Today we continue our exploration of the conceivability argument, covering the best response in the physicalist arsenal, and why it doesn't help physicalists escape the hoard of zombies in the end.

Linktree

Today we discuss David Chalmers' conceivability argument against physicalism: the zombie argument.

Linktree

Today, we discuss the idea that understanding a concept is not a matter of knowing a definition. As philosopher Michael Huemer argues, our main access to a concept comes “not through directly reflecting on the concept, but through activating the dispositions that constitute our understanding.” 

The Wittgensteinian view of concepts explains how it’s possible that we know how to competently use terms even though it is so hard to successfully analyze them. I can’t provide a perfect conceptual analysis of knowledge (no one can), and yet I have no issue using the term and understanding what it means. Not only can I competently use words that I can’t analyze, I can reject proposed analyses as insufficient, like the justified true belief analysis. That’s because I understand the meaning of the concept, despite the fact that I can’t define it. 

“Indefinability of words is perfectly normal," Huemer argues, "since understanding is not constituted by knowledge of definitions. The best way to convey a word’s meaning is through examples.” 


Language & Meaning: Crash Course Philosophy

Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer

Linktree


One note from Huemer on the Wittgensteinian view of concepts and the contrasting Lockean view: "I think what I have to say about concepts is like some stuff that Wittgenstein said, but I don’t actually care how well it matches Wittgenstein’s views. I also don’t care, by the way, whether the 'Lockean theory' matches Locke’s views. You have to add in caveats like this whenever you mention a major philosophical figure, because there are always people who have devoted their lives to studying that figure and who, if you let them, will give you all sorts of arguments that the famous philosopher has been completely misunderstood and never really said the things they’re famous for saying." 

What is knowledge? What does it mean to know something? Today, we discuss the defeasibility theory, which adds a fourth condition to the famous "justified true belief" analysis of knowledge. We also touch on Gettier cases, certainty, and what contemporary analytic philosophy is all about (the answer may surprise you!). 


For even more epistemology, check out the new series on Counter Apologetics about mistakes atheists often make about epistemology. 


Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer

Linktree

We take a short break from our epistemology series to talk about the hypothesis of indifference, a limited God, natural teleology, pan-agentialism, and how value-orientation in the universe is not binary but rather comes on a continuum.

For reference, Paul Draper (1989) characterizes the hypothesis of indifference as follows: “neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by non-human persons.” 

If the audio sounds different than usual, that's because I recorded this as a video and edited it slightly differently as a result. You can watch the video on YouTube here 

Check out the series on atheism and epistemology over on Counter Apologetics here

Linktree 

This is part one of a series about epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge and justification. When does something count as knowledge? How can we be justified in accepting mathematical truths, moral truths, and truths about the external world? Can I trust my perceptual faculties, my memory, my ability to reason? Can I know anything at all? 

Today, we're discussing internalism vs. externalism about knowledge and justification. We also touch on the person-based nature of justification, giving others the benefit of the doubt, and empathy on the epistemic landscape.

Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer 

Linktree 

Perspective Philosophy and I speak about metaethics, intervening in wild animal suffering, veganism, the toll of working in a slaughterhouse, ethical intuition, moral disagreement, and a few metaphysical questions about contingency and necessity. 

Full interview here

Linktree

“On panpsychism, how can there ever be unconsciousness, like in the case of dreamless sleep?” As far as objections go, this is a pretty weak one, but I decided to take the opportunity to talk about death, sleep, states of unconsciousness, and how panpsychists see the mind and its place in nature. 

YouTube

Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Transcript

Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Philip Goff and Dustin Crummett debate psychophysical harmony, God, axiarchism, pan-agentialism, natural teleology, and explore some neglected terrain between theism and the hypothesis of indifference. What are our options in explaining the fine-tuning of consciousness? 

Subscribe on YouTube

Twitter @waldenpod @Philip_Goff @dustin_crummett

Dustin's Channel

Mind Chat

Music by ichika Nito & Whalers. Used with permission.

linktr.ee/emersongreen 

When did consciousness first evolve? If physicalism is true, we’d expect it to have evolved gradually, just as other complex biological phenomena evolved gradually. But the transition from feeling nothing to feeling something couldn’t have been gradual. No matter how minimal a conscious experience is, if it’s “like something” to exist – anything at all – it’s not like nothing at all. On reflection it seems hard to imagine anything other than a sharp border between non-experiential reality and experiential reality. On the other hand, complex physical states are not sharp: they admit borderline cases. If we remove one atom at a time from a given brain state, it will eventually be vague or indeterminate whether or not the organism is still in that physical brain state. So if consciousness is just a kind of physical state, we’d expect consciousness to follow suit. Since it seems impossible that there could be a borderline case of consciousness – it’s either like something for a creature or like nothing – we have reason to think that physicalism is false. 

Michael Tye - Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness

David Papineau’s review of Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness in NDPR

Nino Kadic - Phenomenology of Fundamental Reality

YouTube

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Support at patreon.com/counter or patreon.com/waldenpod 

Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.

