Study Guide

After suggesting that one can learn from Rabbi Meir's opinion about melika of a bird that is a treifa, that one can learn a binyan av from a kal va'chomer in kodashim, sacrificial items, the Gemara rejects this explanation because it is derived from chulin, not kodashim.

Can one derive a law through a binyan av and then use another method of hermeneutics to derive something else? The Gemara only suggests an answer for a binyan av on a binyan av, but that answer is rejected since the method of derivation in the braita does not make sense. It must be derived from a verse in the Torah, Vayikra 2:6, and the braita is just being used as an asmachta.

The remainder of the blood of the inner offerings is poured on the base of the altar on the western side. This is derived from Vayikra 4:7 where it states, "opposite the entrance to Ohel Moed," which refers to the exit of the sanctuary, which is by the western side of the altar.

In Vayikra chapter 4, the phrase "pour on the base of the altar" is mentioned for three different sacrifices. Each one teaches a different law relating either to the base of the altar or to the pouring of the remainder. The Gemara explains why these verses were available to be extrapolated and were not necessary for their straightforward meaning.

Study Guide

The Gemara explores various hermeneutical methods used to derive halakhic laws - juxtaposition (hekesh), gezeira shava (verbal analogy), kal va'chomer (a fortiori reasoning), and binyan av (paradigm from precedent). It raises the question: can a law derived through one method serve as the basis for further derivation, either by the same method or a different one? They systematically examine each possible permutation, presenting logical arguments and textual proofs to evaluate the validity and limitations of such compound derivations. Importantly, this entire discussion is confined to laws pertaining to sacrificial items (kodashim) alone.

Study Guide

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Rebbi) interprets the first mention of "bull" in Vayikra 4:20 as referring to the bull offering of Yom Kippur, even though the verse's context concerns the communal sin offering. According to Rebbi, this verse teaches that the Yom Kippur bull is comparable to the bull brought by the kohen gadol who sins, referenced by the second mention of "bull" in the same verse.

Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with Rebbi, arguing that the laws of the Yom Kippur bull can be derived through kal va'chomer (a fortiori) reasoning. However, the kal va'chomer argument he proposes is not fully spelled out in the text, and the Gemara clarifies which cases are being referenced and what laws are derived.

Since Rabbi Yishmael does not interpret the word "bull" as referring to the Yom Kippur offering, but rather to the communal sin offering, the question arises: why use the term "bull" instead of simply saying "it"? Rav Pappa explains that the unnecessary word comes to teach a law not explicitly stated in the verses about the communal offering, but found in the kohen gadol's sin offering - that the lobe of the liver and the kidneys are burned on the altar. Although this law could have been derived by juxtaposition, the inclusion of the word "bull" makes it as though it were written explicitly, which then allows it to be used to derive the same law by juxtaposition to the communal sin offering for idol worship.

A braita is brought to support Rav Pappa's explanation and shows how the juxtaposition between the communal sin offering and the communal offering for idol worship (from Bamidbar 15:25) is established. However, another braita derives the juxtaposition from the verse in Vayikra 4:20. Both derivations are considered necessary, as each teaches a different law.

Rebbi's position is cited earlier to support Rav Pappa's explanation that the word "bull" serves to compare the Yom Kippur bull to the kohen gadol's sin offering for specific laws derived from the words "et," "b'dam," and "taval." However, Rebbi himself states that the comparison teaches that all the laws are the same, not just those three. This discrepancy is explained as stemming from two different tannaitic positions.

Two braitot from the school of Rabbi Yishmael are brought, each explaining why certain words or laws appear only in the kohen gadol's sin offering and not in the communal one. Both are interpreted through parables that reflect God's relationship with His people.

Finally, a Mishna in Menachot presents a debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding whether a pigul (disqualifying intent) during the taking of the handful of the meal offering, but not during the taking of the frankincense (or vice versa), renders the offering pigul. Reish Lakish explains Rabbi Meir's position: the offering becomes pigul not because intent during part of the matir (the enabling act) can render an offering pigul, but because later actions follow the original intent. That is, if improper intent occurred during the first stage, and the second stage was performed without intent, the second stage is still governed by the initial thought. Reish Lakish supports this interpretation by asserting that our Mishna must align with Rabbi Meir's view. However, Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzchak disagrees and interprets the Mishna according to the rabbis' position.

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of Faye Darack, one of Hadran's dedicated learners who passed away yesterday. Yehi zichra baruch.

Beit Shamai holds that if one sanctified something by mistake, it is effective. Beit Hillel disagree. An example is brought in the Mishna of one who said that the first black ox to leave my house will be sanctified and a white ox left the house first. Or the first gold coin to come in my hand, or the first wine barrel and silver came first or a barrel of oil. Beit Shamai holds it is sanctified, Beit Hillel says it is not. There are three explanations in the Gemara regarding the details of the case and what in fact becomes sanctified according to Beit Shamai - is it the white one or the first black one that came out? What is the "mistake"? Was the declaration referring to what will happen or what did happen? Difficulties are raised on each of the interpretations and are resolved. Rav Chisda said that white bulls are superior to black bulls. This assumption is questioned from our Mishna and also from a different statement of Rav Chisda. In order to reconcile this, they distinguish between bulls in the Kerman Province where white bulls are superior, and everywhere else where black bulls are superior. The Mishna discusses what happens to animals that were sanctified by someone who was a nazir but then dissolved his vow. The halacha is that the animals are no longer sanctified. Beit Hillel uses this to argue against Beit Shamai as they claimed that mistaken sanctification is effective. Beit Shamai retorts that how can Beit Hillel explain the law regarding animal tithes as if one mistakenly counts the 9th or 11th as the tenth, it is sanctified. Beit Hillel claims that it is derived from a verse in the Torah and is therefore specific just for that specific type of error.

Study Guide Nazir 30

In what situation can a child take the money his father set aside for nazir offerings and use it for his own nazir sacrifices? Rabbi Yosi says it is only when following the father's death the son decided to become a nazir and use his father's money, but not if the father and son were both nazirs before the father's death. This rule applies only to sons and not to daughters. According to Rabbi Yochanan it is a halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai. Why does Rabbi Yochanan need to explain this, isn't it obvious that this halacha relates to sons and not to daughters as sons can inherit and daughters do not? It is necessary to apply the law in a case when a man only had daughters to teach that it is not based on inheritance laws but on halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai. Do the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yosi? A source is brought to prove that they disagree and permit both scenarios. Are these laws connected to inheritance in some way? If two sons both want to take on being a nazir, do they share the money or does the first one to become a nazir and say he will use the money get exclusive rights? If one is a firstborn does he get a double portion? Do these laws only apply to a regular type of nazir or is it also applicable to one who takes on a nazir olam? If the father set aside the money for the completion of his nazirite term before he died and the son became an impure nazir and wanted to use it for the sacrifices brought for a nazir who became impure or vice-versa, could he? All these questions remain unanswered.

