Explore every episode of the podcast Supreme Court Oral Arguments
| Title | Pub. Date | Duration | |
|---|---|---|---|
| [23-191] Williams v. Washington | 07 Oct 2024 | 01:15:50 | |
Williams v. Washington Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2024. Petitioner: Nancy Williams, et al. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dissatisfied with the Alabama Department of Labor’s handling of their unemployment benefits applications, 26 plaintiffs filed a complaint and motion for injunctive relief against Secretary Fitzgerald Washington and the Department. The plaintiffs, each having filed applications for benefits, alleged various grievances against the Department’s processing methods. Subsequently, Secretary Washington and the Department filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. In response, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, which resulted in the omission of several initial claims and the exclusion of the Department as a defendant. The remaining allegations in the suit were federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accusing Secretary Washington of implementing policies and procedures that violated both the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought various forms of relief, including multiple permanent and preliminary injunctions to expedite the handling of unemployment compensation applications and improve communication clarity, as well as attorney fees. Secretary Washington again moved to dismiss the case, citing reasons such as lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, absence of a private cause of action, and the substantive meritlessness of the claims. The court granted the dismissal without stating the basis for it. The plaintiffs moved to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, but the court denied their motion. They then appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the suit because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted mandatory administrative remedies. Question Does a Section 1983 claim brought in state court require the plaintiffs to first exhaust state administrative remedies? | |||
| [23-677] Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger | 07 Oct 2024 | 01:05:21 | |
Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger Argued on Oct 7, 2024. Petitioner: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Anastasia Wullschleger filed a class-action complaint in Missouri state court against Royal Canin and Nestle Purina, alleging that their requirement for a prescription for specialized dog food was misleading and led to higher prices. The defendants removed the case to federal court, which remanded it back to state court, and then they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which determined that the antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims raised substantial federal issues and belonged in federal court. Upon returning to the district court, Wullschleger amended her complaint to remove references to federal law, dropped the antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims, and added a civil-conspiracy claim. Despite these changes, the district court exercised federal-question jurisdiction and ultimately granted the manufacturers’ motion to dismiss, leading to a second appeal. Reviewing the case de novo, the Eighth Circuit concluded that amending a complaint to eliminate the only federal questions destroys subject-matter jurisdiction and thus returned the case to state court. Question Can a plaintiff whose state-court lawsuit has been removed by the defendants to federal court seek to have the case sent back to state court by amending the complaint to omit all references to federal law? | |||
| [23-108] Snyder v. United States | 15 Apr 2024 | 01:38:38 | |
Snyder v. United States Argued on Apr 15, 2024. Petitioner: James E. Snyder. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) James Snyder formerly served as mayor of Portage, Indiana. He was convicted of federal funds bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) for soliciting and accepting $13,000 in connection with the city’s purchases of garbage trucks, among other federal crimes. Before, during, and after trial, Snyder argued that the evidence did not support a finding that there was an agreement to exchange money for the truck contracts before they were awarded. Without a prior quid pro quo agreement, he argued, § 666 cannot apply. Interpreting the plain language of the statute and Sixth Circuit precedent, the district court rejected his interpretation of that provision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalize gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions? | |||
| [21-1270] MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC | 05 Dec 2022 | 01:09:51 | |
MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 5, 2022. Petitioner: MOAC Mall Holdings LLC. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sears formerly occupied a space in the Mall of America in Minneapolis, Minnesota, under a lease with MOAC. In 2019, the bankruptcy court permitted Transform to assign the Sears lease to its wholly-owned subsidiary. MOAC moved to stay assignment of the lease, but the bankruptcy court denied the motion. MOAC appealed to federal district court but did so without first obtaining from the district court a stay of the assignment pending resolution of the appeal. Transform challenged the district court’s review of the bankruptcy court’s assignment order, claiming that Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) “creates a rule of statutory mootness” barring appellate review of a sale “made to a good-faith purchaser” and not stayed pending appeal. Because MOAC had not obtained a stay, the district court dismissed as moot MOAC’s appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Question Does Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) limit the jurisdiction of appellate courts over an order approving the sale of a debtor’s assets or instead simply limit the remedies available on appeal from such an order? Conclusion Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code—which restricts the effects of certain successful appeals of judicially authorized sales or leases of bankruptcy-estate property—is not a jurisdictional provision. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Congressional statutes often contain restrictions and conditions on relief, but absent a “clear statement” that a provision is jurisdictional, courts must not treat these restrictions and conditions as jurisdictional. Jurisdictional provisions limit the power of the district court, whereas other limitations bear on the rights or obligations of the parties. Nothing in the limiting language of § 363(m)’s purports to “gover[n] a court’s adjudicatory capacity.” First, the text does not address a court’s authority or refer to the jurisdiction of district courts. Second, the structure of the Code and context of § 363(m) suggest it is not jurisdictional. The provision is separate from other provisions in the code that address federal courts’ jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters, and unlike other provisions, § 363(m) contains no “clear tie” to the jurisdictional provisions. | |||
| [21-1164] Wilkins v. United States | 30 Nov 2022 | 01:05:47 | |
Wilkins v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 30, 2022. Petitioner: Larry Steven Wilkins, et al.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Robbins Gulch Road runs between Highway 93 and the Bitterroot National Forest, crossing the private properties of Larry Wilkins and Jane Stanton near Connor, Montana. The previous owners of each of their properties had granted the United States an easement for Robbins Gulch Road in 1962. In 2018, Wilkins and Stanton sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) to confirm that the easement does not permit public use of the road and to enforce the government’s obligations to patrol and maintain the road against unrestricted public use. The district court granted the federal government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Is the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule? Conclusion The Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations is a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court holding that Wilkins's and Stanton's lawsuit may proceed. Jurisdictional rules tend to disrupt litigation, whereas procedural rules (including claim-processing rules) seek to facilitate the litigation process. Given the risk of disruption and waste that accompanies the jurisdictional label, courts will view a procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” that it is. As a general rule, most statutes of limitations are nonjurisdictional. The 12-year statute of limitations described in 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) lacks a jurisdictional clear statement, and nothing in its text or context supports departing from the general rule that statutes of limitations are nonjurisdictional. Nor do any of the three cases the government cites definitively interpreted Section 2409a(g) as jurisdictional. Thus, the provision at issue is a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional one. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the Court has long treated conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity, such as the one at issue in this case, as jurisdictional, and he would recognize the Court’s precedents as resolving the question. | |||
| [22-58] United States v. Texas | 29 Nov 2022 | 02:16:13 | |
United States v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 29, 2022. Petitioner: United States of America, et al.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In September 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued the Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law in an effort to allocate limited resources that could not feasibly deport every removable non-citizen presently in the United States. Texas and Louisiana challenged the Guidelines in federal court. The court concluded Texas had Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines because, as a result of the Guidelines, Texas would have to spend more money on law enforcement and social services. The court further concluded that the Guidelines violate the Administrative Procedure Act because they granted DHS discretion to decide who will be detained and when, and because they were issued without notice and comment. The court vacated the Guidelines nationwide, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal. Question 1. Do the state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security’s Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law? 2. Do the Guidelines violate the Administrative Procedure Act? 3. Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) prevent the entry of an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the guidelines under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)? Conclusion Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge immigration-enforcement guidelines promulgated by the Secretary of Homeland Security that prioritize the arrest and removal of certain noncitizens from the United States. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court. For a plaintiff to establish standing, they must show that they have suffered a real, specific injury that was caused by the defendant and that the court can remedy. While the district court had concluded that the states would suffer an injury in the form of additional costs due to the arrest policy in question, the Supreme Court pointed out that the injury also has to be "legally and judicially cognizable"—in other words, that it should be a type of dispute that courts have traditionally been involved in resolving. The states failed to point to any precedent or historical practice that supported their claim to have standing in this particular issue. Second, the Court acknowledged that there are good reasons for federal courts to avoid these types of lawsuits, one of which is the Executive Branch’s discretion in deciding whom to arrest or prosecute, which falls under its constitutional Article II powers. Additionally, the courts generally lack the standards to judge the appropriateness of such enforcement decisions, which can be influenced by various factors like resource constraints and public safety needs. This conclusion does not mean that federal courts can never handle cases involving the Executive Branch's decisions about arrests or prosecutions. Indeed, certain circumstances might warrant a different standing analysis; for instance, if there are claims of selective prosecution based on discrimination, or if Congress has explicitly made certain injuries legally recognizable. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that the states lack standing not because of the “cognizable injury” aspect of standing, but because of the redressability requirement. Justice Barrett authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined, also arguing that the case should be resolved on redressability grounds. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that Texas does have standing. | |||
| [21-1158] Percoco v. United States | 28 Nov 2022 | 01:07:55 | |
Percoco v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 28, 2022. Petitioner: Joseph Percoco. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo launched an initiative, known as the “Buffalo Billion” initiative, to develop the greater Buffalo area. Alain Kaloyeros strategically secured a highly influential role in the initiative and used that role to award contracts to certain developers of his choosing based on his knowledge and control over the process. Once the scheme came to light, the participants were charged and convicted of conspiracy to engage in wire fraud. In 2018, a jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, and the defendants were sentenced to prison terms of varying lengths. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the wire fraud convictions, relying on a “right-to-control theory” of wire fraud that allows for conviction on “a showing that the defendant, through the withholding or inaccurate reporting of information that could impact on economic decisions, deprived some person or entity of potentially valuable economic information.” Question Can a private citizen who has informal political or other influence over governmental decisionmaking owe a fiduciary duty to the general public such that he can be convicted of honest-services fraud? Conclusion A private citizen who has informal political or other influence over governmental decisionmaking can be convicted of honest-services fraud, but in this case, the jury instructions leading to Percoco’s conviction were insufficiently definite. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court. The jury instruction in this case required the jury to determine whether Percoco had a “special relationship” with the government and had “dominated and controlled” government business. However, these concepts are too vague to allow ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch agreed with the majority but expressed concern over the vagueness of “honest-services fraud” more generally, regardless of what jury instruction might be provided. | |||
| [21-1170] Ciminelli v. United States | 28 Nov 2022 | 01:17:45 | |
