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Let's Know Things
Colin Wright
Frequency: 1 episode/7d. Total Eps: 477

letsknowthings.substack.com
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Sick Week
mardi 3 septembre 2024 • Duration 00:54
Friends!
It looks like Covid got me (my girlfriend is just getting over her own Covid-y week, and we live together—so despite our best efforts this was maybe unavoidable).
In accordance with my policy of aggressively resting when I get sick, I’ll be taking the week off to sleep, feel generally sore and uncomfortable, and consume alarming quantities of ibuprofen.
Sorry about the gap in programming, but unless something unexpected and worrying happens I’ll be back to my usual publishing schedule beginning next week, on the 10th.
This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe
The Boeing Starliner
mardi 27 août 2024 • Duration 20:18
This week we talk about the Falcon 9, the Saturn V, and NASA’s bureaucracy.
We also discuss Boeing’s mishaps, the Scout system, and the Zenit 2.
Recommended Book: What’s Our Problem? by Tim Urban
Transcript
In 1961, the cost to launch a kilogram of something into low Earth orbit—and a kilogram is about 2.2 pounds, and this figure is adjusted for inflation—was about $118,500, using the Scout, or Solid Controlled Orbital Utility Test system of rockets, which were developed by the US government in collaboration with LTV Aerospace.
This price tag dropped substantially just a handful of years later in 1967 with the launch of the Saturn V, which was a staggeringly large launch vehicle, for the time but also to this day, with a carrying capacity of more than 300,000 pounds, which is more than 136,000 kg, and a height of 363 feet, which is around 111 meters and is about as tall as a 36-story building and 60 feet taller than the Statue of Liberty.
Because of that size, the Saturn V was able to get stuff, and people, into orbit and beyond—this was the vehicle that got humans to the Moon—at a dramatically reduced cost, compared to other options at the time, typically weighing in at something like $5,400 per kg; and again, that’s compared to $118,500 per kg just 6 years earlier, with the Scout platform.
So one of the key approaches to reducing the cost of lifting stuff out of Earth’s gravity well so it could be shuffled around in space, in some rare cases beyond Earth orbit, but usually to somewhere within that orbit, as is the case with satellites and space stations, has been to just lift more stuff all at once. And in this context, using the currently available and time-tested methods for chucking things into space, at least, that means using larger rockets, or big rocket arrays composed of many smaller rockets, which then boost a huge vehicle out of Earth’s gravity well, usually by utilizing several stages which can burn up some volume of fuel before breaking off the spacecraft, which reduces the amount of weight it’s carrying and allows secondary and in some cases tertiary boosters to then kick in and burn their own fuel.
The Soviet Union briefly managed to usurp the Saturn V’s record for being the cheapest rocket platform in the mid-1980s with its Zenit 2 medium-sized rocket, but the Zenit 2 was notoriously fault-ridden and it suffered a large number of errors and explosions, which made it less than ideal for most use-cases.
The Long March 3B, built by the Chinese in the mid-1990s got close to the Saturn V’s cost-efficiency record, managing about $6,200 per kg, but it wasn’t until 2010 that a true usurper to that cost-efficiency crown arrived on the scene in the shape of the Falcon 9, built by US-based private space company SpaceX.
The Falcon 9 was also notable, in part, because it was partially reusable from the beginning: it had a somewhat rocky start, and if the US government hadn’t been there to keep giving SpaceX contracts as it worked through its early glitches, the Falcon 9 may not have survived to become the industry-changing product that it eventually became, but once it got its legs under it and stopped blowing up all the time, the Falcon 9 showed itself capable of carrying payloads of around 15,000 pounds, which is just over 7000 kgs into orbit using a two-stage setup, and remarkably, and this also took a little while to master, but SpaceX did eventually make it common enough to be an everyday thing, the Falcon 9’s booster, which decouples from the rocket after the first stage of the launch, can land, vertically, intact and ready for refurbishment.
