Scope Conditions Podcast – Details, episodes & analysis

Today on the podcast, why are more unequal neighborhoods sometimes better at promoting the collective good?

A world of high inequality is, in many ways, a world in which the fortunes of the rich are detached from the welfare of the poor. It’s a world in which the affluent are less reliant on public goods for securing their own safety and wellbeing. Those with money can purchase essential services – even things like security, sewage systems, or street lights – on private markets – rather than turning to the government. A highly unequal society is thus one in which the affluent may have little reason to support public infrastructure and services – or the high taxes required to finance them. It’s a society, in short, that’s going to have a hard time providing widespread public goods. The result can be a vicious circle – deteriorating living conditions among the poorest and growing comfort and prosperity among the better-off.

But our guest today argues that things don’t always have to work this way – that the consequences of inequality depend not only on who has what, but also on where. Dr. Alice Xu is an Assistant Professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s School of Social Policy and Practice and Department of Political Science. In her article published in the American Political Science Review – and a book project currently in progress – Alice argues that whether or not the affluent support the provision of public goods depends on patterns of residential segregation and integration. 

As Alice argues, when the middle and upper classes live in close proximity to the poor, their fortunes are more closely intertwined than they are in cities that are highly segregated by social class. In an integrated city, when the poor experience unsafe streets or disease-ridden sewage runoff, so too do their better-off neighbors. 

Alice talks to us about the in-depth, mixed method study she carried out in several cities in Brazil – one of the world’s most unequal countries. We dig into how class-integrated neighborhoods sometimes escape inequality’s vicious circle – as the middle and upper classes demand that the state invest more generously in urban infrastructure and services for everyone. This is work that doesn’t just shed new light on the political economy of inequality but also holds important lessons for the planning and governance of the world’s cities – in particular, showing just what is at stake in avoiding high levels of segregation by social class.

We hope you enjoy this conversation. To stay informed about future episodes, follow us on Bluesky @scopeconditions and check out our website, scopeconditionspodcast.com, where you can also find references to all the academic works we discuss. And if you like the show, please rate and review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.

Now, here’s our conversation with Alice Xu.

Works cited in this episode

Allport, Gordon Willard, Kenneth Clark, and Thomas F. Pettigrew. The nature of prejudice. Vol. 2. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954.

Boustan, Leah Platt. “Was postwar suburbanization ‘white flight’? Evidence from the black migration.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125, no. 1 (2010): 417–443.

Derenoncourt, Ellora. “Can you move to opportunity? Evidence from the Great Migration.” American Economic Review 112, no. 2 (2022): 369–408.

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. Coethnicity: Diversity and the dilemmas of collective action. Russell Sage Foundation, 2009.

McGhee, Heather. The sum of us: What racism costs everyone and how we can prosper together. One World, 2022.

Milanovic, Branko. Worlds apart: Measuring international and global inequality. Princeton University Press, 20

Political analysts are thinking a lot these days about the rule of law: where it comes from, what sustains it, how it can break down. Those are hard enough questions in themselves. And, yet — they simplify away an important complexity. They assume that there is only one law that rules. 

As our guest today, Dr. Egor Lazarev – assistant professor of political science at Yale – points out to us, in many parts of the world, the question is not just whether the law will rule – it’s also which of many legal orders will prevail. In his recent book State-Building as Lawfare: Custom, Sharia, and State Law in Postwar Chechnya, Egor studies a setting in which different legal systems have evolved over time and coexist side by side – with matters like marriage, divorce, and murder sometimes being adjudicated by state judges, sometimes by religious courts, and sometimes under customary rules.

Egor first gives us a helpful primer on the Chechnyan civil wars and their central role in the making of Putin’s Russia. We then talk with him about how customary law, Sharia law, and state law operate alongside each other in Chechnya and how those seeking the protection of the law decide which legal order to turn to. As Egor explains, Chechnya is far from unique in displaying what he calls “legal pluralism.” Scholars estimate, for instance, that over 60 countries formally recognize some form of customary or traditional law alongside state law.

