Case Info: Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7 | Date Argued: 04/23/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act generally preempts States from adopting emission standards for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). But under Section 209(b) of that Act, EPA may grant California and only California-a waiver from federal preemption to set its own vehicle-emission standards. Before granting a preemption waiver, EPA must find that California "need[s]" its own emission standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B).

In 2022, EPA granted California a waiver to set its own standards for greenhouse-gas emissions and to adopt a zero-emission-vehicle mandate, both expressly intended to address global climate change by reducing California vehicles' consumption of liquid fuel. Fuel producers challenged EPA's waiver as contrary to the text of Section 209(b). The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge without reaching the merits, concluding that fuel producers' injuries were not redressable because they had not established that vacating EPA's waiver would have any effect on automakers.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties.
2. Whether EPA's preemption waiver for California's greenhouse-gas emission standards and zero-emission- vehicle mandate is unlawful.

Holding: The fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson filed dissenting opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioners: Jeffrey B. Wall
• For Federal Respondents: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General
• For State Respondents: Joshua A. Klein, Deputy Solicitor General, Oakland, Cal.

Case Info: Velazquez v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Date Decided: 4/22/25 | Case No. 23-929

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?

Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II.  Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Gerard J. Cedrone
• For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Host Note: Please note that the opinion date is April 22, 2025.

Case Info: Fuld v. PLO | Case No. 24-20 | Date Argued: 4/1/25

Case consolidated with: United States v. PLO, Case No. 24-151.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq., provides an extraterritorial private right of action for victims of terror attacks committed against American nationals abroad. In 2019, Congress amended the ATA by enacting the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA). Under the PSJVTA, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction" in an ATA action if: (a) more than 120 days after the statute's enactment, they pay any terrorist convicted of or killed while committing a terror attack against an American national, and the payment is made "by reason of' the conviction or terror attack, 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e) (1)(A); or (b) more than 15 days after the statute's enactment, they "conduct any activity" while physically present in the United States (with limited exceptions), id. § 2334(e)(1) (B).

The PLO and PA engaged in both categories of conduct after the trigger dates. But in the decisions below, the Second Circuit facially invalidated the PSJVTA. The court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids Congress from specifying conduct that triggers a defendant's consent to federal jurisdiction unless the statute provides the defendant with some "governmental benefit" in return, and that the PLO and PA had not received such a benefit.

Question Presented: Whether the PSJVTA violates the Fifth Amendment.

Holding: The PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part II.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioners in 24-20: Kent A. Yalowitz, New York, N. Y.
• For Petitioner in 24-151: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondents: Mitchell R. Berger, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Catholic Charities Bureau v. WI Labor Review Comm'n | Case No. 24-154 | Date Argued: 3/31/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Wisconsin exempts from its state unemployment tax system certain religious organizations that are "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches" and that are also "operated primarily for religious purposes."

Petitioners are Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Superior and several sub-entities. Although all agree Catholic Charities is controlled by a church-the Diocese of Superior-the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Catholic Charities is not "operated primarily for religious purposes" and thus does not qualify for the tax exemption. Specifically, the court held that Catholic Charities' activities are not "typical" religious activities because Catholic Charities serves and employs non-Catholics, Catholic Charities does not "attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith," and its services to the poor and needy could also be provided by secular organizations.

Questions Presented:

1. Does a state violate the First Amendment's Religion Clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state's criteria for religious behavior?
2. In addressing federal constitutional challenges, may state courts require proof of unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt?"

Holding: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  Justices Thomas and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Eric C. Rassbach, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
• For respondents: Colin T. Roth, Assistant Attorney General, Madison, Wis.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Rivers v. Guerrero | Case No. 23-1345 | Date Argued: 3/31/25 | Date Decided: 6/12/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing.

The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit).

Question Presented: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.

Holding: Once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a first-filed habeas petition, a second-in-time filing qualifies as a "second or successive application" properly subject to the requirements of Section 2244(b).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. There were no concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D.C.
• For respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: United States v. Miller | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-824

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state  fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.

Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that fed­eral claim.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
• For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Case No. 24-354 | Date Argued: 3/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund.