That means these components, which are incredibly expensive, could be reused rather than discarded, as had been the case with every other rocket throughout history. And again, while it took SpaceX some time to figure out how to make that work, they’ve reached a point, today, where at least one booster has been used 22 times, which represents an astonishing savings for the company, which it’s then able to pass on to its customers, which in turn allows it to outcompete pretty much everyone else operating in the private space industry, as of the second-half of 2024.
The cost to lift stuff into orbit using a Falcon 9 is consequently something like $2,700 per kg, about half of what the Saturn V could claim for the same.
SpaceX is not the only company using reusable spacecraft, though.
Probably the most well-known reusable spacecraft was NASA’s Space Shuttle, which was built by Rockwell International and flown from the early 1980s until 2011, when the last shuttle was retired.
These craft were just orbiters, not really capable of sending anyone or anything beyond low Earth orbit, and many space industry experts and researchers consider them to be a failure, the consequence of bureaucratic expediency and NASA budget cuts, rather than solid engineering or made-for-purpose utility—but they did come to symbolize the post-Space Race era in many ways, as while the Soviet, and then the successor Russian space program continued to launch rockets in a more conventional fashion, we didn’t really see much innovation in this industry until SpaceX came along and started making their reusable components, dramatically cutting costs and demonstrating that rockets capable of carrying a lot of stuff and people could be made and flown at a relatively low cost, and we thus might be standing at the precipice of a new space race sparked by private companies and cash-strapped government agencies that can, despite that relatively lack of resources, compared to the first space race, at least, can still get quite a bit done because of those plummeting expenses.
What I’d like to talk about today is a reusable spacecraft being made by another well-known aerospace company, but one that has had a really bad decade or so, and which is now suffering the consequences of what seems to have been a generation of bad decisions.
—
Boeing is a storied, sprawling corporation that builds everything from passenger jets to missiles and satellites.
It’s one of the US government’s primary defense contractors, and it makes about half of all the commercial airliners on the planet.
Boeing has also, in recent years, been at the center of a series of scandals, most of them tied to products that don’t work as anticipated, and in some cases which have failed to work in truly alarming, dangerous, and even deadly ways.
I did a bonus episode on Boeing back in January of this year, so I won’t go too deep into the company’s history or wave of recent problems, but the short version is that although Boeing has worked cheek-to-jowl with the US and its allies’ militaries since around WWII, and was already dominating aspects of the burgeoning airline industry several decades before that, it merged with a defense contractor called McDonnell Douglas in the late-1990s, and in the early 2000s it began to reorganize its corporate setup in such a way that financial incentives began to influence its decision-making more than engineering necessities.
In other words, the folks in charge of Boeing made a lot of money for themselves and for many of their shareholders, but those same decisions led to a lot of inefficiencies and a drop in effectiveness and reliability throughout their project portfolio, optimizing for the size of their bank account and market cap, rather than the quality of their products, basically.
Consequently, their renowned jetliners, weapons offerings, and space products began to experience small and irregular, but then more sizable and damaging flaws and disruptions, probably the most public of which was the collection of issues built into their 737 MAX line of jets, two of which crashed in 2018 and 2019, killing 346 people and resulting in the grounding of 387 of their aircraft.
A slew of defects were identified across the MAX line by 2020, and an investigation by the US House found that employee concerns, reported to upper-management, went ignored or unaddressed, reinforcing the sense that the corporate higher-ups were disconnected from the engineering component of the company, and that they were fixated almost entirely on profits and their own compensation, rather than the quality of what they were making.
All of which helps explain what’s happening with one of Boeing’s key new offerings, a partially reusable spacecraft platform called the Starliner.
The Starliner went into early development in 2010, when NASA asked companies like Boeing to submit proposals for a Commercial Crew Program that would allow the agency to offload some of its human spaceflight responsibilities to private companies in the coming decades.
One of the contract winners was SpaceX’s Crew Dragon platform, but Boeing also won a contract with its Starliner offering in 2014, which it planned to start testing in 2017, though that plan was delayed, the first unmanned Orbital Flight Test arriving nearly 3 years later, at the tail-end of 2019, and even then, the craft experienced all sorts of technical issues along the way, including weak parachute systems, flammable tape, and valves that kept getting stuck.
