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Are the "3 days before the non-Jews' holidays" inclusive of the day of the holiday itself? Or really not? What about Sundays? Other holidays are named explicitly too. Also, what if you did do business with the non-Jews on these days? How temporary must a thing be? How guilty is the one who does this? Plus, Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi, consulting Resh Lakish on what to do with regard to this kind of case.

On sin and the purpose of sin! God allows sin to happen so that future sinners can repent. Consider the story of King David with Batsheva, with the implication that David wouldn't have done the sin were it not for his later repentance. Comparably, the sin of the Golden Calf. When an individual sin, we encourage reflection, repentance, and atonement. A group sin is a little more complicated, but the same principle stands. Plus, the differences between humans and angels, including, or especially, progeny. Plus, the harsh punishments for sin (for example, Rabbi Akiva). Also, a return to halakhah, with the question of why 3 days of not selling to non-Jews before their holidays (why not more or less)?

More on Jews and non-Jews -- how does God anger and how does He mete out punishment? Also, God's indignance during the day, which only Balaam the prophet knew how it was timed. Plus, the donkey gets the better of Balaam when he wants to hide the degree to which he relied on the donkey.

On the special relationship between God and the Jewish people, there's a recognition of the Jews as having kept the Torah -- and criticism by the non-Jews that perhaps the Jews hadn't actually been keeping the Torah. God is willing to testify on their part, but His testimony isn't considered legitimate because of God's bias, as it were, for treating Israel as a son. So God calls the heavens and earth as witnesses -- but they are also considered suspect. Finally, God points to the non-Jewish nations of the world themselves. Plus, a reference back to preparation for Shabbat from Shabbat eve... and the granting of one small mitzvah for the non-Jews, who apparently now want in on God's command. Also, converts to join the Jewish people were not accepted during the time of King David and King Solomon -- when things are so good that the likelihood of sincerity is that much diminished. At least, until they heard of the travails of the Children of Israel... and the war of Gog and Magog. Plus, God's laughter -- rare, hopeful, or limited in some ways? Plus, remembering Jerusalem.

A new tractate! A lot of material that is relevant when Jews live among non-Jews -- without delving into idolatry necessarily per se (though it will come up in the tractate, certainly). A new mishnah: For 3 days before the festivals of non-Jews, Jews are not supposed to do certain things that would make the non-Jews happy, lest they express gratitude to their pagan gods as part of the holiday. Which opens the question of whether a Jew could collect money - which might be painful, but also joyous down the road, for being rid of the debt. Plus, the Gemara delves into the spelling of the word that means their "holidays." Plus, there's no polity without a king -- a monarchy. Also, Rome as the most important of the non-Jewish nations (certainly at that time).

The last daf of the masekhet! And, interestingly enough, a new chapter (8)! With a new mishnah delineating the levels of responsibility for each of the 4 guardians, depending on the potential conflict (and need for an oath) with the original owner. Also, Gemara on the cases of the mishnah, including the disputes about how and when the guardians would take an oath.

Cases from the mishnah - when a customer asks the shopkeeper for X amount of produce. And then they dispute whether the customer every actually paid for the produce. Plus, a similar case with a money-changer and smaller coins for a dinar -- but did the customer hand over the dinar? Both cases are necessary. Also, orphans inheriting debt/payback from... orphans, instead of the original lender/borrower -- that is, pay close attention to who dies in which order.

If one or both parties to litigation are suspect with regard to oaths, they can't take oaths, so they divide the funds and carry on. But Rav Nachman said he didn't know the halakhah in this case - which was surprising, perhaps, but when push came to shove, he did determine this to be the practice too. Also, contradictory witnesses - 2 pairs - which are understand differently by Rav Huna and Rav Hisda.

Rabbi Yehudah's opinion is that a worker could take an oath for an employer (and collect the funds), and the Gemara works to figure out the source for this halakhah. But that kind of dispute can't be about wages... Also, in the name of Rabbi Yehudah - when someone leaves another home with objects concealed beneath his clothes - that's suspect (when he says he bought the items), unless it's actually not suspect for a whole host of potential reasons.

A very long mishnah beginning on the previous daf to open chapter 7 -- about oaths that are rabbinic in nature. Also, some Gemara on the mishnah - that on who takes the oath gets out of paying - with a sourcetext in Exodus 22.

What happens to a loan on collateral if the collateral is lost? A discussion that leads into an application of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer to Shmuel's position - which seems counter-historical in terms of how the Gemara is put together. Also, does the shemitah year cancel the debt that is loaned on collateral? Perhaps that depends on whether it's symbolic or covering the loan.

