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S9 Ep63: Inflation and the polarisation of reality
Season 9 Β· Episode 63
Friday, November 13, 2026 β’ Duration 25:56
In recent years, shoppers in TΓΌrkiye do not need the evening news to tell them prices have been rising, because they see it at the till. But the till only tells you about the history of inflation. When they turn on the television, the news might tell them what to expect next, and which channel they choose will matter.
Orkun Saka (City St George's, University of London) and his co-authors matched a monthly household survey to the transcripts of prime-time news on 13 Turkish channels. He tells Tim Phillips about how the way a channel talks more about inflation, and how often it mentions the word, affects what viewers expect will happen next. Do polarised TV channels lead to a "polarisation of reality"?
The research behind this episode:
Demiralp, Selva, Orkun Saka, and Michael Weber. 2026. "Polarized Media and Inflation Expectations." CEPR Discussion Paper 21747. Paris and London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.Β
To cite this episode:
Phillips, Tim, and Orkun Saka. 2026. βInflation and the polarisation of reality.β VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest
Orkun Saka is a Reader in Economics at City St George's, University of London. He is also affiliated with the London School of Economics and the CESifo Network. His research spans financial intermediation, international finance and political economy.
Research cited in this episode
Turkey's 2022 inflation peak. Annual consumer price inflation in Turkey reached 85.5% in October 2022, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute, its highest level in 24 years. It followed a run of interest rate cuts while inflation was rising. Orkun uses the episode to explain why expectations in TΓΌrkiye became so detached from the official figures. See Al-Monitor (2022).
Heterodox monetary policy. For several years the Turkish government argued that lower interest rates would bring inflation down, the reverse of the textbook view. In the experiment, respondents were asked whether they agree that "lower interest rates are needed to curb high inflation"; neutral-channel viewers whose inflation expectations rose became less likely to agree.
Freedom House press rating. In 2014, Freedom House downgraded TΓΌrkiye's press from "partly free" to "not free" in its annual Freedom of the Press report. The paper uses this, with evidence on media ownership and regulation, as background to its classification of 13 channels as pro-government, neutral or pro-opposition.
KoΓ§ University Household Inflation Expectations Survey (KUHIES). KoΓ§ University. 2024. KoΓ§ University Household Inflation Expectations Survey. A nationally representative monthly survey of about 2,500 Turkish adults, launched in January 2024. It asks respondents what inflation was over the past 12 months, what it will be over the next 12, which channel they watch for prime-time news and how they voted in 2023. In the paper's sample, mean expected inflation was 101%.
News selection as a signal. Nimark, Kristoffer P., and Stefan Pitschner. 2019. "News Media and Delegated Information Choice."Journal of Economic Theory 181: 160-196. Newsrooms decide what is important enough to report, so the choice to cover a topic tells the audience something before they hear a word of the story. Orkun's finding that the amount of inflation coverage matters more than its tone fits this idea.
The 2024 local elections. Turkey held local elections on 31 March 2024. In the run-up, election news crowded economic news out of prime time, so inflation coverage fell for reasons unrelated to viewers' beliefs. The authors use this as a natural experiment; as coverage fell, expectations fell with it.
Bayesian updating. A way of describing how people revise beliefs; they start from a prior, see new information, and arrive at a posterior that weighs the two. People with weak priors move further when new information arrives. In the experiment, the test is whether the usual close link between a respondent's prior and posterior inflation expectation weakens after reading a news story.
Experimenter demand effects. de Quidt, Jonathan, Johannes Haushofer, and Christopher Roth. 2018. "Measuring and Bounding Experimenter Demand."American Economic Review 108 (11): 3266-3302. Survey participants may give the answer they think the researcher wants. To reduce this, the experiment asked about posterior expectations using a differently worded question from the first.
The polarisation of reality. Alesina, Alberto, Armando Miano, and Stefanie Stantcheva. 2020. "The Polarization of Reality."AEA Papers and Proceedings 110: 324-328. People with different political views hold systematically different beliefs about the same facts. Orkun argues that inflation is a particularly worrying place for this to happen, because monetary policy depends on a shared view of where prices are going.
More VoxTalks Economics episodes
How should we measure expected inflation? Ricardo Reis on which measures of inflation expectations are reliable, and how well they anticipated the surge in European inflation from 2021.
Social media polarization. Yves Zenou on when social media pulls opinions apart and when it brings people together, the open question Orkun raises at the end of this episode.
For three decades years, software makers have paid bug bounty hunters to break their code so they can make it more secure. Recently, some software companies have decided that bug bounties programmes aren't useful any more: Curl shut its bounty in January, and Intel suspended its own in September. And the discovery of the PHP flaw that sent websites offline in October came from researchers working with AI, not from a bounty hunter's report.
Tobias Kretschmer (Imperial College London, CEPR) and his co-authors followed 86 programmes on Bugcrowd to discover how they work best. Do you run closed programmes, open only to invited hackers, or open them to all comers? And what happens now that AI is making a bug report cheaper to produce? Tim Phillips asks Kretschmer how well bug bounties are working.
Phillips, Tim, and Tobias Kretschmer. 2026. "How well do bug bounties work?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest
Tobias Kretschmer is Professor of Strategy, Technology and Organisation at Imperial College Business School and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. He joined Imperial in 2025 from LMU Munich. His research spans competitive strategy in digital industries, platform markets, and the digital transformation of organisations.
Research cited in this episode
Bug bounties. Netscape launched the first technology bug bounty on 10 October 1995, offering rewards for flaws found in the Navigator 2.0 beta. Jarrett Ridlinghafer, a technical support engineer, proposed the idea after he saw enthusiasts finding bugs for free. In this paper's data, the average reward for a unique vulnerability is about $566 in private programmes and $209 in public ones. High-priority flaws average about $1,440.