It was two more years before the company launched the second test flight, and there were more delays leading up to the Starliner’s first Crew Flight Test, during which it would carry actual humans for the first time.
That human-carrying flight launched on June 5 of 2024, and it carried two astronauts to the International Space Station—though it experienced thruster malfunctions on the way up, as it approached the ISS, and after several months of investigation, the Starliner capsule still attached to the Station all that time, it was determined that it was too risky for those two astronauts to return to Earth in the Starliner.
That brings us to where we are now, a situation in which there are two astronauts aboard the ISS, in low Earth orbit, who were meant to stay for just over a week, but who will now remain there, stranded in space, for a total of around eight months, as NASA decided that it wasn’t worth the risk putting them on the Starliner again until they could figure out what went wrong, so they’ll be bringing Starliner back to earth, remotely, unmanned, and the stranded astronauts will return to Earth on a SpaceX Crew Dragon craft that is scheduled to arrived in September of this year, and which will return to Earth six months in the future; that craft was originally intended to have four astronauts aboard when it docks with the ISS, but two of those astronauts will be bumped so there will be room for the two who are stranded when it returns, next year.
All of which is incredibly embarrassing for Boeing, which again, has already had a truly horrible double-handful of years, reputationally, and which now has stranded astronauts in space because of flaws in its multi-billion-dollar spacecraft, and those astronauts will now need to be rescued, by a proven and reliable craft built by its main in-space competitor, SpaceX.
One of the key criticisms of NASA and the way it’s operated over the past several decades, from the shuttle era onward, essentially, is that it’s really great at creating jobs and honorable-sounding positions for bureaucrats, and for getting government money into parts of the country that otherwise wouldn’t have such money, because that spending can be funneled to manufacturing hubs that otherwise don’t have much to manufacture, but it’s not great at doing space stuff, and hasn’t been for a while; that’s the general sense amongst many in this industry and connected industries, at least.
This general state of affairs allowed SpaceX to become a huge player in the global launch industry—the dominant player, arguably, by many metrics—because it invested a bunch of money to make reusable spacecraft components, and has used that advantage to claim a bunch of customers from less-reliable and more expensive competitors, and then it used that money to fund increasingly efficient and effective products, and side-projects like the satellite-based internet platform, Starlink.
This has been enabled, in part, by government contracts, but while Boeing and its fellow defense contractors, which have long been tight-knit with the US and other governments, have used such money to keep their stock prices high and to invest in lobbyists and similar relationship-reinforcing assets, SpaceX and a few similar companies have been stepping in, doing pretty much everything better, and have thus gobbled up not just the client base of these older entities, but also significantly degraded their reputations by showing how things could be done if they were to invest differently and focus on engineering quality over financial machinations; Boeing arguably should have been the one to develop the Falcon 9 system, but instead an outsider had to step in and make that happen, because of how the incentives in the space launch world work.
One of the big concerns, now, is that Boeing will retreat from its contract with NASA, leaving the agency with fewer options in terms of ISS resupply and astronaut trips, but also in terms of longer-term plans like returning to the Moon and exploring the rest of the solar system.
Lacking industry competition, NASA could become more and more reliant on just one player, or just a few, and that’s arguably what led to the current situation with Boeing—its higher-ups knew they would get billions from the government on a regular basis whatever they did, no matter how flawed their products and delayed their timelines, and that led to a slow accretion of bad habits and perverse incentives.
There’s a chance the same could happen to SpaceX and other such entities, over time, if they’re able to kill off enough of their competition so that they become the de facto, go to option, rather than the best among many choices, which they arguably are for most such purposes at the moment.
And because Boeing seems unlikely to be able to fulfill its contract with NASA, which will necessitate flying six more Starliner missions to the ISS, before the International Space Station is retired in 2030, this raises the question of whether the company will move forward with the reportedly expensive investments that will be necessary to get its Starliner program up to snuff.
