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Shvilei HaChassidus | שבילי החסידות

Shvilei HaChassidus

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Religion & Spirituality

Frequency: 1 episode/7d. Total Eps: 15

Shvilei HaChassidus is a Boro Park seminar devoted to the study of Chassidic thought, practice, and spiritual life. Through close engagement with classic Chassidic texts, historical context, and lived traditions, we explore the paths of avodas Hashem revealed in the world of Chassidus.

http://www.youtube.com/@ShvileiHaChassidus

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PE2 | Noam Elimelech: Three Levels of Avodah — Contradiction or Coherent System? — Parallel Seminar 2

Episode 17

Monday, October 19, 2026 • Duration 01:34:33

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**Can the Noam Elimelech contradict himself—or is there a coherent theological system beneath his teachings?** **שבילי החסידות | Parallel Seminar | שיעור 1** **נועם אלימלך – פרשת בראשית** ג׳ מדרגות: סתירה או שיטה? In the opening session of our Parallel Seminar, we begin a systematic study of the Noam Elimelech by examining the sefer itself, rather than imposing an external philosophical framework. We begin with the three מדרגות introduced at the opening of פרשת בראשית: תורה • עבודה • גמילות חסדים What initially appears to be a familiar division of religious activities becomes a much deeper investigation into תורה לשמה ושלא לשמה, עבודת הלב, the struggle for דבקות, העלאת הניצוצות, and the extraordinary condition of the צדיק who remains physically in this world while connected to חיים נצחיים. But then we encounter a striking difficulty. When the Noam Elimelech explains תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה קהילת יעקב, he appears to rearrange the very מדרגות he just established. Does he contradict himself? Are there actually four מדרגות rather than three? Or have we misunderstood what a מדרגה means? Through close textual analysis, audience discussion, and comparisons with other teachings in the sefer, we begin developing a distinction between the inward condition of the עובד ה׳ and the outward effect of his עבודה—and between spiritual effort and a qualitatively transformed mode of דבקות. This is the first installment of an ongoing seminar investigating whether the Noam Elimelech presents a coherent and sustained theological vision. https://rss.com/podcasts/shvilei-hachassidus/ https://chat.whatsapp.com/BpT817doRD54yGN5DBdN46 ### Chapters / Bookmarks 00:00 — Introduction: Does the Noam Elimelech have a coherent שיטה? 02:51 — The three things for which the world was created 08:45 — The initial three מדרגות: What are we actually studying? 11:24 — מדרגה ראשונה: תורה לשמה ושלא לשמה 13:36 — Why reaching לשמה requires עבודה במדות 20:13 — Torah as an עבודה that transforms the learner 29:40 — מדרגה שניה: תפילה ועבודה שבלב 33:04 — Outward behavior versus the struggle of מחשבה 37:38 — תפילה, קשר, and the battle for דבקות 43:45 — The Wi-Fi analogy: Reconnecting versus being connected 47:47 — מדרגה שלישית: גמילות חסדים, חסד ורחמים 49:54 — העלאת הניצוצות and the work of the צדיק 54:54 — Cross-reference: Sanctifying physical activity 58:56 — Is the third מדרגה merely a higher degree—or a different mode of existence? 1:04:04 — תורה צוה לנו משה: The three מדרגות appear again 1:07:43 — The apparent contradiction: Three מדרגות or four? 1:12:15 — דביקות גמור and חיים נצחיים: A different plane of existence 1:16:39 — מורשה: העלאת הניצוצות as an entrusted עבודה 1:23:22 — Further evidence: עבודה and spiritual attainment 1:25:28 — Toward a resolution: The inward and outward dimensions of עבודה 1:30:07 — Testing the interpretation through additional textual comparisons ### About the Series שבילי החסידות – Shvilei HaChassidus The Parallel Seminar is a companion series devoted to close reading of foundational Chassidic texts, investigating their conceptual structure, theological arguments, and internal coherence. The goal is not merely to extract inspirational teachings, but to understand the intellectual and spiritual vision developed within the sefarim themselves. #נועם_אלימלך #חסידות #ShvileiHaChassidus

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PE01 | Can the Noam Elimelech Contradict Himself — Parallel Seminar 1