Ciminelli v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 28, 2022. Petitioner: Louis Ciminelli. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo launched an initiative, known as the “Buffalo Billion” initiative, to develop the greater Buffalo area. Alain Kaloyeros strategically secured a highly influential role in the initiative and used that role to award contracts to certain developers of his choosing based on his knowledge and control over the process. Once the scheme came to light, the participants were charged and convicted of conspiracy to engage in wire fraud. In 2018, a jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, and the defendants were sentenced to prison terms of varying lengths. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the wire fraud convictions, relying on a “right-to-control theory” of wire fraud that allows for conviction on “a showing that the defendant, through the withholding or inaccurate reporting of information that could impact on economic decisions, deprived some person or entity of potentially valuable economic information.” Question Does the Second Circuit’s “right to control” theory of fraud state a valid basis for liability under the federal wire fraud statute? Conclusion The Second Circuit’s right-to-control theory cannot form the basis for a conviction under the federal fraud statutes because the right to control is not grounded in a traditional property interest. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The federal wire fraud statute prohibits the use of interstate wires for “any scheme or orifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” When the statute was enacted, the common understanding of the verb “to defraud” related to property rights. Although lower courts have interpreted the statute to include interests unconnected to traditional property rights, the Supreme Court in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), held that the statutes protect only individual property rights. The right-to-control theory has no roots in a traditional property interest and thus cannot be the basis for a conviction under the federal fraud statutes. | |||
| [21-376] Haaland v. Brackeen | 09 Nov 2022 | 03:12:20 | |
Haaland v. Brackeen Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 9, 2022. Petitioner: Deb Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a federal law enacted in 1978, restricts the removal of Native American children from their families and establishes a preference that Native children who are removed from their families be placed with extended family members or Native foster homes. Several individuals and states filed a lawsuit challenging the law as violating constitutional anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment. The plaintiffs include several couples who wished to adopt or foster Native children, a woman who wished for her Native biological child to be adopted by non-Natives, and the states of Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana. The district court ruled for the plaintiffs, striking down portions of the ICWA. The defendants appealed, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. In a fractured ruling, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc upheld portions of the district court’s decision and reversed other portions. Question Do the Indian Child Welfare Act’s restrictions on placement of Native American children violate anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment? | |||
| [21-1168] Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. | 08 Nov 2022 | 01:48:14 | |
Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2022. Petitioner: Robert Mallory. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Robert Mallory sued Norfolk Southern Railway Co. in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas for claims arising under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA). According to his complaint, Mallory was exposed to harmful carcinogens while employed by Defendant in Ohio and Virginia between 1988 through 2005. He did not allege that he suffered any harmful occupational exposures in Pennsylvania but sued in Pennsylvania court on a theory that the court could exercise jurisdiction over the Virginia company because it had registered to do business in Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvania law, a foreign corporation “may not do business in this Commonwealth until it registers” with the Department of State of the Commonwealth. State law further establishes that registration constitutes a sufficient basis for Pennsylvania courts to exercise general personal jurisdiction over that foreign corporation. Norfolk Southern Railway objected to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the exercise violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court agreed and held Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Question Does a state registration statute for out-of-state corporations that purports to confer general personal jurisdiction over the registrant violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion A Pennsylvania law requiring out-of-state companies that register to do business in Pennsylvania to agree to appear in Pennsylvania courts on “any cause of action” against them comports with the Due Process Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the main opinion of the Court. The outcome in this case is controlled by the Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917), which held that suits based on the defendant’s consent to jurisdiction do not deny the defendant due process of law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded otherwise based on its erroneous belief that the Court had “implicitly overruled Pennsylvania Fire in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). However, rather than displace Pennsylvania Fire, International Shoe merely paved an additional road to jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations. Thus, the facts of this case fall squarely within Pennsylvania Fire, and there is no due process violation. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion noting another precedent, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), which she finds “particularly instructive.” Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito agreed with the plurality that exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the state registration statute does not violate the Due Process Clause, but he opined that the statute might be unconstitutional on other grounds not before the Court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Brett Kavanaugh joined, arguing that compelled state registration does not constitute “consent.” | |||
| [21-806] Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County v. Talevski | 08 Nov 2022 | 01:34:04 | |
Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County v. Talevski Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2022. Petitioner: Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, et al.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gorgi Talevski was living with dementia and receiving care at Valparaiso Care and Rehabilitation, a state-run nursing facility in Indiana. His wife, Ivanka Talevski, filed a lawsuit on behalf of her husband alleging that Valparaiso Care failed to provide Gorgi with adequate medical care, used psychotropic medications as unnecessary chemical restraint, and improperly discharged and transferred him, among other practices, in violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA). The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, finding that FNHRA does not provide a private right of action that may be redressed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Section 1983 has a broad purpose of providing a remedy for federal statutory and constitutional violations. Question May a plaintiff file a federal civil rights claim for violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act, which was enacted under Congress’s Spending Clause power? Conclusion A plaintiff may file a federal civil rights claim for violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA). Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. The Court first considered whether FNHRA can create rights enforceable through Section 1983. Section 1983 allows private parties to sue for deprivations of any any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. The phrase “and laws,” without modifiers, means that the rights at issue need not fall within a specific category (e.g., civil rights) or through a specific power of Congress. The Court then considered whether FNHRA unambiguously created a right to be enforced via § 1983 and concluded that it does. A law unambiguously creates a right enforceable via § 1983 if “the provision in question is ‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited’ and contains ‘rights-creating,’ individual-centric language with an “unmistakable focus on the benefited class.” The provisions at issue here addressing unnecessary restraint and predischarge notice pass that stringent test; they unambiguously confer rights on residents of nursing-home facilities. Finally, the Court considered whether FNHRA creates a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983. While FNHRA does have a complex enforcement scheme, that scheme is not incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983 and does not suggest Congress intended to preclude § 1983 enforcement. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion to point out two questions the petitioners could have raised but did not and called for the resolution of those questions another time in another case. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, cautioning that while she agreed with the disposition in this particular case, courts must “tread carefully before concluding that Spending Clause statutes may be enforced through § 1983.” Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion arguing that laws passed pursuant to Congress’s spending power cannot secure rights within the meaning of § 1983. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that while FNHRA does create individual rights, the remedial scheme of the Act forecloses enforcement of those rights via § 1983. | |||
| [21-86] Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission | 07 Nov 2022 | 01:31:33 | |
Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 7, 2022. Petitioner: Axon Enterprise, Inc.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Axon Enterprises manufactures personal body cameras for law enforcement. In 2018, it acquired a competitor body camera company called Vievu. After the acquisition, the Federal Trade Commission informed Axon that the transaction raised antitrust concerns and that the Commission would be investigating. At the end of 2019, the FTC informed Axon of its demands, which it could either accede or face administrative proceedings. Axon filed a lawsuit in federal district court alleging that (1) the FTC’s administrative proceeding violates Axon’s Fifth Amendment due process rights, (2) the FTC’s structure violates Article II by providing improper insulation from the President, and (3) Axon’s acquisition of Vievu did not violate antitrust law. The district court dismissed Axon’s complaint, holding that the FTC’s statutory scheme required Axon to raise its constitutional challenge first in the administrative proceeding. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Congress impliedly barred jurisdiction in federal district court. Question Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the Federal Trade Commission’s structure, procedure, and existence, or must such challenges be raised first in the administrative proceeding? Conclusion Federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the structure or existence of the SEC or FTC notwithstanding statutory review schemes set out in the Securities Exchange Act and Federal Trade Commission Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act (in 21-86) and the Securities Exchange Act (in 21-1239) did not preclude district courts’ ordinary subject-matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to those agencies’ structure, procedure, or existence. The Court considered three factors, known as the Thunder Basin factors, to determine whether particular claims concerning agency action are “of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within th[e] statutory structure,” and thus would preclude district court jurisdiction. The three factors are: (1) Could precluding district court jurisdiction “foreclose all meaningful judicial review” of the claim? (2) Is the claim “wholly collateral” to the statute’s review provisions? (3) Is the claim “outside the agency’s expertise”? The Court concluded that all three factors supported the conclusion that district courts retained subject-matter jurisdiction. First, preclusion of district court jurisdiction “could foreclose all meaningful judicial review” because Axon and Cochran will lose their rights not to undergo the complained-of agency proceedings if they cannot assert those rights until the proceedings are over. Second, the claims are “wholly collateral” to the statutes’ review provisions because challenges to the Commissions’ authority have nothing to do with either the enforcement-related matters the Commissions regularly adjudicate or those they would adjudicate in assessing the charges against Axon and Cochran. Finally, the claims are outside the agencies’ expertise because neither specializes in constitutional issues like separation of powers. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to express “grave doubts about the constitutional propriety of Congress vesting administrative agencies with primary authority to adjudicate core private rights with only deferential judicial review on the back end.” Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that he would reach the same conclusion as the majority by applying only 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which establishes federal-question jurisdiction of federal courts. | |||
| [21-1239] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cochran | 07 Nov 2022 | 01:09:21 | |