S9 Ep61: Cooperatives in the 21st century
Season 9 Β· Episode 61
Friday, October 30, 2026 β’ Duration 27:21
Go to work, follow orders all day, and your living standards will rise. That is the deal behind the capitalist economy. In his forthcoming book, Cooperatives in the twenty-first century, Francesco Caselli (LSE, CEPR) argues that the deal has been broken for two generations. Pay at the top keeps climbing. Pay in the middle and at the bottom has barely moved.
The usual fixes for spiralling inequality are higher taxes on the rich and stronger unions. Francesco's answer is to change who owns the firm. In a worker cooperative there are no outside shareholders, so the profits stay with the people who produce them. In conversation with Tim Phillips, he explains which of the economic objections to cooperatives are red herrings, and which ones are more serious.
Phillips, Tim, and Francesco Caselli. 2026. "Cooperatives in the 21st century." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest
Francesco Caselli is Norman Sosnow Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and Director of the Macroeconomics and Growth Programme at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the Econometric Society. His research spans growth, technical change and inequality, the sources of economic development, the economic and political effects of natural resource wealth, and how voters select politicians.
S9 Ep60: The challenges to the international financial system
Phillips, Tim, Valentina Bruno, and Ceric Tille. 2026. "The challenges to the international financial systemβ. VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guests
Valentina Bruno is Professor of Finance at the Kogod School of Business, American University, where she holds the Arlene R. and Robert P. Kogod Eminent Scholar Chair in Finance. She is a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in the Banking and Corporate Finance programme. Her research spans macroeconomics and finance, with recent work on how the US dollar transmits global financial conditions. She has worked at the World Bank and been a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Board.
Who gets the kids? Courts aim to decide custody in the child's best interests, but nobody has had the data to test how well those decisions work.
Gordon Dahl (UC San Diego, CEPR), Costas Meghir (Yale, CEPR) and seven co-authors built the data themselves. They collected more than 56,000 Swedish custody rulings, scanning paper files by hand where no digital copy existed, and linked them to records of parents' earnings, prescriptions and children's school tests.Β
It seems Swedish judges do not agree on how often to award joint custody. Some award it in about 60% of cases; others in about 20%. But that decision makes a huge difference to the lives, and happiness, of both parents and children. They tell Tim Phillips whether joint or sole custody has, on average, better outcomes.
Phillips, Tim, Gordon Dahl, and Costas Meghir. 2026. "Life after divorce." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).Β About the guests
Gordon Dahl is Professor of Economics at the University of California, San Diego, and a Fellow in the Labour Economics programme of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. His research spans the family, public policy and the labour market, including how family income shapes children's achievement, peer effects among co-workers and family members, the effects of incarceration on employment, and how welfare use passes between generations.
Costas Meghir is the Douglas A. Warner III Professor of Economics at Yale University and a CEPR Fellow in the Labour Economics, Development Economics and Public Economics programmes. His research spans labour supply and welfare programmes, marriage markets and how resources are shared within households, informal labour markets, and early childhood development.
S9 Ep58: Not wearing Prada
Season 9 Β· Episode 58
Friday, October 9, 2026 β’ Duration 18:58
Since March 2022, it has been harder to buy an iPhone in Russia, because Apple chose to stop selling there. So did Prada, Renault, Starbucks, Nike and more than 1,000 other firms. These private sanctions added to the official sanctions imposed by 45 countries.
Beata Javorcik (EBRD, Oxford, CEPR) and her co-authors wanted to know if private sanctions did anything more than generate good headlines. To do this, they matched millions of Russian customs records to the trademarks on the goods, so they could tell an iPhone from a Samsung phone and a Gucci scarf from a Gucci bag. Would imports of goods under voluntary sanctions stop? Would the brands cheat? Would importers find an other way to get goods into the country through the back door? She tells Tim Phillips what private sanctions on Russia have achieved.
Phillips, Tim, and Beata Javorcik. 2026. "Not wearing Prada." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest
Beata Javorcik is Chief Economist of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, on leave from the University of Oxford, where she is Professor of Economics and a Fellow of All Souls College. She is a Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in the International Trade and Regional Economics programme. Her research spans foreign direct investment, shocks to production networks, trade under sanctions and the evasion of import duties.
Research cited in this episode
Official sanctions on Russia. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, 45 economies, including the US, the EU and the UK, imposed sanctions on Russia. They cut selected Russian banks off from the SWIFT payment messaging system, immobilised the reserves of Russia's central bank, limited Russia's earnings from hydrocarbon exports and banned exports of arms, dual-use goods, advanced technology, industrial equipment and luxury goods. By the end of 2022, around 40% of product lines were at least partly covered. The luxury ban explains some odd entries. Ski suits and sports clothing priced above β¬300 are sanctioned, and champagne is banned while prosecco is not. Enforcement sits with several bodies: in the US, the Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Commerce Department; in the EU, individual member states; in the UK, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation and the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation.
S9 Ep57: Merit, masters and China's imperial exam
Season 9 Β· Episode 57
Friday, October 2, 2026 β’ Duration 21:03
For more than 1,300 years, China chose its top officials by written exam. Its top officials were chosen meritocratic ally -- or were they?
When the results came out, each successful candidate went to pay his respects to the men who had marked his exam. He called the examiner master, and the bond lasted for life.