Episode 16

Sunday, October 18, 2026 • Duration 01:02:50

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Can the Noam Elimelech contradict himself? And if not, how can we know which of his teachings applies to us? In Parshas Noach, the Noam Elimelech teaches that a tzaddik must constantly engage in teshuvah. Yet elsewhere, he describes a צדיק גמור who is entirely free of spiritual impurity. Are these teachings contradictory? Or are they describing different spiritual levels? And if the answer is simply that each teaching concerns a different מדרגה, a more difficult question emerges: How do we know which level each teaching describes—and which teaching is meant for us? In the opening session of our new Parallel Seminar series, we examine a fundamental question in studying Chassidus: Are Chassidic teachings coherent claims about spiritual reality, or are they primarily inspirational and emotional exhortations? Through the Noam Elimelech, two humorous illustrations, and Rambam's comparison of moral education to medicine, we explore: - What actually constitutes a contradiction? - Can two seemingly opposite teachings both be correct? - What role do spiritual levels, context, and the intended audience play? - Why doesn't resolving a textual contradiction automatically tell us how to apply the teaching? - Can a spiritually true and elevated teaching nevertheless be the wrong guidance for a particular individual? The discussion introduces a larger inquiry that we will continue through the teachings of Komarno and Tanya: **How can enduring Torah speak meaningfully to different individuals, at different stages, in different circumstances?** Shvilei HaChassidus | שבילי החסידות Parallel Seminar — Session 1 https://rss.com/podcasts/shvilei-hachassidus/ https://chat.whatsapp.com/BpT817doRD54yGN5DBdN46 00:00 Introduction — What Is the Parallel Seminar? 03:25 The Noam Elimelech: Two Kinds of Tzaddik? 09:48 Does a Perfect Tzaddik Need Teshuvah? 18:56 “A Gut Shabbos — How Do You Know?”: What Kind of Statement Is This? 23:57 The Hidden Premise Behind the Contradiction 26:39 “For You? Less.” — Opposite Advice, One Coherent Principle 31:31 Rambam: Why the Right Medicine Can Harm the Wrong Person 37:45 Two Different Errors: Misunderstanding vs. Misapplication 39:53 Komarno: Can a Sefer of Avodah Be Written for Every Reader? 46:19 Why Does Grounding the Sefer in Pirkei Avos Help? 51:48 Tanya: Can a Written Sefer Replace Personal Guidance? 59:53 Conclusion — Knowing the System vs. Knowing Where You Stand #Chassidus #NoamElimelech #JewishThought

When Is a Mistake Really a Judgment? Yevamot, Aristotle & Phronēsis | Phronesis Dilemma — Part IV

Episode 14

Wednesday, September 9, 2026 • Duration 01:45:06

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When a wise person reaches the wrong conclusion, what exactly has gone wrong?

It is tempting to say simply: the judge made a mistake. But that already hides a much harder question. Was the error in the facts supplied to judgment? In the decision to rely on those facts? In the way the particular situation was perceived? Or in the deliberation about what those circumstances required?

Seminar 14 continues the Phronēsis Dilemma by returning to the conceptual maps developed in Seminar 13 and applying them to the sugya of Yevamot 92a.

The Gemara distinguishes between הוראה and טעות. Through the explanation of Rabbeinu Avraham min haHar, the issue becomes especially sharp: when Beis Din acts on a single witness, is the resulting determination carried by Beis Din’s own סברא, or is Beis Din ultimately relying upon the testimony itself? The contrast with the case of חלב forces us to distinguish institutional involvement from genuine reason-governed judicial determination.

That distinction then returns us directly to Aristotle.

In Nicomachean Ethics VI.8, Aristotle distinguishes error concerning the particular from error in deliberation—and describes the ultimate practical particular through a kind of perception. But where exactly does perception end and phronetic deliberation begin?

The seminar therefore asks:

What counts as a genuine token exercise of phronēsis?

Can a phronimos be factually mistaken without phronēsis itself failing?

When does accepting evidence become part of practical judgment?

Is seeing a circumstance as “urgent,” “available,” or “adequate” perception or deliberation?

Can a correct conclusion result from defective reasoning?

Before the Verdict: Truth-Bearers, Truth-Grounds & Authority. Phronēsis Dilemma — Part III

Episode 13

Wednesday, September 2, 2026 • Duration 01:44:44

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What does it mean to say that a court was wrong—and yet its ruling still governs?

Seminar 13 continues the Phronēsis Dilemma by turning from the general problem of practical error to a concrete sugya: the dispute between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in Rosh Hashanah 25.

The Ramban invokes this episode when discussing לא תסור and the competent dissenter who is convinced that Beis Din is mistaken. But the comparison raises a difficult problem. Kiddush HaChodesh has the exceptional rule of אתם — אפילו שוגגין, אפילו מזידין, אפילו מוטעין. And the sugya also invokes the principle of יפתח בדורו כשמואל בדורו.

So what exactly is being established at each stage?

This seminar develops three conceptual maps in order to separate questions that are easily collapsed:

What is the correct substantive judgment?

What makes a proposition true — its truth-ground?

Who has epistemic access to that truth?

Who possesses jurisdiction to determine a legal status?

What makes an authoritative decree binding?

What happens when a competent dissenter remains convinced that his own judgment is correct?

The central claim is that the statement “Rabban Gamliel was wrong” does not yet tell us which proposition was wrong.