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cochran Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 7, 2022. Petitioner: Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In April 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an enforcement action against Michelle Cochran, a certified public accountant, alleging that she had failed to comply with federal auditing standards. After a hearing, an SEC administrative law judge (ALJ) agreed that Cochran had violated federal law, fined her $22,500, and banned her from practicing before the SEC for five years. The SEC adopted the ALJ’s decision, and Cochran objected. Before the SEC could rule on Cochran’s objection, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, in which it held that SEC ALJs are officers of the United States under the Appointments Clause, who must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or a department head. In response to that ruling, the SEC remanded all pending administrative cases for new proceedings before constitutionally appointed ALJs, including Cochran’s. Cochran filed a lawsuit in federal district court arguing that while Lucia may have addressed one constitutional issue with ALJs, it left uncorrected another problem: because SEC ALJs enjoy multiple layers of "for-cause" removal protection, they are unconstitutionally insulated from the President's Article II removal power. The district court dismissed Cochran’s case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on a reading of the Exchange Act as implicitly stripping district courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to ongoing SEC enforcement proceedings. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed as to that interpretation of the Exchange Act. Question Does a federal district court have jurisdiction to consider claims challenging the constitutionality of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s administrative proceedings? Conclusion Federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the structure or existence of the SEC or FTC notwithstanding statutory review schemes set out in the Securities Exchange Act and Federal Trade Commission Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act (in 21-86) and the Securities Exchange Act (in 21-1239) did not preclude district courts’ ordinary subject-matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to those agencies’ structure, procedure, or existence. The Court considered three factors, known as the Thunder Basin factors, to determine whether particular claims concerning agency action are “of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within th[e] statutory structure,” and thus would preclude district court jurisdiction. The three factors are: (1) Could precluding district court jurisdiction “foreclose all meaningful judicial review” of the claim? (2) Is the claim “wholly collateral” to the statute’s review provisions? (3) Is the claim “outside the agency’s expertise”? The Court concluded that all three factors supported the conclusion that district courts retained subject-matter jurisdiction. First, preclusion of district court jurisdiction “could foreclose all meaningful judicial review” because Axon and Cochran will lose their rights not to undergo the complained-of agency proceedings if they cannot assert those rights until the proceedings are over. Second, the claims are “wholly collateral” to the statutes’ review provisions because challenges to the Commissions’ authority have nothing to do with either the enforcement-related matters the Commissions regularly adjudicate or those they would adjudicate in assessing the charges against Axon and Cochran. Finally, the claims are outside the agencies’ expertise because neither specializes in constitutional issues like separation of powers. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to express “grave doubts about the constitutional propriety of Congress vesting administrative agencies with primary authority to adjudicate core private rights with only deferential judicial review on the back end.” Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that he would reach the same conclusion as the majority by applying only 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which establishes federal-question jurisdiction of federal courts. | |||
| [23-50] Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio | 15 Apr 2024 | 00:58:21 | |
Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio Argued on Apr 15, 2024. Petitioner: Jascha Chiaverini, et al. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Jascha Chiaverini, manager of the Diamond and Gold Outlet in Napoleon, Ohio, bought a men's ring and diamond earring from Brent Burns for $45. He recorded the transaction, including copying Burns' ID and photographing the items. Subsequently, David and Christina Hill contacted Chiaverini, claiming the jewelry was stolen from them. Chiaverini advised them to report to the police but denied buying their described items. After multiple calls, Chiaverini ended the conversation. Both parties contacted the police. Chiaverini expressed his suspicion about holding stolen property and requested police, not the Hills, to visit. When the police arrived, Chiaverini cooperated, providing information and photographs of the jewelry. The situation escalated when Chiaverini received a conflicting "hold letter" from the police, instructing him to keep the items as evidence but also to release them to the Hills. Chiaverini refused to release the items, citing legal concerns and advice from his counsel. His confrontation with Police Chief Weitzel revealed Chiaverini's lack of a precious-metal-dealer license, prompting a new investigation angle. Officer Steward updated the police report to include Chiaverini's suspicion about the stolen nature of the items, which Chiaverini disputed. Based on these developments, warrants were issued for Chiaverini's arrest and the search of his store, leading to his temporary detention. Although a court later dismissed the criminal case against Chiaverini, he filed a complaint against the officers and the city, alleging various legal violations. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, citing probable cause for Chiaverini's arrest and dismissing his claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Question May a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim proceed as to a baseless criminal charge so long as other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause? | |||
| [21-1195] Bittner v. United States | 02 Nov 2022 | 01:12:54 | |
Bittner v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2022. Petitioner: Alexandru Bittner. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Alexandru Bittner erroneously failed to report his interests in foreign bank accounts on annual FBAR forms, as required by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA). The government fined him $2.72 million—$10,000 for each unreported account each year from 2007 to 2011. Bittner challenged the fine, and the district court reduced the assessment to $50,000, holding that the $10,000 maximum penalty attaches to each failure to file an annual FBAR, not to each failure to report an account. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on this issue, holding that each failure to report a qualifying foreign account constitutes a separate reporting violation subject to penalty. Question Is a “violation” under the Bank Secrecy Act the failure to file an annual Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (no matter the number of foreign accounts), or is there a separate violation for each individual account that was not properly reported? Conclusion The Bank Secrecy Act’s $10,000 maximum penalty for the nonwillful failure to file a compliant report accrues on a per-report, not a per-account, basis. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion holding that Bittner was subject to a fine only for each report he failed to file, not for each account he failed to report over that five-year period. The plain language of Section 5321 addresses the legal duty to file reports, not of individual accounts or their number. The penalty the statute prescribes for nonwillful violations must therefore be based on the number of reports, not on the number of accounts. In contrast, for willful violations, the statute expressly considers a penalty on a per-account basis. The government’s guidance as to these provisions, as well as the drafting history, further support this understanding. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that “the most natural reading of the statute establishes that each failure to report a qualifying foreign account constitutes a separate reporting violation.” | |||
| [21-846] Cruz v. Arizona | 01 Nov 2022 | 01:01:57 | |
Cruz v. Arizona Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2022. Petitioner: John Montenegro Cruz. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2005, a jury convicted John Montenegro Cruz of first-degree murder for the 2003 killing of a Tucson police officer and sentenced Cruz to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Cruz’s conviction and sentence, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. In 2012, Cruz filed a petition in state court for post-conviction relief, which the court dismissed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. In 2014, Cruz initiated federal habeas proceedings. In 2016, while those proceedings were ongoing, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Arizona (Lynch II), holding that the Arizona Supreme Court had misapplied precedent. Cruz then filed a second petition for post-conviction relief. Ordinarily that second petition would be barred, but state law provides for an exception if there was an intervening “significant change in the the law.” Cruz argued that the decision in Lynch II was a signficant change in the law, that it applies retroactively, and would probably overturn his sentence. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that Lynch II was not a significant change in the law and was instead based on precedent well established at the time the defendant was convicted and sentenced. Question Is the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling that a state rule of criminal procedure precluded post-conviction relief an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment against him, thereby precluding review by a federal court? Conclusion The Arizona Supreme Court’s holding below is not an adequate state-law ground supporting that judgment and thus does not preclude federal court review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. If the judgment of a state court rests on “adequate and independent state-law grounds,” the Supreme Court will not decide a simultaneously presented question of federal law. Generally, a state’s procedural ruling is adequate to foreclose a review of a federal claim. The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision holding that Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 613, did not represent a “significant change in the law,” as it was entirely new and conflicted with existing state law. Because the interpretation was so novel and unforeseeable, it cannot constitute an adequate state procedural ground. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the Court should have given the “utmost deference” to the state court’s interpretation of its own precedent and that it failed to do so. | |||
| [21-857] Jones v. Hendrix | 01 Nov 2022 | 01:19:56 | |
Jones v. Hendrix Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2022. Petitioner: Marcus DeAngelo Jones. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A jury convicted Marcus DeAngelo Jones of one count of making false statements to acquire a firearm and two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon. Jones appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Jones then filed a motion to vacate his sentence on the grounds that it was illegally imposed. The district court denied his motion, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that Jones’s counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the two felon-in-possession counts as duplicative. The district court vacated one of his felon-in-possession convictions and resentenced him. In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, to convict someone under § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant knew both that he had a prohibited status and that he possessed a firearm. Because Jones had been convicted of this offense without proof that he knew he had a prohibited status, he filed a habeas petition challenging his conviction. The district court dismissed his petition, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question May a federal inmate who did not challenge their conviction on the ground that the statute did not criminalize their activity subsequently apply for habeas relief after the Supreme Court retroactively invalidates the circuit precedent on which the inmate relied in not challenging their conviction? Conclusion Section 2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions by filing a §2241 habeas petition. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The majority first clarified the relationship between §2255 and §2241 in the context of federal prisoners challenging their sentences. Congress introduced §2255 to allow prisoners to challenge their sentences in the sentencing court, rather than through a habeas corpus petition under §2241. While the saving clause in §2255(e) preserved access to §2241 in specific situations, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) added restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions. The saving clause does not permit prisoners to circumvent AEDPA's restrictions, even if they are challenging a new interpretation of a criminal statute. The majority found unpersuasive arguments by both Jones and the federal government regarding when §2255 might be considered “inadequate or ineffective,” thus allowing recourse to §2241. AEDPA’s restrictions reflect Congress’s deliberate choice to balance finality with error correction in the justice system. Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan jointly dissented, arguing that Jones presents the precise type of mismatch contemplated in §2255(h) and would those remand for the lower courts to consider his claim under the proper framework. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion arguing that §2255 requires that Jones’s petition alleging legal innocence should have been considered on the merits. | |||
| [20-1199] Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College | 31 Oct 2022 | 01:55:15 | |
Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2022. Petitioner: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) sued Harvard College over its admissions process, alleging that the process violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating against Asian American applicants in favor of white applicants. Harvard admits that it uses race as one of many factors in its admissions process but argues that its process adheres to the requirements for race-based admissions outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger. After a 15-day bench trial, the district court issued a detailed opinion in favor of Harvard. SFFA appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The case was originally consolidated for oral argument with a similar case challenging the admissions policies at the University of North Carolina under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, but the Court severed the cases. Question May institutions of higher education use race as a factor in admissions? If so, does Harvard College’s race-conscious admissions process violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? | |||
| [21-707] Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina | 31 Oct 2022 | 02:44:44 | |
Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2022. Petitioner: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) sued the University of North Carolina (UNC) over its admissions process, alleging that the process violates the Fourteenth Amendment by using race as a factor in admissions. UNC admits that it uses race as one of many factors in its admissions process but argues that its process adheres to the requirements for race-based admissions outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger. After an eight-day bench trial and litigation that spanned nearly seven years, the district court ruled that UNC’s admissions policy survived strict scrutiny and was consistent with Grutter v. Bollinger. SFFA appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed to hold the case in abeyance after the U.S. Supreme Court granted review. The case was originally consolidated for oral argument with a similar case challenging the admissions policies at Harvard University under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but the Court subsequently severed the two cases. Question May institutions of higher education use race as a factor in admissions? If so, does UNC’s race-conscious admissions process violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Conclusion The University of North Carolina admissions program violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion. First the Court concluded that Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) had organizational standing because is a voluntary membership organization with identifable members who support its mission and whom SFFA represents in good faith. Second, while the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was to ensure that laws apply equally to everyone, regardless of race, both the Supreme Court and the nation failed to uphold this principle, most notably in Plessy v. Ferguson, which sanctioned “separate but equal” facilities. However, the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education overturned this, and the equal protection principle has since expanded to various areas of life. Any exceptions to equal protection must satisfy “strict scrutiny”; that is, the government must show that the racial classification serves a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion became the touchstone for evaluating the constitutionality of race-based admissions, reasoning that diversity in the student body could be a “compelling state interest,” but that race could only be used as a “plus” in admissions and not as a quota. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court adopted Powell's viewpoint, while also setting limits to ensure race-based admissions did not result in stereotyping or harm to non-minority applicants, and stating that such race-based programs should eventually come to an end. Harvard’s (and UNC’s, in the consolidated case) race-based admissions systems fail to meet the strict scrutiny, non-stereotyping, and termination criteria established by Grutter and Bakke. Specifically, the universities could not demonstrate their compelling interests in a measurable way, failed to avoid racial stereotypes, and did not offer a logical endpoint for when race-based admissions would cease. As a result, the programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court noted that nothing prohibits universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected the applicant’s life, so long as that discussion is concretely tied to a quality of character or unique ability that the particular applicant can contribute to the university. Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh each wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined (except Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case against Harvard). Justice Jackson wrote a separate dissenting opinion. | |||