It’s already on the hook for about $1.6 billion just to pay for various delays and cost overruns the project has accrued up till this point, and that doesn’t include all the other investments that might need to be made to fulfill that contract, so they could look at the short-term money side of this and say, basically, we’re ceding this aspect of the aerospace world to younger, hungrier companies, and we’ll just keep on collecting the reliable dollars we know we’ll get from the US military each year, no questions asked.
We could then see Boeing leave the race for what looks to be the next space-related government contract bonanza, which will probably be related to NASA’s smaller, more modular space station ambitions; the ISS may get a second-wind and be maintained past 2030, but either way NASA is keen to hire private companies to launch larger craft into low Earth orbit for long-term habitation, supplies and crew for these mini space-stations shuttled back and forth by companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin, the latter of which is a direct competitor to SpaceX owned by Amazon founder Jeff Bezos.
Boeing has been tapped by Blue Origin to help keep their in-orbit assets supplied under that new paradigm, but it could be that they show themselves incapable of safely and reliably doing so, and that could open up more opportunities for other, smaller entities in this space, if they can figure out how to compete with the increasingly dominant SpaceX, but it could, again, also result in a new monopoly or monopsony controlled by just a few companies, which then over time will have to fight the urge to succumb to the save perverse incentives that seem to be weighing on Boeing.
Show Notes
https://www.npr.org/2024/03/20/1239132703/boeing-timeline-737-max-9-controversy-door-plug
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Starliner
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing
https://arstechnica.com/space/2024/08/after-latest-starliner-setback-will-boeing-ever-deliver-on-its-crew-contract/
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/24/science/nasa-boeing-starliner-astronauts.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scout_(rocket_family)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saturn_V
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zenit-2
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_March_3B
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-space-launches-low-earth-orbit
https://www.cradleofaviation.org/history/history/saturn-v-rocket.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_orbiter
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reusable_spacecraft
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spaceplane
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9
This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe
Axis of Disorder
mardi 25 juin 2024 • Duration 18:45
This week we talk about China, Russia, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
We also discuss BRICS, North Korea, and the post-WWII global world order.
Recommended Book: Supercommunicators by Charles Duhigg
Transcript
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO, is a defense and economic alliance that was started by China and Russia back in 2001, and which has since expanded to become the largest regional organization in the world in terms of both land area and population, encompassing something like 80% of Eurasia, and 40% of the global population, as of 2020.
The SCO also boasts about 20% of global GDP between its member nations, which originally included the governments of its precursor regional alliance, the Shanghai Five, which formed back in 1996: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
With the evolution of that group into the SCO, though, Uzbekistan joined the club, and in 2017 it allowed India and Pakistan in, as well. Iran joined in 2023, and the list of observer and dialogue partner nations is pretty big, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Cambodia, Egypt, Kuwait, the Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the UAE.
The original purpose of the Shanghai Five, which was inherited by the SCO, was to increase trust and diplomatic relationships between these nations, which otherwise have a lot of potential enemies surrounding them on all sides—this is why the advice to never fight a land war in Asia is so well-taken: there's just a lot of land and a lot of borders and pretty much everyone who's tried, with few exceptions, has found themselves depleted by the effort.
Thus, while there are other components to the SCO, member countries' agreement to respect each others' borders, including opposition to intervention in other countries—invading them, messing with their politics, criticizing their approach to human rights, etc—the sovereignty issue is the big one here, with making sure that everyone involved is diplomatically tied-up with everyone else in a close second, so member states can focus on the borders that present the most risk, and invest less attention and resources on the borders they share with their fellow members.
That said, the SCO also includes mechanisms that allow member nations to work together on big projects, like transportation infrastructure that passes through or benefits more than one country, and fighting local terrorist organizations. It also allows them to integrate some aspects of their monetary and banking infrastructure, among other ties, so there's an economic component to these relationships.