Ruixue Jia (UC San Diego, CEPR) and her co-author Ying Bai followed 24,269 graduates of the Qing dynasty's imperial examination, from 1644 to 1905, to see who reached the top of the imperial state. A high mark in the examination was important, but so did an examiner who later rose to power. Jia tells Tim Phillips how merit and patronage worked together.
Phillips, Tim, and Ruixue Jia. 2026. "Merit, masters and China's imperial exam." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).Β About the guest
Ruixue Jia is Professor of Economics at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California San Diego, where she co-directs the China Data Lab. She is also a Visiting Professor at the University of Hong Kong, a Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in its Political Economy and Economic History programmes, and co-editor of the Review of Economics and Statistics. Her research spans elite formation, the politics of education and science, and the historical roots of China's development. She is co-author, with Hongbin Li and Claire Cousineau, of The Highest Exam: How the Gaokao Shapes China (Belknap Press, 2025).
Research cited in this episode
The imperial examination. China's system for recruiting officials through competitive written exams on the Confucian classics and literary composition. It began around 605 CE, expanded under the Song dynasty around 1000 CE, and was abolished in 1905. In the Qing dynasty it had three levels. The entry (prefectural) exam was held twice every three years; the provincial and national exams once every three years. About 240 candidates passed each national exam, earning the title of . Bai and Jia study all 112 national exams held between 1644 and 1905.
S9 Ep56: Decoupling from China after Trump's Trade Wars
Season 9 Β· Episode 56
Friday, September 25, 2026 β’ Duration 29:25
In March 2025, Apple chartered cargo flights to deliver 600 tonnes of iPhones from India to the United States. A year earlier, four in five smartphones that imported to the US came from China.Β
One of the aims of US trade policy has been to decouple the US economy from China. So is the strategy working? Chad Bown (PIIE, CEPR) tells Tim Phillips how he examined the US import data product by product to see how American importers coped with Trump's second trade war. In consumer electronics, many firms quietly built a second supply chain in tariff-exempt countries before 2025, and switched sourcing away from China almost overnight in 2025. But clothing and footwear did not switch, because alternative source countries like Vietnam faced tariffs almost as high. When the US taxes imports from every country, the decoupling strategy gets lost.
Phillips, Tim, and Chad P. Bown. 2026. "Decoupling from China after Trump's Trade Wars." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest
Chad P. Bown is the Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a Fellow in the International Trade and Regional Economics programme of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. He was chief economist at the US Department of State from January 2024 to January 2025, and senior economist for international trade and investment on President Obama's Council of Economic Advisers. His research spans trade policy, industrial policy, economic security and supply chains. He co-created the Trade Talks podcast with Soumaya Keynes in 2017, and with Keynes he is co-author of How to Win a Trade War (Simon & Schuster, 2026).
S9 Ep55: Loosening inheritance law
Season 9 Β· Episode 55
Friday, September 18, 2026 β’ Duration 25:59
In most of the world you do not get to choose who inherits your money. Across continental Europe, Latin America, and countries governed by Islamic law, a minimum share of your estate will be reserved for your children, your spouse, and in some places your surviving parents. Write a will that ignores them and the law overrules you.Β
If you want a head start in life, choose your parents carefully.
Switzerland changed the rules in January 2023. The compulsory share for children fell by one third and the share reserved for surviving parents disappeared altogether. In this week's VoxTalk, Marius BrΓΌlhart (University of Lausanne, CEPR) tells Tim Phillips how he had been following the reform with no way of observing its effects, until a website that helps Swiss people write their wills online offered him its anonymous data. People who were handed more freedom gave less to their children and their parents, and more to spouses and partners. About one third of every liberated franc went to recipients outside the family altogether. Liberalising the law spreads wealth without taxing anyone: politically, though maybe not democratically, attractive.Β
Phillips, Tim, and Marius Brulhart. 2026. "Loosening inheritance law." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest
Marius Brulhart is Professor of Economics at HEC Lausanne, University of Lausanne, and a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. His research spans public finance, regional and urban economics, and international trade, with a long-running interest in how Swiss taxpayers and testators respond to the rules they are given. He has advised the World Bank, the OECD, the European Commission, and the Swiss government.
S9 Ep54: Does sacking the manager work?
Season 9 Β· Episode 54
Friday, September 11, 2026 β’ Duration 18:23
Your football team keeps losing. The season is slipping away. One thing can be changed by Friday, and the crowd is already singing about it: sack the manager.
Jan van Ours (Erasmus School of Economics, CEPR, Feyenoord fan) has looked at seven seasons of the Dutch top flight and 31 managers who were sacrificed mid-season. To work out whether any of them deserved it, he uses bookmaker odds and expected goals to distinguish bad play from bad luck.Β
The new-manager bounce is real: results improve after a new manager walks in. But also, not real: clubs that don't sack the manager have an upturn too. The message for the boardroom, in football and business, is that not doing anything might often be the best course of action.
Phillips, Tim, and Jan van Ours. 2026. "Does sacking the manager work?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest
Jan van Ours is Emeritus Professor of Applied Economics at Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and a core member of the Erasmus Centre for Applied Sports Economics. He is also Adjunct Professor at the Center for Health Economics, Monash Business School, and a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. His research spans unemployment dynamics, labour market policy, health and well-being, and the economics of professional sport, where match data offer a rare chance to watch a labour market in the open.
Research cited in this episode
The Eredivisie sample. Seven seasons of the top league of Dutch professional football, from 2018/19 to 2024/25, covering 4,136 match observations and 126 club-seasons. In that period 31 managers were replaced during a season; about 15% had gone by mid-season and 25% by the end of it.