Transcript 

Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen


/ timestamps /
00:00 The vagueness argument
04:18 Which creatures are conscious?
06:18 The sharpness of consciousness
10:09 The vagueness of biological phenomena
12:41 The sharpness of consciousness (cont.)
20:14 Weak emergence
21:42 The advantage of vagueness arguments

In many ways, I'm the ideal audience for apologists of capital punishment. I believe in free will, I think human beings are responsible for their actions, I’m not opposed to retribution in all cases, I believe there are virtuous qualities to revenge, and I think some people deserve to die. However, none of that is enough to justify the death penalty system. 

First, arguing that some people deserve to die is not sufficient to show that any particular institution (e.g. the state) should have the power and legitimacy to carry out executions. Second, capital punishment is not reconcilable with the principle of remedy: when mistakes are inevitably made, the punishment for the wrongly convicted cannot be brought to an end and they cannot be given damages. Third, the application of the death penalty will inevitably be morally arbitrary in some cases – either due to the morally arbitrary nature of the laws themselves, the enforcement of the law, or the imperfect determination of guilt. Since this is unavoidable, we cannot have the death penalty without murdering innocents. And since saving innocent life is far more important than ending the lives of the guilty, this should dissuade us from maintaining a death-penalty system. Finally, the virtuous qualities of revenge are absent in the death penalty system.

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Support at patreon.com/waldenpod & patreon.com/counter

YouTube

Transcript

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.

Twitter @waldenpod

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Subscribe on YouTube

Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.

Full interview on the Sentientism podcast

Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

The core theory, weak and strong emergence, micro-reductionism, and Sean Carroll’s skeptical argument against everything. Is Dr. Carroll correct in holding that physics has ruled out the afterlife, the soul, fundamental consciousness, parapsychology, and other immaterialist claims? 

Linktree 

Sean Carroll speaking to the Freedom From Religion Foundation https://youtu.be/40eiycH077A?si=xgg4KC0JPYWnH0fU

Philip Goff: Is physics different in the brain? https://www.youtube.com/live/wlyKdirhOa4?si=RRYXSUbW8As7sRLw

Papers: 

Carroll: Consciousness and the Laws of Physics (2021) https://philarchive.org/archive/CARCAT-33

Goff’s response to critics: https://philpapers.org/archive/GOFPCF.pdf

The Quantum Field Theory on Which the Everyday World Supervenes (2021) https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.07884

Relevant blog posts from Carroll: 

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/01/04/the-world-of-everyday-experience-in-one-equation/

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2010/09/23/the-laws-underlying-the-physics-of-everyday-life-are-completely-understood/

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2010/09/29/seriously-the-laws-underlying-the-physics-of-everyday-life-really-are-completely-understood/

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2010/10/01/one-last-stab/

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/07/18/the-effective-field-theory-of-everyday-life-revisited/

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/05/23/physics-and-the-immortality-of-the-soul/

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2008/02/18/telekinesis-and-quantum-field-theory/

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Subscribe on YouTube

Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.

Full interview on the Sentientism podcast

Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

Dr. Michael Huemer joins me to discuss moral realism vs. antirealism, ethical intuitionism, phenomenal conservatism, moral disagreement, and much else in moral philosophy. 


Ethical Intuitionism 

Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy 

William Lane Craig vs. Erik Wielenberg 

Linktree


/ The Five Metaethical Positions / 

Noncognitivism/expressivism: Moral statements are neither true nor false. Evaluative predicates do not even
purportedly refer to any sort of property, nor do evaluative statements assert propositions.

Error theory/nihilism: Moral statements (that imply that something has an evaluative property) are all false.

Subjectivism: Some moral statements are true, but not objectively. For a thing to be good is for some individual or group to (be disposed to) take some attitude towards it.

Moral Naturalism: There are objective moral properties, but they are reducible. Evaluative truths are reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, moral statements can be justified empirically.

Moral Non-Naturalism/Intuitionism: There are objective moral properties, and they are irreducible. Evaluative truths are not reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, at least some moral truths are known intuitively.


/ Timestamps /
00:00 Introduction
01:05 Objective vs. Subjective
06:45 Five Metaethical Views
36:45 Fictionalism
50:40 Phenomenal Conservatism, Scientism, Skepticism
1:15:00 Moral Disagreement
1:25:00 Theism and Moral Realism
1:41:00 Companions in Innocence
1:46:30 Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
2:00:00 Huemer’s soul is not in Colorado nor is it in Michigan

Is the intellectual tradition of theism evidence in favor of it? What about the atheistic tradition? ... Does atheism sap your moral motivation? Do Christians even believe in ultimate justice? ... Do contingency arguments succeed? What does it mean for something to be necessary? 

Leave a voicemail at (734) 707-1940
(I'm only taking 3-4 calls per episode, so if you've already left one and haven't heard it yet, don't worry)

YouTube

Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

Patreon.com/waldenpod

linktr.ee/emersongreen

I'm joined by two proponents of libertarian free will to discuss determinism, the phenomenology of free choices, how "ought implies can" could prove we have the ability to do otherwise, and much else. 

linktr.ee/emersongreen

YouTube

Support the podcast at patreon.com/waldenpod or /counter

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.

Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

Darren (Necessary Being) w/ Bread of Life

Necessary Being on Free Will

Critiquing arguments against free will from neuroscience | The Analytic Christian & Dr. Matthew Flummer (of The Free Will Show) 

I'm joined by Matthew Adelstein of Deliberation Under Ideal Conditions for Utilitarianism 101. We also talk about a few basic things everyone needs to know to be conversant in moral philosophy. 

YouTube

Matthew's Channel 

Matthew's Blog (Bentham's Bulldog)

Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.

Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Wild animal suffering – is it possible to do anything about it? Should we do anything about it? Even though the general principles that inform our concern for animal welfare shouldn’t be arbitrarily limited to animals outside the wild, I think intervention on any serious scale would be ill-advised. The natural order is deeply interconnected, dynamic, and awesomely complex. Drastic action, such as ending predation, would plausibly cause the system to collapse into nonexistence or end in some other irreversible catastrophe. Sadly, natural evil is inextricably built into the biological order.
“...for practical purposes I am fairly sure, judging from man’s past record of attempts to mold nature to his own aims, that we would be more likely to increase the net amount of animal suffering if we interfered with wildlife, than to decrease it.” - Peter Singer
YouTube

Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here
Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.
Transcript 

Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Personal identity, the potential evolutionary origins of religion, Bernardo Kastrup and analytic idealism, the Ship of Theseus and substance dualism.

Leave a voicemail at (734) 707-1940

YouTube
Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

Patreon.com/waldenpod

linktr.ee/emersongreen

A few thoughts on what mysterianism is not. Also, why "What is consciousness?" is a bad question. 

Linktree

My opinionated introduction to mysterianism. Inspired by Noam Chomsky, Colin McGinn, and Eric Schwitzgebel, we explore a version of mysterianism that I think may be true.

YouTube

Support on Patreon

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here
Transcript

Shane Wagoner - From Physicalism to Mysterianism

Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.
Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen

A few scattered thoughts about internet materialists, stronger forms of physicalism, underdetermination, neuroscience, the evolution of consciousness, qualia microscopes, and the hard problem of consciousness.

YouTube

Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.

Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen

I recently asked for your questions, and I posted my responses on YouTube here. We touch on compatibilism, NDEs, aliens, euthanasia, abortion, death anxiety as an atheist, idealism, incest, Islam, Mormonism, subjectivism, psychophysical harmony, and more. (For those listening via podcast, I left the introduction in to preserve the timestamps for those who want to skip around to different sections.)

00:00 Intro
00:46 Atheistic platonism?
01:22 Why are you gay?
01:30 Are you still a naturalist?
05:47 What kind of compatibilist are you?
09:41 If I settle your debt with PragerU, will you become a libertarian?
10:12 What’s your biggest gripe with physicalism?
12:42 On the abortion debate, when do you think personhood / full moral status begins?
17:22 Do twinks make better philosophers?
17:56 Are you agnostic about anything in philosophy?
19:37 Why are you such a sucker for spooky stuff?
30:49 Who makes those guitar transitions?
32:34 Favorite music?
34:30 Who are some of your favorite Eastern philosophers?
35:03 Which religion would you choose to be true?
40:54 Who are your favorite theist and atheist philosophers?
42:18 Arguing for dualism from mereological nihilism?
45:48 Euthanasia?
48:43 What are your thoughts on each general era of philosophy?
55:00 Thoughts on Jordan Peterson?
58:55 Have you looked into Islam?
1:03:57 Does your mother know you spend so much time talking to strangers on the internet?
1:04:04 What is your opinion on the resurrection?
1:08:23 The best argument against veganism?
1:21:18 What is the primary goal of adopting panpsychism?
1:23:20 Best defenses of objective morality?
1:24:34 How would aliens affect theism and atheism?
1:30:53 Are you a dualist or a physicalist?
1:31:31 Isn’t solipsism simpler than panpsychism?
1:33:37 Thoughts on idealism?
1:35:41 Which political system do you think is right?
1:39:34 Thoughts on metaethical naturalism?
1:41:52 Is incest wrong?
1:45:27 When will you have some Mormons back on your show?
1:46:34 Why atheist and not agnostic? Where can I find good philrel content?
1:49:54 Would necessitarianism defeat fine-tuning and psychophysical harmony?
1:57:38 Do you accept physical causal closure?
2:00:00 How do you explain psychophysical harmony?
2:02:34 Kant’s transcendental idealism and free will?
2:07:56 Are we obligated to refute false beliefs even if they’re meaningful?
2:13:01 Is there any profound nugget of wisdom that Christianity has first or exclusive ownership of?
2:15:17 Analytic/Continental divide?
2:18:05 “Emmerson”
2:19:03 Does the phenomenal powers view weaken psychophysical harmony?
2:22:04 Is time necessary for consciousness?
2:28:49 If you did reconvert, would you be a Christian or a generic theist?
2:32:20 Finite theism?
2:36:22 Top three philosophers who are wrong about everything?
2:37:57 Moral subjectivism with normally functioning humans as the (collective) observer(s) morality is stance-dependent upon?
2:48:52 Are you afraid of death? How do you cope with death anxiety as an atheist?