Study Guide Nazir 29

This week's learning is dedicated by Phyllis & Yossie Hecht in memory of Phyllis's father's 14th yahrzeit, l'zecher HaRav Yerachmiel Binyanim ben Zalman Tzvi Witkin. "Jerry Witkin, as he was affectionately known to all, was a true source of nachat to his friends, family and clal yisrael. Dad was a friend to all, activist and champion of causes and sameach b'chelko. As this week is Parshat Terumah, Dad only knew had to give and never learned how to take. It is so appropriate to commemorate this part of Adar in your memory as the yahrzeit is the first day of Rosh Chodesh Adar. Meshenichnas Adar Marbim B'Simcha! Dad was a baal koreh par excellence since he was 11 years old-and on Purim was the baal koreh of Megilat Esther which brought joy to so many. Your legacy of 6 children, 29 grandchildren and ever growing great-grandchildren - all Torah Jews continues to live on. You are so missed and we have been so blessed. Yehi Zichro Baruch."

Why can a man make his son become a nazir but a woman cannot? Rabbi Yochanan says it is a halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai. Reish Lakish says it is because it is part of the father's obligation of chinuch (education) for his son. Seven questions are brought against Reish Lakish's opinion including, why wouldn't a woman also be obligated to educate her child, why wouldn't it apply to daughters as well, and how can the relatives protest the father's educating of his child. In answer to the seventh question, the Gemara assumes that Reish Lakish holds like Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda that by Torah law one does not need to slaughter birds. A question is raised against that as it seems from another source that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda does hold birds need proper slaughtering by Torah law. But, in the end, it can be explained that the other source was referring to rabbinic law. It is suggested that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish's debate between Rebbi and Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the cut-off age at which a father can no longer take on a nazirite vow for his son. But that suggestion is rejected. Rebbi and Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda have the same debate as Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yosi as found in the Tosefta Nidda 5:6.

Study Guide Nazir 28

Today's daf is sponsored by Savta Becki Goldstein in honor of her two eldest grandsons chayalim Eitan Efrayim and Gilad Yoel on their twentieth birthdays. "With gratitude to Hashem for the z'chut of reaching this milestone with them. Our wishes for briut and simcha and hatzlacha in their endeavors and may Hashem keep them safe and all our chayalim. Amen."

A woman who was a nazir and separated animals for her sacrifice and then her husband nullified the vow, what happens to those animals? It depends on whether the money used to purchase the animals was her husband's money or her own. If it was his, the animals are no longer sanctified. If it was her own money, the one designated for the sin offering is left to die, the burnt and peace offerings are offered as voluntary offerings. But the peace offering has unique laws - it can only be eaten for one day, like the nazirite peace offering but is not eaten with loaves of unleavened bread that usually accompany the nazirite offering. If she had just designated money for the animals, all that money is used to purchase voluntary offerings. If she had designated money and specified what would be purchased with the money, the same concept applies as before - the money for the sin offering is sent to the Dead Sea as it cannot be used for anything, the money for the burnt and peace offerings are used to buy voluntary burnt and peace offerings as per the details in the earlier case. There is a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis about whether a husband is obligated to pay for his wife's sacrifices by a commitment written in the ketuba. Which one of these opinions fits in with our Mishna regarding the husband who gave money to his wife for sacrifices? Two different versions are brought of a debate regarding this issue between Rav Chisda and Rava. What would be a scenario where she would have her own money to purchase the sacrifices? Avuha bar Ihi listed four cases in which a nazir peace offering is brought without the accompanying loaves. What are the four cases? Are there not more? What about a nazir sacrifice that was slaughtered incorrectly (either not for the sake of the right sacrifice or it was a an animal in its first year, instead of its second year of life.

Today's daf is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the refuah shleima of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah and their daughter, Tamar Davida bat Sarah Leah.

If a woman becomes a nazir and her husband nullifies the vow without her knowledge and she drinks wine not knowing that she is no longer a nazir, she does not get lashes by Torah law. However, Rabbi Yehuda adds that she gets lashes by rabbinic law as she intended to go against the law. A braita brings a verse from which this law is derived and Rabbi Akiva learns from there that since one who intended to sin but didn't sin is punished, how much more so one who intended to sin and actually sinned. Two other verses are brought to show how severe it is for one who intentionally sinned from that fact that one needs to atone for sins that one is not even sure they committed as in a case of doubt whether one ate a piece of permitted fat or forbidden fat from an animal (both in a case where there was one piece and it wasn't clear if it was permitted or forbidden, and a case where there were two pieces, one permitted and one forbidden and the person isn't sure which one they ate from). Why was it necessary to mention all three cases? Regarding intent, sometimes different people can do that same action but for righteous people, it will be a righteous act and for the sinner it will be a sinful act. There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about what would be a good example of this. After raising an issue with Reish Lakish's opinion, a suggestion is made that the episode with Lot and his daughters is a good example of this as they did it with good intentions and he did not. How do we know that he did not have the right intentions? Wasn't he forced into it as he was drunk? They prove how we know that Lot sinned intentionally and he is ultimately punished by Jews not being allowed to marry males from Amon and Moab, his descendants. Tamar and Zimri are brought as further examples of how the same action could be used for a positive reason and for a negative reason. Tamar was rewarded with kings and prophets and Zimri was punished as thousands of Jews were killed. A discussion ensues about one who sins for the sake of  Heaven and one who does a mitzva not for the sake of Heaven - which is more valuable? The example of Yael and Sisra is brought regarding a sin for the sake of Heaven.

This week's learning is sponsored by Ruth Rotenberg "in commemoration of our daughter, Tanielle Gavre'ea Margalit's yahrzeit. Hard to believe it is 18 years. You continue to live within us and inspire us and so many others. Thank you to Rabbanit Farber for your tireless and inspired teaching and leadership."