Bugcrowd connects organisations with independent security researchers. It gave the authors anonymised records of more than 480,000 submissions to 2,483 programmes, from mid-2012 to mid-2021. The data predates the widespread use of AI-generated submissions, so the paper measures the effect of openness, not the effect of AI. The authors argue that AI sharpens the same problem.
Triage. Each submission is classified as rejected, duplicate, or unique. A unique report identifies a flaw nobody has reported before. Only the first valid report generally earns a reward, so a duplicate can be good work that arrived late. It must still be reviewed.
Wisdom of the crowd. Francis Galton's "Vox Populi" (Nature, 1907) reported that the median of about 800 guesses at an ox's dressed weight, made at a Plymouth livestock show, was remarkably close to the true figure. Eric Raymond gave software its version in "The Cathedral and the Bazaar": "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow". Maillart and co-authors tested that idea on bug bounties in 2017. Kretschmer's point is that real attackers differ in their objectives and methods; a varied crowd resembles them more closely than one employee can.
Open and closed programmes. Anyone can join a public programme; a private one is by invitation. Bugcrowd and many other bounty platforms leave that choice to the software company rather than setting one rule for all. Many other platforms keep far tighter control, which makes this the governance decision worth studying. Kretschmer and co-authors set out the wider argument about platforms as organisations in 2022. Among programmes that never switched, public ones were 7.6% of programmes but drew about half of all submissions. Private ones accounted for about 59% of unique discoveries and nearly 80% of dollar rewards.
Comparing like with like. Firms choose their regime deliberately, so comparing open with closed programmes misleads. The authors focus on the 86 programmes that switched once from private to public, and compare them with programmes that stayed private. The main estimates are about 23 more submissions a week, nearly six more unique vulnerabilities, 10 more new researchers, and seven more duplicates. An alternative estimator built for staggered timing gives smaller figures: about 15, three, seven, and six. The effect is front-loaded. Weekly submissions averaged about five before opening, reached about 70, then settled near 20 within 10 weeks. Opening is a choice, not an experiment, and the authors say so.
Quality mix. This is the share of incoming submissions that are unique. It is about 16 percentage points higher in private programmes, and it falls by about 17 points when a programme opens. Opening produces more discoveries in absolute terms and a smaller share of useful reports.
Monitoring. The authors cannot see how much firms spend on review, so they count verdicts per submission. One more weekly verdict is associated with about $139 more in weekly rewards in public programmes and about $508 in private ones; this is an association, not a causal estimate. A rough calculation in the paper suggests that opening pays only when a programme's discoveries have fallen to fewer than about 3.5 a week, before review costs. Programmes that opened averaged about 2.2. The authors say they do not identify the best moment to open, and Kretschmer makes the same point in the episode.
Programmes that have closed. Curl ended its bounty on 31 January 2026 after paying more than $100,000 for 87 confirmed vulnerabilities since 2019. Its creator, Daniel Stenberg, reported that the confirmed rate fell from more than 15% of submissions to below 5%, which he blamed in large part on AI slop. Intel suspended its programme in September 2026, which paid up to $100,000 per flaw, and replaced it with one that pays nothing. It gave no reason. Google stopped accepting product vulnerability reports to its open source reward programme on 1 October 2026, a change it calls temporary.
PHP2Shell. Two critical flaws, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, were patched in PHP on 21 October 2026. PHP runs about 69% of websites whose server-side language is known, and many operators took sites offline as a precaution. Calif found the first route to an attack during an audit under OpenAI's Patch the Planet programme, and Wiz and OpenAI reported further ones; all used AI tools. The PHP Foundation says a core developer first saw signs of one flaw in 2024, then the fix stalled, and it calls that delay "a structural failure" of process and resources. It reports 15 CVEs and 106 reports closed as invalid, duplicate, or non-reproducible since 1 July, and says "the models don't make the calls".
Open source software. Both curl and PHP are open source, maintained by small teams on which much of the web depends. Kretschmer argues that no single model fits. A firm may keep tight control of its core code and open the rest to its users. A related CEPR paper by Miklos Koren and co-authors, "Vibe Coding Kills Open Source", models how AI could weaken the user engagement that sustains these projects.
The labour share. The labour share is the part of national income paid to workers as wages; the rest goes to the owners of capital as profit. Caselli's point is that profits flow mostly to people at the top of the income distribution, so when the labour share falls, inequality rises even if pay within firms stays the same. That is why he argues ownership, not executive pay, is the bigger part of the story.
Wealth taxes. Tim raises Thomas Piketty, who argues for higher taxes on top incomes and on wealth. Caselli agrees in principle, but says any victory is temporary because concentrated wealth funds the campaign to reverse it. For evidence on how people respond to a wealth tax in practice, listen to Marius Brulhart on Switzerland's cantons, linked below.
Worker bargaining power. The other standard fix, associated with labour economists such as Suresh Naidu of Columbia University, is to strengthen unions and give workers more power to bargain. Caselli puts it in the same category as wealth taxes; desirable, but vulnerable to the same political erosion.
Mondragon. The Mondragon group of cooperatives in the Basque Country of Spain is the best known example of worker ownership at scale. Caselli cites its rules that let members keep a stake in the returns to investment after they leave, which answers the worry that departing workers will vote against investing in a future they will not share.
WBO Italcables. When the owners of a steel wire plant in Caivano, on the outskirts of Naples, gave up on it, the workers bought it and ran it as a cooperative. Il ManifestoΒ reported its reopening in December 2015. Caselli says the firm has since grown, invested in new equipment and exports worldwide, and uses it to question whether closures are always healthy creative destruction.
The residual claimant. The residual claimant keeps whatever is left after the bills are paid. In a conventional firm that is the shareholder; in a cooperative it is the workers. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972) used the idea to explain why firms have owners who monitor effort. Caselli turns it round: when a slacking colleague costs you money, you watch your colleagues.