| [21-869] Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith | 12 Oct 2022 | 01:42:29 | |
Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 12, 2022. Petitioner: Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Artist Andy Warhol created a series of silkscreen prints and pencil illustrations (“Prince Series”) based on a copyrighted 1981 photograph of the musician Prince, taken by Lynn Goldsmith. Warhol made some aesthetic changes to Goldsmith’s original photograph, but they remained “recognizably derived” from the original. Goldsmith sued the Andy Warhol Foundation, successor to Warhol’s copyright in the Prince Series, for copyright infringement. The Foundation raised fair use as a defense. The district court granted summary judgment for the Foundation, concluding that Warhol had “transformed” the original photograph by giving it a new “meaning and message.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, holding that because the Prince Series remained “recognizably derived” from the original, it failed to transform and was thus not fair use. Question What is the proper test for whether a work is “transformative” under the first factor of the Copyright Act’s fair use doctrine? Conclusion The “purpose and character” of the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF)’s particular commercial use of Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph of the musician Prince does not favor AWF’s fair use defense to copyright infringement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. The fair use defense to copyright infringement promotes creativity by recognizing that some secondary works make unauthorized use of original works but serve a different purpose, add new expression, or convey new ideas. Andy Warhol’s “Orange Prince,” one of the Prince Series that was derived from the photograph by Lynn Goldsmith, appeared on the cover of a Vanity Fair magazine commemorating the late musician for a fee of $10,000—all of which to AWF and of which Goldsmith received none. In contrast, Goldsmith’s photographs were licensed and used on several other magazine covers commemorating Prince. AWF’s use of Orange Prince on the cover of Vanity Fair served essentially the same commercial purpose as Goldsmith’s original. Thus, the first fair-use factor—the purpose and character of use, including whether the use is for commercial or nonprofit purpose—weighs against the conclusion that AWF’s use of Goldsmith’s photograph for the specific purpose of a magazine cover commemorating Prince was fair. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, emphasizing the narrowness of the majority’s opinion and its appropriate focus on the specific use challenged. Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, criticizing the majority of stifling creativity and disregarding the reality that creativity relies upon the borrowing of works that came before. | |||
| [21-984] Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt | 12 Oct 2022 | 01:33:50 | |
Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 12, 2022. Petitioner: Helix Energy Solutions, et al.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael J. Hewitt worked on an offshore oil rig managing other employees. His employer, Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., paid Hewitt based solely on a daily rate, and he often was required to work well over forty hours per week. Hewitt sued Helix for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Helix argued that it was not required to pay Hewitt overtime because Hewitt was a “highly compensated employee,” and highly compensated employees are exempt from overtime pay. Hewitt argued that because his pay was calculated on a daily rate, he was not paid on a salary basis and thus was entitled to overtime pay regardless of the dollar amount he was paid. The district court ruled for Helix, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Question Is a supervisor who makes over $200,000 annually, calculated on a daily basis, entitled to overtime pay, despite a regulation that carves out an exception for highly paid executives? Conclusion Daily-rate workers, of whatever income level, qualify as paid on a salary basis only if they satisfy the three conditions outlined in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court holding that Hewitt was not an executive exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay guarantee. Under the FLSA, an employee is considered a bona fide executive excluded from the FLSA’s protections if the employee meets three tests: (1) the salary basis test, which requires that the employee receive a predetermined and fixed salary that does not vary with the amount of time worked; (2) the “salary level” test, which requires the preset salary to exceed a specified amount; and (3) the job “duties” test, which considers whether the employee has responsibility for managing the enterprise, directing other employees, and hiring and firing other employees. It was undisputed that Hewitt satisfied (2) and (3); at issue was whether he was paid on a salary basis. Under Section 602(a), an employee is paid on a salary basis if they regularly receive each pay period on a weekly or less frequent basis. Under the plain meaning of that provision, it does not apply to daily-rate workers. Hewitt’s pay, in contrast, was determined on a daily basis, despite receiving paychecks every two weeks. Because he did not satisfy the first part of the test, he was not an exempt executive within the FLSA and was thus entitled to overtime pay. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted because the issue originally presented was different from the issue argued and addressed. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that Hewitt was a bona fide executive based on his salary level and duties, and the fact that he was certain to make at least $963 per week for any week he worked. | |||
| [21-468] National Pork Producers Council v. Ross | 11 Oct 2022 | 02:12:08 | |
National Pork Producers Council v. Ross Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 11, 2022. Petitioner: National Pork Producers Council, et al.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2018, California voters passed Proposition 12, which amends the California Health and Safety Code to prohibit the sale of pork from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards. Trade associations representing the pork industry and farmers challenged the law as violating the dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce or imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce. According to the challengers, Proposition 12 places an undue burden on interstate commerce and that it causes an impermissible “extraterritorial effect” because it effectively forces all or most hog farmers, regardless of their location, to comply with the California requirements yet mostly affects non-California transactions (because 87% of the pork produced in the country is consumed outside of California). The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding the complaint did not plausibly plead that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause under either theory. Question Does a California law that prohibits the in-state sale of pork from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards violate the “dormant” component of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause? Conclusion California’s Proposition 12 does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion in which a majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. State laws violate the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause when they seek to “build up…domestic commerce” through “burdens upon the industry and business of other States.” An antidiscrimination principle is at the core of the dormant Commerce Clause; an “almost per se” rule against state laws that have extraterritorial effects is unsupported. A state law that does have extraterritorial effects but does not purposefully discriminate does not necessarily violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Under the balancing test established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), a court must assess “the burden imposed on interstate commerce” by the state law and prevent its enforcement if the law’s burdens are “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” A majority of the Court concluded that under this test, Proposition 12 does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Elena Kagan, concluded that the petitioners failed to plausibly allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce and thus voted with the majority. Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett, concluded that the petitioners did allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce, but the benefits and burdens of Proposition 12 are incommensurable. Chief Justice John Roberts filed an opinion, joined by Justices Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Ketanji Brown Jackson, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the petitioners did allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce and that the judgment should be vacated and the case remanded to the court below to decide whether the petitioners had stated a claim under Pike. Justice Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, largely agreeing with the Chief Justice but pointing out also that state economic regulations like California’s Proposition 12 may raise questions not only under the Commerce Clause, but also under the Import-Export Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. | |||
| [21-442] Reed v. Goertz | 11 Oct 2022 | 00:59:52 | |
Reed v. Goertz Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 11, 2022. Petitioner: Rodney Reed. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Rodney Reed was sentenced to death in Texas for the 1996 rape and murder of Stacey Stites. He unsuccessfully sought federal post-conviction relief, and when the state asked to set an execution date, Reed requested to have DNA testing conducted on several items on or near the victim’s body. A state trial court declined his request. Reed then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of the Texas law governing post-conviction DNA testing. The district court dismissed his claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that Reed’s claims are barred by the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which begins to run as soon as the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury.” Question When does the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begin to run? Conclusion When a prisoner pursues state post-conviction DNA testing through the state-provided litigation process, the statute of limitations a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 begins to run when the state litigation ends. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion holding that, in Reed’s case, the statute of limitations on his § 1983 claim began when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his motion for rehearing, not when the state trial court denied DNA testing. A statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action.” When that occurs depends on the cause of action. The violation of procedural due process rights, as Reed alleged in this case, requires two elements: (1) deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (2) inadequate state process. Thus, a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action” for a procedural due process violation not at the time of deprivation, but at the time the state fails to provide due process. In Reed’s case, the State’s alleged failure to provide him with a fundamentally fair process was complete when the state litigation ended and deprived Reed of his asserted liberty interest in DNA testing. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case for lack of standing. Justice Thomas would dismiss the case on the finding that Reed’s action presents no original Article III case or controversy between him and the district attorney. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that there are a number of points in the case at which the statute of limitations could begin to run—all before the denial by the Criminal Court of Appeals, and all leading to the conclusion that Reed’s claim is time-barred. | |||
| [21-432] Arellano v. McDonough | 04 Oct 2022 | 00:47:31 | |
Arellano v. McDonough Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 4, 2022. Petitioner: Adolfo R. Arellano. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Adolfo R. Arellano served honorably in the Navy from November 1977 to October 1981. On June 3, 2011—more than 30 years after he was discharged—he applied for disability benefits on the basis of psychiatric disorders that rendered him 100% disabled. He sought retroactive benefits from the day after his discharge, arguing that the one-year filing deadline to submit disability claims should be extended in his case because his mental illness had prevented him from filing his claim earlier. The VA Regional Office granted his claim, but only from the date the claim was received. The Board of Appeals rejected his argument, and the Veterans Court affirmed that decision, concluding that Mr. Arellano's claim was “squarely foreclosed by binding precedent” in Andrews v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2003), which held that principles of equitable tolling are not applicable to the time period in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1). Question Can the one-year filing deadline for veterans to submit disability claims after they are discharged be extended under principles of equitable tolling? Conclusion The one-year filing deadline for veterans to submit disability claims after they are discharged cannot be extended under principles of equitable tolling. Justice Amy Coney Barret authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that the effective date of Arellano’s award of disability compensation was the day the VA received his claim. Equitable tolling can extend a deadline when a litigant diligently pursues their rights but is nonetheless prevented from bringing a timely action due to extraordinary circumstances. Courts presume that equitable tolling applies, but that presumption is rebuttable by evidence that it is inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The default rule of 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(1) establishes that the day VA receives a claim is the effective date, subject to the limited exception in § 5110(b)(1), which states that “the effective date of an award . . . shall be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor.” Moreover, the structure of § 5110, which sets out 16 exceptions that explain when each type of benefits qualifies for an effective date earlier than the default, suggests Congress intended only certain enumerated exceptions to the default date. This statutory language and structure indicate Congress’s intent that principles of equitable tolling not apply. | |||