2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates.

3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.

Host Note: Consolidated with: SHLB Coalition V. Consumers' Research, Case No. 23-422.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
• For Respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Case No. 23-1229 | Date Argued: 3/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In a pair of final actions, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) denied 105 petitions filed by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act's Renewable Fuel Standard program. Six of those refineries petitioned for review of EPA's decisions in the Fifth Circuit, which denied the government's motion for transfer to the D.C. Circuit.

Question Presented: Whether venue for the refineries' challenges lies exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because the agency's denial actions are "nationally applicable" or, alternatively, are "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect." 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).

Holding: EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.

Case Info: Oklahoma v. EPA | Case No. 23-1067 | Date Argued: 3/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits.

The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.
2. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan may only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b)(1) if EPA packages that disapproval with disapprovals of other States' SIPs and purports to use a consistent method in evaluating the state-specific determinations in those SIPs.

Host Note: Consolidated with: Pacificorp V. EPA, Case No. 23-1067.

Holding: EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in a regional Circuit.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners in 23-1067: Mithun Mansinghani, Oklahoma City, Okla.
• For petitioners in 23-1068: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.
• For respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Case Info: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Date Argued: 3/24/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals. In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.

Questions Presented:

1. Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8?
2. Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny?
3. Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions?
4. Is this action non-justiciable?

Host Note: Consolidated with Robinson V. Callais (Case No. 24-110)

Oral Advocates:

• For Appellant in 24-109: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La.
• For Appellants in 24-110: Stuart C. Naifeh, New York, N.Y.
• For Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Mo.

Case Info: Riley v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-1270 | Date Argued: 3/24/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Petitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.
2. Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Keith Bradley, Denver, Colo.
• For respondent in support of petitioner: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below: Stephen J. Hammer, Dallas, Tex.

Case Info: NRC v. Texas | Case No. 23-1300 | Date Argued: 3/5/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency's statutory authority.
2. Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.
3. (For Interim Storage Partners, LLC) Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's exercise of authority to issue a license to a private party to temporarily possess spent nuclear fuel at a location away from an operating nuclear power reactor was lawful under the applicable statutes (as the D.C. and Tenth Circuits have held) or not (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).
4. Whether, notwithstanding an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action, a person must take steps to become a "party" to an agency proceeding under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, in order to then subsequently challenge the agency action resulting from that proceeding in court (as the Second, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held), or whether an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action can override statutory limitations on jurisdiction (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).

Host Note: Consolidated with: Interim Storage Partners, LLC V. Texas, Case No. 23-1312.

Holding: Because Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding, they are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners in 23-1300: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
• For petitioner in 23-1312: Brad Fagg, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents Texas, et al.: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
• For respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: CIR v. Zuch | Case No. 24-416 | Date Argued: 4/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Case No. 23-1141 | Date Argued: 3/4/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Mexican Government sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades-from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions-that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States. The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico.
2. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.

Holding: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.
• For respondent: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman | Case No. 23-1259 | Date Argued: 3/3/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

For more than 70 years, this Court has "required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court has also stressed that a movant must be "faultless" to obtain relief. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). "This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (cleaned up).

In this case, Respondents declined multiple invitations and opportunities to amend their complaint. The District Court then dismissed their complaint with prejudice, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Only then did Respondents move to vacate the judgment so they could file an amended complaint.

The District Court denied the motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-settled standard. But the Second Circuit reversed, based on an unprecedented "balanc[ing]" test that requires district courts to consider Rule 15(a)'s "liberal pleading principles" when addressing a Rule 60 (b)(6) motion to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

Question Presented: Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard applies to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

Holding: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Robers and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined and in which Justice Jackson joined in all parts but Part III. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg¬ment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents: Michael J. Radine, Hackensack, N.J.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: CC/Devas Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. | Case No. 23-1201 | Date Argued: 3/3/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
2. The question presented in Antrix Corp. Ltd. is: Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).

Holding: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner in 24-17: Aaron Streett, Houston, Tex.
• For petitioners in 23-1201: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D.C.
• For United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioners: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents: Carter G. Phillips, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Argued: 2/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."