Another intergovernmental organization that likewise encompasses a significant chunk of the global population, landmass, and economic activity is BRICS, which is an acronym that was originally coined to gesture at the economic potential of the then-burgeoning economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, but which in recent years has expanded to also include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE.
BRICS nations hold about 30% of the world's territory, 45% of its population, and pull in about 33% of global GDP, based on purchasing power parity.
And BRICS has long served as a sort of counterweight to global institutions that often seem to favor the world's wealthiest and most powerful nations, many of which are Western nations, like those of North America and Europe.
So while the G7's expanded iteration, the G20, brings nations like Brazil, India, and Indonesia into the conversation, the majority of the power in such institutions—and this includes institutions like the UN, because of who holds vetoes and soft power influence within those organizations—the majority of the power is still typically held by the world's currently most influential and wealthy governments.
And BRICS, from the beginning, included those nations that were assumed to become the most powerful, or at least equally powerful nations, by many metrics, in ten or twenty or thirty years, based on demographics, economic growth, and so on.
Both of these groupings, then, are attempts to lash together the governments of nations that are on favorable growth trajectories, or otherwise in interesting, upward-moving positions by various metrics, or which are located in areas that would benefit from some kind of unity, but which aren't always given the respect they believe they deserve within other globe-straddling organizations; in some cases because they're simply not there yet, in others because their governments are a bit more authoritarian, while entities like the UN, while including everyone, tend to favor democracies.
What I'd like to talk about today is another loose grouping of nations that seems to be forming, and which, while it doesn't have an official designation or even membership roster yet, is becoming increasingly well-defined, collaborative, and active.
—
The geopolitical, military, and news analysis community has been struggling, over the past handful of years in particular, to come up with a monicker for a loosely defined, but increasingly impactful cluster of nations that are oriented, in part, around disrupting the current global status quo, including but not limited to the rule of law and establishment through which international things are typically handled that arose in the wake of WWII.
Following that conflict, the US and the Soviet Union scrambled to figure out how to deal with each other in ways that didn't lead to, at first, conventional war, and then in a relatively short period of time, nuclear war, and that led to a flurry of geopolitical activity that culminated in the creation of, among other things, of the United Nations, which itself birthed a huge stack of other organizations and protocols, most of which favored those who were willing to play ball within these institutions, and made life a little more difficult for those who defied them; North Korea, for instance, following its formation after the Korean War, is famously excluded from a lot of the benefits of belonging to the modern international order, in large part because it's made it pretty clear it intends to do away with its neighbor to the south, and maybe the US and other perceptual enemies, as well, the first chance it gets.
The group that analysts have been trying to label centers around China and Russia, but usually includes Iran, as well, and in some cases North Korea, as well. Iran's many proxy groups, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Gaza, are also sometimes thus categorized.
Some of the proposed labels have been clear and illustrative, others have been a little in the weeds—like the acronym CRANKs, which kinda sorta stands for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, the Axis of Upheaval, the Axis of Autocracy, and in some more western and patriotic publications, the New Axis of Evil, and even the Legion of Doom, which arguably makes this group seem pretty hardcore, but I guess it still gets the intended point across.
I personally like one that was posited by a writer for the American Enterprise Institute, the Axis of Disorder, as while there's still a fairly biased reference to the WWII Axis powers in there, which depending on whose side you're on and which governments you support, could be construed as an unfair comparison, but it also points at the seeming purpose of a lot of this group's actions, which seem to orient around disrupting the current world order—that one that was implemented post-WWII.
And the seeming rationale for this is that this post-WWII order was established to favor nations with capitalistic economies and democratic values, including things like human rights, freedom of the press, freedom of worship, and the like; and while there's absolutely room for argument as to how well various nations uphold those values on a country-to-country basis, and across time, few would argue that China has a better reputation for human rights than Sweden, or that Iran has a better record for equality between the sexes than the UK.