| [23-370] Erlinger v. United States | 27 Mar 2024 | 01:33:06 | |
Erlinger v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2024. Petitioner: Paul Erlinger. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Paul Erlinger received a 15-year prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), for illegally possessing a firearm. This sentence was based on his three prior convictions for violent felonies, all being Indiana burglaries. Erlinger challenged his sentence on two grounds. First, he argued that Indiana’s definition of burglary extends beyond the federal statute, making it non-applicable as a predicate offense under ACCA. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that Indiana's definition of burglary is “[a] person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it.” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (1990) is no broader than the federal definition of general burglary, which is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Secondly, Erlinger argued that these burglaries did not occur on separate occasions, and claimed that the determination of this fact should be made by a jury, not a judge, as per the Sixth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States (2022). The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that under binding circuit precedent, the government was not required to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Erlinger committed the Indiana burglaries on separate occasions, only to the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence. Question Does the Constitution require a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act? | |||
| [21-1086] Allen v. Milligan | 04 Oct 2022 | 01:53:56 | |
Allen v. Milligan Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 4, 2022. Appellant: Wes Allen, Alabama Secretary of State, et al.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) After the 2020 census, Alabama created a redistricting plan for its seven seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. One of the districts in the plan is a majority-Black district. Registered voters and several organizations challenged the map, arguing that the state had illegally packed Black voters into a single district while dividing other clusters of Black voters across multiple districts. The challengers alleged that the map effectively minimizes the number of districts in which Black voters can elect their chosen candidates, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which bans racial discrimination in voting policies. A three-judge district court agreed with the challengers that the map likely violated Section 2 of the VRA, granting a preliminary injunction that ordered the state to draw a new map. Alabama asked the U.S. Supreme Court to freeze the district court’s injunction, which the Court did by a 5-4 decision pending a merits decision. Question Does Alabama’s 2021 redistricting plan for its seven U.S. House seats violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act? Conclusion The district court correctly applied binding Supreme Court precedent to conclude that Alabama’s redistricting map likely violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Court’s decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) sets out a three-part framework for evaluating claims brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. First, the plaintiffs must prove that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district (measured by criteria such as contiguity and compactness). Second, the plaintiffs must show that the minority group is politically cohesive. Third, the plaintiffs must show that under the totality of the circumstances, the political process is not “equally open” to minority voters. The majority applied that three-part framework to the facts in the record and agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their challenge. The plaintiffs submitted maps demonstrating the traditional districting criteria, and the district court found “no serious dispute” that Black voters are politically cohesive or that the challenged districts’ white majority consistently defeated Black voters’ preferred candidates. Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority opinion except for a discussion of the difference between race-consciousness and race-predominance. He concurred separately to emphasize and clarify four additional points. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in full, and Justices Amy Coney Barrett and Samuel Alito joined in part. Justice Thomas argued that Section 2 of the VRA does not require Alabama to redraw its congressional districts so that Black voters can control a number of seats proportional to Black voters in its population. Justice Alito authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Gorsuch joined arguing that the majority’s understanding of Gingles—specifically its understanding of the phrase “reasonably configured” within the context of the first precondition—is flawed, and that a correct understanding would lead to a different result in this case. | |||
| [21-454] Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency | 03 Oct 2022 | 01:48:05 | |
Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 3, 2022. Petitioner: Michael Sackett and Chantelle Sackett. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael and Chantall Sackett own a residential lot near Priest Lake, Idaho, and want to build a home there. However, shortly after they began placing sand and gravel, the federal Environmental Protection Agency told them that they could not build on their lot because construction on the land violated the Clean Water Act. According to the EPA, the Sacketts’ lot contained wetlands that qualify as “navigable waters” regulated by the Act, so they needed to remove the sand and gravel and restore the property to its natural state. Litigation ensued, and in 2012, the Supreme Court permitted the Sacketts to litigate their challenge to the EPA’s order in federal court. During the litigation, the EPA removed its compliance order. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA’s withdrawal of the compliance order did not render the Sacketts’ challenge moot and that the EPA does have jurisdiction over their property under the Clean Water Act. The court reasoned that, under binding circuit precedent, “jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.” Question What is the proper test for determining whether wetlands are “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act? Conclusion The Clean Water Act extends only to wetlands that have a continuous surface connection with “waters” of the United States—i.e., with a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court that was unanimous in the judgment reversing and remanding. In 1973, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers, which jointly enforce the Clean Water Act, initially defined “the waters of the United States” differently. By 1980, they had adopted identical definitions, which encompassed “all waters that could affect interstate or foreign commerce.” Since then, they have repeatedly sought to define and redefine “waters of the United States” through rulemaking procedures. Despite this history, the Court found that the meaning of “waters” in the CWA encompasses “only those relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water.” The mere presence of water is too broad; such a definition would include puddles and isolated ponds. Thus, wetlands are not per se “waters of the United States”; rather, only those with a continuous surface connection to traditional navigable waters fall within that category. Justice Clarence Thomas joined Justice Alito’s majority opinion in full but concurred separately, along with Justice Neil Gorsuch, emphasizing the importance of curbing the expansion of federal authority through agency action. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh disagreed with the Court’s “continuous surface connection” test because, in his view, it “departs from the statutory text, from 45 years of consistent agency practice,” and from the Court’s own precedents. Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. Justice Kagan lamented that, in her opinion, the majority “substitutes its own ideas about policymaking for Congress’s.” | |||
| [22O145] Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin | 03 Oct 2022 | 01:08:39 | |
Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 3, 2022. Petitioner: State of Delaware. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) MoneyGram Payments Systems, which is headquartered in Delaware, returns unclaimed checks to that state. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin argue that the checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments,” which federal law requires to go to the states where they were purchased. Invoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over interstate disputes, Delaware filed the case directly in the Supreme Court. The Court appointed a special master, who concluded that MoneyGram’s checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus should go to the states where they were purchased. Delaware asked the Court to review the Special Master’s findings for error. Question Are unclaimed MoneyGram checks “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus subject to a federal law that remits them to the states where they were purchased? Conclusion Unclaimed MoneyGram checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus subject to the Federal Disposition Act, which remits them to the states where they were purchased. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the opinion of the Court, which was unanimous as to its conclusion (but only 5-4 as to the discussion of legislative history supporting that conclusion). The unclaimed checks at issue in this case are sufficiently similar to “money orders” to fall within the Federal Disposition Act (FDA) for two main reasons. First, they are similar in function in operation because they are prepaid financial instruments used to transmit a specified amount of money to a named payee. Second, because of the recordkeeping practices of the entity issuing and holding on to the prepaid funds, it would be inequitable for unclaimed checks to go to the state where the creditor is incorporated, as common law would require. For these reasons, the FDA, not the common law, applies to unclaimed MoneyGram checks. | |||
| [21-429] Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta | 27 Apr 2022 | 02:09:42 | |
Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2022. Petitioner: State of Oklahoma. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta, a non-Native, was convicted in Oklahoma state court of child neglect, and he was sentenced to 35 years. The victim, his stepdaughter, is Native American, and the crime was committed within the Cherokee Reservation. Castro-Huerta challenged his conviction, arguing that under the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which held that states cannot prosecute crimes committed on Native American lands without federal approval. Oklahoma argued that McGirt involved a Native defendant, whereas Castro-Huerta is non-Native, so McGirt does not bar his prosecution by the state. Question Do states have the authority to prosecute non-Natives who commit crimes against Natives on Native American lands? Conclusion The federal government and the state have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against Natives on Native American land. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Court has held that States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against non-Natives on Native American lands. Native American land is not separate from state territory. And States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed on Native American land unless preempted. Preemption may occur either under ordinary principles of federal preemption, or when the exercise of state jurisdiction would unlawfully infringe on tribal self-government. Neither is present in this case, so states have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against Natives on Native American land. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court’s decision reneges on the federal government’s centuries-old promise that tribes would remain forever free from interference by state authorities. | |||
| [21-511] Shoop v. Twyford | 26 Apr 2022 | 00:58:40 | |
Shoop v. Twyford Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2022. Petitioner: Tim Shoop, Warden. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1993, an Ohio jury convicted Raymond Twyford of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. Twyford unsuccessfully pursued direct appeals and also filed a federal habeas petition. In November 2018, Twyford asked the federal district court to allow him to undergo neurological imaging to substantiate allegations of neurological problems due to childhood abuse, neglect, and injuries. The district court granted Twyford’s motion and ordered the prison warden to transport Twyford for his neurological imaging because the results might assist the court in exercising its habeas review. The warden appealed the order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question May a federal district court order the transportation of a state prisoner to help him develop evidence for his habeas petition, even before determining the admissibility of the evidence? Conclusion A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action when the prisoner has not shown that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. A federal court may never needlessly prolong a habeas case. For that reason, before a federal court may admit new evidence, either the claim must rely on a new and previously unavailable rule of constitutional law made retroactively available by the Supreme Court, or it must rely on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. In this case, the court granted Twyford’s request for transportation under the All Writs Act. But the All Writs Act cannot be used to circumvent binding procedural rules. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) is the source of binding rules and limits review to the record that was before the state court. The district court’s failure to determine how Twyford’s request for transportation would aid the adjudication of his habeas petition before granting the request was thus erroneous. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the state’s interlocutory appeal. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion stating that he would dismiss the case as improvidently granted. | |||
| [21-954] Biden v. Texas | 26 Apr 2022 | 01:47:11 | |