Two more sources  (altogether five. including the sources on Nazir 21) are brought to answer the question - when a husband nullifies his wife's vow - is it uprooted from when she took the vow or only from the moment of the nullification. The fourth source proves that it is nullified from the beginning but the last source clearly shows that it is only nullified from the moment of nullification. Mar Zutra tried to argue that one could derive from here an answer to a question Rami bar Hama raised about one who forbids an item by connecting it to a piece of meat of a peace offering. Just as the woman's status changes when the husband nullifies her vow (first she is prohibited then permitted), so does the status of the meat change as it is forbidden at first and is permitted to be eaten once the blood is sprinkled. However, there are differing opinions about whether this is an accurate comparison as the meat still maintains a certain level of sanctity, while the woman does not. In the braita previously quoted, Rabbi Shimon differentiated between two cases - one where a woman's friend said "and me" and one where she said, "I will be like you." The Gemara asks what would be the halacha if the friend said "b'ikvayich, in your footsteps?" They try to answer the question from a case in our Mishna where the woman says she will be a nazir and her husband says "and me" (which is equated to "in your footsteps" according to Tosafot as the power to nullify it is in his hands), he cannot nullify it, as if he nullifies, it will cancel his own vow, thus proving that "b'ikvayich, in your footsteps" would cause the second person's vow to be nullified as well. This proof is rejected as it is possible to understand why he can't nullify because when he says "and me" he is ratifying her vow. A difficulty is raised on the case in our Mishna where the husband says "I am a nazir and you?" - if the woman answers yes and he nullifies her vow, he is still a nazir. However, in a braita it says the opposite. This is resolved in two ways.

Study Guide Nazir 21

Reish Lakish held that if one says "I will be a nazir" and another said "and me" and another said "and me", it is effective only if it was said immediately after (toch k'dei dibur). Support for this is brought from a braita. They also try to prove it from the fact that our Mishna listed only two people who responded "and me" and not more. But that answer is rejected as the tanna is not expected to count cases exactly as a peddlers count their wares. If so, why did the tanna not just list one person who said "and me"? Two questions are asked and sources, including our Mishna, are brought to try to answer the question. First question: when each person says "and me" are they connecting their statement to the first person who said they will be a nazir or to the person who said "and me" just before them? The second question is: when a husband nullifies the vows of his wife does it nullify them from the beginning, as if she never vowed, or is it cutting off the vow from right now? Most sources brought to answer the questions are rejected, but in the first question, they find the answer eventually in a braita.

Study Guide Nazir 20

There were different traditions about whether Helene the Queen was a nazir for fourteen years or twenty-one. According to Rabbi Yehuda's version that it was fourteen, was it that she kept seven outside of Israel and then seven more when she got to Israel (and did not become impure to a dead person) as per Beit Hillel's opinion or was it based on Beit Shamai that she added another thirty days when she got to Israel but became impure and then ended to start all over again from the beginning and do seven more? The Gemara first proves it from the language of our Mishna and then also from a braita that it was according to Beit Hillel. If two groups of witnesses disagreed about whether a particular person took upon themselves two terms of being a nazir or five, does that person need to keep two terms as each set of witnesses agreed that the person at least took upon themselves two terms or do we view this as contradictory testimony and no set is believed? Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree. However, there was a different version of the debate that it was in a case where the disagreement was between two witnesses and not two sets of witnesses. But if it were two sets of witnesses, all would agree that they would be required to keep two terms. Rav held that they both agree in a case where the witnesses counted the terms. Rav Hama questions this statement of Rav and the rabbis of Israel agreed with his rejection fo Rav. The Mishna beginning the fourth chapter discusses cases of one who took on being a nazir by saying "and me" to someone who just took upon themselves to be a nazir. If the first one dissolved their vow, the others are dissolved as well. What happens when the situation involves a husband and wife? In what case can or can he not nullify her vow? Reish Lakish says that if one wants to take on being a nazir by saying "and me," it needs to be said immediately after the first person says "I will be a nazir." Rabbi Yehuda Nesia questioned this.

Study Guide Nazir 19

Today's daf is dedicated l'ilui nishmat Chana bat Reb Shimon by her sons, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and all who knew and loved her.

A braita states that a woman who became a nazir, became impure to a dead person and then her husband nullified her vow, after she had separated birds for her sacrifice, she brings the sin offering but not the burnt offering. Rav Chisda connects this source to Rabbi Yishmael's opinion. A further question is asked on the braita: when the husband nullifies her vow, it is retroactive but why does she still need to bring the sin offering? It must accord also with Rabbi Elazar the Kapar who held that anyone who refrains from things such as drinking wine has sinned as one should not cause oneself to suffer. The Gemara refers back to and resolved a language issue in the Mishna and explains important details that weren't spelled out. Rabbi Eliezer required a minimum of two days of being a nazir before becoming impure. Ulla says that he was only referring to a case of one who accepted nezirut in impurity and then left and came back. But if one was a nazir and then became impure, that is not required. Abaye raises a difficulty against Ulla and it is not resolved. Does Rabbi Eliezer mean two full days or partial days? If one took upon oneself a long period of nezirut outside the land of Israel, when one comes to Israel to bring the sacrifices, one has to redo the entire period (Beit Hillel) or perhaps only thirty days (Beit Shamai) in purity in Israel as the rabbis decreed that all land outside of Israel is impure. A story is brought of Helene the Queen who ended up with an incredibly long period of nezirut on account of this law. What is the root of the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai?

Study Guide Nazir 18

In the fourth attempt to answer Rabbi Ashi's question, we find a source explicitly stating that one who vowed to be a nazir while impure does not shave one's hair on the seventh day of purification. Rav Chisda attributes a braita we saw on a previous page a Mishna in Keritut 20b - one to Rebbi and one to Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda - regarding their debate about when a nazir who becomes impure begins their count of nezirut again - on the seventh day of purification or the eighth. What is the basis for their debate? From Rav Chisda's explanation of the Mishna in Keritut, is it possible to understand what he holds about whether the obligation of the sacrifice begins on the night of the eighth or in the morning?  A braita is quoted where two more opinions appear in connection with the dispute we saw between Rebbi and Rabbi Yosi bar Yehuda - from when do you start counting the days? Is it after the sin offering was brought or after the sin and the guilt offering? What is the basis for each opinion and how does each one deal with the verses that the other uses to prove his position?

Study Guide Nazir 17

Today's daf is dedicated for a refuah shleima for Benaya Chaim ben Avital Ora who is undergoing surgery this morning.

After raising several sources against Reish Lakish's opinion, and particularly one that couldn't be resolved, Mar son of Rav Ashi reinterprets the debate between him and Rabbi Yochanan. They both hold that a person who takes upon being a nazir in a cemetery is considered a nazir immediately but there is a debate whether or not they receive lashes if they are warned and do not leave the cemetery right away. The same sources as before are brought as difficulties against Reish Lakish's position. Two are resolved and the third is not. If one vows to be a nazir in the cemetery, Rava asks if there is a certain amount of time that must pass before leaving in order to incur a punishment of lashes (as is the case of one who became impure in the Temple) or is one liable as soon as one does not leave immediately? Rav Ashi asked of one who takes on to be a nazir in a cemetery, do they shave their hair when they finish the seven days of impurity? Two of the sources used against Reish Lakish are brought to try to answer the question but both are rejected. A third source comparing a nazir who became impure and a nazir who became a leper is brought also to answer the question. But, it too is rejected.

Study Guide Nazir 16

Today's daf is sponsored by Joyce Bendavid in honor of Rabbanit Michelle. "Thank you to Rabbanit Michelle Farber for the clarity of your teaching as you motivate us to continue learning the daily daf."

If Rabbi Yossi holds that part of the day is considered a whole day regarding the impurity of a zava, how could one ever become a zava gedola? The Gemara brings two possible answers. The third chapter begins with a description of few different cases of one who took upon oneself to be a nazir either without a specified amount of time or with a specified amount of time. The Mishna explains in each case what is the ideal day for the sacrifices and shaving to take place and what is the law if it was done a day earlier. What if one became impure on the last day or on the day the sacrifices were to be brought? Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree in most cases. The Gemara explains the reasoning for Rabbi Eliezer in each of the different cases. If one takes upon oneself to be a nazir while they are in a cemetery, one is not considered that they became impure as a nazir and does not bring the sacrifices of a nazir who became impure as the nazirite status never began. But if one left and then came back in, even on the day that one became pure again, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer about whether or not they would be obligated in the sacrifices for one who becomes impure. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue about a case where one took upon to be a nazir in a cemetery - would that be effective once they became pure again (Rabbi Yochanan) or would they need only become a nazir if they reaccepted to be a nazir once they became pure? Rabbi Yochanan brings a number of sources to raise difficulties with Reish Lakish's position. The first one is from our Mishna and it is resolved, the second is from a Tosefta and is resolved.

Study Guide Nazir 15

 Today's daf is dedicated to our amazing mom and grandma - Patty Belkin! Love, Jason, Erica, Raquel, Eli, Ariel, and Gili.

Today's daf is dedicated for the rescue and healing of the victims of the earthquake. May we find more living and help more of those displaced. Our thoughts and prayer are with them and their families.

The Gemara proves the words of Rabbi Yossi bar Rabbi Hanina that if the days of a nazir have passed before but one has not yet done the shaving and sacrifices, one would not get lashes for any of the prohibitions – only for becoming impure to the dead. But then a braita is brought to contradict him as it appears there that one would receive lashes for all the prohibitions of a nazir. The Mishna cites a case where one said I will become a nazir when I have a child and I will be a nazir for a hundred days. There are different interpretations of the law of the Mishna. It all depends on whether the child was born before the seventieth day or after. If before, then one doesn't need to count extra days but if after, one does. Rav says that if the child is born on the seventieth day, this day can also be considered the first day of the nazir for the child - according to the law that part of the day can be considered a whole day, and therefore also for the nazir term of a hundred days, it will be counted as two days and one can perform the shaving and sacrifices on the hundredth day and not day one hundred and one. The Gemara brings two difficulties about his words from our Mishna - the first one is resolved but the second one is not. And they conclude that Rav does not agree with our Mishna. The Gemara tries to find a tanna that Rav's opinion corresponds to. First, they suggest Abba Shaul regarding matters of mourning, but that is not successful. Then they try Rabbi  Yossi regarding a zav or zava and the Passover sacrifice. There are two ways to understand his opinion and according to one way, the words of a Rav will correspond to his opinion. 

Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's grandmother, Rabbanit Sara Hene Geffen on her Tu B'Shevat yahrzeit. "She and her husband Rav Tuvia Geffen, Rabbi of Sherith Israel in Atlanta, brought up their 8 children with love and learning."

Rava's question is explained as referring both to a case where one said they will be a nazir in twenty days and a nazir now and also if the second nazirite term was one hundred days instead of the usual thirty. The difference in the cases is whether or not if one starts counting the second term immediately and then stops to count the first term (after twenty days) will there be enough days for hair growth left at the end when finishing the second term? What if one said I will be a nazir after twenty days and now a nazir olam (forever)? Or nazir Shimshon? Nazir olam can be undone (by going to a chacham) but nazir Shimshon cannot - does that make a difference in these cases? If someone took on to be like Moshe on the seventh of Adar (his birthday and his date of death), what was meant by this? In the end, only the first question is answered about the twenty and one hundred days. The ruling is that one starts the one hundred days immediately and finishes up the eighth after the nazir term that starts on day twenty. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about two similar cases. First, if one took on two overlapping terms, as previously discussed and one became impure in the middle of the term that interrupted the other, would they need to start counting from the very beginning or does it only cancel the current term? Second, if one became a leper while being a nazir, one pauses the counting of nazirite days, but if one became impure to a dead person during those leper days, would that cancel the nazirite days? Why was it necessary to state both debates?  If one's hair was cut during the nazirite term, one needs to wait until there is hair growth of thirty days to be able to shave and bring the sacrifices. What happens if one becomes impure during those days? Rav and Shmuel disagree. However, Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan wouldn't necessarily disagree about this case. Rav Chisda said that one who became impure after bringing sacrifices but before shaving one's hair cannot rectify the situation. What did he mean by this and according to whose opinion? One who finishes counting the days of being a nazir but did not yet finish the sacrifices and shaving, receives lashes if one becomes impure to a dead person but not if one drank wine or cut one's hair - from where is this derived?

This month's learning is sponsored by Hadran of Silver Spring in memory of Nicki Toys, Nechama bat Shmuel Tzadok. "Nicki was creative, talented, and filled with so much love and goodness. She had an incredible attitude about life, family, and faith that every one of us should aspire to achieve. May her memory always be a blessing." 

This week's learning is sponsored in loving memory of Miriam Baumel who passed away last week on her 91st birthday. May her memory be a blessing. -From her loving granddaughters.

The Mishna talks about a case where one takes upon being a nazir in the event a child will be born, but the child dies either in childbirth or within the first thirty days. Since one can't be sure whether the child was viable and died by some other cause or was never viable to begin with, there is a doubt about whether or not the parent is a nazir. The rabbis rule leniently, as per Rabbi Yehuda that we are lenient in laws of nazir. But Rabbi Shimon rules stringently and suggests that one should say, if the child was viable, I am a nazir based on my previous declaration (obligatory) and if not, I will take on being a nazir voluntarily. If subsequently a child was born, one will need to do the same thing, in case the previous obligation was not fulfilled in the previous birth. First, the Gemara goes back to the cases in the Mishna on Nazir 12b where one said "son" or "child" and it was discussed which type of child is included in each term. The Gemara explains why the Mishna needed to spell that all out - why wasn't it obvious? Rabbi Abba asked Rav Huna: if one gave birth to a child who died soon after childbirth and the husband separated animals for the nazir sacrifice and then his wife gave birth to a second healthy child (presumably, the case is that there are twins), is the animal sanctified? This question is asked according to Rabbi Yehuda's opinion and the ramification is to know whether one can use the animals for work or shear them. Ben Rachumi asked Abaye about a case where one said he will be a nazir if he has a child and then a friend said "On me also." Did he mean that he will also be a nazir when the friend has a child or he will be a nazir when he has a child. This question leads to several other questions such as, would it change if he said "And me" instead of "On me"? Would it make a difference if the original person took on to be a nazir if a third person had a child. The Mishna brings up cases of one who took upon to be a nazir immediately and when he has a child. If after he starts counting the first term, the child is born, he completes the first term, including shaving/sacrifices and then starts counting the second term. But if he first said "I will be a nazir when I have a child and I will be a nazir, he starts counting the second term and when the child is born, if he hasn't finished, he stops the second term, starts counting the term for the child and when it ends, he finishes the first term. Rava asks about a different, but similar case.

Today's daf is sponsored by Susan Gruber Vishner, in loving memory of her father, Everett Gruber, Yehudah Gedalia ben Sender Chaim v'Perl, on the 100th anniversary of his birth. "My father deeply loved Jewish learning, Torah study, and his family."

Rabbi Yochanan explains that if one appointed a messenger to betroth a woman for him, without specifying which woman, and the messenger died before returning, one can assume he betrothed the woman before his death and the man who sent him can no longer betroth a woman as it is possible any woman he chooses will be a relative of the woman he is betrothed to who is a forbidden relative, such as mother, daughter, sister, etc. Reish Lakish raises a question against Rabib Yochanan from a Mishna in Kinnim 2:1 where there is a similar doubt and it is permitted. A distinction is made between the cases based on laws of majority and how the law is affected by the status of objects that are stationary and those that move. Rava says that Rabbi Yochanan will agree that if the man finds a woman without any relatives (that would be potentially forbidden to him) or with a sister who was married at the time he sent the messenger, even if she divorced by the time the messenger betrothed someone, he can marry her. On what basis is the woman with a sister divorced after he sent the messenger permitted? First, they think it is based on a particular assumption, but that is rejected on the basis of our Mishna with one who took on sacrifices of a nazir which can apply even to someone who is not a nazir yet. The Gemara then distinguishes between one who takes upon oneself an obligation and one who sends a messenger, as regarding laws of messengers one cannot send a messenger to do something one cannot do oneself. Is that really true? A source is brought to show it is not true, but that source is explained differently. If one takes on a vow for sacrifices of a half nazir or half of a nazir's sacrifices, what is the law? If one says I will be a nazir if I have a son, this means only a son, not a daughter, tumtum or androgynous. But if one used gender-neutral language then it includes all.

Today's daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari. "In honor of the 30th anniversary of the first time I read Torah, of the special birthday of my daughter Ilana, and of Tu B'Shvat, Chag La'ilanot."

Today's daf is sponsored by Terri Krivosha in memory of her father, Nachum Meir ben Malka on his second yahrzeit. Yehi Zichro Baruch. And in honor of the first birthday of her granddaughter and her father's namesake, Orli Nessa, daughter of Avi and Shaina Herring. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Blima Slutsky in memory of her father, Yitzchak Tzvi ben Blima and Chaim Shimon.

If one is in a situation where they are being encouraged to drink and they say, "I am a nazir from it," they become a nazir. However, there was a case with a woman who was drunk and when she said this, they ruled she was not a nazir as she was just trying to prevent them from pushing her to drink more. The Mishna lists three cases in which one takes upon being a nazir but expresses hesitation (each in a different way) from accepting being a nazir fully. In the first case, there is no debate. In the other two, Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree, but in each one, one is strict and the other is lenient but who is strict and who is lenient switches from one case to the other. First, the Gemara questions whether or not they disagree in the first case. Then they try to understand why Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis switch positions between the second and the third case. Three solutions are offered. If one person says they will be a nazir and they will pay for the sacrifices of another, and a person nearby says "and I and I will pay for the sacrifices of another," they can each pay for each other's (and that would be wise on their part!). What would have been the responsibilities of the second one if they only said "and I" - would it apply to both statements or not? The Gemara fleshes out the possibilities and weighs in on the issue.

Study Guide Nazir 10

Study Guide Nazir 9

One who vowed to be a nazir not to eat figs, is that person considered a nazir? Are they forbidden from eating figs? Or is it just an absurd statement that means nothing? Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai disagree about this case. There are three different explanations about what Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai actually hold. According to one of the interpretations, Beit Hillel's opinion is based upon an opinion of Rabbi Shimon in a Minha in Menachot 103a. That Mishna is brought and Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan disagree about two issues in that Mishna. Firstly, to whom does tanna kama's opinion correspond? What would be the case if the declaration there was made with lentils instead of barley (the Mishna's case is with barley)? 

Study Guide Nazir 9

One who vowed to be a nazir not to eat figs, is that person considered a nazir? Are they forbidden from eating figs? Or is it just an absurd statement that means nothing? Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai disagree about this case. There are three different explanations about what Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai actually hold. According to one of the interpretations, Beit Hillel's opinion is based upon an opinion of Rabbi Shimon in a Minha in Menachot 103a. That Mishna is brought and Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan disagree about two issues in that Mishna. Firstly, to whom does tanna kama's opinion correspond? What would be the case if the declaration there was made with lentils instead of barley (the Mishna's case is with barley)? 

Study Guide Nazir 8

Today's daf is sponsored by Dalia Gamson in memory of Efraim ben Yitzchak Shmuel.

The Mishna lists several cases where one accepted to be a nazir for a time period based on an object, like the hair on my head, dush of the earth...). They are considered a nazir forever, but tana kama and Rebbi disagree about whether one meant an infinite number of separate terms of being a nazir (with haircuts and sacrifices at the end of each thirty-day term) or one long period of being a nazir that lasts forever. If one said one will be a nazir for the capacity of the house or the basket, we ask what the intent was - for the house/basket or for contents. If the intent was the house/basket, they are a nazir for thirty days. If the intent was the contents, we view it as if it was filled with mustard seeds and they are a nazir for the rest of their life. If one says they will be a nazir from here to a different location, we measure how many days' journey and use that to determine how long the term will be. If one says "like the number of the days in the solar year" they are a nazir for 365 30-day terms. Rabbi Yehuda recounts that someone did this and as he finished the last term, he died. The Gemara questions the case with the basket - why do we assume they meant full of mustard seeds and not something larger like gourds, which would mean a nazirite term for a period of time corresponding to the number of gourds. Does this issue depend on a debate between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda about whether we are stringent or lenient regarding vows? Chizkiya says yes, but Rabbi Yochanan distinguishes between the case where they disagree and our case and claims that Rabbi Yehuda would agree in the case of our Mishna as well. According to Rabbi Yochanan's explanation, one must explain that Rabbi Yehuda holds like Rebbi's opinion in our Mishna. However, that is difficult in light of Rabbi Yehuda's statement in our Mishna and in a braita. Those difficulties are resolved. Several braitot are quoted with more cases of specific wording used by one accepting to be a nazir and how long or how many terms that person would need to be a nazir.

Study Guide Nazir 7

Today's daf is sponsored by Jane and David Shapiro in honor of their Skokie daf yomi compatriots: Shira & Norman Eliaser, Nina Black, and Rav Marianne Novak. "You keep us engaged, enthusiastic, and inspired by the daf every day."

The Mishnayot discuss various languages used to accept a nazirite term and how many days one would be a nazir for each of the different languages used. If one says "one large term" or "one short term" or "from here until the end of the world," one is only a nazir for thirty days. Why is the last case only thirty days? The assumption is that one is saying it is so difficult to be a nazir for thirty days that it feels like forever. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this answer from a different Mishna where one says they will be a nazir "from here until a particular place" and the term of the nazir depends on the number of days it takes to get there. Why are the rulings in these two cases different? Two answers are given to answer this question. The Mishna lists several different cases where one said I will be a nazir and then added an additional amount of time. In each case, the person has to keep two periods of being a nazir. Why was it necessary for the Mishna to list all the different cases? The next Mishna lists a case where one said "I will be a nazir for thirty days and one hour." Since one can't be a nazir for an hour, the person is a nazir for thirty-one days. Rav rules that this is only if one did not say thirty days and one day, but thirty and one day as he holds like Rabbi Akiva that any extra word can be used to mean something additional. Rabbi Akiva's position is found in a Mishna in Bava Batra 64a regarding the ownership of a pit and a cistern on a property of a house that one sold to someone else.

Study Guide Nazir 6

Today's daf is sponsored by Blima Slutzky in memory of her mother, Mazal (Tina) bat Rina and David.

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of those murdered in the terrorist attack on Friday night in Neve Yaakov and for a refuah shleima to those injured there and from the attack in Ir David.

Five Mishnayot from the third chapter of Nazir are brought to raise a question against Bar Pada's opinions (that a stam nezirut is twenty-nine days). Three of those were already brought on the previous page. There are all resolved, and some as they are resolved are thrown back to question Rav Matna's opinion. A further question is raised to explain Rabbi Eliezer's position regarding a nazir who became impure on the last day of nezirut. The Gemara suggests that the debate between Rav Matna and Bar Pada is based on a tannatic debate between Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan. However, this suggestion is rejected. 

We derive from Avshalom who was a nazir olam that if one's hair gets too long, one can trim it. But at what intervals did Avshalom cut his hair? Three opinions are brought and the GEmara both raises questions and explains these three approaches. If one accepts to be a nazir without specifying how much time, the Mishna rules that the timeframe is thirty days. Rav Matna learns this from gematria of the words "yihiye." Bar Pada derives that is it twenty-nine from the twenty-nine times in the chapter where the root n.z.r. appears. Two Mishnayot are brought to question Bar Pada but are resolved. After explaining the second one, that source is thrown back against Rav Matna. After that is resolved, another Mishna is brought to raise a difficulty against Bar Pada.  

Study Guide Nazir 4

Today's daf is sponsored by Goody and Eric Weil to our beloved mother/mother-in-law, Lili Weil z"l on the Shloshim since her passing. Aside from the many acts of chessed and philanthropic organizations she created, Lili was also a pioneer of women's learning. Several years after making Aliya from France in 1970, she wanted to learn Gemara, but organizations like Hadran didn't exist back then. So Lili and her friends started Matan around her kitchen table, helping generations of women deepen their Jewish learning and connection to our tradition. We honor her with our collective learning today.

After pointing out the derivations of Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding their debate of one who accepts to be a nazir by only refraining from one particular prohibition of a nazir, the Gemara has a back-and-forth discussion of what each one does with the verse the other one uses and so on. Throughout the discussion, several verses in the section of the nazir are used to derive different halachot by each of them. What language needs to be used to accept upon oneself to be a nazir Shimshon? One who is a nazir Shimshon can never cut one's hair but can become impure to dead people. One who is a nazir olam (forever) can trim one's hair periodically but can never become impure to the dead. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about nazir Shimshon as Rabbi Shimon holds that one cannot accept upon oneself to be a nazir in this way as Shimshon did not accept upon himself to be a nazir and a vow only works if one connects it to something that is vowed upon, not something that has inherent sanctity. A different tannaitic debate is brought and compared to this debate, but in the end, the comparison is rejected. From where do we derive that Shimshon was not forbidden to become impure to dead people?

Today's daf is sponsored by Marcia Baum in memory of Sam Baum חיים שמחה בן אהרון הלוי וליבה on his 22nd yartzeit. "My father was a larger-than-life individual whose impact is still felt to this day. He would be immensely proud of his daughters and their progeny! "

What are the laws of bishul akum (food cooked by a non-Jew)? Under what conditions is it permitted and when is it forbidden? If a Jew is involved in part of the cooking process, it is permitted - what type of involvement is necessary?

Study Guide Nazir 3

Introduction to Masechet Nazir

Rav Papa said that Rava would quiz them on the following question: Does the wife of a kohen who is raped and must get divorced, receive her ketuba money or not? The answer is clear from our Mishna that she does. If a woman says in court that her husband divorced her, Rav Hamnuna says she is believed because a woman wouldn't have the audacity to lie in front of her husband if it wasn't true as he would know she is lying. Rava thinks that a woman is believed as in our Mishna, in a case where she says she is raped as it is humiliating for her to say that and therefore she would only say it if it were true. However, regarding divorce, that is not humiliating and therefore she is not believed. A question is raised against Rav from the case in our Mishna where a woman claims "heaven is between you and me" and was originally believed which seems to indicate she is believed even if she says something that doesn't humiliate her, as the issue is with her husband and not her. This difficulty is resolved as the language she uses clearly indicates that she is uncomfortable talking about this and therefore it is humiliating to her. A question is raised against Rav Hamnuna from the case in our Mishna where a woman claims "heaven is between you and me" according to the later ruling that she is not believed. According to Rav Hamnuna, if this is something he knows about as well, how could she have the audacity to lie to him about it? To answer the question, they assume that the wife thinks that the husband may not know whether or not he is at fault. Two stories are told of women married to kohanim who claimed that they accidentally may have had relations with another man and yet Rav Nachman ruled that they are not to be believed and the husbands do not need to divorce their wives. Two stories are told of men who found another man in their house alone with their wives and based on the details of what happened when they arrived home, Rava ruled in both cases that the women could stay married to their husbands.

Does the debate between Rabbi Natan and the rabbis regarding nullification of a vow that has not yet taken effect also apply to dissolving vows with a chacham? A story is brought of a man who took a vow of this kind and Rav Acha made sure the vow took effect so that it could be dissolved. Two explanations are brought up explaining why he needed the vow to take effect first. Sources are brought to support the second explanation but are each rejected. An alternate version of the second explanation is brought and the same sources are brought to raise a difficulty against it. One is resolved, and the other is not. Originally there were three different claims a woman could make and the rabbis would insist the husband divorce the wife and give her the ketuba money, but over time there were women who lied in order to get the husband to divorce her, and therefore the rabbis stopped believing them. What were these claims? After the rabbis changed their minds, what would they do if a woman made these claims? One of the claims is a woman married to a kohen claims that she was raped. The Gemara asks: if we no longer believe her to insist on divorce, can she continue to eat truma?

This week's learning is sponsored by Cindy Dolgin for the yahrzeits of Mira and Avram Dolgin. "Loving in-laws of Cindy and dedicated public servants of The Zionist and Democratic State of Israel."

Today's daf is sponsored by Sari Esserman in memory of her father Moshe ben Yosef Hakohen.

Today's daf is sponsored by Marcia Baum in loving memory of her mother Helen Baum, Chaya Chana Alter bat Chana v'Yekutiel Yehudah on her 7th yahrzeit. "Mom was a lover of learning and yahadut who instilled those values in her daughters. She is sorely missed!"

The Mishna rules that if a vow is made by a woman to start in thirty days, if she gets married before the vow takes effect, her husband cannot nullify the vow. If she was married at the time she made the vow (to start at a later date) and her husband nullified the vow but she got divorced before the vow took effect, the nullification is still valid. This Mishna rules that the nullification follows the time the vow was made and not the time it takes effect. This issue also was raised in a similar case of a woman who vows to be a nazir when she gets married or when she gets divorced. There, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva debate whether we follow the time the vow was made or the time it takes effect. Is this the same debate or can we distinguish between the cases? The Mishna stated at the end that if a woman vowed and on the same day got divorced and remarried to the same person, her husband would not be able to nullify the vow she made earlier that day before they were remarried. The Mishna ended with the words: "This is the rule..." What do those words come to include in our Mishna and what do they come to include in a Mishna that appeared previously on Nedarim 71a on a similar topic but regarding a woman who was betrothed both times and not married? The Mishna lists nine cases where a father cannot nullify his daughter's vows. The main reasons why he cannot nullify are: 1. if she is already a bogeret (has reached maturity), 2. if she was married already (and now widowed or divorced), and 3. if her father died. The Mishna rules that if she makes a vow on condition that she will not benefit from others if she does work for her husband or the reverse, the husband can nullify the vow even though it the condition has not been fulfilled and the vow has not yet taken effect. The Gemara quotes a braita which shows there is a tannaitic debate regarding one of these cases and a different case. Rabbi Natan holds that since the vow has not yet taken effect, he cannot nullify it.

The contradiction between Rabbi Meir in the Mishna and Rabbi Meir regarding a city of refuge is resolved by distinguishing between the cases and showing that the debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir was derived specifically from the words in the verses of the Torah on that topic. If one vows to not let his son-in-law benefit from him, in what way can he give a gift to his daughter so that the son-in-law won't benefit? The Mishna proscribes what to do according to Rabbi Meir's approach who holds that whatever a woman accepts the right to use the item goes straight to her husband. Rav and Shmuel rule differently on this topic. A contradiction is brought against Rav from laws of eruv, but is resolved as a distinction is made between the cases. Ravina raises a question from a braita and Rav Ashi resolves it. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Gordon Marx in honor of Sara Marx's Hebrew birthday. "Happy birthday!"

If the Mishna teaches us that one needs to know exactly whose vow he is nullifying from the verse in the Torah saying "her", why when it comes to a mourner, a braita rules that tearing clothing for a relative, if the tearing is done with the wrong person in mind, it is valid, even though it is learned from a verse "for Shaul and for Yonatan" which would seem to also indicate the need one to know for whom they are tearing. Two different answers are brought to resolve the contradiction between the Mishna and the braita. The first answer is to distinguish between a case (the braita) where one did it generally or was told generally about a relative and then intended when tearing for the wrong person, and a case (our Mishna) where one was told or did the action specifically for a particular person and it turns out it was the wrong person. The second answer is that in the braita, he realized the mistake within a few seconds (toch k'dei dibur) and therefore it was valid and the Mishna was in a case where he realized his error beyond that short time frame. A braita is brought to support each response. If one forbade two things in one vow, if the husband/father ratifies part, the whole thing is ratified. But if he nullified only part, neither part is nullified. The Gemara explains that the Mishna goes according to Rabbi Yishmael and then brings Rabbi Akiva and the rabbi's positions who each disagree with Rabbi Yishmael and with each other. From where do they each derive their opinions? If one didn't know that he could nullify his wife's/daughter's vows, even if he heard the vow earlier, he can nullify it on the day he learns that he can nullify it. But if he knew he could nullify but not that it was a vow that needed to be/could be nullified, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether he can/cannot nullify it later when he discovers that. Rabbi Meir's opinion here contradicts his opinion regarding a blind accidental murderer who is punished by having to go to a refuge city even though his knowledge was only partial, whereas, in our Mishna, Rabbi Meir agrees with the rabbis in the first case and considered partial knowledge only partial.

Today's daf is sponsored by Sharon Mink in honor of the 40th anniversary of their Aliya.

Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yehoshua answered the contradiction in Shmuel's rulings by explaining that Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri's position is not a case where the woman is forbidding something that is not yet in the world as her vow refers to her hands and what they can create, and her hands are in this world. However, the Gemara points out that she is still referring to what her hands will create at a potential future point if and when she gets divorced and therefore it still should be considered something that is not yet in this world. In order to answer this question, several different rabbis suggest making comparisons to other cases. Each rejects the comparison of the previous one and suggests an alternative. In the end, all the comparisons are rejected as a woman getting divorced is not something that is clear will happen and not something in the woman's control. Rav Ashi suggests a different answer. Although the woman does not own her produce fully, she has the rights to forbid it as Rava said that three things can remove a lien that is on one's possessions: sanctifying it (which is similar to forbidding something by a vow), chametz on Pesach and freeing a slave. Even if one were to say the rabbi's strengthened the husband's rights to be more like a buyer's still the vow will take effect if and when he divorces her. If a man nullified his wife's/daughter's vow but was under a misimpression such as, he thought it was his wife who vowed, but it was in fact his daughter, or he thought she vowed to be a nazir but she vowed something else or he thought she vowed not to eat a certain type of food, but it was a different type, when he realizes his mistake, he needs to nullify the vow again.

Study Guide Nedarim 85

Study Guide Nedarim 84

Today's daf is sponsored by Adrienne Robb-Fund in honor of her friend and chavruta, Joanna Rom, on her birthday!

Today's daf is sponsored by Idana Goldberg on the first yahrzeit of Meyer Weitz, Meir Ben Yehoshua v'Leah. "An Orthodox feminist, my grandfather was so proud of my gemara knowledge and even in his 101st year always asked what masechet I was learning."

Rava challenged Rav Nachman from a different Mishna in the chapter which seemed to imply that the husband was included in a vow made against 'all people'. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between the two Mishnayot. From our Mishna it has been established that a woman who vows to not benefit from others can collect the produce left in the fields but cannot collect produce from the tithe of the poor people. However, in the Tosefta the tithe for the poor people is added to the list with the other gifts for the poor. Rav Yosef suggests that the contradiction between the Mishna and the Tosefta can be resolved by connecting each source to a different tannaitic opinion. To prove this, he quotes a Mishna in Demai 4:3 which relates a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding the obligation to separate the tithe for the poor from produce taken from an am haaeretz. He connects their opinions there to whether or not the one who separates the tithe for the poor can decide who they want to give it to which would then translate as still being "owned" by them. But Abaye rejects Rav Yosef's explanation because he does not see the point of contention between them as Rav Yosef did. Rava offers a different resolution in that the Mishna and the Tosefta refer to two different cases of the tithe for the poor - one who set aside it from in the house and the one who set it aside in the threshing floor/field. From the one at home, the owner can choose who to give it to but the one in the field has to be left ownerless for anyone to come to take. In the Mishna, there were two laws regarding a woman who vows that Kohanim/Levites won't benefit from her. From the first case, it can be inferred that getting to choose who to give the gifts to is not considered financial value. From the second case, the opposite can be inferred. Rav Hoshaya suggests that each case represents a different tannaitic opinion and he quotes a braita where those opinions appear and explains how the root of the debate there is the same as here.

Study Guide Nedarim 83

Today's daf is sponsored by Sari Esserman in memory of her aunt Miriam bat Yosef Hakohen.

Today's daf is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to their son Eliav and his wife Noia on becoming parents! "Celebrating the Shabbat brit together was very meaningful yehi ratzon that Shachar Yosef will always reach out to Hashem, in the spirit of the pasuk that his parents related to in choosing his name - in Yeshayahu Chapter 26 "נפשי אויתיך בלילה אף רוחי אשחרך", coupled with the memory of Debbie's father – Yosef Gindsberg z"l,  a unique and loving  individual who epitomized the concept of Torah U'madda and beyond."

According to a second version, Rav Asi asked Rabbi Yochanan about a case where a woman vowed not to eat two loaves of bread and refraining from eating one is considered suffering, but from the other is not. Rabbi Yochanan answered that he only nullifies the one that causes her d suffering and not the other. A mishna and braita from Nazir are brought to raise difficulties with Rabbi Yochanan's answer, but the difficulties are resolved. Rav Yosef explains the first difficulty, by saying there is a unique law by a nazir that there is no taking on bring a nazir in a partial manner. Abaye makes an inference from Rav Yosef's words and questions them and clarifies the statement Rav Yosef made. The Gemara then questions Abaye's reading as well but resolves it.  The second difficulty is answered that both abstaining from drinking wine and refraining from becoming impure to the dead is considered suffering because he who eulogized, buries, cries for others, others will do it for them as well. If a woman forbids herself from benefitting from all people, the husband cannot nullify the vow because he is not included in all people, and in addition to that, she can take from gifts for the poor. This is one way to understand the words of the Mishna and that is assuming that the husband is not included in 'all people.' But there are two more ways to understand the words of the Mishna. In one they understand that the husband is included in 'all people' and she is actually forbidden to him as well and in the second it is assumed that the husband is not included in 'all people' and the two parts of the sentence in the Mishna speak of two different situations (a woman within the marriage and a woman after she has been divorced). If a woman has vowed that the Kohanim and Levites cannot benefit her, what happens to the gifts meant to be given to them from her produce?