The compensating differential. A compensating differential is the pay people will give up for a job with other rewards, such as meaning or status; the idea goes back to Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776). Caselli says it is how cooperatives keep their most able members, and accepts there is a limit to it.
The talent drain. Gabriel Burdin (2016) found that in Uruguay's worker-managed firms, where pay is more equal, the highest-ability members are more likely to quit. This is the objection Caselli treats as serious, and his answer may surprise listeners who expect a defence of strict pay equality.
Pro-worker AI. Daron Acemoglu, David Autor and Simon Johnson argue that AI can be designed to complement workers rather than replace them, in CEPR Policy Insight 123, "Can We Have Pro-Worker AI?" (2023). Caselli argues that AI developers build what their customers want, and that cooperative customers would want something different.
More VoxTalks Economics episodes
Wealth taxes. Marius BrΓulhart uses Switzerland's cantonal wealth taxes to show what happens when the rich are taxed on what they own, the fix Caselli fears will not last.
How AI can become pro-worker. Daron Acemoglu, David Autor and Simon Johnson propose policies to steer AI towards complementing workers rather than automating them away.
Research cited in this episode
The triple decline of April 2025. After the US announced sweeping tariffs on 2 April 2025, which President Trump called "Liberation Day", US stocks, Treasuries and the dollar fell together. Bruno argues that foreign investors did not sell their US assets; they bought protection against a falling dollar, and that hedging pushed the currency down. Much of their US equity exposure remains unhedged, so a new shock that starts in the US could trigger the same response.
Global imbalances. Large and persistent current account surpluses in some countries, mirrored by deficits in others. Imbalances were a major policy topic before 2008, faded after the global financial crisis, and are now back. Tille argues that the headline measures have risen only modestly; the concern is China, whose trade surplus is the largest ever recorded as a share of world GDP.
The coordinated policy package.International Monetary Fund. 2026. "2026 External Sector Report: Amid Rising Imbalances, the Case for Rebalancing." The standard prescription is US fiscal consolidation, more consumption in China and more investment in Europe. The report cites IMF estimates that a coordinated package would narrow global imbalances by 0.5% of world GDP over the medium term, compared with a widening of 0.4% under current trends. Nearly all the narrowing comes from China.
The renminbi debate. Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations argues that China holds its exchange rate down and that a stronger renminbi is part of the solution. Tille notes that other economists treat the exchange rate as a sideshow to China's high savings and weak domestic demand.
The basis trade. Pension funds, insurers and asset managers often prefer to hold Treasury exposure through futures. Hedge funds take the other side; they sell the futures, buy the bonds and earn the small gap between the two prices, funded with overnight borrowing. In calm markets the trade links the futures and cash markets and helps the Treasury sell its debt. When lenders pull back, hedge funds must sell bonds at the same moment. The report cites estimates that Cayman Islands hedge funds alone held about $1.8 trillion of Treasuries.
March 2020 and the UK gilt crisis. In March 2020, the Covid shock set off a scramble for dollars in which even Treasuries were sold, and the Federal Reserve bought Treasuries to restore order. In September 2022, UK pension funds using liability-driven investment strategies had to sell gilts as yields rose, which pushed yields higher still, until the Bank of England stepped in. Bruno cites both as examples of safe assets at the centre of stress, where falling prices force more sales.
The 1970s and 2008. Bruno compares today with two earlier periods when imbalances, the dollar and bond markets came under pressure together: the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, when inflation also eroded bond values, and the years before 2008, when Asian savings and European bank lending flowed into US assets. In 2008 the stress sat in the banks. Today it sits with pension funds, insurers and hedge funds.
The market-based trilemma. The old trilemma of international finance, associated with Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming, says a country cannot have free capital flows, a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy all at once. The report proposes a new one. Governments want to issue ever more debt, regulators want tight limits on bank balance sheets, and investors expect bond markets to work smoothly every day. You can have any two, but not all three all the time.
"Our currency, but your problem." John Connally, US Treasury Secretary, told European counterparts in 1971 that "the dollar is our currency, but it's your problem." The report updates the line; the dollar is no longer just a currency but the operating system of global finance.
Rupture or transition? The report opens with a remark by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, at the 2026 World Economic Forum, that the world is "in the midst of a rupture, not a transition." The authors test whether the same is true of the international financial system.
More VoxTalks Economics episodes
The Dollar Anchor Is Slipping. Tarek Hassan explains why the dollar became the world's safe haven and how tariffs weaken it.
Addressing Global Imbalances. Gita Gopinath and Philip Lane on why today's imbalances put more risk on government debt and non-bank lenders.
The best interests of the child standard. Since the 1970s, most custody law has told judges to decide in the child's best interests rather than weigh the parents' claims. Most countries now read this as keeping both parents involved, which is why joint custody is the default in many jurisdictions. The standard leaves wide discretion to judges, and Meghir says judges get little systematic evidence on what works. Elizabeth Scott and Robert Emery examine why the standard has persisted despite this criticism in "Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard" (Law and Contemporary Problems, 2014).
The tender years doctrine. Before the mid-19th century, English law treated children as their father's property. The Custody of Infants Act 1839, passed after a campaign by Caroline Norton, let mothers petition for custody of children under seven, and the presumption that young children belong with their mother spread across Europe. Dahl raises it to show how far the legal default has moved in less than two centuries, from father, to mother, to both.