For the most part, this is a conversation about two things. First, we might expect that government actors would do all they can to suppress competing legal systems and ensure the primacy of state law. Why, then, do we sometimes see state leaders doing exactly the opposite? Egor tells us about the strategic conditions under which government officials will choose to intentionally strengthen customary or religious law relative to state law – and why a strategy that looks like it would diminish the power of state actors can actually enhance their legitimacy and authority.

This is also a conversation about gender and the law. In his book, Egor argues that the core social divide at the center of legal pluralism is a gender cleavage. Many struggles over social control often revolve around the regulation of female sexuality, around marriage and divorce, property inheritance, and honor and shame – and the different legal orders handle these issues very differently. We talk with Egor about the gendered impacts of state, customary, and Sharia law and about why Chechen women – particularly in the wake of two brutal, socially disruptive civil wars – have been turning to the state judiciary far more than Chechen men.

We hope you enjoy this conversation. To stay informed about future episodes, follow us on Bluesky @scopeconditions and check out our website, scopeconditionspodcast.com, where you can also find references to all the academic works we discuss. And if you like the show, please rate and review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.

Now, here’s our conversation with Egor Lazarev.

Works cited in this episode

Desmond, M. (2012). Eviction and the reproduction of urban poverty. The American Journal of Sociology, 118(1), 88-133. 

Gibson, E. L. (2013). Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Pachirat, T. (2011). Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight. New Haven: Yale University Press. 

Wedeen, L. (2010). Reflections on ethnographic work in political science. Annual Review of Political Science, 13(1), 255-272. 

Today on Scope Conditions: what drives discrimination against immigrants – and what can be done about it?

When social scientists have sought to explain anti-immigrant bias, they’ve tended to focus on one of two possible causes: the perceived economic threat that migrants might pose to the native born or the cultural threat driven by differences in race, ethnicity, or religion.

In a new book with Mathias Poertner and Nicholas Sambanis, our guest Donghyun Danny Choi, an assistant professor of political science at Brown, uses an innovative set of field experiments to test an alternative possibility: that the native-born perceive migrants as a threat to longstanding civic norms.

Could anti-immigrant bias be shaped by fears – often unjustified – that newcomers don’t share the same ideas about the meaning and practice of citizenship? Can misperceptions about norm-divergence be corrected? And are there interventions that can actually lead native-born citizens to adopt more cooperative behaviors across ethnic and cultural divides?

In their book Native Bias, Danny and his coauthors try to get at these questions using a wonderfully creative set of experiments, carried out across Germany shortly after the arrival of over a million Syrian refugees. You’ll have to listen to find out how the experiments worked – but for now we’ll just say that they involved dropping thousands of lemons on train platforms. 

We talk with Danny about how the team came up with their experimental designs, how they carried them out, and what they found. One of their most interesting findings is that native German women tend to be more accepting of Muslim female migrants who signal that they hold progressive gender norms. But we also push Danny on the implications of the book’s findings. The treatments in the experiments involve immigrants demonstrably signaling their adherence to dominant German values. Even if this signaling works to dampen discrimination, we wondered how exactly this kind of intervention can be scaled up to the societal level. We also talk with Danny about who the book is saying bears the onus of reducing discrimination: is it up to immigrants to “fit in” better or up to natives to examine their own prejudices?

A little over two years ago, mass protests in the wake of the murder of George Floyd, an unarmed Black man in Minneapolis, focused public attention on the dramatically higher rates at which the police use force against Black and Latinx people. More broadly, the Black Lives Matter movement has put a spotlight on deep-seated systemic racism in the criminal justice system in the U.S. and beyond. Against this backdrop, many reform advocates have called for a fundamental reorientation of priorities and resources with calls to “defund the police”: to shift money away from armed law enforcement and toward unarmed first responders and investments in communities. 