Linktree

If epiphenomenalism is true, mental causation is an illusion. Even if pain and pleasure were inverted, you’d go on behaving the same way you do now, since your conscious states have nothing to do with determining or motivating your physical behavior. This is counterintuitive, to say the least. But it also leaves us completely unable to explain why our conscious states line up appropriately with our actions. We typically think that natural selection molded our mental profile: that which aids in survival and reproduction is incentivized by experiences with a positive hedonic valence, and vice versa. Thus, we have an evolutionary explanation of harmonious correlations. But on epiphenomenalism, this can't be the right explanation, since experiences play no causal role at all. If they have no causal influence, they can't make any difference to genetic fitness. So how is it that harmonious correlations evolved if experiences are invisible to natural selection?

Argument from Psychophysical Harmony w/ Dustin Crummett 

Psychophysical Harmony in a Nutshell  

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Transcript

Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.

Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

YouTube

Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Ben Burgis recently invited me on his Callin show to speak about the value of “science fiction” thought experiments in applied ethics.  I argue that in the realm of applied ethics, thought experiments often confuse more than they clarify. They don’t map on to the real world cases they’re intended to help with (for various reasons), and we shouldn’t be informing action with scenarios that differ in ethically relevant respects.
Applied ethics is about what we should do – it’s a uniquely practical subfield of philosophy. Ethical thought experiments commonly provide us with both too much and too little information: they exclude morally relevant detail that we would possess in the real world, and they include morally relevant detail that we would not possess in the real world. So even though we may come to the same conclusion regarding an action or principle in a thought experiment doesn’t mean we’d agree in the real world case, since these two cases differ in morally relevant respects. Consequently, I think it’s often a mistake to inform action in the real world with conclusions drawn from a thought experiment.
Ben Burgis - The Joe Rogan Experience 
Canceling Comedians While the World Burns
The Left Should Oppose Censorship by Big Tech Companies
Callin - Friendly Debate w/Emerson Green—Do “Science Fiction” Thought Experiments Have Any Value in Philosophy?
James Wilson - Philosophy Bites Interview on the value of thought experiments in applied ethics
Subscribe on YouTube

Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Follow me on Twitter @waldenpod

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Many leaders in the skeptic community have proven themselves to be untrustworthy sources of information on the topics they speak about. They’ve misled me often about what others believe and why. Moreover, genuine skepticism seems to be far less important to the skeptic community than the kind of conclusions one comes to. Failure to adopt the required list of beliefs disqualifies one from being a real skeptic, it would seem. In today’s episode, I talk about how my atheism caused me to gravitate towards the skeptic community, and how the same subject caused me to drift away. We also discuss how skeptics mishandle the subjects of theism, parapsychology, the JFK assassination, 9/11, and aliens.
For the record, this should not be seen as a comprehensive treatment of the topics raised (e.g. conspiracy theories). My framework was the following: Skeptics told me conspiracy theorists believed X for reason Y, but they were often wrong on both counts. I used a few examples, but I wasn’t aiming to provide a full account of what 9/11 truthers believe, or what alien abductees think, nor was I trying to defend a rejection of the Warren Commission. I especially shied away from that last topic, since it’s a bit different from the others for me. In the case of the JFK assassination, I’m more solidly on the side of the conspiracy theorists. Along with the majority of Americans, I don’t accept the Warren Commission.
Watch on YouTube
Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Transcript

Twitter @waldenpod 

Linktree


For a more accurate picture of what these common skeptic targets believe and why:

/ JFK
Oliver Stone’s documentary JFK Revisited: Through the Looking Glass /or/ JFK: Destiny Betrayed [longer version of same doc] 
Mark Lane interviewed on JFK assassination (1992) 

/ 9/11
Three-part article in CovertAction Magazine - Peter Dale Scott, Aaron Good, Ben Howard
The Road to 9/11 (University of California Press) Peter Dale Scott 

/ Theism
Kenny Pierce defends theism against Graham Oppy (Dialogue) 
Joshua Rasmussen defends theism against Felipe Leon (Dialogue) 

/ Parapsychology 
Mitch Horowitz: A parapsychologist’s take on James Randi

/ Aliens
Nick Pope w/ Michael Shermer on UAPs and UFOs
Avi Loeb w/ Michael Shermer on alien life and oumuamua 

I’m joined by philosopher Luke Roelofs to discuss the combination problem for panpsychism, split brain cases, vagueness arguments, illusionism, mental privacy, the general and special composition question, mereological nihilism and universalism, and many other topics related to consciousness and composite subjectivity.

Watch on YouTube

Combining Minds: How to Think About Composite Subjectivity (Oxford University Press)
Amodal Mind Perception: Combining Inferentialism and Perceptualism

Luke’s website
Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here

Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here

Music by ichika Nito and used with permission.

Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen

I'm joined by Scott Clifton (Theoretical Bullshit) to discuss free will skepticism, compatibilism, moral responsibility, revenge, and killing coyotes.

Video version - Is free will an illusion? 

Scott's channel 

Follow me @waldenpod and TBS @TheoreticalBS

Consider supporting Walden Pod here or Counter Apologetics here

linktr.ee/emersongreen

I respond to Alex O'Connor's arguments against compatibilism, the view that there is no real conflict between determinism and free will. Is free will skepticism the better view, as Alex claims? Will the British ever learn their lesson?