Random assignment of judges. Families who end up with joint custody differ from those who do not, so a simple comparison cannot separate the effect of the arrangement from the effect of the family. In Sweden, custody disputes go to judges at random, and judges differ in how often they award joint custody. Comparing families who drew a lenient judge with families who drew a strict one isolates the effect of the ruling itself. Economists have used the same design to study prison sentences, for example Jeffrey Kling in "Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings" (American Economic Review, 2006). The method only measures effects for cases where judges could disagree; it says nothing about cases where every judge would reach the same decision.
Swedish court archives. Custody rulings are public records in Sweden, but no national database holds them. The authors requested files from all 48 district courts and received documents from 45. Digital archives covered cases from about 2010; for earlier years, the team visited court archives and scanned 19,491 paper rulings by hand. Dahl estimates that 80% of the project's time went on collecting data.
Swedish administrative registers. Statistics Sweden registers cover the whole population and record earnings, employment, family links and place of residence. The authors linked these to prescription records, which show who takes antidepressant, anti-anxiety and ADHD medication, and to records of intimate partner violence. This is why the research could follow mothers, fathers and children for years after each ruling.
National tests and school quality. All Swedish pupils sit the same national tests in Swedish and mathematics in grades three, six and nine. The authors use these scores to measure children's achievement, and build a measure of school quality from how much better or worse a school's pupils score than their backgrounds predict. In the paper, joint custody raises test scores by 0.47 of a standard deviation, which Meghir likens to about two extra years of schooling.
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Helping fathers to acknowledge paternity. Anna Raute on what happens to mothers and children when fathers do not formally recognise their child, and which policies change that.
Love, money and parenting. Fabrizio Zilibotti on what economic research tells us about parenting, and about raising children who thrive.
Private sanctions and public opinion. Oliver Hart, David Thesmar and Luigi Zingales surveyed 2,915 Americans, a representative sample, in May and June 2022. Of these, 61% agreed that doing business in Russia is like being an accomplice to the war, and that firms should sever ties whatever the consequences. Javorcik raises the study to explain why firms with no legal obligation to leave Russia chose to go anyway: reputation, the threat of boycotts, pressure from investors, employees and business partners, and sometimes the values of managers. Hart, Oliver, David Thesmar, and Luigi Zingales. 2024. "Private Sanctions."Economic Policy 39 (117): 203-268.
"The business of business is business." The phrase is a popular summary of the view Milton Friedman set out in a 1970 essay in the New York Times Magazine, "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." Hart and his co-authors found that only a minority of their respondents treated the decision to leave Russia as a purely commercial one.
The Yale list. A team at the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute, led by Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, has tracked what more than 1,500 major companies said about their Russian operations since the invasion. To qualify, a firm must have revenue above $100 million, be majority owned from outside Russia and Belarus, and have meaningful operations in its home country, in Russia and in at least one other country. The team grades firms from full withdrawal to "digging in," and keeps a separate record of firms that reneged on their promises to leave. Javorcik and her co-authors use the list to classify the owners of 1,657 Western trademarks. Only 11 firms moved from strict private sanctions to doing little or nothing.
Customs data with trademarks. The paper draws on transaction-level records of Russian imports from 2016 to 2023, about 12 million records in 2022 alone. Each record shows the product code, the value, the quantity, the trading partner and the trademark. The products are classified at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System, which has more than 5,600 categories. The trademark field contained more than 1.2 million spellings; the authors used a large language model to standardise them, which merged 600 versions of "Samsung" into one.
Trade diversion through neutral countries. Countries that do not participate in sanctions, including China, Turkey and the UAE, do not monitor re-exports to Russia. After the invasion, the share of imports arriving via traders in these neutral jurisdictions rose by an additional 16 percentage points for brands whose owners announced private sanctions. The same authors traced a related route in "The Eurasian Roundabout: Trade Flows into Russia through the Caucasus and Central Asia" (Chupilkin, Javorcik, and Plekhanov 2026, European Economic Review).
Tariff equivalent. Trade economists often express a barrier to trade as the ad valorem tariff, a tax set as a percentage of the value of the goods, that would cause the same fall in trade. On this measure, private sanctions against Russia equal a tariff of between 9% and 84%. The range is wide because the answer depends on the trade elasticity, which measures how strongly trade responds to a change in costs.
The Clark Center Forum surveys. On 8 March 2022, the Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets at Chicago Booth asked its panels of leading economists if the sanctions already in place would lead to a deep recession in Russia. Of the respondents, 93% of the US panel and 94% of the European panel agreed. A deep recession did not follow. In June 2025, a majority of the European panel agreed that, on the evidence of the past 10 years, Western-led economic sanctions do not substantially deter target countries. Javorcik, a panel member, agreed, citing trade diversion and sanctions circumvention.
The UN vote. On 2 March 2022, 141 countries in the UN General Assembly voted for a resolution that condemned Russia's invasion and demanded its withdrawal from Ukraine. Javorcik contrasts this with the 45 economies that impose sanctions. The effectiveness of sanctions depends on how many countries take part.
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Do sanctions work? Moritz Schularick takes the long view of the evidence on sanctions of every type, and asks if policymakers will impose the ones that bite.
Trading around geopolitics Giancarlo Corsetti, Banu Demir and Beata Javorcik on whether Turkish exporters filled the gap in the Russian market, and an earlier sighting of the balloon.
What impact have trade sanctions had on Russia? Dzhamilya Nigmatulina uses railway shipments, company accounts and procurement records to measure what official trade sanctions did inside Russia.
How many took part. Every man could sit the exam in principle, but preparation cost years of study and lost income. Jia says that in the 18th century about two million men registered for the entry-level exam, roughly 2% to 3% of men aged 15 to 50, and that families often pooled resources to put one son forward. By her calculation, even a man who tried five times had less than a 1% chance of passing the entry level. These are her figures from the conversation.