The phrase “defund the police” has been a powerful rallying cry for millions of Americans seeking to reimagine the relationship between the state and communities of color. However, some critics, including leaders within the Democratic Party, have argued that calls to cut police budgets might undermine support for change by allowing opponents to equate police reform with leaving neighborhoods unpatrolled and unprotected. It’s possible that the slogan “defund the police,” while mobilizing core supporters, turns away other people who actually support the substance of reform.

Our guest today, Dr. Genevieve Bates, is interested in how the way we talk about racial justice in policing shapes public support for reform. Gen is an Assistant Professor of Political Science here with us at UBC, and has to date mostly worked in the fields of international relations and comparative politics, studying transitional justice mechanisms in the wake of civil war. But recently, Gen has teamed up with coauthor Geneva Cole – who studies racial politics in the US – to examine the effect of alternative framings of police reform on public attitudes. 

What they’ve been especially interested in are the ways in which efforts to root out systemic racism in policing look a lot like post-conflict, or post-authoritarian, transitional justice initiatives. This suggests an intriguing possibility: what if, instead of talking about criminal justice reform as defunding the police, advocates framed reform as part of a larger international movement to redress past state abuses and defend human rights? This is the question that Gen and Geneva tackle through a novel survey experiment that they recently carried out in the US.

In this episode, we talk with Gen about the broad criminal-justice reform landscape, about how she and Geneva drew the connection between transitional justice and police reform, how they designed their experimental treatments, and why it’s important to study not just generic support for reform but support for implementing concrete, real-world reforms in people’s own communities.

This episode puts the study of American politics into dialogue with the study of international relations and comparative politics in an unconventional way: by seeing what happens if we ask Americans, who often view their political system as exceptional, to place their own societal conflicts and challenges in a comparative perspective. We also talk with Gen about why and how the study of international relations itself ought to be grappling with issues of race.

Today on Scope Conditions, we’re talking about rising partisan animosity and what can be done about it.

When we think about partisan polarization, we’re often thinking about the United States – and about how the policy attitudes or ideological positions of Republicans and Democrats have moved further and further apart in recent decades. But partisan polarization is far from a uniquely American phenomenon. And it isn’t just about policy attitudes.

Increasingly, political scientists have been attending to the sociological and emotional features of partisan differentiation – to the ways partisanship can become a social identity, with party adherents developing warm feelings toward members of the same political camp – and deep hostility toward citizens on the opposing team. This is known as affective polarization. Moreover, recent studies have shown that affective polarization has been on the rise well beyond the U.S., in places like Switzerland, France, Denmark and – as we learn from our guest today – in Israel. 

Chagai Weiss is a PhD candidate at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, a predoctoral fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and co-founder of the Intergroup Relations Workshop. He’s interested in how institutions and interpersonal interactions can shape conflict between social groups. While much of his work has focused on tensions between Jews and Palestinians, we’re talking to Chagai today about the social divide between left and right voters – who often view each other with deep distrust and enmity. In an article just published in Comparative Political Studies, Chagai and coauthor Lotem Bassan-Nygate use a set of natural and survey experiments in Israel to understand the drivers of affective polarization and shed light on potential institutional solutions.

In particular, they’re interested in how elite behavior can exacerbate or mitigate social divisions within the electorate. Does the cut-and-thrust of electoral competition contribute to mutual dislike between the voters of opposing parties? And can elites’ decisions to cooperate across party lines encourage their supporters to better get along? These are the questions Chagai and Lotem are interested in, and they’re especially salient ones right now in Israel – which is currently being governed by an unlikely and unwieldy coalition of left, right, and center parties. But they’re also tricky questions to answer. After all, when we observe elite competition or cooperation, they may be as much consequences of intergroup relations as they are drivers of those relations. 

We talk with Chagai about how he and Lotem gained leverage on these causal relationships by exploiting naturally occurring features of Israeli politics – including how they spotted a research design opportunity in the messy, indeterminate outcome of the fall 2019 Knesset elections.