Holding: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which requires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
• For respondent: T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Esteras v. United States | Case No. 23-7483 | Date Argued: 2/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The supervised-release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), lists factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for a court to consider when sentencing a person for violating a supervised release condition. In that list, Congress omitted the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(A)-the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.

Question Presented: Even though Congress excluded section 3553(a)(2)(A) from section 3583(e)'s list of factors to consider when revoking supervised release, may a district court rely on the section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release?

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioners: Christian J. Grostic, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Cleveland, Ohio.
• For Respondent: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Perttu v. Richards | Case No. 23-1324 | Date Argued: 2/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich.
• For respondent: Lori Alvino McGill, Charlottesville, Va.

Case Info: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Case No. 23-7809 | Date Argued: 2/24/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), this Court held that Rodney Reed has standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas's post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ''Reed suffered an injury in fact," the named defendant "caused Reed's injury," and if a federal court concludes that Texas's statute violates due process, it is "substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order."

In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow that ruling over a dissent that recognized that this case was indistinguishable from Reed. The majority formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which requires scouring the record of the parties' dispute and any legal arguments asserted, to predict whether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court's declaratory judgment. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2024).

The Fifth Circuit's new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have applied the standing doctrine exactly as this Court directed in Reed. See Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506 (8th Cir. 2023); Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023).

Question Presented: Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?

Holding: Gutierrez has standing to bring his Section 1983 claim challenging Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to all but Part II.B.2. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Anne E. Fisher, Assistant Federal Defender, Philadelphia, Pa.
• For respondents: William F. Cole, Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Case Info: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 | Date Decided: 5/15/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using "unreasonable" force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). But four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth-cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the "moment of the threat doctrine," which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer's actions only in the narrow window when the officer's safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits-the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits-reject the moment of the threat doctrine and follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer's actions leading up to the use of force.

In the decision below, Judge Higginbotham concurred in his own majority opinion, explaining that the minority approach "lessens the Fourth Amendment's protection of the American public" and calling on this Court "to resolve the circuit divide over the application of a doctrine deployed daily across this country." Pet. App. 10a-16a (Higginbotham, J., concurring).

Question Presented: Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.

Holding: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which re­quires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from the per­spective of a reasonable officer at the scene. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re­quires analyzing the totality of the circumstances. That analysis demands careful attention to the facts and circum­stances relating to the incident. Most notable here, the totality of the circumstances inquiry has no time limit.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky, Washington, D. C.; and Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
• For respondents: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D. C.; and Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae.)

Case Info: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Case No. 23-1007 | Date Argued: 1/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (C), prohibits a plan fiduciary from "engag[ing] in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest." The statute elsewhere defines "party in interest" broadly to include a variety of parties that may contract with or provide services to a plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B).

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have, on the other hand, required plaintiffs to allege additional elements to state a claim, because a "literal reading" of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) would purportedly produce "results that are inconsistent with ERISA's statutory purpose." Albert v. Oshkosh Corp., 47 F.4th 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2022).

Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text.

Holding: To state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausi­bly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without ad­dressing potential §1108 exemptions.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Advocates:

• For petitioners: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
• For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp. | Case No. 23-1226 | Date Argued: 1/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Holding: The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency's interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law's meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Matthew W.H. Wessler, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondents: Joseph R. Palmore, Washington, D.C.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Case Info: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Date Argued: 4/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read.

Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct."

Question Presented:

Whether public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D.C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
• For Respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N.Y.

Timestamps:

00:00 Introduction

00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement

02:06 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

18:38 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

53:39 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement

54:43 Government Free for All Questions Begin

1:04:21 Government Sequential Questions Begin

01:22:12 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement

01:24:02 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

01:52:42 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

2:25:55 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Case Info: FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | Case No. 23-1187 | Date Argued: 1/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. If FDA denies an application for authorization, "any person adversely affected by such * * * denial may file a petition for judicial review of such * * * denial with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or for the circuit in which such person resides or has their principal place of business." 21 U.S.C. 387l(a)(l). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has determined that a manufacturer may seek judicial review in that circuit even if it neither resides nor has its principal place of business there, so long as its petition is joined by a seller of its products, such as a gas station or convenience store, based in the circuit.