CosmicSkeptic - Compatibilism Debunked

Subscribe on YouTube here

Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here

Consider supporting Walden Pod on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here 

Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism 

linktr.ee/emersongreen

After listening to Very Bad Wizards' new episode about panpsychism, I hit record and commented on a few clips that stood out to me.

Subscribe on YouTube here

Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here

Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here

An interesting article on panpsychist history by Joe Zadeh

Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. In other words, a compatibilist is someone who doesn’t have a quarrel with using the term “free will” and who doesn’t think we need to run around with our hair on fire if determinism turns out to be true. By my lights, free will skeptics and libertarians seem to be entirely wrong about the dramatic consequences that would follow from not possessing libertarian freedom. 
As you may have gathered, I’ve finally migrated from the free will skeptic camp over to the compatibilist camp. Years ago, learning about determinism and moral luck for the first time rocked my world. But as the dust settled, I wondered if I had been too quick to reject the entire notion of free will. How much does it matter that we don’t have libertarian free will? How much has actually changed? Is our ordinary sense of free will really unsalvageable?
Consider supporting the show

Subscribe on YouTube here

Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here

Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism

Transcript

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Can we be ultimately responsible for what we do? No one denies that we can be the proximate cause of our actions. I made this episode because I wanted to. But being the proximate cause of an action is compatible with determinism – no determinist in their right mind would deny that I made this episode because I wanted to. So is there a deeper sense of responsibility that can be attributed to human beings? One which absolves God, the world, ancestors, luck, and society of what we choose to do?
This deeper kind of responsibility, which Nietzsche disparagingly called “‘freedom of the will’ in the superlative metaphysical sense,” and which is often ascribed to human beings by the religious, arguably requires one to be causa sui – to be the ultimate cause of oneself. Since this is impossible, we can be sure that we do not possess the kind of responsibility that so many seem convinced we have. You can’t be radically self-creating in a way that gets you beyond a compatibilist notion of responsibility.
It’s unclear whether our lack of ultimate responsibility for our actions is a problem for libertarian free will. Do libertarians unanimously impute this degree of responsibility to humans? No – some do, some don’t. Regardless, the attacks on free will “in the superlative metaphysical sense” from Nietzsche and Strawson convincingly show that our responsibility for our actions is quite limited.
Galen Strawson - Your Move: The Maze of Free Will
Tamler Sommers & Galen Strawson - You cannot make yourself the way that you are
The Panpsycast Philosophy Podcast - The Galen Strawson Interview
Consider supporting the show on Patreon here

Subscribe on YouTube here

Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here

Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen

"The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so far, it is a sort of rape and perversion of logic; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with just this nonsense. The desire for ‘freedom of the will’ in the superlative metaphysical sense, which still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated; the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one’s actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui and, with more than Münchhausen’s audacity, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps of nothingness."
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 21 (tr. W. Kaufmann)

I’m joined today by Jack Symes, editor of the new book, Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind. Jack is a Teacher and Researcher of Philosophy at the University of Liverpool, UK and is also the co-host of The Panpsycast Philosophy Podcast.
Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism Follow Jack on Twitter @_JackSymes @ThePanpsycast
Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind

Support on Patreon here

Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here

linktr.ee/emersongreen

/ timestamps /

00:00 Introduction to the book

15:52 The construction problem 

20:23 Why philosophy of mind? Why not just neuroscience?

28:28 Does Emerson misrepresent illusionism?

38:11 The terminological mess in philmind

46:21 Different forms of panpsychism

52:20 Illusionism redux: the metaproblem of consciousness

1:01:53 Practical implications of illusionism

1:14:58 Podcasting

1:18:55 Practical implications of panpsychism

1:41:37 Paganism and panpsychism

1:52:26 Pantheism

1:55:48 Panpsycast stories

2:02:05 LIVE SHOW

2:03:13 Parting thoughts

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental states have no effect on anything. The feeling of pain, counterintuitively, does not cause your aversion, mentally or physically. Beliefs don’t cause behavior. None of our actions occur in virtue of our thoughts, feelings, or sensations.

Inspired by Matthew Adelstein’s post defending epiphenomenalism, I want to explain my opposition to the view. A few times, he referenced a podcast episode / blog post of mine from 2020, which I hadn’t read since it was first posted. I found a few things to disagree with in my own episode, so I thought I’d respond to Matthew and try to offer an updated critique of epiphenomenalism in the process. While epiphenomenalism is probably less wrong than physicalism, the causal efficacy of our mental states is as evident as anything, so the view should still be rejected in favor of panpsychism or interactionist dualism. As Paul Draper once put it, “wild ideas are needed” to explain consciousness, but I don’t think epiphenomenalism is the right wild idea.

After responding to a few key points from Matthew, I offer a few reasons to reject epiphenomenalism:

• Epiphenomenalism is self-defeating.
• The evidence that supports the causal influence of mental states is the exact same kind of evidence for causal influence in other cases. This not only supports mental causation, but also raises the threat of undermining the epiphenomenalist’s claim that the physical has causal powers.
• The phenomenal powers view as defended by Mørch (2017, 2020) is plausible and entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. In short, there are plausible examples of causal necessity in the mind.
• Among metaphysical theories of consciousness, epiphenomenalism is the most vulnerable to the problem of psychophysical harmony.

