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Under questioning, Lysis has been primed to think that being ruled by slaves and hired professionals in technai where he is incompetent is restrictive, while being entrusted to read and write for his parents, in the technai of reading and writing, where he is competent, is freeing and permits him to do as he desires. To say that Lysis himself actually thought like this before Socrates' questioning is problematic. Even so, Lysis should have begun questioning the notion that being entrusted with technai is freeing when Socrates began talking about making stew for the Great King.

Lysis realizes that he is ruled and restricted by slaves, hired professionals, and his mother, in those arts and crafts (technai) where he does not yet understand. However, his parents allow him to read and write because he understands the technai of reading and writing. Socrates draws out the implication that Lysis will be allowed to do whatever he wants the moment he understands all technai. Under further questioning, Lysis agrees that his father, his neighbour, Athenians in general, should entrust their things to him the moment he is more capable than them.

Even the parents of Lysis restrict his desires to technai where he is competent, but there he is allowed to do whatever he wishes, so Socrates pretends to infer.

Socrates' line of questioning establishes that Lysis is prevented by his parents, who love him very much, from doing whatever he desires. Even slaves are put in charge of him. We should remember that Hippothales is listening to this as a lesson in how to attract rather than repel his lust-obect.

Socrates begins his interrogation of Lysis. He had been considering asking Lysis and Menexenusk, before the latter left, which of them was more just and expert, but now with Lysis alone, Socrates asks him about his parents' treatment of him.

Menexenus leaves the conversation, leaving Lysis at the mercy of Socrates, Ctesippus, and the many onlookers, including Hippothales who still hopes to learn how to speak to his lust object without repelling him.

Stage directions about who sits or stands where for the conversation between Socrates, Menexenus, and Lysis

Socrates innocently describes the scene as he and Ctesippus, followed by the others, enter the palaestra.

Socrates promises.to demonstrate to Hippothales how to speak to one's lust object in a way which will attract rather than repel. Hippithales is. deviously inventive when it comes to helping Socrates talk to Lysis, enlisting the aid of Ctesippus and Ctesippus' cousin Menexenus in order to facilitate the meeting. Hippothales appears not to have noticed that Socrates has successfully engineered a conversatipn with Lysis, which is something Hippothales seems never to have done.

Socrates criticizes Hippothales for his speeches and songs, but not for the right reason.

Ctesippus describes to Socrates the sort of ridiculous praise his friend Hippothales has been directing at Lysis. It turns out that Hippothales is not in fact praising Lysis.

We learn some more about Lysis, the formal subject of this part of the conversation. Lysis is the son of Democrates of the deme Aixone, so he is of an aristocratic family. He seems to have it all - looks, wealth, status, reputation, and a course in wrestling. We should not forget, however, the the most important things we learn are from characters themselves, about themselves, and here we learn quite a bit about Hippothales, Ctesippus, and of course, Socrates as he is in this dialogue.

Ctesippus enters the chat. He informs Socrates that Hippothales is so obsessed with Lysis that he is an annoyance to Ctesippus and the others of their age group.

Socrates, using his god-given gift to recognize lusters and lusted, quickly ascertains that Hippothales is lusting after a younger boy in the wrestling school. Socrates' profession of ignorance with regard to all other things should be taken with a grain of salt, as should be the notion that a god was required to give Socrates the ability to deduce Hippothales' infatuation with someone.

The youths, including Hippothales and Ctesippus, are assmbled outside of a palaestra, where they spend time in words. During this introductory chat we come to appreciate one feature of Socratic dialectic, namely how Plato's Socrates sets up conversations in advance. We should not apply this feature to Socrates in every dialogue, but it is certainly a feature in the later early dialogues, and some middle ones (e.g., Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Politeia, Phaedrus, Symposium - not in. e.g., Euthyphro, Laches, Phaedo, where Socrates does control the conversation, but does not initiate the discussion or put himself in the way of an anticipated discussion).

Socrates says he was walking from Academy straight to Lyceum, but on the way encountered a crowd of youths. Is he about to be mugged under the city wall of Athens?

Socrates conceals his dialectic exercise with rhetoric and even eristics in an attempt to make Io, who enjoys listening to sophists (he says "you sophoi"), and consequently nice rhetorical stories such as the magnet analogy, actually consider what his rhapsodic techne is. It does include thousands of Homeric lines as subject matter, but this does not mean he is an expert (has the techne) regarding each subject talked about.
I have not speculated in the podcast, but Plato may have written this dialogue with some of his own students in mind. Plato was considered divine by many people, and Plato's Socrates emphasizes that divinely inspired authors lack intelligence. An interpreter of Plato's dialogues is like the rhapsode, probably even learning the dialogues by heart, which might make such a Platonist feel that he knows more than he really does. This dialogue may well have given such an interpreter pause for thought.