In the interest of catching up, we're foregoing the description here... (this daf was (is!) for Friday, and we appreciate your cooperation and forbearance at this complicated time)

In the interest of catching up, we're foregoing the description here... (this daf was for Thursday, and we appreciate your cooperation and forbearance at this complicated time)

NOTE: We are still dedicating our study of daf yomi to the speedy and complete recovery of בילא פריידא בת העניא מינא - Baila Freyda bat Henya Minna (with apologies for any mis-transliteration).

NOTE: The app we use to record has updated itself and is blocking the recording of some of the Hebrew/reading from the Talmud. We apologize for this and are looking for a solution in the next few days.

Biblically mandated oaths vs. rabbinically mandated oaths - which leads into the question whether the defendant can kick it back to the plaintiff. For a deaf-mute, cognitively impaired person, or a minor - they have the protections against theft. But the reversal of oaths remains possible, and flips on its head, when you know an oath-taker is likely to be unreliable in doing so. Also, a mnemonic to help remember the halakhah. Plus, looking to keep those who are expected to swear falsely from swearing at all.

When person A claims that person B owes him 2 things, and person B agrees that he owes part of the claim, but not both parts - which brings us to the claim of "modeh be-miktzat," and the need to take an oath to avoid having to pay back. With variations on the theme in trying to determine the way to put this kind of law into practice. Also, 3 related rulings, including regarding intention.

This episode and our future learning for the time being are dedicated to the speedy recovery of בילא פריידא בת העניא מינא - Baila Freyda bat Henya Minna (with apologies for any mis-transliteration).

Beginning with some words of explanation for our recent delays.... and moving on to further discussion of false oaths, wicked people, lying, the punishments that take place, and why the courts administer oaths the way they do. Plus, the insidious "reed of Rava."

The end of chapter 5: Someone says: Give me my deposit that is in your possession - and the response is one oath that seems to stand for 5 separate denials. With 4 tannaitic opinions as to when the oath counts for a single oath vs. a group of them -- with 2 different methodologies. And starting chapter 6: with a new mishnah, and a new oath -- issued by the judges. The mishnah is long, reviewing the cases of the chapter... many of which are "modeh be-miktzat" - agreeing to part of the claim, and therefore requiring the oath.

An oath on a deposit - to make it clear that it's not in the person's possession, for example. A deliberate false oath of deposit means a korban asham - a guilt-offering. Back when they were studying Shevuot in yeshiva in the time of the Gemara - witnesses warn the person not to swear falsely. Note - the korban asham is fairly unusual, in that it is itself the punishment, or the guilt, and not for the sake of atoning. Plus, Rav Kahana's question about witnesses warning against false testimony - but is that warning a halakhic warning for all sins, in general? It would seem not. Also, a refinement - the guilt-offering only is incumbent when the false oath is intentional - and without witnesses. Plus, the way the oath for the deposit has more stringent halakhot than those for the oath of testimony.

Finishing chapter 4 and beginning chapter 5! The term "Amen" has an element of an oath to it. As does "No." And "Yes." With support from God's promise to never destroy the earth via water again. Plus, what happens when an oath is in the form a curse, swearing to the negative? When would the Ineffable Name of God be required - if one is going to curse "in the name of God"? A new mishnah! (with the new chapter) - An oath over a deposit or collateral. How aware does the oath-taker need to be of a violation, in order to be liable for a false oath? Plus, the penalties and liabilities...including personal injury - as a monetary issue.

2 mishnayot and a good amount of Gemara! 1 - Administering an oath to one who could testify about a plaintiff, but instead denies that he saw anything - the false-oath-maker would still be exempt from the korban. One who asks a whole congregation to come forward - that's not even an oath. Plus, several other cases where the oath-taking would not be sufficient to make a false oath incur the need to bring a korban. 2 - If one insists one take the stand, but not with the language of oath - the commitment is implicit. But taking an oath in the name of the heavens and earth - no, because they are not in the Name of God. Likewise, cursing in the Name of God needs God's name. Also, the Gemara: The question of whether erasing partials of God's name counts as erasing God's name. Plus, interpretation of verses to God's power, not angels. Plus, the vineyard of Navot. When are the texts talking to God, as compared to referring to something other than God?

Different opinions about the oath of testimony on monetary matters and monetary matters only. Note the example of camels and their propensity to bump into each other and even kill other animals, apparently during the mating process. Plus, the question of the degree to which circumstantial evidence would be accepted. Also, the question of liability for a false oath - in monetary claims. And Rabbi Shimon was mocked in the land of Israel - for his view that a case of false oath regarding a deposit (pikadon) can inform the case of an intentional false oath.