Biden v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2022. Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2018, the Trump administration announced the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPPs), under which policy certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border of the United States were returned to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. Known as the “remain in Mexico” policy, the MPPs faced legal challenges shortly after their enactment, but the Supreme Court allowed the Trump administration to enforce it. In June 2021, the Biden administration sought to end the policy, but Texas and Missouri challenged that effort, arguing that rescinding the policy violated federal immigration law and that the policy change violated the Administrative Procedure Act. A federal district court agreed with the challengers and ordered the Biden administration to implement the MPPs in good faith or initiate new agency action in compliance with the APA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to block the lower court’s ruling, as did the Supreme Court. In October 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a new decision ending the policy supported by a memorandum explaining the decision. A district court again ordered DHS to continue the CPPs, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the order. The Biden administration sought expedited review as to whether federal immigration law requires it to maintain the policy and whether the October decision to end the policy has any legal effect. Question Must the Biden administration continue to enforce the Trump administration’s Migrant Protection Protocols, or does the Biden Department of Homeland Security decision ending the policy have legal effect? Conclusion The Government’s rescission of Migrant Protection Protocols did not violate section 1225 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the then-Secretary of Homeland Security’s October 29 Memoranda constituted valid final agency action. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion. Although the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue its injunction, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the case. By using the word “may,” Section 1225(b)(2)(C) confers a discretionary authority to return nonresidents to Mexico. Historical context confirms this understanding. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) was added to the statute more than 90 years after the mandatory language that appears in a nearby provision. And since its enactment, every presidential administration has interpreted section 1225(b)(2)(C) as purely discretionary. Interpreting the provision as mandatory would impose a significant burden upon the Executive’s ability to conduct diplomatic relations with Mexico, which Congress likely did not intend. Once the district court vacated the original attempt to rescind the policy, DHS properly “issue[d] a new rescission bolstered by new reasons” absent from the original rescission. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch joined. | |||
| [21-418] Kennedy v. Bremerton School District | 25 Apr 2022 | 01:47:52 | |
Kennedy v. Bremerton School District Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 25, 2022. Petitioner: Joseph A. Kennedy. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Joseph Kennedy, a high school football coach, engaged in prayer with a number of students during and after school games. His employer, the Bremerton School District, asked that he discontinue the practice in order to protect the school from a lawsuit based on violation of the Establishment Clause. Kennedy refused and instead rallied local and national television, print media, and social media to support him. Kennedy sued the school district for violating his rights under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that because the school district suspended him solely because of the risk of constitutional liability associated with his religious conduct, its actions were justified. Kennedy appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Is a public school employee’s prayer during school sports activities protected speech, and if so, can the public school employer prohibit it to avoid violating the Establishment Clause? Conclusion The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court. The District disciplined Coach Kennedy after three games in October 2015, in which he “pray[ed] quietly without his students.” In forbidding Mr. Kennedy’s prayers, the District sought to restrict his actions because of their religious character, thereby burdening his right to free exercise. As to his free speech claim, the timing and circumstances of Kennedy’s prayers—during the postgame period when coaches were free to attend briefly to personal matters and students were engaged in other activities—confirm that Kennedy did not offer his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. The District cannot show that its prohibition of Kennedy’s prayer serves a compelling purpose and is narrowly tailored to achieving that purpose. The Court’s Lemon test, and the related endorsement test, are “abandoned,” replaced by a consideration of “historical practices and understandings.” Applying that test, there is no conflict between the constitutional commands of the First Amendment in this case. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito filed concurring opinions. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. | |||
| [21-439] Nance v. Ward | 25 Apr 2022 | 01:26:01 | |
Nance v. Ward Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 25, 2022. Petitioner: Michael Nance. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1993, Michael Wade Nance robbed a bank, and, in the process of fleeing, killed a person. In 1997, a jury convicted Nance of murder, and he was sentenced to death. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his death sentence and rejected a petition for collateral relief. Nance then filed a federal habeas petition; the district court denied the petition, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Then, in 2020, Nance filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the State’s lethal-injection protocol was unconstitutional as applied to him because of two medical issues. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Nance’s complaint, concluding that it was untimely and failed to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals concluded that because the relief Nance sought implied the invalidity of his death sentence, his complaint must be construed as a habeas petition, and because he had already filed an earlier habeas petition, it was properly considered a “successive” petition, over which a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Question What is the proper legal procedure for a death-row inmate’s challenge to the method by which the state intends to execute? Conclusion Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the procedural vehicle appropriate for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim even if an order granting the relief requested would necessitate a change in state law. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court. Both Section 1983 and the federal habeas statute allow a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” However, Section 1983 has an implicit exception for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus”—that is, relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” In two prior cases, the Court allowed a prisoner to bring a method-of-execution claim under Section 1983, but those cases did not require a change in state law, only in an agency’s uncodified protocol. In contrast, here, Nance’s requested relief would require Georgia to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. However, this requirement is not a substantial impediment, nor would it necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence. Thus, Section 1983 remains the proper vehicle for his method-of-execution claim. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the Court erroneously considered the law as it could exist, rather than as it is. Justice Barrett argued that because the relief Nance requests precludes his execution under current state law, habeas is the proper vehicle for seeking that relief. | |||
| [21-499] Vega v. Tekoh | 20 Apr 2022 | 01:20:19 | |
Vega v. Tekoh Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2022. Petitioner: Carlos Vega. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Terence Tekoh worked as a patient transporter in a hospital in Los Angeles. After a patient accused him of sexual assault, hospital staff reported the allegation to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Deputy Carlos Vega went to the hospital to ask Tekoh some questions and to take Tekoh’s statement. Although the parties described vastly different accounts of the nature of the interaction between Tekoh and Vega, it is undisputed that Vega did not advise Tekoh of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him or taking his statement. Tekoh was arrested and charged in California state court, but a jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Following the acquittal on the criminal charge, Tekoh sued Vega under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Vega violated Tekoh’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by taking his statement without first advising him of his Miranda rights. Based on the district court’s instructions, a jury found for Vega. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the verdict, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. Question Is the use of an un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal case sufficient to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action? Conclusion A violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court. Miranda imposed a set of prophylactic rules requiring that police officers issue warnings before a custodial interrogation and disallowing the use of statements obtained in violation of those rules. A Miranda violation is not necessarily a Fifth Amendment violation. Expansion of Miranda rules to provide a right to sue for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would provide very little benefit and would impose substantial costs on the judicial system. Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined, arguing that the Court’s precedents recognize Miranda as conferring a constitutional right, and as such, violation of that constitutional right should be sufficient to support a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983. | |||
| [21-5726] Kemp v. United States | 19 Apr 2022 | 00:43:30 | |
Kemp v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 19, 2022. Petitioner: Dexter Earl Kemp. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dexter Kemp and several co-defendants were charged and convicted of drug and firearms offenses. Kemp and some of the co-defendants appealed, but their sentences were affirmed. Some of the co-defendants, without Kemp, filed petitions for rehearings, rehearings en banc, and certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. Over a year later, Kemp moved to vacate his sentence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied his motion as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Kemp argued that his petition was timely under Supreme Court Rule 13.3, which provides that if a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the lower court, the time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of the denial of rehearing. The court denied his motion, finding that it fell under Rule 60(b)(1) because it alleged the court made a “mistake,” and that such motions must be filed within one year. Question Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorize relief based on a district court’s error of law? Conclusion The term “mistake” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law, but Kemp’s motion was untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. When the Rule was adopted in 1938 and revised in 1946, the word “mistake” applied to any “misconception,” “misunderstanding,” or “fault in opinion or judgment” as to any law or fact. The text, structure, and history of the Rule support the understanding that it applies to judicial mistakes, not just party mistakes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion clarifying that the Court’s opinion does not disturb establish precedent or break new ground. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that he would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. | |||
| [23-146] Connelly v. United States | 27 Mar 2024 | 00:53:42 | |
Connelly v. United States Argued on Mar 27, 2024. Petitioner: Thomas A. Connelly, as Executor of the Estate of Michael P. Connelly, Sr. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Brothers Michael and Thomas Connelly were the sole shareholders of a corporation. The corporation obtained life insurance on each brother so that if one died, the corporation could use the proceeds to redeem his shares. When Michael died, the Internal Revenue Service assessed taxes on his estate, which included his stock interest in the corporation. According to the IRS, the corporation’s fair market value included the life insurance proceeds intended for the stock redemption. Michael’s estate argued otherwise and sued for a tax refund. The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding that the stock-purchase agreement did not affect the valuation and furthermore, that a proper valuation of the corporation must include the life insurance proceeds used for redemption because they were a significant asset of the company. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Should the proceeds of a life insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder’s stock be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder’s shares for purposes of the federal estate tax? | |||
| [21-234] George v. McDonough | 19 Apr 2022 | 01:15:20 | |
George v. McDonough Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 19, 2022. Petitioner: Kevin R. George. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kevin R. George and Michael B. Martin are both military veterans who sought and were denied disability benefits several decades ago based on the straightforward application of a regulation. Since then, the regulation was overturned, so George and Martin sought revision of those denial decisions based on the “clear and unmistakable error” (CUE) by the VA. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the motions, holding that it was not clear and unmistakable error to faithfully apply a regulation that existed at the time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. Question When the Department of Veterans Affairs denies a veteran’s claim for benefits in reliance on an agency interpretation later deemed invalid under the plain text of the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the denial, is that the kind of “clear and unmistakable error” that the veteran may invoke to challenge the VA’s decision? Conclusion The invalidation of a Department of Veterans Affairs regulation after a veteran’s benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief permitting revision of that decision based on “clear and unmistakable error.” Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court. The “clean and unmistakable error” doctrine evolved over several decades. Its history reveals that this category of error does not encompass a subsequent change in law or in interpretation of law. Because the invalidation of a prior regulation constitutes a “change in interpretation of law,” this type of error does not encompass a claim like George’s. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the history of “clear and unmistakable error” is not so clear as the majority suggests. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court erroneously excuses an agency’s departure from its statutory commands.
