/counter or patreon.com/waldenpod 

Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.

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Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

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/ timestamps /
00:00 The vagueness argument
04:18 Which creatures are conscious?
06:18 The sharpness of consciousness
10:09 The vagueness of biological phenomena
12:41 The sharpness of consciousness (cont.)
20:14 Weak emergence
21:42 The advantage of vagueness arguments