2 mishnayot! The administration of witnesses taking a false oath of testimony, apparently along with an oath that they know nothing about what they're being asked to testify about - perhaps swearing falsely, which may or may not entail an offering to atone for it. That requirement may depend on the specifics of the oath. Also, what about testimony about one's status -- and the oath taken in that context. Plus, the significant difference between a case of status that involves a kohen to adjudicate and administer an oath - as compared to murder (for example), in court.

When 2 potential witnesses deny any knowledge of the event(s) they're asked to testify about, the claim is that they need to deny at exactly the same time. And since that precise of a time is not possible, perhaps they weren't really liable... (this is the view of R. Yosi HaGlili, who says they could have spoken at "the same time," with a certain amount of time to make a short utterance. Also, the case of one witness -- when that would be acceptable, and when insufficient. Note the eye to the protection of women.

After 4 ways to keep yourself away from falsehood on yesterday's daf, we have another 9 ways here (13 in total) - and all of them fall under this category. Also, who is intended in the category of "those who are not fit to testify" when there's already been a list of those who are not fit to testify!?! Perhaps a king. Perhaps the one who plays with dice. Also, a new mishnah: defining the oath of testimony (swearing that they have nothing to say on behalf of the plaintiff). Including the concern that one denies having anything to say about several cases - that will mean a liability for each false oath taken.

Chapter 4! On the "oath of testimony" - the witness swears on the Bible that his testimony is correct, as rooted in a verse in Vayikra/Leviticus, as formal court proceedings. A new mishnah: This oath of testimony is only issued to men. An other points of trustworthiness. But how valid is that testimony? Also, note that this "men" is specific - to exclude women, as compared to other more generic uses. Of course, there are other circumstances where women's testimony is acceptable. Plus, the formality of witnesses standing while giving testimony.

2 mishnayot! 1 - If someone swears that something is factually incorrect is in fact true, or if someone swears about something that is impossible to have seen. But what if he's swearing to something as he understands it? There's concern about the plain meaning of words as people understand them. 2 - Oaths that one takes to confirm that one's statement is true - shevuat bitui - in contrast to the one taken in court. Plus, one who says "Amen" to a formulation of an oath without uttering all the words of the oath is akin to one who did utter all of the words. It amounts to taking an oath.

What about conditional oaths? That means one oath forbids something, but the second may not. Unless he engineered the events of the first one, and neglected the second one. Also, the story of the brothers Eifa and Avimi, and their learning of Shevuot in the beit midrash.

A new Mishnah! With exceptions to the basic laws of oaths - for example, if one swears not to fulfill a mitzvah. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beterah says that one who makes an oath that you're not allowed to make would still entail a violation, but the Tanna Kama seems to think that it wouldn't count as violating. Likewise, an issue to swear on a mitzvah to keep it. Plus, another new mishnah! Different wordings of swearing off something, though in the end, he would only be held accountable or on punishment. This "shevuot bitui" - risks the false oath in the intentional breaking of the oath - and needing lashes.. And an oath in vain?

More on the tannaitic dispute of the previous daf. Delineating the logic of amplification - ribui u-miyut vs. kelal u-prat u-kelal. They're two different schools of thought, and the rationale holds across the Talmud, for each of them. But they're also very similar. Plus, taking an oath in an unavoidable way. Also, one who took an oath, but he forgot about the item he had foresworn... Likewise, forgetting an oath itself -- these aspects of forgetting will affect whether an offering is required. Including some mockery from the colleagues in the land of Israel. Plus, the case of someone who unwittingly breaks his oath -- what if he had remembered? Would he have broken the oath anyway, or not?

A new mishnah! Taking a false oath about the past, or an oath about the future, which is not upheld, which turns it into a false oath, about tangible or intangible matters, means a sliding scale offering. Likewise, if it pertains to other people. Plus, the stringencies of oaths (shevuot) vs. vows (nedarim), with regard to each other. Also, if a person swears about another party - falsely - either that person needs to bring the sacrifice or not - a large debate. Oaths also seem to pertain to matters that are either good or bad - and a textual inference is necessary to present them as not necessarily being harmful or beneficial. Rabbi Akiva vs. Rabbi Yishmael, and Rav vs. Shmuel -- which is not the same dispute, though we might have thought they were. Plus, the formulation with regard to oaths to make them oaths.

What if one takes an oath not to eat, and then ingests non-food items, does that break the oath? What about eating non-kosher food? The key is the "isur kolel," an inclusive prohibition. For example, not eating on Yom Kippur is more inclusive than not eating non-kosher food. Also, more extensive prohibitions -- prohibited in the kind of food and the circumstances of eating (for example, consecrated, or Yom Kippur). In one scenario, multiple things can be forbidden at the same time, each nested within the other, as it were.