So we live in a world, today, that's shaped by a bunch of values that these loosely grouped oppositional nations don't really agree with, at least not to the degree that other nations think they should, and a lot of the levers of power are currently in other hands. And they believe, well, why shouldn't we hold those levers? Why shouldn't China have the economic power the US has? Why shouldn't Iran be as geopolitically influential as Germany? Why shouldn't North Korea be in charge of something like the UN?
And on top of that, why should the US and its allies hold the reins of so many sanctions-related powers? Why should the USD and its vast underpinnings grant one nation, and its allies, so many benefits, while the rest of the world is forced to play ball and toe the line—play ball according to rules set by the US and those who believe similar things, and toe lines they draw according to their preferences—lest they find themselves, like Iran and North Korea, and increasingly, now, Russia, sanctioned into oblivion?
It's a fair question, if you are ambivalent about those aforementioned human rights and press freedoms and such.
And these governments, not really liking those limitations on their behaviors and how they run things, are doing what they can, in a loosely affiliated way, to disrupt these enforcement institutions and the powers and nations they support.
So part of the strategy of this group is fairly direct and unambiguous: they playact toeing the line a lot of the time, but when they think they can get away with it.
Some of these raw acts of violation, though, would seem to be performed with the intention of making people question those institutions and powers, and the larger order they add up to, which could, over time, bring some of the nations that are sitting on the sidelines over to their, oppositional side; courting those of the so-called nonaligned movement, basically, of which there are officially around 120, though about 25 of them are highly desirable allies that have become transactional in their dealings with members of both sides of this simmering conflict, with the roughly delineated west on one side, and that of China and Russia and their allies on the other.
The economist actually called this group the Transactional 25, to T25, which is a nicely illustrative monicker, and that group includes nations as big as India and as small, but increasingly diplomatically important, as Qatar.
So when the Houthis shut down the Red Sea passage to the Suez Canal, disrupting global trade, and when North Korea provides ammunition to Russia for use during its invasion of Ukraine, these are actions that are beneficial to these groups unto themselves—the Houthis gain more attention and recruits, and get to hurt, ostensibly at least, Israel and its allies, and North Korea gets more trade with Russia, while also helping set a precedent for invading and claiming a neighboring country, which is something they're very interested in doing at some point—but they're also actions that show the weakness of the current global system and the folks running it, which could, over time, nudge more nations over to their side.
This isn't just theory: this is something we've already seen play out in parts of Africa, where Russia's Wagner mercenaries have been subbed-in for US and UN troops, for defending against extremist militants purposes, and we've seen other T25 nations in particular wobble on various, global-scale issues, to the point that it's a big question who India, who Indonesia, who Vietnam, who Israel would support if push came to shove and a global conflict broke out, or if some kind of geopolitical movement arose, intending to fundamentally alter institutions like the UN—who would these sideline-sitters throw in their lot with?
These disruptions, in some ways, are arguments in favor of siding with the group that's trying to upend the way things are currently done, by showing the fragility of that existing system.
This new Axis of Disorder, or whatever we want to call it, is not a fully unified front, however. Neither is what they're positioning themselves against, members of the UN, EU, NATO, and every other group regularly squabbling with each other; but the rifts between China and Russia are huge, with China becoming increasingly dominant over Russia, Russia's economy becoming more and more reliant on their neighbor, and that's created tensions within both countries, alongside existing concerns about the vast border they share.
Likewise, North Korea worries pretty much everyone, and Russia's recent announcement of a defense pact with them has raised a lot of eyebrows, including in China. And while Iran has gained a lot of prestige in Russia recently, for the cheap and functional drones and rockets they offer, their ongoing tensions with regional neighbors that China and Russia would like to get closer to, like Saudi Arabia, makes them a bit of a liability, as much as an asset, and the actions they help their proxies take (like the Houthis in the Red Sea) are not ideal for shipping giant China.
So there's a lot of scuffling and below-the-surface tension between the members of this so-called axis, and while they're doing an arguably solid job, so far, of testing the limits of the current system, and publicly airing its weak points, that doesn't mean they're set up for anything more substantial than that kind of testing the fence, seeing what they can get away with, asymmetric warfare sort of approach to this ambition.