Transcript

YouTube

Linktree

For the full episode, and access to other bonus episodes, subscribe at patreon.com/waldenpod

How can one reconcile the reality of mental causation with the accuracy of “the core theory,” which Sean Carroll hails as explaining all of everyday life? Contrary to Carroll’s intention, his proclamation that the laws underlying the physics of everyday life are completely understood is one of the factors that lead some to adopt Russellian panpsychism. (This episode was recorded as a video, which is available to patrons.)

Is a brain necessary for experience? Do we have any good reason to limit the attribution of experience to creatures with complex nervous systems? Actually, no. Some materialists claim that consciousness can only exist in brains–sound reasoning, neuroscience, and physics all point in the same direction. We take a closer look at the reasoning that underlies the claim that complex nervous systems are necessary for experience.
A quick note on terminology: In this episode, I use physicalism and materialism interchangeably. And by “consciousness,” I’m referring to subjective experience: the what-it’s-like of consciousness. I try to stick to “experience” for clarity, but when I say “consciousness,” or “mind,” unless otherwise specified, experience is what I mean.
Swinburne quote
Robert Epstein - Your brain is not a computer
Peter Sjöstedt-Hughes - Panpsychism: 3 Reasons Why Our World is Brimming with Sentience

YouTube Channel

patreon.com/waldenpod

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Recently I learned that H.P. Lovecraft had undergone a surprising and dramatic political transformation in the final years of his brief life. I wanted to read a few of Lovecraft's letters and discuss his views on capitalism, socialism, and the influence of the profit motive on artistic expression. (In the middle part of this episode, I also indulge in a bit of culture war stuff, so consider yourself warned.) In these letters from the last several years of his life, his notorious racism seems to fade, and he explicitly rejects the reactionary political ideology he held prior to 1931. He ruthlessly critiques capitalism, speaks glowingly of Marx, and warns us that our only options are socialism or barbarism. Anyone familiar with the author knows how out of kilter this feels compared to the absurdly reactionary person who most of us know as Lovecraft.

First episode on Lovecraft

@waldenpod

Lovecraft Letters: 1937, Catherine Moore 1936 Arthur Sechrist 1934, Helen Barlow

Lovecraft Audiobooks: Dagon The Call of Cthulhu At the Mountains of Madness The Shadow Over Innsmouth

/ timestamps /
00:00 Introduction
02:53 Flawed Characters, Real and Fictional
09:30 Letter to Catherine Moore (1937)
13:00 Letter to Helen Barlow (1934)
15:32 Letter to Arthur Sechrist (1936)
17:23 Art & the Profit Motive
19:52 The Shadow

Transcript

I was recently interviewed by Zac of Adherent Apologetics on the subject of problems with physicalism. We outline a few arguments against the view, including physicalism’s conflict with realism about phenomenal consciousness and anti-emergentism, as well as a couple different forms of the vagueness argument against physicalism. We also talk a bit about the tradition of atheist non-physicalism, which is almost entirely behind the recent rise in interest in alternatives to physicalism. Other topics include the science of consciousness, the relationship between neuroscience and the metaphysics of consciousness, the standard thinking that motivates physicalism and where it goes wrong, panpsychism, and other subjects related to philosophy of mind.

Subscribe to Zac’s channel

and my channel

linktr.ee/emersongreen

Support on Patreon here

emersongreenblog.wordpress.com

Rate the show on iTunes here

Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here

Subscribe to CA and Walden Pod on YouTube here

Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism

Music by ichika Nito. Used with permission.

Today I'm speaking with Dr. Michael Huemer about phenomenal conservatism, a theory in epistemology that seeks to ground justified beliefs in the way things “appear” or “seem” to the subject who holds that belief. We discuss a wide range of issues in epistemology, including internalism vs. externalism, justified true belief, proper functionalism, the epistemic value of psychedelic experiences, religious experiences, radical skepticism, knowledge, conceptual analysis, intuition, and much else.
Michael Huemer is a professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado. He is the author of more than seventy academic articles in epistemology, ethics, metaethics, metaphysics, and political philosophy, as well as several books, including Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, Ethical Intuitionism, Paradox Lost, and Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism, and his new book, Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy.
PC: If it seems to S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some justification for believing that P.
Michael’s Website
Phenomenal Conservatism - IEP
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism
MH YouTube Channel 

/ / / 
linktr.ee/emersongreen
For the extended version of this interview, support on Patreon here

emersongreenblog.wordpress.com

Rate the show on iTunes here
Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here

Subscribe to CA and Walden Pod on YouTube here
Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism

/ / /

YouTube version of this episode

Naturalists, according to David Papinau, author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on naturalism, urge “that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing ‘supernatural’.” Naturalism “has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy” beyond this, along with an emphasis on science as a means to understand the natural world.
Naturalism is the view that there is only the natural world. I defend this simple conception of naturalism, ward off a few criticisms, and argue that there’s a kind of parity between the terms “theism” and “naturalism.” In other words, if you don’t have a problem with the term “theism,” you shouldn’t have a problem with “naturalism.”
Luke Roelofs - Combining Minds: How to Think about Composite Subjectivity
Is God the Best Explanation of Things? A Dialogue - Joshua Rasmussen & Felipe Leon (this wasn’t mentioned in the episode, but Leon does a wonderful job fleshing out “liberal naturalism”
Graham Oppy - The Best Argument Against God
Sean Carroll - Poetic Naturalism
Galen Strawson - Real Naturalism
William Lycan - Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction
Naturalism - SEP
/ / / 
linktr.ee/emersongreen