When we talk about eating and drinking - is drinking included in an oath about eating, or not? With practical implications for whether offerings would be required after violating the oath (or perhaps not). Also, the case of one who takes an oath not to drink - without specification - and then drinks many things - he still is liable only for one offering. What if he gives a list of things he won't drink? Is that to exclude everything else, that he might be willing to drink, or is it just about the moment and the beverages before him? How complete of a statement does he need?

A discussion about speech and eating. Which includes defining when one's speech incurs a requirement to bring an offering -- like the blasphemer? A nazir? Plus, "konamot." And oaths about eating that do not specify the details or amounts of prohibition... the Gemara specifies the inferred amounts, when nothing is stated. What about non-food? Does dirt count as eating? What about grapeseed, which isn't eaten outside of a mixture? How do you define that amount for eating? (Or how much dirt counts as eating). Also, a new mishnah! About one who swears about not eating - and then eats and drinks - is that a liability for 2 offerings, or only one? With other comparable cases.

Rabin brought the Torah of Rabbi Yochanan in Israel to Babylonia to establish the difference between a false oath, not keeping one's word, and swearing in vain (with 3 different verses in the Torah that establish the prohibition). Plus, every negative commandment that has an action - gets lashes. But if there's no action, no lashes -- except for the exceptions, where lashes would be incurred. Also, establishing the views of the sages with regard to the unspecified statements - and what they mean in terms of amounts, and so on. For example: if a minute amount of food is prohibited, does it incur a sacrifice? In part, it's contingent on establishing the definitions - what is the minimum amount for eating to count as eating?

Starting chapter 3 with a Mishnah - and the new topic of uttering oaths. Plus, the question of taking oaths, and getting tripped up by them. Something that is obvious that it's impossible... maybe could have ben done better. Note: Oaths of utterance, oaths that are explicit in the verses, and the "before/after" factor.... If someone takes an oath not to eat - a certain amount, or any amount, a small amount would or would not make him liable, depending on whose view. Plus, anything one might uttered, if uttered in that way, can be held in abeyance. Plus, determining the "right" language to use can truly matter. Also, the difference between a false oath and one taken in vein - and how the two versions of the Ten Commandments in the Torah each contains one version. Were they uttered at the same like the versions about Shabbat?

Finishing chapter 2! If there are 2 paths, one with a known source of impurity and the other ostensibly pure, and you don't know which is which, and he walked both paths, he was definitely impure, but it's not known when he became impure. But what if he forgot where he walked? How does he track when he became impure? Also, what about a person who did the same transgression where it entails a sin-offering, for example, and he did it again, and isn't sure about what h remembered and what he forgot. With a clear dispute among Amoraim.

The case of a couple who are engaged in sexual intercourse when she realizes she has begun menstruating -- which makes their intimacy a violation of niddah. The question, of course, is what are they to do? With extenuating factors in whether the man is a Torah scholar, for example. Also, some aggadata on the daf: the consequences - on a metaphysical level - if the couple don't separate. And if a couple takes caution with regard to to the time when she expects to start menstruating, they'll be rewarded as a positive consequence.

One who discovers that he is impure after entering the Beit HaMikdash needs to depart as quickly and/or directly as possible. But what if he used the shortest route, but took a long time to walk it (or a long route quickly)? Also, one who enters a home that is impure because of tzara'at, that same person stays pure - if he walks in differently from normal. Plus, the kohen's check of the house for tzara'at. Also, the positive mitzvah that is included in the sum total for which one is not liable.

More on adding to the city of Jerusalem or the Temple courtyard - where Rav Nachman says one of the factors listed in the mishnah is necessary (as compared to all of them). With the question of lasting sanctification or resanctification, in the time of Ezra and Nechemiah's return to Zion. Note differences between the First Temple and the Second Temple. Also, the question of shifts in status (in terms of impurity upon entry, or thereafter) between the Mishkan (Tabernacle) and the Mikdash (Temple).

Sourcing the process of adding to the city of Jerusalem and/or the Temple's courtyard -- in verses. With discussion of whether Moshe's sanctification of Temple vessels lasted for the generations or whether they needed new anointing... and what implications are there (if any) from the vessels to the area? Also, the song to accompany the expansion of Jerusalem or the Temple courtyard - also, from the verses. Plus, the question of using verses as prayer, but not incantation.