What the dialogue is not about.

In this final section of the dialogue, Socrates provides Io with two options. Either Io has techne and refuses to divulge his sophia to Socrates, and is therefore doing wrong, or he has no techne but is divinely inspired. Should he choose to be considered unjust or divine?

Socratae, beginning his concluding remarks, presents the first of his two options for Io. Accordinng to this first option, Io is doing Socrates wrong by purposely shapeshifting in order to avoid revealing how clever he is with regard to the sophia of Homer.

Socrates finishes off the argument refuting Io's claim that he is a general, let alone a good general, incidentally revealing that the dramatic date of the dialogue is around 413 BC, after the disastrous Athenian campaign against Syracuse.

Socrates begins dismantling Io's claim that he has a techne common to rhapsodes and generals. Io accepts that he is the best rhapsode and the best general, but he cannot accept that any general is also a rhapsode, for the very good reason, I suggest, that a general is not a rhapsode. This is not a refutation based on logic, but an argument from observation.

Having essentially agreed (in not so many words) that each techne has exclusive subject matter, it is perhaps surprising that Io remains steadfast over his claim that the rhapsode and the strategos share the same techne.

Io had been forced to narrow the rhapsode's expertise down to knowing what sort of things it would be fitting for different types of people to say, ,such as a man, a woman, a slave or a ruler, rather than any type of craftsman. However, Socrates has derailed this approach to rhapsody by giving each of these types of people various types of techne: the ruler he has turned into a ruler of a ship at sea (a helmsman), and a ruler of a sick person (a physician); even the slave becomes a ruler of oxen (an oxherd), a woman becomes a ruler of wool (a spinner), and in all these, Io agrees that the craftsman would know better than a rhapsode what sort of things it is fitting for these types of people to say. Socrates now turns to the man, and Io thinks that at least here he knows what sort of things it is fitting for a man to say. It turns out that he doesn't, again according to the flawed assumption that any subject matter is exclusive to only one techne or another.

Io misspoke when he formulated the rhapsode's techne as the ability to know the sort of things any type of person should say. It is easy for Socrates to make Io admit that craftsmen of all other crafts will say things connected to their crafts more finely than a rhapsode could - this after all is what they have been assuming for a long time now.

What began as a question over who can judge better when Homer is speaking well has recently become a question of which techne is better suited to judge the subject matter of the poem. In every case, the professional associated with the subject matter being discussed is preferred to the rhapsode, since Io accepts the sophistic principle of exclusivity (if one techne knows X, then the rhapsodic techne doesn't know X). This pushes Io finally to consider what the rhapsodic techne might be without reference to the subject matter of the poem.,

Socrates quotes another Homeric example of the mantike techne (the craft of the seer). Unlike the first example, a prophecy, the.second example is an omen.

Socrates adds to the medical quote from Homer a quote from the techne (craft) of fishing, and another from the craft of divination. It still appears to Io that professionals rather than a rhapsode would be able to better judge whether Homer speaks well about these ultimately minor details from entire professions..

Socrates makes a meal of the refutation. One point I don't discuss in the podcast is why a charioteer would want to judge a poet anyway, and the question may be directed at the judging of rhapsodes in competitions. What exactly is being judged? Their knowledge of the subject matter talked about by the poet, or their ability to perform the poem? This would seem to be an easy question to answer, but it would imply that the subject matter is not exclusive to one techne, and were Io to have arrived at this conclusion, Socrates' longwinded refutation of the rhapsodic techne might have achieved its goal.

Socrates is still sophistically establishing the exclusivity of the subject matter of a craft, such that the subject matter of one techne cannot be the subject matter of another techne.

Spcrates continues developing his sophistic argument which will eventually lead to yet another proof that rhapsody is not a techne (craft or skill). We two use the same skill concerning the same content, such as knowing that Socrates is holding up five fingers. It would seem to follow that different content therefore requires different skills.

Socrates' apparently dialectical elenchus turns out to be more of a sophistic exercise with the foregone false conclusion that only a charioteer (having the techne of chariot racing) would understand what Homer says about chariot racing. Not only are there several obvious flaws in the construction of the argument, but the very idea that it is Homer rather than Nestor speaking is also concerning, but probably deliberate, given the care Socrates earlier took in making sure the rhapsode knew who spoke the lines and to whom. Of course Io would know this too, but with these names fresh in his memory, he should have objected to the assumption that it is Homer rather than Nestor whose words need to be understood.

While the four rhetorical arguments to prove that Io lacked techne and nous at the moment he delivered well the best of Homer were, according to Io, spoken well, they were not convincinng. Socrates changes tack, deciding to stop arguing to persuade in favour of questioning, but still with a view to challenging Io's view that he has a techne. If Io speaks well, he must surely know what Homer is talking about. In the spirit of dialectial induction,  Socrates begins with an example from the techne of chariot racing. Does Io really know how to make a chariot make a sharp turn?