Question Presented: Whether a manufacturer may file a petition for review in a circuit (other than the D.C. Circuit) where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer's products that is located within that circuit.

Holding: Retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA's denial order may seek judicial review of that order under § 387l(a)(1).

Result: Affirmed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioners: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondents: Ryan J. Watson, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton | Case No. 23-1122 | Date Argued: 1/15/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

This Court has repeatedly held that States may rationally restrict minors' access to sexual materials, but such restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny if they burden adults' access to constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit applied rational-basis review-rather than strict scrutiny-to vacate a preliminary injunction of a provision of a Texas law that significantly burdens adults' access to protected speech, because the law's stated purpose is to protect minors.

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review to a law burdening adults' access to protected speech, instead of strict scrutiny as this Court and other circuits have consistently done.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioners: Derek L. Shaffer, Washington, D.C.
• For United States, as amicus curiae: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Case Info: Thompson v. United States | Case No. 23-1095 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 | Date Decided: 3/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits making a "false statement" for the purpose of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies, also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false.

Holding: 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state­ment,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Alito and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Chris C. Gair, Chicago, Ill.
• For respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services | Case No. 23-971 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 | Date Decided: 2/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) empowers district courts, on just terms and under circumstances specified in that Rule, to "relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding."

Question Presented: Whether a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b).

Holding: A case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b).

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Vincent Levy, New York, N. Y.
• For respondent: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Stanley v. City of Sanford | Case No. 23-997 | Date Argued: 1/13/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee-who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed-lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?

Holding: To prevail under §12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts III and IV, except for n. 12.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D.C.; and Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
• For Respondent: Jessica C. Conner, Orlando, Fla.

Case Info: Hewitt v. United States | Case No. 23-1002 | Date Argued: 1/13/25

This case was consolidated with: Duffey V. United States, Case No. 23-1007.

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The First Step Act (FSA) significantly reduced the mandatory minimum sentences for several federal drug and firearm offenses. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- 391, §§ 401, 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220-5222. Sections 401 and 403 apply to offenses committed after the FSA's enactment on December 21, 2018, and to "any offense that was committed before the date of enactment * * * if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment." FSA§§ 401(c), 403(b).

There is an acknowledged split between the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the one hand; and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, on the question whether sections 401(c) and 403(b) apply when a pre-enactment sentence is vacated and the court must impose a new post-enactment sentence.

Question Presented: Whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the FSA's enactment when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the FSA's enactment.

Holding: Under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence "has . . . been imposed" for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.
• For respondent in support of petitioners: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: TikTok, Inc. v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 24-656 | Date Argued: 1/10/25 | Date Decided: 1/17/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to Petitioners, violates the First Amendment.

Holding: The challenged provisions do not violate petitioners’ First Amendment rights.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: The Supreme Court wrote a Per Curiam unanimous opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion that concurred in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners TikTok Inc., et al.: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C.
• For petitioners Firebaugh, et al.: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Melo Park, Cal.
• For respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Host Note: Consolidated with: Firebaugh v. Garland, Case No. 24-657.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Case No. 23-900 | Date Argued: 12/11/24 | Date Decided: 2/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether an award of the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.

Holding: In awarding the “defendant’s profits” to the prevailing plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act, §1117(a), a court can award only profits ascribable to the “defendant” itself. And the term “defendant” bears its usual legal meaning: the party against whom relief or recovery is sought—here, Dewberry Group. The Engi­neers chose not to add the Group’s affiliates as defendants. Accord­ingly, the affiliates’ profits are not the (statutorily disgorgable) “de­fendant’s profits” as ordinarily understood.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D. C.
• For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicholas S. Crown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
• For respondent: Elbert Lin, Richmond, Va.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Seven County Coalition v. Eagle County | Case No. 23-975 | Date Argued: 12/10/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004), this Court held that when an agency cannot prevent an environmental effect "due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions," the National Environmental Policy Act does not require it to study that effect. This holding has divided the courts of appeals. Five circuits read Public Citizen to mean that an agency's environmental review can stop where its regulatory authority stops. Two circuits disagree and require review of any impact that can be called reasonably foreseeable.