The witnesses may have been wrong about the moon.

The court may have misjudged the evidence.

Yet the calendrical determination may remain legally effective.

The court may possess jurisdiction without possessing superior wisdom.

Where Is Truth? Aristotle, Wittgenstein & the Phronesis Dilemma — Part II

Episode 12

Wednesday, August 19, 2026 • Duration 01:24:29

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Where does truth reside—in the world, in human judgment, or in the grammar through which reality becomes intelligible to us?

Seminar 12 continues the Phronēsis Dilemma by slowing down over a question that had previously been assumed rather than explained: what does Aristotle mean when he calls practical wisdom truth-attaining?

Beginning with Aristotle’s Metaphysics, we trace the relation between logos, being, substance, form, and truth. Aristotle insists that thought does not create what makes it true: judgment is answerable to reality. But Wittgenstein introduces an important qualification. The reality may be independent of our verdict without arriving already equipped with the complete grammar of its own practical description. His discussion of pain becomes the model: suffering is real before language, yet the mature concept of pain—with its criteria of recognition, sameness, concealment, correction, and use—is acquired within a human practice.

This produces a sharper account of practical truth:

verdict-independent, but grammar-mediated.

From there the seminar returns to Aristotle’s ethics and asks whether the exact mean can actually be hit in finite practice. Nicomachean Ethics II.9 leads into the central dilemma:

If the genuine possessor of phronēsis cannot err in a concrete judgment, how do we identify the genuine wise person?

If a genuine possessor can make a token error, what distinguishes possession of practical wisdom from its successful exercise in this particular case?

Along the way we distinguish:

first-order practical truth from second-order recognition;

conative integration, conative correctness, and cognitive correctness;

a false end pursued intelligently from a right end falsely particularized;

Can the Wise Person Be Wrong? Aristotle’s Phronēsis Dilemma — Part I

Episode 11

Wednesday, August 12, 2026 • Duration 01:27:14

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Aristotle gives phronēsis—practical wisdom—the task that no universal rule can perform by itself: perceiving what the good requires in this particular situation.

But what happens when two apparently wise judges, formed within the same tradition and working from the same source and factual record, reach incompatible conclusions?

Using a recurring halakhic thought experiment based on Yoreh De’ah 249:16—whether a necessary בית הכנסת project or urgent צדקה לעניים should receive priority—this seminar examines the structure of perfected practical judgment.

We distinguish:

first-order knowledge of what should be done from second-order recognition of the genuinely wise teacher or judge;

right desire from true judgment;

akrasia from cognitive error;

factual ignorance, compulsion, accident, impairment, and failures of practical perception;

possession of phronēsis from its successful exercise in a particular case.

The argument then divides.

If perfected phronēsis is infallible, the genuine phronimos can be defined as the person who judges correctly—but how can an imperfect learner identify that person without already knowing which judgment is correct?

If a genuine possessor of phronēsis can occasionally err, what distinguishes a successful exercise from a confident token failure? Can practical wisdom certify its own present judgment?

The target is not Aristotle’s ethics as a whole, nor the indispensability of habituation, character, experience, and non-mechanical judgment. The target is the stronger claim that the perfected agent can function as a self-sufficient criterion or constitutive ground of concrete rightness.

The Rule Does Not See the Case | Aristotle, Kant, Shabbos & Judgment

Episode 10

Thursday, July 30, 2026 • Duration 01:43:36

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If the good and the law are objective, why can neither the objective good nor the universal rule determine what must be done in the concrete case?

This seminar begins with a listener’s question about a large donation to a shul. Even after Seminar 9 established that transferring money to a charitable institution does not automatically constitute צדקה, an objectively good result still occurred: the shul can now be expanded. Why does that not establish that the donor performed a good and formative deed?

To answer, we distinguish three levels:

• an objectively good result;

• an objectively fitting deed;

• the virtuous performance of that deed.

The goodness of the result does not automatically establish that this was the right action for this agent, in this amount, at this time, and in this manner. Yet habituation cannot require that the beginner already possess mature virtue, or habituation would become circular. Aristotle therefore distinguishes performing the sort of deed a virtuous person would perform from performing it as the virtuous person performs it.

This leads to phronēsis: not mere rule-following, strategic cleverness, or private intuition, but truthful practical judgment concerning what the good requires in contingent particulars.

The seminar then turns from objective goodness to objective law:

• Aristotle’s epieikeia shows that fidelity to law may require judgment beyond mechanical repetition of universal wording.

• Kant shows why another universal rule cannot eliminate the need for judgment in application.

• Shabbos demonstrates that objective holiness, menuchah, and binding law do not mechanically classify every concrete case.

Is צדקה Charity? Wittgenstein, Deleuze, and Humpty Dumpty

Episode 9

Wednesday, July 22, 2026 • Duration 01:14:39

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Is צדקה simply the Jewish word for charity—or does that assumption already conceal a philosophical mistake?