YouTube

Transcript 

Rate the show on iTunes

Support on Patreon here

Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here

Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism

/ / / 
a few elaborations of naturalism...
“By ‘naturalism’ I mean the view that the world contains a single basic type of stuff, whose behavior is governed by a single set of simple, general laws, and that these laws are those revealed by science. The most common version of naturalism among contemporary philosophers is physicalism, the view that the world is entirely made up of matter, and matter is exhaustively described by physics. But some philosophers reject physicalism, even while accepting naturalism, holding that matter is not exhaustively described by physics—there are fundamental aspects of matter that physics is blind to. In particular (they tend to say), there are certain things each of us can know about matter, such as that one particular portion of matter (the one between our ears) sometimes feels and thinks and experiences, which go beyond both what physics itself says and what can be deduced from any physical description, no matter how detailed. Because facts about my consciousness are left out by any purely physical descriptions, these ‘naturalistic anti-physicalists’ infer that consciousness must be itself a fundamental feature of reality, no more derivable from physical properties than mass is derivable from charge.”
Luke Roelofs

“Naturalism is a philosophy according to which there is only one world -- the natural world, which exhibits unbroken patterns (the laws of nature), and which we can learn about through hypothesis testing and observation. In particular, there is no supernatural world -- no gods, no spirits, no transcendent meanings. I like to talk about a particular approach to naturalism, which can be thought of as Poetic. By that I mean to emphasize that, while there is only one world, there are many ways of talking about the world. "Ways of talking" shouldn't be underestimated; they can otherwise be labeled "theories" or "models" or "vocabularies" or "stories," and if a particular way of talking turns out to be sufficiently accurate and useful, the elements in its corresponding vocabulary deserve to be called real.”
Sean Carroll

“Naturalism says that causal reality is natural reality: the domain of causes is nothing more nor less than the natural world. Atheism says that there are no gods; in consequence, atheism says that there is no God. Naturalism entails atheism: if causal reality is natural reality, then there is no (supernatural) cause of natural reality, and, in particular, there is no God. But atheism does not entail naturalism: to deny that there are gods is not to insist that causal reality is natural reality. . . . Supernaturalism says that causal reality outstrips natural reality: there are supernatural causes. . . . This ‘minimal’ conception of naturalism relies on a prior understanding of the distinction between the natural and the supernatural (as did our ‘minimal’ conception of theism). We shall proceed on the assumption that we do understand this distinction well enough. If we come to have doubts about whether we do understand this distinction well enough, then we can return to give it more careful consideration. ‘Minimal naturalism’ admits of elaboration in many different – mutually inconsistent – ways. Any suitably elaborated naturalism will hold that some features of the natural world are primitive – not susceptible of further explanation – whereas other features of the natural world are fully explained in terms of those primitive features. Thus, for example, some naturalists suppose that all of the primitive features of the natural world are physical features – i.e. features that lie in the proper domain of the discipline of physics. Other naturalists suppose that there are features of the natural world . . . that cannot be fully explained in terms of the fundamental physical properties. The key point to note is that all naturalists suppose that there are no supernatural causal properties…”
Graham Oppy

Aaron is a lecturer in the Rutgers philosophy department (@ETVpod). Emerson is the host of Counter Apologetics and Walden Pod (@waldenpod).

Aaron’s podcast, Embrace the Void https://voidpod.com/

This debate took place on the Right to Reason podcast https://therighttoreason.podbean.com/e/panpsychism-debate/

https://linktr.ee/emersongreen

Dustin and I discuss vagueness arguments against materialism, phenomenal conservatism, doubt arguments, Phineas Gage, physical causal closure, the core theory, vitalism, ghosts, split-brain cases, occam's razor, panpsychism, idealism, dual-aspect theories, and the problem of psychophysical luck.

Dr. Crummett received a PhD from the University of Notre Dame in 2018, and he is currently working on animal ethics as a postdoctoral researcher at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. He specializes in social and political philosophy, ethics, and philosophy of religion.

Dustin’s website http://dustincrummett.com/

Micah Edvenson & Dustin Crummett on Socialism

Dustin Crummett with John Buck & Inspiring Christianity on Dualism 

A Deeper Analysis of the Problem of Evil with Dr. Dustin Crummett 

Is The Problem Of Evil Worse Than We Thought? Non-Alchemist & Dr. Dustin Crummett 

Science, Mind, and the Limits of Understanding - Noam Chomsky 

Can physicalism explain phenomenal consciousness? 