Here, the Surface Transportation Board relied on Public Citizen to cabin its environmental review of a new rail line in Utah. But the D.C. Circuit rejected that approach, ruling that the Board "cannot avoid" environmental review "on the ground that it lacks authority to prevent, control, or mitigate" distant environmental effects. As a result, it ordered the Board to study the local effects of oil wells and refineries that lie outside the Board's regulatory authority.

Question Presented: Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.

Holding: The D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the Board to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
• For federal respondents supporting petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents Eagle County, et al.: William M. Jay, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme. Whether a sovereign's statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services.
2. Whether all contract rights are "property."

Holding: A defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion con¬curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal.
• For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Kennedy, Sec. of H&HS v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Case No. 24-316 | Date Argued: 4/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1).

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

Host Note: On 4/25/25, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to “file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question: Whether Congress has ‘by Law’ vested the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with the authority to appoint members of the United States Preventive Services Task Force. U. S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.” Link to 4/25/25 Order: Here. On 5/5/25, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs.

This may mean that the Supreme Court is skeptical of Respondent’s position that the Task Force members constitute principal officers and that the Supreme Court may not remand the question to the Fifth Circuit. Check out the exchange involving Mr. Mitchell on this point at 42:00.

Case Info: Feliciano v. Dept. of Transportation | Case No. 23-861 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/30/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

This case presents a question of critical importance to hundreds of thousands of Americans who serve their country both as federal civilian employees and members of the Armed Services' reserve components.

Congress enacted the differential pay statute, 5 U.S.C. § 5538, to eliminate the financial burden that reservists face when called to active duty at pay rates below their federal civilian salaries. To ensure that these reservists suffer no financial penalty for active-duty service, the differential pay statute requires that the government make up the difference. Federal civilian employees are entitled to differential pay when performing active duty "pursuant to a call or order to active duty under * * * a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10." That section, Section 101(a)(13)(B), enumerates several statutory authorities and includes a catchall provision: "any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress."

Recently, in a decision that departed from settled understandings of this language, the Federal Circuit held that reservists relying on Section 101(a)(13)(B)'s catchall provision to claim differential pay must show that they were "directly called to serve in a contingency operation." Adams v. DHS, 3 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Under that demanding, fact-intensive standard, the Federal Circuit has rejected claims for differential pay even by reservists like petitioner whose activation orders expressly invoked a presidential emergency declaration.

Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.

Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt
• For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding: Tennessee's law prohibiting certain medical treatments for transgender minors is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. SB1 satisfies rational basis review.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Parts I and II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to Parts I–IV. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N.Y.
• For Respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.

Case Info: Hungary v. Simon | Case No. 23-867 | Date Argued: 12/03/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

A foreign sovereign is generally immune from suit in domestic courts, subject to the specific exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Under the expropriation exception, claims involving rights in property taken in violation of international law may be heard if "property or any property exchanged for such property" has a commercial nexus with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). Specifically, the property or its proceeds must be either "present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity" or "owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States." Id. The circuit courts have split as to the showing required to meet the commercial nexus requirement.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that  proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the  expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
2. Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference.
3. Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to  affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law  have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Holding: Alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
• For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Case No. 23-1038 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. The agency may grant such authorization only if the applicant shows, among other things, that the marketing of the product would be "appropriate for the protection of the public health." 21 U.S.C. 387j(c)(2)(A). In this case, the agency denied respondents' applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products because they had failed to show that marketing the products would be appropriate for the protection of the public health. The Fifth Circuit set aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious, relying on legal theories that have been rejected by other courts of appeals that have reviewed materially similar FDA denial orders.

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious.

Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: United States v. Miller | Case No. 23-824 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid any prepetition transfer of the debtor's property that would be voidable "under applicable law" outside bankruptcy by an actual unsecured creditor of the estate. 11 U.S.C. 544(b)(1). The applicable law may be state law. Elsewhere, the Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governmental units "to the extent set forth in this section with respect to" various sections of the Code, including Section 544. 11 U.S.C. 106(a)(l). The court of appeals below joined a circuit split in holding that Section 106(a)(l) permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b), even though no actual creditor could have obtained relief outside of bankruptcy in light of sovereign immunity, the Supremacy Clause, and the Appropriations Clause.

Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state  fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.

Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that fed­eral claim.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
• For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB | Case No. 23-970 | Date Argued: 11/13/24 | Date Decided: 12/11/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) imposes "[e]xacting pleading requirements" on plaintiffs who file securities fraud class actions. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 311, 313 (2007). To state a claim, plaintiffs must "state with particularity all facts" supporting their allegations of falsity and must also allege "facts giving rise to a strong inference" of the required mental state. 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(1), (2)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs frequently try to meet these requirements by claiming that internal company documents contradicted the company's public statements.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether plaintiffs seeking to allege scienter under the PSLRA based on allegations about internal company documents must plead with particularity the contents of those documents.
2. Whether plaintiffs can satisfy the PSLRA's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion to substitute for particularized allegations of fact.

Result: Writ of certiorari DISMISSED as improvidently granted by per curiam Opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D. C.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Case Info: Delligatti v. United States | Case No. 23-825 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 3/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), a felony qualifies as a "crime of violence" if it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." Courts have disagreed about how to apply use-of-force language to crimes that require proof of a victim's bodily injury or death but can be committed by failing to take action.

In the decision below, the Second Circuit held that any crime requiring proof of death or bodily injury categorically involves the use of physical force, even if it can be committed through inaction-such as by failing to provide medicine to someone who is sick or by failing to feed a child. That ruling reflects the law in eight circuits.

Two courts of appeals, by contrast, have held that the use of force is not an element of such crimes if the crime may be committed by inaction. One of those courts recently rejected the government's petition for rehearing en banc, which had argued that any crime requiring proof of bodily injury or death necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

Question Presented: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be  committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C.
• For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-929 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 4/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Federal immigration law allows the government to grant a "voluntary departure" period of up to 60 days to a noncitizen "of good moral character" who receives an adverse decision in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b). If the noncitizen fails to depart during that window, he or she is subject to a civil fine and is ineligible for various forms of immigration relief (like cancellation of removal or adjustment of status) for 10 years. §1229c(d)(1). If, however, the noncitizen "file[s] a post-decision motion to reopen or reconsider during the period allowed for voluntary departure," the penalties for failure to voluntarily depart do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(3)(iii).

Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?

Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II.  Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Gerard J. Cedrone
• For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank | Case No. 23-980 | Date Argued: 11/6/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

This petition presents two important questions that have divided the federal courts of appeals.

First, the circuits have split three ways concerning what public companies must disclose in the "risk factors" section of their 10-K filings. The Sixth Circuit holds that companies need not disclose past instances when a risk has materialized. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that companies must disclose that a risk materialized in the past if the company knows that event will harm the business. The Ninth Circuit here adopted a third, outlier position requiring companies to disclose that a risk materialized in the past even if there is no known threat of business harm.

Second, the circuits disagree on the proper pleading standard for the loss causation element of a private securities-fraud claim. The Fourth Circuit holds that loss causation allegations must satisfy Federal Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for fraud, while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits apply the ordinary Rule 8 standard. The Ninth Circuit here initially applied Rule 8, then substituted citations of Rule 9(b) without changing its analysis.

Questions Presented:

1. Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm?
2. Does Federal Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) supply the proper pleading standard for loss causation in a private securities-fraud action?

Result: Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted by per curiam.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents: Kevin K. Russell, Washington, D. C.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Case Info: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Case No. 23-217 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) covers more than 140 million workers and guarantees eligible workers a minimum wage and overtime pay. But the FLSA also contains 34 exemptions from those requirements. Employers do not have to pay overtime to, e.g., bona fide executives, agricultural workers, and outside salesmen. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)-(b).