Socrates' four analogies supporting his claim that Io lacks techne, nous, or episteme whenever he performs the best of Homer's poems, is easily dismissed by Io who appreciates Socrates' rhetoric, but remains unconvinced by it. He observes that Socrates speaks well. Coincidentally, this is now what also concerns Socrates about Io. On what subject in Homer's poems does Io speak well?

Socrates completes his fourth analogy illustrating why rhapsodes lack techne and episteme when performing a poet's best poems in the best way possible. This time, very little of substance seems to have been added to the original magnet analogy. Possibly an attempt has been made to shift the notion of possession as a divine occupation replacing the rhapsode's intelligence towards the notion of possession as a holding by magnetic attraction, but the absence of intelligence is still the main point.

Purportedly to explain why even the emotions instilled in the spectator are not due to the skill of the rhapsode, the fourth analogy is a refinement of the first analogy about magnets. Instead of a magnet attracting many rings which in turn attract many other rings, this time there are only three rings in a chain, and this must be explained.

Now that Io has agreed that he is affected by the poetry he declaims, Socrates asks whether the audience is similarly affected, and Io makes it clear that it is his job to know that they are.

Having shown to Io's delight with three examples why poets lack techne, Socrates begins to interrogate Io in order to determine that rhapsodes also lack techne. The reason for rhapsodes lacking techne differs from the reasons Socrates ascribed to the poets.

My final thoughts on the three analogies concerning the mindlessness of poets producing good poetry. Socrates then returns to the rhapsodes who are interpreters of interpreters, given that poets are interpreters (or expounders of expounders - hermenes of hermenes). Io replies, "Absolutely!".

Ostensibly to prove the third claim regarding the lack of intelligence of poets at the time of performing a poem, Socrates adduces the famous example of an otherwise worthless poet whose paeon is widely considered to be the best of lyric poetry. Socrates, as usual, inserts a number of inconsistencies no doubt calculated to make Io think dialectically, although nothing of the sort happens,

Socrates adds a third reason for the poets' lack of intelligence, inconsistent with the other two reasons.

Socrates makes some interesting wordplays and confusions between the two analogies - the magnet and the bees. Io does not react. As he said earlier, he enjoys listening to "you sophoi". Socrates has contrasted an accurate but prosaic analogy with a highly inaccurate and denigrating but poetic and rhetorical analogy.

Socrates continues telling Io about the divine power, this time using the analogy of bees spreading honey.

The alternative to Io having a techne is that he is possessed by a divine power. Socrates first uses the magnet analogy.

Io seems almost to challenge Socrates to tell him why he is exceptional as someone with a techne, in that he can talk well only about one practitioner of his techne, although Socrates' last example implies that Io does not have Homer's techne. The techne of poetry and the techne of rhapsody appear to be treated differently. All the technai in this inductive passage are treated incorrectly, as if complete knowledge of the techne includes complete knowledge concerning the practitioners of the techne.

Socrates appears to perform a normal sequence of induction, but things are not quite what they seem.

To exemplify the point that any techne deals with the whole of the field of that techne, Socrates refers to graphike techne, meaning here just painting. Socrates proceeds, however, to talk about the critic of one artist needing to be able to criticize all artists if indeed the techne pertains to the whole. Earlier, Io had said that he excelled as a critic of Homer, but not of other poets, so Socrates' analogy is accurate, although it does not prove the point about techne pertaining to the whole of its field.

The rhapsode Io can judge of the poets both who speaks well and who speaks less well since he has the appropriate techne, but in the next breath Socrates determines that Io can't judge anyone, even Homer, since he lacks techne and episteme. Even more strangely, Io seems happy with this, and even treats Socrates as a sophos whom he is happy to listen to.

Socrates concludes from the examples with arithmetic and medicine that the one who has a techne in a subject is the one who may recognize the one speaking well in the subject and the ones speaking badly (later in the argument, worse = less well), so that Io himself turns out to be the one with techne who can judge that Homer speaks well while the other poets speak less well. Socrates finally uses the word kritēs (judge), but not about those who judge rhapsodes such as Io in competitions, but about Io himself, judging Homer and the other poets. This is confusing, to say the least, and it is not clear what the techne might be which Homer, the other poets, and Io, are considered to be using.

Socrates steers the conversation back to the subject matter by asking who will recognize who speaks well or badly in arithmetic and in medicine. The answer is that the one who has the techne (craft / art) of arithmetic or medicine is the one who will recognize both types of speaker. Why does Socrates not mention a judge (kritēs) explicitly, or the verb "to judge" (dikazō)? He is certainly referring to the function of a judge, and we may ask why a judge is necessary for the argument. Why does Socrates not focus the argument on the arithmetician, the physician, or the rhapsode, directly?