They're not as tight as the loosely defined west, then, but it also behooves them to keep things in the grey area, in some ways, lest they trigger alarm bells throughout those systems they're trying to throw off, so that looseness might serve them more than hinder them, at this point. It also allows them to work with grey-area members of this group, like Venezuela and Cuba, which periodically make nice with their western opposition, while still fighting against them at the macro-scale.
Probably the biggest impact this group is having right now, though, with all that testing and vulnerability identifying, is increasing the number of threat surfaces the world faces, in terms of hacking and snooping and stealing, but also in terms of provoking military actions and threatening more of the same.
Russia invading Ukraine was a big deal, and China threatening to invade Taiwan could be even bigger; and both of those acts, alongside all of the hacking they do, the stealing of intellectual property, the leaking of state secrets, and the messing with foreign elections, are all violations of what's supposed to be good and proper and allowed within that global system.
And because they're pushing all those buttons all at once, they're spreading the response capability of the other side pretty thin, which could be a precursor to a more direct attack, but it could also just be a means of weakening that system, wearing it out to the point that it no longer functions even at the imperfect level it was at before, which could, over time, make way for some new model, run by a new set of hands.
Show Notes
https://archive.ph/bOr06
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/meet-cranks-how-china-russia-iran-and-north-korea%C2%A0align-against-america-211186
https://thehill.com/opinion/4094000-iran-just-joined-a-pact-with-moscow-and-beijing-heres-what-it-means-for-the-us/
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/22/world/asia/putin-korea-china-disruption.html
https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/the-axis-off-kilter-why-an-iran-russia-china-axis-is-shakier-than-meets-the-eye/
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2024/03/18/how-china-russia-and-iran-are-forging-closer-ties
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine
https://www.aei.org/articles/the-axis-of-disorder-how-russian-iran-and-china-want-to-remake-the-world/
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/never_fight_a_land_war_in_Asia
https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zynt2nb/revision/3
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_Independent_States
https://archive.ph/xVbrh
https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zynt2nb/revision/3
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRICS
This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe
Russia's Invasion
mardi 27 septembre 2022 • Duration 33:09
This week we talk about Ukraine, Putin, and political expediency.
We also discuss protests, conscription, and NATO.
Show notes / transcript: https://letsknowthings.com/episode331
This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe
Frontier Mining
mardi 20 septembre 2022 • Duration 22:11
This week we talk about lithium, nodules, and helium-3.
We also discuss the deep ocean, The Metals Company, and obscure regulatory bodies.
Show notes / transcript: https://letsknowthings.com/episode330
This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe
Apple Ads
mardi 13 septembre 2022 • Duration 21:45
This week we talk about the iPhone, App Tracking Transparency, and privacy.
We also discuss iOS, Android, and digital online advertising.
Show notes / transcript: https://letsknowthings.com/episode329
This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe
Hydro Power
mardi 6 septembre 2022 • Duration 23:23
This week we talk about Sichuan, hydroelectricity, and failure cascades.
We also discuss droughts, heat waves, and virtual power plants.
Show notes / transcript: https://letsknowthings.com/episode328
This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe
DALL-E 2
mardi 30 août 2022 • Duration 24:46
This week we talk about OpenAI, AlphaFold, and centaurs.
We also discuss GPT-3, CLIP, and Photoshop.
Show notes / transcript: https://letsknowthings.com/episode327
This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe
Other Conflicts
mardi 23 août 2022 • Duration 26:43
This week we talk about Yemen, Syria, and Ethiopia.
We also discuss the Mexican Drug War, Myanmar, and Ukraine.
Show notes / transcript: https://letsknowthings.com/episode326
This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe
Franchises
mardi 16 août 2022 • Duration 24:10
This week we talk about Marvel, the Gray Man, and cinematic universes.
We also discuss sequels, remakes, and spin-offs.
Show notes / transcript: https://letsknowthings.com/episode325
This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe