Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran – Details, episodes & analysis

Study Guide

After suggesting that one can learn from Rabbi Meir's opinion about melika of a bird that is a treifa, that one can learn a binyan av from a kal va'chomer in kodashim, sacrificial items, the Gemara rejects this explanation because it is derived from chulin, not kodashim.

Can one derive a law through a binyan av and then use another method of hermeneutics to derive something else? The Gemara only suggests an answer for a binyan av on a binyan av, but that answer is rejected since the method of derivation in the braita does not make sense. It must be derived from a verse in the Torah, Vayikra 2:6, and the braita is just being used as an asmachta.

The remainder of the blood of the inner offerings is poured on the base of the altar on the western side. This is derived from Vayikra 4:7 where it states, "opposite the entrance to Ohel Moed," which refers to the exit of the sanctuary, which is by the western side of the altar.

In Vayikra chapter 4, the phrase "pour on the base of the altar" is mentioned for three different sacrifices. Each one teaches a different law relating either to the base of the altar or to the pouring of the remainder. The Gemara explains why these verses were available to be extrapolated and were not necessary for their straightforward meaning.

Study Guide

The Gemara explores various hermeneutical methods used to derive halakhic laws - juxtaposition (hekesh), gezeira shava (verbal analogy), kal va'chomer (a fortiori reasoning), and binyan av (paradigm from precedent). It raises the question: can a law derived through one method serve as the basis for further derivation, either by the same method or a different one? They systematically examine each possible permutation, presenting logical arguments and textual proofs to evaluate the validity and limitations of such compound derivations. Importantly, this entire discussion is confined to laws pertaining to sacrificial items (kodashim) alone.

Study Guide

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Rebbi) interprets the first mention of "bull" in Vayikra 4:20 as referring to the bull offering of Yom Kippur, even though the verse's context concerns the communal sin offering. According to Rebbi, this verse teaches that the Yom Kippur bull is comparable to the bull brought by the kohen gadol who sins, referenced by the second mention of "bull" in the same verse.

Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with Rebbi, arguing that the laws of the Yom Kippur bull can be derived through kal va'chomer (a fortiori) reasoning. However, the kal va'chomer argument he proposes is not fully spelled out in the text, and the Gemara clarifies which cases are being referenced and what laws are derived.

Since Rabbi Yishmael does not interpret the word "bull" as referring to the Yom Kippur offering, but rather to the communal sin offering, the question arises: why use the term "bull" instead of simply saying "it"? Rav Pappa explains that the unnecessary word comes to teach a law not explicitly stated in the verses about the communal offering, but found in the kohen gadol's sin offering - that the lobe of the liver and the kidneys are burned on the altar. Although this law could have been derived by juxtaposition, the inclusion of the word "bull" makes it as though it were written explicitly, which then allows it to be used to derive the same law by juxtaposition to the communal sin offering for idol worship.

A braita is brought to support Rav Pappa's explanation and shows how the juxtaposition between the communal sin offering and the communal offering for idol worship (from Bamidbar 15:25) is established. However, another braita derives the juxtaposition from the verse in Vayikra 4:20. Both derivations are considered necessary, as each teaches a different law.

Rebbi's position is cited earlier to support Rav Pappa's explanation that the word "bull" serves to compare the Yom Kippur bull to the kohen gadol's sin offering for specific laws derived from the words "et," "b'dam," and "taval." However, Rebbi himself states that the comparison teaches that all the laws are the same, not just those three. This discrepancy is explained as stemming from two different tannaitic positions.

Two braitot from the school of Rabbi Yishmael are brought, each explaining why certain words or laws appear only in the kohen gadol's sin offering and not in the communal one. Both are interpreted through parables that reflect God's relationship with His people.

Finally, a Mishna in Menachot presents a debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding whether a pigul (disqualifying intent) during the taking of the handful of the meal offering, but not during the taking of the frankincense (or vice versa), renders the offering pigul. Reish Lakish explains Rabbi Meir's position: the offering becomes pigul not because intent during part of the matir (the enabling act) can render an offering pigul, but because later actions follow the original intent. That is, if improper intent occurred during the first stage, and the second stage was performed without intent, the second stage is still governed by the initial thought. Reish Lakish supports this interpretation by asserting that our Mishna must align with Rabbi Meir's view. However, Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzchak disagrees and interprets the Mishna according to the rabbis' position.