Luke Roelofs - Combining Minds 

Hedda Hassel Morch - The Evolutionary Argument for Phenomenal Powers 

/ / /

emersongreenblog.wordpress.com

Support on Patreon at patreon.com/waldenpod or /counter

Rate the show on iTunes

Subscribe to CA and Walden Pod on YouTube 

Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen

What is philosophy, and who counts as a philosopher? My two favorite answers come from Alvin Plantinga and Arthur Schopenhauer. According to Plantinga, philosophy is just thinking hard about something. Schopenhauer put it a bit more loftily: philosophy represents our attempt to “lay bare the true nature of the world.” (At least, this is true in philosophy’s more ambitious moments.) Additionally, I would submit that philosophy is the intensification of a natural human activity.

linktr.ee/emersongreen

David Egan on Philosophy [Aeon]

Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig on Philosophy [Reasonable Faith]

Transcript [emersongreenblog]

Is philosophy dead? [iTunes]

You’re wrong to hate philosophy [iTunes]

linktr.ee/emersongreen

You can watch the video version of this podcast here

emersongreenblog.wordpress.com

Rate the show on iTunes here

Support on Patreon here

Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here

Subscribe to CA and Walden Pod on YouTube here

Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism

Here's my interview on Shannon Q's YouTube channel where we discuss dualism, panpsychism, personal identity, and other topics in the philosophy of mind! 

Linktree 

We discuss poetic naturalism and its nemesis, tunnel vision reductionism. Tunnel vision reductionism takes one description of reality and declares it to be the “real” description of reality to the exclusion of all others. At the very least, the given lower level of description is considered “more true” than higher-level descriptions.

The basic problem with tunnel vision reductionism is that it has a narrow and inconsistent notion of the real. Neurons are taken to be real, but emotions are illusory (or at least, less real than neurons). Both are emergent, higher level phenomena, but for some reason, the former is the true description. But if love isn’t real because it’s a higher level description, then neurons aren’t real either. Neither are chemicals like oxytocin. But of course, higher level descriptions are real. There are many legitimate theories, models, vocabularies, stories, and ways of talking about the world. As poetic naturalist Sean Carroll puts it, “if a particular way of talking turns out to be sufficiently accurate and useful, the elements in its corresponding vocabulary deserve to be called real.” If we describe the biochemical correlates of love, we haven’t described everything there is to know about love, nor have we given the “real” description of love.

“But all this only works if we reject reductive materialism, right?” No! This is true especially if one accepts reductive materialism. On reductive materialism, the feeling of love and oxytocin are both real in exactly the same way.

Linktree

YouTube

Transcript

Twitter @waldenpod

Here’s my conversation with John Buck and Craig Reid that was held on Craig’s YouTube channel. I was invited on to discuss atheism and consciousness, two of my favorite subjects. Unfortunately we were having audio issues at different points, but I did a bit of editing to make it more listenable.
Craig’s channel is primarily devoted to Christian apologetics, but here we mostly discuss consciousness. We talk about my religious background near the beginning, and my reasons for being an atheist a bit near the end, but most of the conversation is on physicalism, panpsychism, dualism, and a lot of interesting questions related to those ideas.
Craig's YouTube Channel 
Follow John Buck on Twitter here and Craig Reed here 

https://linktr.ee/emersongreen 

When it comes to the combination problem, there are almost always controversial hidden assumptions about the stuff doing the combining and about the entity being formed by the combining. The assumptions one makes about the self and physical reality alter the difficulty and nature of the combination problem.

As Luke Roelofs has argued in his extensive book, Combining Minds, the combination problem is a much wider problem that doesn’t dissipate if one rejects panpsychism in favor of physicalism. He also convincingly shows that panpsychists are not required to appeal to strong emergence to explain the existence of the self or subject.

While the combination problem does not deter me from taking panpsychism seriously, it’s nonetheless an interesting research program that warrants thoughtful study. The distinction I’m trying to draw here is between a problem that should dissuade one from adopting a view, and a puzzle that should inspire one to keep thinking about the view.

Luke Roelofs on Consciousness Live! with Richard Brown [YouTube]

Nino Kadic on the Combination Problem and Phenomenal Routing [YouTube]

Galen Strawson on the subject-experience-content identity view [YouTube]

The Subject of Experience - Galen Strawson [Oxford University Press]

Panpsychism’s combination problem is a problem for everyone - Angela Mendelovici [PDF]

Combining Minds: How to Think about Composite Subjectivity - Luke Roelofs [Oxford University Press]

/ / /

Transcripts available at emersongreenblog.wordpress.com

Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism

patreon.com/waldenpod

https://linktr.ee/emersongreen

We discuss the ideas that have led me away from physicalism. Specifically, realism about phenomenal consciousness, phenomenal precision, nonemergence (that there is only weak emergence, no strong emergence), monism, the objective/subjective divide, and the explanatory gap.

David Chalmers - Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness [text]

Galen Strawson - Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism [doc]

Thomas Nagel - Panpsychism [PDF]

Nagel - What is it like to be a bat? [PDF]

Nagel - Subjective and Objective [philpapers]

Philip Goff - Orthodox Property Dualism+The Linguistic Theory of Vagueness=Panpsychism [Springer]

Hunter Ash - The Argument from Vagueness [YouTube]

Galen Strawson & Philosophy Bites - Panpsychism [YouTube]

William James - Principles of Psychology [text]

Panpsychism [SEP]

. . .
Transcripts available at emersongreenblog.wordpress.com

Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism

https://linktr.ee/emersongreen