Fan Zhongyan. The Northern Song statesman and poet (989 to 1052) whose story Jia uses to show how the exam sold itself. He lost his father as an infant and grew up in modest circumstances, passed the national exam in 1015, and rose to become one of the empire's most senior officials. Stories like his, Jia argues, sustained belief in the system. What mattered was perceived mobility, not the realised rate.
The high and low categories. Successful national candidates were ranked and divided at a cutoff. The top two groups received the jinshi degree; the third and largest group received the lesser tong jinshi ("similar to jinshi") degree. Bai and Jia compare the cutoff to the admission thresholds of elite universities today. Candidates just above it started their careers in better positions.
Top office. Bai and Jia define top office as rank three or above in the nine-rank system, which covered ministers, governors general and provincial governors. Only about 12.6% of jinshi reached it, on average 16 years after passing the exam. In practice, appointments were shaped by a handful of Grand Secretaries and Grand Ministers of State; on average seven people held these posts in any year.
The master and disciple relationship. Each national exam was overseen by one or two chief examiners and two or three vice examiners, all serving officials. After the results, graduates visited their examiners, called them "master teacher" and called each other "classmates". The historian Ichisada Miyazaki describes it as "a pledge between them to assist each other to weather the storms of political life" (Miyazaki, Ichisada. 1981. China's Examination Hell: The Civil Service Examinations of Imperial China. Yale University Press, p. 56). Philip Kuhn called the system "a veritable faction factory" (Kuhn, Philip A. 2003. Origins of the Modern Chinese State. Stanford University Press). Because papers were anonymous, the link between a candidate and his examiners was set by chance, which lets Bai and Jia treat it as a natural experiment.
Power or mentoring. Bai and Jia measure ties to powerful examiners by counting how many years a candidate's examiners held key central posts in the decade after the exam. To separate a good teacher from a well-placed patron, they compare an examiner's power before and after the exam. Power that came later mattered more, which points to patronage rather than instruction alone.
Merit and connections in modern China. Jia found a similar pattern in an earlier study of provincial leaders after 1993, in which neither strong economic performance nor links to the top leadership was enough for promotion on its own. Jia, Ruixue, Masayuki Kudamatsu, and David Seim. 2015. "Political Selection in China: Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance."Journal of the European Economic Association 13 (4): 631-668.
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The Success of the Embedded State. James Robinson on how unpaid local elites ran British government two centuries ago, and why they were more efficient than salaried officials.
Related reading on VoxEU
Who becomes a top politician in China? Ruixue Jia, Masayuki Kudamatsu and David Seim on why Communist Party leaders need both connections and a strong record to reach the top.
The 2018-19 Section 301 tariffs. In Trump's first term the US imposed tariffs on imports from China in stages, on product lists set under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Lists 1, 2 and 3, mostly intermediate inputs such as auto parts, ended at 25%. List 4A began at 15% and was cut to 7.5% in February 2020 under the Phase One agreement. List 4B, mostly consumer goods such as smartphones, laptops and toys, was delayed "for Christmas season" and never imposed. By the end of the first trade war, roughly two thirds of US imports from China faced new tariffs. Bown's point is that the goods spared in 2018-19 were the ones hit hardest in 2025.
The 2025 IEEPA tariffs on China. In February and March 2025, before Liberation Day, the US imposed two rounds of 10% tariffs on all imports from China under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, justified by concerns over fentanyl. For the first time this covered smartphones and other List 4B goods. One of the two was removed in November 2025 after Presidents Trump and Xi met in South Korea.
Liberation Day. On 2 April 2025 the US announced tariffs on most of its trading partners, at rates that varied by country. A long list of products, including smartphones, was exempt under Annex II. On 9 April the country rates were paused and a 10% baseline applied while countries negotiated. China's rates escalated after retaliation on both sides; the Liberation Day actions on China alone reached 125% before a truce in Geneva in May. The exemptions matter to the episode. A tariff on China changes sourcing only if the alternatives face a lower one.
The August 2025 tariffs on India. The US raised tariffs on India by a further 25 percentage points in August 2025, citing India's purchases of Russian oil. Smartphones were again exempt, so Apple's Indian supply chain stayed tariff free. For some clothing, India ended up facing a larger tariff increase than China.
The Supreme Court ruling on IEEPA tariffs. On 20 February 2026 the US Supreme Court ruled that the country-level tariffs imposed under IEEPA were illegal. The Section 232 sectoral tariffs and the Section 301 tariffs on China were not part of the case. The administration removed the IEEPA tariffs and began imposing new ones under other legal authorities, which is why Bown warns that some of the 2025 effects may yet reverse.
Apple's alternative supply chain in India. Apple and its contract manufacturers, including Foxconn and Tata Electronics, spent several years building iPhone assembly in India. Patrick McGee tells the story in Apple in China: The Capture of the World's Greatest Company (Simon & Schuster, 2026). Over the last nine months of 2025, 40% of US smartphone imports came from China and 46% from India. Laptops, monitors and video game consoles moved in a similar way, mostly to Vietnam.
Inputs for AI. The paper defines AI inputs using the product codes that Nvidia publishes for export control compliance: certain semiconductors, printed circuit boards, servers and other data centre hardware. These made up about 14% of US imports in 2025. They grew by $183 billion that year, more than the $144 billion rise in total US goods imports. A separate classification by Michael Waugh (2026) finds a larger share, at 23%.
US tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. In 2024 the Biden administration raised US tariffs on electric vehicles from China to 100%, using the authority of the 2018 Section 301 action. China exported 40% of the world's electric vehicles in 2024, according to the International Energy Agency, but almost none to the United States.
China's export restrictions on rare earths. In April 2025 China restricted exports of rare earths and permanent magnets, of which it produces about 90% of world supply. Bown did not include these products in the paper, but they are the reverse of the decoupling story. They are goods for which the US found no alternative supplier.
Tariff pass-through to consumer prices. Bown suggests that firms with an alternative supplier may explain why some prices, such as the iPhone's, did not rise. He points to work by Alberto Cavallo, Paola Llamas and Franco Vazquez (2025), "Tracking the Short-Run Price Impact of U.S. Tariffs," NBER Working Paper 34496, which tracks how the 2025 tariffs reached retail prices.
How to Win a Trade War. Soumaya Keynes and Chad P. Bown. 2026. How to Win a Trade War: An Optimistic Guide to an Anxious Global Economy. New York: Simon & Schuster. The authors argue that the conflict with China will not reverse, and that other economies are now dealing with China-related shocks of their own.
US-China decoupling: Rhetoric and reality, a VoxEU column showing that after the first trade war US imports from China slowed, but supply chains for strategic products stayed intertwined with China.
Tariff confusion, a VoxEU column by Kalina Manova, Dennis Novy, Thomas Sampson and Aaron Tang on how confusion about current US tariffs reduced trade in 2025.
Research cited in this episode
Protected heirs. Swiss law, like that of most civil-law countries, reserves compulsory minimum shares of an estate for close family. Before 2023 those categories were children and other direct descendants, spouses, and surviving parents. An unmarried testator with children could freely allocate only 25% of their estate; the rest belonged to the children by law.
The 2023 reform. Parliament passed the change in December 2020 and it came into force on 1 January 2023. Minimum shares for direct descendants were cut by one third, those for surviving parents were abolished, and the share reserved for a surviving spouse was left alone. Averaged across family types in the data, the freely attributable portion of an estate rose by 19 percentage points, from 39% to 58%.
DeinAdieu.ch. The Swiss online service that generated the data, funded by charities seeking legacies. Users answer questions about their family situation, the tool limits their choices to what the law allows, and they set the shares with a set of sliders. The sample covers 16,887 completed forms submitted between January 2020 and March 2024, which straddles the reform.
Bunching. Before the reform, a large share of testators gave their protected heirs exactly the legal minimum and not a franc more; 52% of testators with children and 72% of those with living parents had been giving more than they wanted to. When the minimum fell, so did their allocations.
Reference dependence. The whole distribution moved, not just the people who had been pinned to the legal floor. Testators who had voluntarily given their children more than the law required also gave less after the reform, which suggests the legal minimum works as a mental benchmark for generosity even when it is not binding.
Marginal diffusion propensity. Brulhart and Soler's term for the share of each newly discretionary franc that goes to nonrelatives and charities. Their central estimate is 0.33. Applied to the whole population it implies that the reform moved more wealth outside family dynasties than Switzerland's inheritance taxes do, though Swiss inheritance tax is unusually light, with children inheriting tax free in most cantons.
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Wealth Taxes. Marius Brulhart's earlier conversation with Tim Phillips, on what Switzerland's cantons reveal about how people respond when wealth rather than income is taxed.
Wealth taxation: The Swiss experience, by Marius Brulhart, Jonathan Gruber, Matthias Krapf, and Kurt Schmidheiny, on how Swiss wealth holders respond to the rate they pay.
How inheritances influence wealth inequality, by Mikael Elinder, Oscar Erixson, and Daniel Waldenstrom, using Swedish register data covering every heir of every decedent over several years.
Points surprise. The cumulative gap, from the first match of the season, between the points a club has won and the points the bookmakers implied it should have won. Bookmaker odds are used as the benchmark because they already contain everything the market knows about squad quality, home advantage and the opposition; van Ours confirms this in the data, finding that recent results add nothing to the odds as a predictor of the next match.
Performance surprise. The same cumulative gap, but measured with expected points derived from expected goals rather than actual results. Points surprise catches a club that is losing. Performance surprise catches a club that is playing badly. A club can be one without being the other, which is how luck gets separated from ability.
Expected goals. The probability that a given shot becomes a goal, estimated from thousands of comparable attempts and conditioned on the distance and angle of the shooter, the body part used, and the type of pass and attack. Van Ours converts expected goals scored and conceded into a distribution of match outcomes, and from that into expected points. His data come from fbref.com; the paper notes that match-level expected goals were discontinued in January 2026 after a dispute between fbref and Opta.
The counterfactual replacement. The device that carries the paper. For each actual sacking, van Ours searches the same club in a different season for a moment when the sum of points surprise and performance surprise was almost identical, and the manager survived. Of the 31 replacements, 22 have a counterfactual, 19 of them unique. Clubs that sacked the manager gained 0.21 points per match afterwards. Clubs in the same trouble that did not sack the manager gained 0.38.
Scapegoating. William Gamson and Norman Scotch set out the idea in "Scapegoating in baseball" in the American Journal of Sociology in 1964, describing the sacking of a manager as an anxiety-reducing ritual that participants treat as an improvement whether or not anything improves. Van Ours returns to it to explain why a decision with no measurable effect keeps being taken.
Managers in regular firms. Stuart Gilson's 1989 study in the Journal of Financial Economics found that replaced executives were not employed by another firm for at least three years. Football managers are frequently back in work within weeks, which is one reason the job pays what it does. Hilger, Mankel and Richter reviewed 91 studies of top executive dismissals published between 1960 and 2010 and concluded that the effects of managerial turnover are not statistically different from zero.