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| [21-441] Siegel v. Fitzgerald | 18 Apr 2022 | 01:15:26 | |
Siegel v. Fitzgerald Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 18, 2022. Petitioner: Alfred H. Siegel. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Since 1978, bankruptcy courts in the United States have operated under two programs for the handling of their proceedings — the Trustee program and the Bankruptcy Administrator program. Eighty-eight of the 94 judicial districts operate within the Trustee program, while the other districts (in Alabama and North Carolina) are under the Bankruptcy Administrator program. The former is part of the Department of Justice, while the latter is overseen by the Judicial Council of the United States. Each program is also funded differently. The Bankruptcy Administrator program is funded by the judiciary's general budget, whereas the bankruptcy debtors in Trustee districts primarily fund the Trustee program. All Chapter 11 debtors, regardless of district, paid quarterly fees under a consistent formula until January 1, 2018, at which time the Trustee program experienced a funding deficit. To remedy that deficit, Congress passed the 2017 Amendment, which increased the quarterly fees for larger Chapter 11 cases in the Trustee program. In 2008, Circuit City—then a national chain of consumer electronics retail stores throughout the United States—filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of Virginia, which is a Trustee district. As part of its liquidation plan, Circuit City was to pay fees to the U.S. Trustee until the close of bankruptcy. However, after the quarterly fees increased, Circuit City refused to pay the increased fees, arguing that the 2017 Amendment is unconstitutional because it creates nonuniform bankruptcy laws in violation of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution. The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled for the Circuit City trustee, finding the 2017 Amendment violated the Bankruptcy Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. Question Does the 2017 Amendment (part of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act) violate the uniformity requirement of the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause by increasing quarterly fees solely in districts under the U.S. Trustee program and not in those under the Bankruptcy Administrator program? Conclusion The 2017 Amendment to the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act, which imposed a significant fee increase that exempted debtors in two States, violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The 2017 Act increased fees differently for Chapter 11 debtors in different regions. That difference was due not to an external and geographically isolated need, but from Congress's creation of a dual bankruptcy system which allowed certain districts to opt into a system more favorable for debtors. The Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause does not permit Congress to treat identical debtors differently based on artificial distinctions Congress itself created. Thus, the 2017 Amendment violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. | |||
| [21-404] United States v. Washington | 18 Apr 2022 | 01:03:04 | |
United States v. Washington Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 18, 2022. Petitioner: United States of America. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Hanford site was a federal nuclear production site in Washington State that operated between 1944 and 1989, producing substantial amounts of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste. The U.S. Department of Energy now oversees cleanup of the site, which is largely conducted by private contractors and subcontractors. In 2018, Washington amended its state workers’ compensation laws specifically for these cleanup workers. The amended law creates a rebuttable presumption that certain conditions and cancers are occupational diseases. The federal government challenged the law as violating the principle of intergovernmental immunity. The district court granted summary judgment for Washington, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a Washington state workers’ compensation law that applies exclusively to certain federal workers in that state violate the principle of intergovernmental immunity? Conclusion Washington’s workers’ compensation law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because it facially discriminates against the federal government and does not fall within the scope of the federal waiver of immunity. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Supremacy Clause prohibits states from interfering with or controlling the operations of the federal government, also known as the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Washington’s law explicitly treats federal workers differently from state and private workers, and imposes costs upon the federal government that state and private entities do not bear. As such, it is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. Contrary to Washington’s claims, no federal law “clearly and unambiguously” waives federal immunity from workers’ compensation laws. | |||
| [20-1573] Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana | 30 Mar 2022 | 01:20:55 | |
Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2022. Petitioner: Viking River Cruises, Inc.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Angie Moriana worked as a sales representative for Viking River Cruises, Inc., and agreed to submit any dispute arising out of her employment to binding arbitration. Notwithstanding that agreement, Moriana sued Viking on behalf of herself and similarly situated workers under California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Moriana relied on a 2014 decision by the California Supreme Court, Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, which held arbitration agreements that waive the right to bring PAGA representative actions in any forum (such as the one between Moriana and Viking) are unenforceable. Viking moved to compel Moriana’s claims to arbitration, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis overruled Iskanian. The trial court denied Viking’s motion. The appellate court affirmed. Question Does the Federal Arbitration Act require enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims? Conclusion The Federal Arbitration Act preempts a California law that invalidates contractual waivers of the right to bring representative claims. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion holding that the FAA preempts the rule in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles to the extent that Iskanian precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate. The California Supreme Court’s holding in Iskanian, holding unenforceable any arbitration agreement that waives the right to bring a PAGA representative action, presents parties with an impermissible choice: either arbitrate disputes using a form of class procedures, or do not arbitrate at all. The FAA protects bilateral arbitration from undue state interference. To the extent that Iskanian precludes bilateral arbitration, it is preempted by federal law. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the FAA does not apply to state-court proceedings. | |||
| [20-603] Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety | 29 Mar 2022 | 01:41:05 | |
Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 29, 2022. Petitioner: Le Roy Torres. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Leroy Torres enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1989. In 1998, he was employed by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) as a trooper, where he served until his deployment to Iraq in 2007. In 2008, he was honorably discharged and sought reemployment by DPS. However, due to a lung condition he acquired in Iraq, Torres requested employment with DPS in a position different from the one he held before. Instead, DPS offered Torres only a “temporary duty offer,” which he declined. Torres sued DPS in 2017, alleging that the agency’s failure to offer him a job that would accommodate his disability violated the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which prohibits adverse employment actions against an employee based on the employee’s military service. The trial court ruled in favor of Torres, finding that USERRA properly abrogated DPS’s sovereign immunity under Congress’s constitutional war powers. The appellate court reversed. Question Did Congress properly abrogate state sovereign immunity for claims arising under the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)? Conclusion Congress properly exercised its power to raise and support the Armed Forces when it authorized private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court. In PennEast, the Court held that Congress could, pursuant to its eminent domain power, authorize lawsuits against nonconsenting States because, upon entering the federal system, the States implicitly agreed that their “eminent domain power would yield to that of the Federal Government.” Under PennEast, the test for structural waiver is whether the federal power is “complete in itself, and the States consented to the exercise of that power—in its entirety—in the plan of the Convention.” Congress’s power to build and maintain the Armed Forces fits PennEast’s test. Thus, in joining together to form a Union, the States agreed to sacrifice their sovereign immunity for the good of the common defense. Justice Elena Kagan authored a concurring opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. | |||
| [21-309] Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon | 28 Mar 2022 | 01:06:39 | |
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 28, 2022. Petitioner: Southwest Airlines Co.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Latrice Saxon is a ramp supervisor, which entails managing and assisting workers to load and unload airplane cargo for Southwest Airlines. Unlike ramp agents, supervisors like Saxon are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and instead are required to arbitrate wage disputes, in accordance with their employment contract. Notwithstanding the arbitration requirement, Saxon, on behalf of herself and other ramp supervisors, sued Southwest under the Fair Labor Standards Act for failing to pay overtime work. Southwest moved to stay the suit pending arbitration, or to dismiss it altogether in light of the arbitration agreement. Saxon argued that the Arbitration Act did not apply to her lawsuit because she and other ramp supervisors were “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and therefore exempt under Section 1 of the Act. The district court ruled for Southwest, finding that a transportation worker must actually transport goods, not merely handle them at one end or the other of a network. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the act of loading cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, and thus Saxon and the class of workers she represents are exempt from the Act. Question Is an airline employee who works as a ramp agent supervisor a “transportation worker” under Section 1 of the Arbitration Act and therefore exempt from the Act’s arbitration requirement? Conclusion An airline employee who works as a ramp agent supervisor, frequently loading and unloading airplane cargo, belongs to the “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and is therefore exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act’s arbitration requirement. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous 8-0 opinion of the Court. The “class of workers” language of Section 1 refers not to what Southwest does generally, but what Saxon, as a worker, does specifically: physically loading and unloading cargo on and off airplanes. This work qualifies as being “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” as these workers are directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders. Thus, Saxon falls within Section 1’s exception. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |||
| [20-807] LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Company | 28 Mar 2022 | 01:41:04 | |
LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Company Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 28, 2022. Petitioner: Bradley LeDure. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Bradley LeDure is a conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company. In August 2016, LeDure reported for work at a rail yard in Salem, Illinois, to assemble a train for a trip to Dexter, Missouri. Three locomotives were coupled together on a sidetrack, and LeDure decided only one locomotive would be powered on. On an exterior walkway on his way to shut down one of the locomotives, LeDure slipped and fell down the steps. Upon investigation, LeDure noticed a “slick” substance, which Union Pacific later reported to be a “small amount of oil” on the walkway. LeDure sued Union Pacific for negligence under the Locomotive Inspection Act and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, arguing that Union Pacific failed to maintain the walkway free of hazards. The district court dismissed LeDure’s claims, finding the locomotive was not “in use” and therefore not subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act, and LeDure’s injuries were not reasonably foreseeable because they resulted from a small “slick spot” unknown to Union Pacific. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Is a train that makes a temporary stop in a railyard as part of its unitary journey in interstate commerce “in use” and therefore subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act? Conclusion The judgment of the Seventh Circuit, affirming that the train was not "in use" and therefore not subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act, was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |||
| [21-401] ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd. | 23 Mar 2022 | 01:49:41 | |
ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 23, 2022. Petitioner: ZS Automotive US, Inc., et al.. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2017, Luxshare entered into a large-scale business deal with ZF Automotive US, and the deal closed in April 2018. Luxshare allegedly discovered that ZF fraudulently concealed certain material facts, inflating the purchase price. The parties’ purchase agreement required that all disputes be settled by three arbitrators in Germany, and Luxshare intended to bring claims for the losses as a result of ZF’s allegedly wrongful conduct. However, it first sought to obtain discovery from ZF and its senior officers and asked a federal district court to compel discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a). Question Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), which gives federal district courts authority to order litigants subject to their jurisdiction to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a foreign or international tribunal,” apply to private commercial arbitral tribunals? Conclusion Although 28 U.S.C. §1782(a) permits a district court to order discovery “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,” only a governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative body may qualify as such a tribunal, and the arbitration panels in these cases are not such adjudicative bodies. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The word “tribunal” in the context of § 1782, with modifiers “foreign or international” is best understood to refer to an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority. The statute’s history confirms this understanding, as does analogy to the Federal Arbitration Act. The adjudicative bodies in these cases are not governmental or intergovernmental and thus are not subject to § 1782(a). | |||
| [20-1034] Golan v. Saada | 22 Mar 2022 | 01:19:53 | |
Golan v. Saada Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 22, 2022. Petitioner: Narkis Aliza Golan. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Isacco Saada and Narkis Golan married in Italy in 2015 and had a son. From the very start of their relationship, Saada was violently abusive toward Golan, including in front of their son (though allegedly not toward the son). In 2018, Golan and their son traveled to the United States and remained there. Saada asked a court to return their son under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court found that Italy was the child’s country of habitual residence for the purposes of the Hague Convention. However, it also found that returning the child to Italy would subject him to a grave risk of psychological harm based on Saada’s abuse of Golan. Under binding precedent, the district court was also required to determine whether there were any ameliorative undertakings it could impose on Saada that would mitigate the risk of harm in returning the child to Italy. The district court ordered Saada to stay away from Golan, to pay her $30,000, and to visit their son only with Golan’s consent. After the district court coordinated with an Italian court to enforce the orders, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Question Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, musts courts consider all measures that might mitigate the grave risk of harm if the child were to return to their country of habitual residence? Conclusion A court is not required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court. Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention gives a court the discretion to grant or deny return of a child to a foreign country if it finds that return would expose the child to a “grave risk” of physical or psychological harm. Nothing in the Convention’s text either forbids or requires consideration of ameliorative measures in exercising this discretion. | |||
| [21-328] Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. | 21 Mar 2022 | 01:22:01 | |
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 21, 2022. Petitioner: Robyn Morgan. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In September 2018, Robyn Morgan sued Sundance, Inc. for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that Sundance failed to pay her for overtime work. The district court denied Sundance’s motion to dismiss. Sundance then answered Morgan's complaint but did not assert its right to arbitrate Morgan's claims. After filing its answer, Morgan participated in a settlement mediation with plaintiffs in another similar lawsuit in Michigan. The Michigan case settled, but Morgan's case moved forward. Nearly eight months after the filing of Morgan's complaint, Sundance moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding Sundance's participation in the litigation waived its right to arbitration. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Question Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate the Supreme Court’s instruction that lower courts must “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts”? Conclusion Federal courts may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Outside of the arbitration context, a federal court assessing whether a party has waived a right does not generally ask about prejudice. Rather, waiver is “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” It focuses on the actions of the person who held the right, not the effects on the opposing party. Although the FAA may express policy favoring arbitration, that policy does not authorize federal courts to invent special arbitration-preferring procedural rules. Federal courts thus may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule requiring that a party show prejudice in order to prevail on a claim of waiver. | |||
| [23-235] Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine | 26 Mar 2024 | 01:32:58 | |
Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine Argued on Mar 26, 2024. Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration, et al. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Medication abortion in the U.S. is commonly conducted using a combination of mifepristone and misoprostol. Mifepristone was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in September 2000 and is used in over half of all U.S. abortions. Initially, its distribution was limited to hospitals and medical facilities under FDA regulations. The 2007 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act introduced Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), reinforcing FDA's control over drug approvals. Despite REMS review in 2011, mifepristone's distribution remained restricted. In March 2016, the FDA expanded access, allowing medical practitioners to prescribe it and extending the usage period in pregnancy. In April 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the FDA permitted mail distribution from certified sources, and in January 2023, approved pharmacies also began distributing it. However, following the Supreme Court's June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to abortion, several states sought to restrict mifepristone’s sale. The Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and other anti-abortion groups challenged the FDA’s approval, claiming inadequate consideration of evidence in 2000. In April 2023, a federal district court judge sided with the plaintiffs, suspending the FDA’s approval. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit partially stayed this decision, maintaining the original 2000 approval but striking down the 2016 REMS changes that eased access. After a hearing on the merits, in August 2023, the Fifth Circuit upheld the ban on changes made in 2016. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and stayed the lower court’s injunction. Question 1. Do respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use? 2. Were the FDA’s 2016 and 2021 approvals of mifepristone arbitrary and capricious? 3. Did the district court properly grant preliminary relief? | |||
| [21-248] Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP | 21 Mar 2022 | 01:11:01 | |
Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 21, 2022. Petitioner: Philip E. Berger. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The North Carolina chapter of the NAACP challenged a North Carolina voter-ID law, arguing that it violates the Constitution and the federal Voting Rights Act. Although the state attorney general, a Democrat, is already is representing the State's interest in the validity of that law, defending its constitutionality in both state and federal court, Republicans Phil Berger, president pro tempore of the state senate, and Tim Moore, speaker of the state house representatives, sought to intervene to also represent the interests of the State. The district court twice rejected their requests to intervene, and the full (en banc) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also rejected their request. Question Do the two North Carolina legislators have a right to intervene in this case to defend a state voter-ID law? Conclusion North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that one has a right to intervene in litigation if they have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and are “so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede” their ability to protect their interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest. When a State chooses to divide its sovereign authority among different officials and authorize their participation in a suit challenging state law, full consideration of the state’s interests may require the involvement of various officials. Intervention by the legislators neither violates the North Carolina Constitution nor gives them authority beyond what the law already provides them. The existing parties do not adequately represent the legislators’ interest, as the presumption of adequate representation applies only in cases where interests fully overlap, which is not the case here. Thus, the legislators have a right to intervene in the litigation. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the Court erroneously presumed that a State is inadequately represented in federal court unless whomever state law designates as a State’s representative is allowed to intervene and incorrectly implied that the attorney general’s defense of the constitutionality of the voting law at issue here fell below a minimal standard of adequacy. | |||
| [21-147] Egbert v. Boule | 02 Mar 2022 | 01:11:53 | |
Egbert v. Boule Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2022. Petitioner: Erik Egbert. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Erik Egbert, a Customs and Border Patrol Agent, went to the Smugglers Inn, which sits at the U.S.-Canada border, and approached a car carrying a guest from Turkey. The inn’s owner, Robert Boule, asked Egbert to leave, and when Egbert refused to do so, Egbert pushed Boule to the ground. After Boule complained to Egbert’s supervisors, Egbert suggested to the IRS that it investigate Boule. Boule filed a Bivens lawsuit (so called because of the case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which first recognized the right of plaintiffs to sue federal officials for damages arising from violations of their constitutional rights) against Egbert arguing that the agent had violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court ruled against Boule, finding his claims beyond the scope of those permitted under Bivens. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the full (en banc) Ninth Circuit denied Egbert’s petition for rehearing. Question Does a plaintiff have a right to sue federal officers for First Amendment retaliation claims or for allegedly violating the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights while engaging in immigration-related functions? Conclusion A plaintiff does not have a right to sue Border Patrol officers engaged in immigration-related functions for First Amendment retaliation claims or for alleged excessive force. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court. Although Bivens permits suits against federal officials for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, its application to Border Patrol officers raises national security concerns. Thus, “judicial intrusion” would be harmful or inappropriate in this arena. As to the First Amendment, Boule’s claim is a novel concept and no factors weigh in favor of judicial extension of Bivens to that claim. Moreover, for both claims, Congress is better suited to authorize a damages remedy. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch would overrule Bivens entirely. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, concurring in the judgment as to the First Amendment claim but dissenting as to the Fourth Amendment claim. Justice Sotomayor argued that Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim was squarely within the scope of Bivens and only his First Amendment claim was in a new context. | |||
| [20-1410] Ruan v. United States | 01 Mar 2022 | 01:35:23 | |
Ruan v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 1, 2022. Petitioner: Xiulu Ruan. Advocates:
Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A federal jury in Alabama convicted Xiulu Ruan and several other pain management physicians of running a medical practice constituting a racketeering enterprise in violation of several federal statutes, including provisions of the Controlled Substances Act. Ruan allegedly prescribed medicines, including Schedule II drugs (many of which are opioids), outside the standard of care for his practice. At trial, prosecutors showed that Ruan and other physicians in his practice prescribed medications for their own financial gain rather than for the benefit of their patients. Ruan and other defendants challenged their convictions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Question May a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) regardless of whether he “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice? Conclusion The crime of prescribing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, requires that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally” acted in an unauthorized manner. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court. In general, criminal law seeks to punish conscious wrongdoing. Thus, when a criminal statute is silent as to the mental state required, courts infer a requirement of knowledge or intent. When it is not silent, the general mental state provision applies to each term of the provision. Thus, the “knowingly or intentionally” requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841 applies to the phrase “except as authorized.” As such, once the defendant proves their conduct was “authorized,” the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in an unauthorized manner. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Alito looked to the Harrison Act, which preceded the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Regarding the Harrison Act, the Court held that a registered physician acts “in the course of his professional practice” when the physician writes prescriptions “in good faith.” Justice Alito would thus hold that this rule applies under the CSA and vacate the judgments below and remand for further proceedings. | |||