Today's daf is sponsored by Sarah Zahavi in honor of her sister Hasya and her love of learning. Today's daf is sponsored by Hinda Herman in memory of her dear mother Ethel Bat Chaim on her yahrzeit. Today's daf is sponsored by Linda Freedman in memory of her father Leon Pultman on his 8th yahrzeit. Husband of Thelma Pultman and father of Linda, Sheila and Gwen. "Dad had a special love of learning about Jewish history and our people. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in memory of her father, Melvyn Goldstein, on his third yahrzeit. "Only now that you are gone am I understanding the wisdom of your ways." The Mishna says that if one drank wine while being a nazir, those days still count as their nazirite days. This does not seem to follow either the rabbis or Rabbi Yosi's position as the rabbis require one to add as many days as one spent drinking wine while a nazir, and Rabbi Yosi requires a minimum of thirty days without drinking wine, regardless of how long the nazirite period was supposed to be. However, the Gemara explains that one can explain the Mishna according to each opinion. From the fact that Beit Shamai hold hekdesh by mistake is hekdesh and yet one who dissolved his nazirite vow, the sacrifices are no longer sanctified, we can learn to Beit Hillel that even though substitution by mistake is sanctified, if one dissolved the sanctity of the first animal, the sanctity would be canceled as well. In animal tithes, if one calls the 9th or 11th animal tenth by mistake, the animal is sanctified. Is this true as well if one intentionally called the 9th or 11th the tenth? Can we infer the answer to this question from our Mishna which makes reference to this law? If one vowed to become a nazir, assuming the animal in their possession would be used for the sacrifice, but it gets stolen, can one dissolve the vow on that basis? It depends upon whether the animal was stolen before or after the vow as if it was only stolen later, that is nolad (something unexpected that was not in existence at the time) and one cannot dissolve a vow using nolad. This is what confused Nachum HaMadi when he permitted nezirim who came to Israel after the destruction and when they realized there was no Temple in which to bring their sacrifices, they tried to dissolve their vows and he dissolved them based on the fact that had they realized the Temple would have been destroyed and they would have no way to finish their nazirite term, they never would have vowed. Isn't this nolad? Rav Yosef raises a question on the Mishna because of a verse from Yirmiyahu 7:4 that alludes to the fact that the temple will be destroyed and therefore the nezirim should have known! If two people are walking and see someone from afar and bet on who it is by taking upon being a nazir and then others take a bet and take on being a nazir if one of them, both of them, or neither of them are nezirim, there are three opinions in the Mishna about which of them are nezirim. Beit Hillel's language in the Mishna is difficult as he says "The one who's words do not come to be is a nazir." Shouldn't it be the opposite? Rav Yehuda suggests changing the language to read "The one whose words come true."  

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of Faye Darack, one of Hadran's dedicated learners who passed away yesterday. Yehi zichra baruch.

Beit Shamai holds that if one sanctified something by mistake, it is effective. Beit Hillel disagree. An example is brought in the Mishna of one who said that the first black ox to leave my house will be sanctified and a white ox left the house first. Or the first gold coin to come in my hand, or the first wine barrel and silver came first or a barrel of oil. Beit Shamai holds it is sanctified, Beit Hillel says it is not. There are three explanations in the Gemara regarding the details of the case and what in fact becomes sanctified according to Beit Shamai - is it the white one or the first black one that came out? What is the "mistake"? Was the declaration referring to what will happen or what did happen? Difficulties are raised on each of the interpretations and are resolved. Rav Chisda said that white bulls are superior to black bulls. This assumption is questioned from our Mishna and also from a different statement of Rav Chisda. In order to reconcile this, they distinguish between bulls in the Kerman Province where white bulls are superior, and everywhere else where black bulls are superior. The Mishna discusses what happens to animals that were sanctified by someone who was a nazir but then dissolved his vow. The halacha is that the animals are no longer sanctified. Beit Hillel uses this to argue against Beit Shamai as they claimed that mistaken sanctification is effective. Beit Shamai retorts that how can Beit Hillel explain the law regarding animal tithes as if one mistakenly counts the 9th or 11th as the tenth, it is sanctified. Beit Hillel claims that it is derived from a verse in the Torah and is therefore specific just for that specific type of error.

Study Guide Nazir 30

This month's learning is sponsored by Amy Cohn in memory of her father, Professor Dov Zlotnick who taught his five girls the love of learning! "We miss you!" Today's daf is sponsored by Leah Goldford on the first yahrzeit of her father, Moshe ben Mayer known as Moe. "We miss your humor, your daily check-in calls, and mostly your amazing hugs. Still can't quite believe you're gone. We love you."

In what situation can a child take the money his father set aside for nazir offerings and use it for his own nazir sacrifices? Rabbi Yosi says it is only when following the father's death the son decided to become a nazir and use his father's money, but not if the father and son were both nazirs before the father's death. This rule applies only to sons and not to daughters. According to Rabbi Yochanan it is a halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai. Why does Rabbi Yochanan need to explain this, isn't it obvious that this halacha relates to sons and not to daughters as sons can inherit and daughters do not? It is necessary to apply the law in a case when a man only had daughters to teach that it is not based on inheritance laws but on halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai. Do the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yosi? A source is brought to prove that they disagree and permit both scenarios. Are these laws connected to inheritance in some way? If two sons both want to take on being a nazir, do they share the money or does the first one to become a nazir and say he will use the money get exclusive rights? If one is a firstborn does he get a double portion? Do these laws only apply to a regular type of nazir or is it also applicable to one who takes on a nazir olam? If the father set aside the money for the completion of his nazirite term before he died and the son became an impure nazir and wanted to use it for the sacrifices brought for a nazir who became impure or vice-versa, could he? All these questions remain unanswered.