The question presented is: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

Question Presented: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the  applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six  circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

Holding: The preponderance of the evidence standard applies when an em­ployer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gor­such filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
• For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Parrish v. United States | Case No. 24-275 | Date Argued: 4/21/25 | Date Decided: 6/12/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted.

Question Presented: Whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period expires must file a second, duplicative notice after the appeal period is reopened.

Holding: A litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline but before the court grants reopening need not file a second notice after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich.
• For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical v. Becerra, Sec. of H&HS | Case No. 23-715 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 4/29/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Because low-income patients are often costlier to treat, Congress directed the government to reimburse hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low--income patients at higher Medicare rates. A hospital qualifies for higher payments in part based on the number of days that a hospital provides inpatient care to senior (or disabled) low- income patients, measured as those who "were entitled to benefits under part A of [Medicare] and were entitled to supplementary security income [SSI] benefits." 42 U.S.C.§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(I).

In Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, this Court agreed with the agency that "entitled to [Medicare part A] benefits" included "all those qualifying for the [Medicare] program," whether or not Medicare paid for that hospital stay. 597 U.S. 424, 445 (2022). But Empire expressly left open the question of whether "entitled to [SSI] benefits" likewise includes all those who qualify for the SSI program. Id. at 434 n.2. The agency still insists, contrary to its Medicare interpretation, that only patients who received an SSI cash payment for the month of their hospital stay are "entitled to benefits."

This case thus presents Empire's open question: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and SSI, such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligi­ble to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitali­zation.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Advocates:

• For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus Sherry
• For Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Heath | Case No. 23-1127 | Date Argued: 11/4/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to further the goal of universal access to telecommunications services. In response, the FCC established what's known as the "E-rate" program to provide discounted services to eligible schools and libraries. The program is administered by a private, non-profit corporation and funded entirely by contributions from private telecommunications carriers. After telecommunications carriers provide services to eligible schools and libraries, either the schools and libraries or the providers can submit reimbursement requests to the private corporation for the amount of the discount. In this way, the E-rate program distributes up to $4.5 billion each year.

Question Presented: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.

Holding: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the False Claims Act because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “por­tion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.

Result: Affirmed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.
• For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA | Case No. 23-713 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/5/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

For more than a century, veterans have been entitled to the benefit of the doubt on any close issue relating to their eligibility for service-related benefits. As presently codified, "[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant." 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b).

In 2002, Congress enacted the Veterans Benefits Act. Among other things, the Act supplemented the responsibilities of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the "Veterans Court") by requiring it to "take due account of the Secretary's application of section 5107(b)" as part of its review of benefits appeals. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1).

In these cases, the Federal Circuit held that § 7261(b)(1) "does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond the clear error review" of underlying factual findings - something already required by the pre-2002 review statute, under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a). Pet. App. 16a-17a (quoting Pet. App. 8a- 11a).

Question Presented: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38  U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's  application of that rule?

Holding: The VA’s determination that the evidence regarding a service-re­lated disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C.
• For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: San Francisco v. EPA | Case No. 23-753 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Congress designed the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act) to ensure that anyone holding a discharge permit issued under the Act has notice of how much they must control their discharges to comply with the law. The CWA requires that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and authorized states provide this notice by prescribing specific pollutant limitations in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits they issue. Consistent with its text, this Court and the Second Circuit have read the Act to require EPA and states to develop specific limits to achieve goals for surface waters, called water quality standards.

Parting with these decisions, the Ninth Circuit held here that EPA may issue permits that contain generic prohibitions against violating water quality standards. Rather than specify pollutant limits that tell the permitholder how much they need to control their discharges as required by the CWA, these prohibitions effectively tell permitholders nothing more than not to cause "too much" pollution. These generic water quality terms expose San Francisco and numerous permitholders nationwide to enforcement actions while failing to tell them how much they need to limit or treat their discharges to comply with the Act.

Question Presented: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose  generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination  System (NPDES) permits that subject permit holders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their  discharges must conform.

Holding: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end­ result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a per­mittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make that determination.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II.  Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion dissent­ing in part, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal.
• For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C

Website Link to Oral Arguments: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Arguments: Here.