The end of chapter 1! Does the goat that is sent to "Azazel" atone for kohanim? Unclear, but they have other means of atonement. Plus, the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon on atonement. And, with the new chapter, a long mishnah, beginning with the case of a person who touches an impure thing and then enters the holy (or handles the holy foods) - but inadvertently (namely, the transgression is "hidden from him" - the consequences depend on the particulars. And the mishnah continues with many cases, with details about purity -- including extending the size of Jerusalem or the courtyard of the Temple. Plus, the case of where the action is known, but not the impurity (specifically in the case of a sheretz -- creepy-crawly).

On Yom Kippur atoning for sin, regardless of a person's regret. With a dive into Rabbi Yehudah vs. Rebbe (Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi), as to the extent of the atonement and what happens with unrepented sins. And which view underlies or agrees with the mishnah? Also, the sacrifices atone - but only with repentance, so isn't that going to be the case with Yom Kippur too? But even if Yom Kippur does atone without teshuvah, what happens if the thing to atone for is the violation of Yom Kippur itself?

What can be done with an animal designated for offering that is no longer needed for whatever reason (that does not include a blemish to the animal)? For example, if the owner (the one who sinned) died...so he can't carry out the plan for atonement? Several possible solutions are considered. Also, going back to the atonement of Yom Kippur and all the kinds of transgressions it applies to. Including, it seems, sins for which a person did not repent! (as long as the sinner isn't denying God's existence)

More on the animals that were consecrated for a year, yet not used within the year, and now what? The case of grain offerings is brought to determine what happens in the case of "t'vul yom," someone awaiting the end of the day for his dunking in a mikveh to take full effect. Also, physical sanctity of communal offerings can be conditional. As with the first case, what if the item isn't used, but before it's truly been sanctified? It's a dispute whether you can redeem the animals, let them out to pasture to incur a blemish, or to have to wait and let the animal die. Plus, the red heifer - parah adumah - can it really be conditional ?

Parsing the specific goats - Rosh Chodesh, festivals, Yom Kippur - where each atones for specific things, and is where each thing can't usurp the atonement property of the others, or be used for other things. The particulars of the offering of the goats also make the difference in how and for what they each atone (sin-offerings have different procedures, including different locations of offering - inner and outer altars). Also, other animals that have been consecrated for the daily offerings - the consecration last for a year. If the animal develops a blemish, the sanctity can be redeemed, but what if there's no blemish, just the consecration expires. A parallel is drawn to ketoret, incense - in terms of desacralizing incense that wasn't used within the year of consecration.

Continuing on the question of atonement and how one way to atone doesn't necessarily atone for other needs for atonement. In this case, the he-goats of Yom Kippur vs. the goats of Rosh Chodesh. [What's What: Binyan Av] And where do the offerings of the holidays fit in with the Rosh Chodesh offerings and those of Yom Kippur? Plus, the linguistic comparison of "avon" - sin - for the goats of Rosh Chodesh and the tzitz, the front plate worn by the kohen gadol. Though the conclusion leads to great specificity in what atones for what.

Does the goat-offering atone for 3 different kinds of impurities? The verse indicates it won't atone for all kinds of impurities, only some of them. But what kind of impurities does it atone for? Perhaps for an idolater - but it's too egregious of a transgression. Perhaps for a woman after childbirth -- but what is her sin for which she brings a sin-offering? Perhaps she has (falsely) sworn off relations with her husband in the throes of labor (but it's a machloket). So the Gemara comes around to talking again about the impurity that is brought into the Temple or with regard to its sanctified foods -- inadvertently, to be sure. But how does this atonement relate to the atonement provided by the day of Yom Kippur? What if a person doesn't have time to bring the atoning offering before Yom Kippur?

An investigation into the verses that teach that the sliding scale sacrifice is offered to atone for bringing impurity into the Temple, or the consecrated foods. Also, a long baraita on these violations and the specific sliding-scale offering, including 3 specific kinds of impurity, and the question what the Yom Kippur se'ir (he-goat) atones for.

On the shades of white of tzara'at, in terms of color and brightness, and how they were to be compared, and perhaps even mixed. With various analogies to help explain the relationships among the various colors and intensities. With a possible dig at the Roman empire, in the last analogy.

Beginning on the previous daf - we have a deep dive into the halakhic approach, when it comes to interpreting the biblical text. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi uses "ribui u-miyut" -- amplification and limitation (vs. "k'lal u-p'rat" -- generalization and specification). Both approaches infer meaning and practical applications from the wording of the biblical text. It turns out that either is acceptable, as long as the scholar is consistent. Which was Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi's approach, though? Also, a return to the case of carrying from private-to-public domain from the mishnah, with the appropriate comparison to the mishnah and its cases at the beginning of Tractate Shabbat.