Study Guide Nazir 29

This week's learning is dedicated by Phyllis & Yossie Hecht in memory of Phyllis's father's 14th yahrzeit, l'zecher HaRav Yerachmiel Binyanim ben Zalman Tzvi Witkin. "Jerry Witkin, as he was affectionately known to all, was a true source of nachat to his friends, family and clal yisrael. Dad was a friend to all, activist and champion of causes and sameach b'chelko. As this week is Parshat Terumah, Dad only knew had to give and never learned how to take. It is so appropriate to commemorate this part of Adar in your memory as the yahrzeit is the first day of Rosh Chodesh Adar. Meshenichnas Adar Marbim B'Simcha! Dad was a baal koreh par excellence since he was 11 years old-and on Purim was the baal koreh of Megilat Esther which brought joy to so many. Your legacy of 6 children, 29 grandchildren and ever growing great-grandchildren - all Torah Jews continues to live on. You are so missed and we have been so blessed. Yehi Zichro Baruch."

Why can a man make his son become a nazir but a woman cannot? Rabbi Yochanan says it is a halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai. Reish Lakish says it is because it is part of the father's obligation of chinuch (education) for his son. Seven questions are brought against Reish Lakish's opinion including, why wouldn't a woman also be obligated to educate her child, why wouldn't it apply to daughters as well, and how can the relatives protest the father's educating of his child. In answer to the seventh question, the Gemara assumes that Reish Lakish holds like Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda that by Torah law one does not need to slaughter birds. A question is raised against that as it seems from another source that Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda does hold birds need proper slaughtering by Torah law. But, in the end, it can be explained that the other source was referring to rabbinic law. It is suggested that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish's debate between Rebbi and Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the cut-off age at which a father can no longer take on a nazirite vow for his son. But that suggestion is rejected. Rebbi and Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Yehuda have the same debate as Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yosi as found in the Tosefta Nidda 5:6.

Study Guide Nazir 28

Today's daf is sponsored by Carol Robinson and Arthur Gould in memory of Carol's mother, Irma Robinson, Hudda Bat Moshe, z"l. Today is her 8th yahrtzeit. "Irma moved from New Haven to Chicago to marry Lou and build a rich life there including lifelong friends, work she loved at a nearby high school library, and active participation in her synagogue. She lived with Alzheimer's for seven years with dignity and strength and never forgot Carol or her sister. She would be proud of Carol studying daf yomi." Rava brings a long braita to raise a difficulty with Rav Nachman who differentiated between blemished and unblemished animals - if so, the braita should have mentioned that as well. The Gemara answers the question in the same way they answered Rav Hamnuna's question that preceded Rava's question. There is a debate between three - tanna kama, Rabbi Akiva and Rebbi (or Rabbi Meir). The Gemara even brings a fourth opinion. Is it until the blood is sprinkled, as that permits the woman to drink wine and therefore the husband can no longer claim that it is in the category of vows he can nullify? Or is it until the animal is slaughtered as it will cause the animal to be left to burn and we don't like to destroy sanctified items? Or is it until she shaves as he can claim shaving her head will be disgusting and therefore it is in the category of vows he can nullify? Or is it until shaving for a different reason as the shaving permits her to drink wine, not the sacrifices? A question is asked about destroying the sacrifice as sacrifices slaughtered for the wrong reason can be brought on the altar? It is resolved by saying they were referring to the sin offering which cannot be offered. The debate about shaving her hair being disgusting to her husband is based on a debate about how one perceives wearing a wig - is that a good alternative or not? A father can make his son into a nazir but a mother cannot. Why? What happens when a father makes his son a nazir and the son or relatives protest? What happens to money or animals that were already set aside for the sacrifice? 

Today's daf is sponsored by Carol Robinson and Art Gould in memory of Art's mother Shirley, Sarah bat Avraham v'Ziche Reicha. Today is her 9th yahrtzeit. "She was a life-long learner and a striver; a woman born before her time. She sewed, she made mosaics; she was always busy with something. She lives on in the tallitot and quilts she made for so many members of her family and her synagogue." Rav Shimi bar Ashi raised a difficulty with those who limited the law about unspecified money for the nazirite sacrifices being used for voluntary burnt offerings for money only and not animals, pieces of silver, or piles of beams. Rav Shimi showed that also birds can remain unspecified until a later stage. Rav Papa responded with a source showing that animals do not remain unspecified, even in a case where one didn't specifically designate each one for each particular sacrifice as when a nazir set aside a female sheep, male sheep, and ram, but did not specify which sacrifice each one is for, it is as if they are already specified. Rav Shimi rejects Rav Papa's response as when one specifies those particular animals, it is clear which was meant for which sacrifice since the Torah specifically says that a female sheep is brought as a sin offering, the male sheep for a burnt offering and the ram for a peace offering and therefore, it is as if they were specifically designated. Earlier, Rav Nachan stated that even though the law of unspecified money does not apply to an animal, it would apply to an animal with a blemish, as it could be sold immediately and was therefore considered like money. Rav Hamnuna and Rava bring tannaitic sources to raise a difficulty against Rav Nachman.