In this seminar, we use Humpty Dumpty to enter Wittgenstein’s radical account of language, grammar, and practice. A movement does not contain checkmate. A sound does not contain speech. A transfer of money does not contain צדקה. Before saying that צדקה and charity are “the same action interpreted differently,” we must first ask: the same according to what criteria?

Wittgenstein’s claim that “essence is expressed by grammar” challenges the idea that words merely label pre-existing ontological categories. Grammar does not simply tell us what name to attach to a completed object or action; it helps articulate what kind of object or action is in question, what counts as the same, and what counts as correct or mistaken.

This has profound consequences for religious life. We do not first exist as complete religious individuals and then privately assign meanings to words such as מצוה, תשובה, תפילה, יראה, and צדקה. We become capable of articulated, norm-governed religious action and self-understanding through participation in a religious world of language, law, ritual, authority, teaching, and correction.

The seminar then reads Humpty Dumpty a second time through Gilles Deleuze. Wittgenstein uses the paradox to expose the impossibility of private semantic mastery. Deleuze transforms Humpty’s wall, his “proud” verbs, and his language of impenetrability into a philosophy of surface, event, becoming, and the production of sense.

The seminar ends by opening the next question:

If a written sign does not contain the rule of its own application, how can Torah continue through כתב alone? What living practice allows written Torah to remain living law?

Primary texts:

Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, Chapter VI

Wittgenstein and Torah-Form: Why Mitzvos Are Not Behaviorism

Episode 7

Sunday, July 19, 2026 • Duration 01:17:45

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In this seminar, we continue the central method of the series: there is no neutral reading, no neutral psychology, no neutral wholeness, and no “just doing.” Every position comes with assumptions, and every position is also responding to another position.

The seminar begins with a lecturer who attacks the modern idea that כוונה means inner religious feeling, sincerity, or התלהבות. His alternative is to reintroduce telos: mitzvos are not empty external acts, but Torah-forms with objective goodness. This lets him explain מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה: even imperfect mitzvah-action trains the person because the act itself is already good.

The problem is that this explanation risks becoming a kind of religious behaviorism. Behaviorism is powerful because it sees that repeated behavior, reinforcement, and external practice really do form patterns. But behaviorism fails when it treats behavior as a neutral observable unit. Human action is not mere movement. Action is behavior under a description, from a source, inside a form of life.

Using the Chinuch, Pri HaAretz, Anscombe, and Wittgenstein, this seminar argues that proper שלא לשמה is not ego using Torah, and not mere external mitzvah-performance. Proper שלא לשמה is action from קבלת עול: I do not yet want the mitzvah לשמה, but I do it because Hashem wants it.

The key thesis:

The question is not only whether an act has Torah-form. The question is what source that Torah-form embodied.

This prepares the next seminar: if the lecturer’s whole argument depends on Torah-form, then we need to ask what kind of thing law is. Is legal form the same as natural form? Does Torah permission purify source? Does halakhic form automatically create kedushah? That will require a theory of law.

This seminar continues the project’s previous distinctions: no “just reading,” telos is not method, wholeness is not neutral, and the Chinuch is not behaviorism.

The Chinuch Is Not Behaviorism: How Action Forms the Heart

Episode 6

Sunday, July 19, 2026 • Duration 01:14:38

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How can the Chinuch say that a person is shaped by his actions — האדם נפעל כפי פעולותיו — if every action already comes from something inside the person?

In this seminar, we unpack the Chinuch’s famous principle and argue that it should not be read as simple behaviorism. The point is not that external behavior mechanically creates holiness. Rather, every action embodies an inner source, and repeated action strengthens the source from which it is performed.

This distinction changes how we understand שלא לשמה, קבלת עול, and the formation of the heart. If a person does not want to do a mitzvah but does it because Torah obligates him, the action strengthens קבלת עול. But if a person wants to do the mitzvah for kavod, control, self-image, or status, the same action may strengthen the ego instead.

We also clarify several key distinctions: middah as emotional event vs. middah as disposition, behavior vs. action, intention as mental caption vs. intention as governing reason, and why לשמה means more than simply saying “for Hashem” in one’s mind.

Along the way, we contrast the Chinuch with behaviorism, CBT, and psychoanalysis, and prepare the next step: Ramban’s idea of נבל ברשות התורה — how even a legally permitted act may still not be inwardly Torah-mediated.

Main themes: Sefer HaChinuch, האדם נפעל כפי פעולותיו, שלא לשמה, לשמה, קבלת עול, פרי הארץ, Tosafos, behaviorism, B. F. Skinner, CBT, psychoanalysis, middos, intention, action, avodas Hashem, and Torah psychology.

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