Chagai also talks to us about the limits to using surveys and survey experiments to learn about the effects of elite behavior and institutions. Because they couldn’t manipulate institutions themselves, Chagai and Lotem manipulate information about elite behavior within institutions. But then it’s not straightforward to map from this light-touch informational treatment to conclusions about the real-world effects of macro-level political arrangements. Ultimately, Chagai suggests that studying institutional effects requires a multi-pronged research program that combines carefully crafted experiments with cross-national comparisons. 

Can autocrats fight online dissent with offline repression?

In the world’s most authoritarian regimes, on-the-ground forms of protest or expressions of dissent are quickly quashed. So the online world – especially social media – has emerged as a critical venue for activists and reformers to express opposition and sustain their movements. 

Given its more diffuse and elusive nature, online activism presents dictators with a new challenge of social control. One possible response is to try to censor online dissent, though it takes a high level of technological sophistication and state capacity to shut down social media opposition completely. Another option is to use physical repression to deal with digital dissent: to throw anti-regime Twitter users in jail. So what happens when autocrats bring old coercive weapons to this new battleground?

This is the question we put to our guest, Dr. Alexandra Siegel, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Alex has been working for years on understanding how political conflict plays out in the online sphere, especially in non-democratic settings. The paper we discuss with Alex – an article, coauthored with Jennifer Pan, that appeared in the American Political Science Review – investigates what happens when the Saudi regime imprisons or tortures activists, religious leaders, and journalists for voicing critical views on social media. Does throwing online critics in jail actually silence them? Does it deter other activists? And how do their legions of online followers react? 

This is a fascinating conversation about the limits to authoritarian coercive capacities in the information age. But it’s also a conversation about the exciting new world of social media-based research. Alex’s work is an elegant example of how scholars can use social-media data not just to capture expression and mobilization in the increasingly vibrant digital public square, but also to tap into mass political cognition more broadly – for instance, using search engine data to track the public’s interest in political events. 

We also ask Alex to reflect on the perils that may lurk in this brave new world of text-as-data and social-media research. Does the sheer vastness of the available troves of data create new opportunities to fish for results – to dig up statistically significant patterns that aren’t actually substantively meaningful? Can we do anything to guard against this risk? And how should we think about the ethical implications of using publicly available data to study the targets of violent repression? How should scholars of online political behavior in autocracies strike a balance between principles of open science and the avoidance of harm to the activists they’re studying?

Today on Scope Conditions, we’re talking about the origins of supranational power.

The European Union has no army. It levies no taxes. Covering a population of 450 million, its administrative bureaucracy is on par with that of a moderate-sized city. And yet the EU’s treaties, directives, and regulations – 50,000 pages worth – are enforced daily across Europe, covering domains from labor relations to financial markets to immigration, consumer protection, and pharmaceuticals. 

What’s more, EU law trumps national law. Judges – national judges – strike down actions by their own governments when those actions contravene EU rules. 

So how did Europe get here? How did European law – which didn’t even exist 70 years ago – become supreme, in a very concrete sense, across 27 independent states?

As our guest argues, it wasn’t overzealous, activist judges who made European law supreme. In fact, in the early decades of European law, most judges knew little about it and preferred not to go near it, let alone overrule their own country’s policies in its name. Dr. Tommaso Pavone, an assistant professor of Law and Politics at the University of Arizona, tells us that the real architects of EU ascendancy were a ragtag band of entrepreneurial lawyers – lawyers who worked behind the scenes to coax reluctant judges into referring cases up to the European Court of Justice – even to the point of writing the judges’ referrals for them. 

We have a fantastic conversation with Tom about his forthcoming book, The Ghostwriters: Lawyers and the Politics behind the Judicial Construction of Europe. In the book, Tom tells the story of a scattered set of actors whom he calls the “Euro-lawyers”: a group of attorneys who had survived the calamity of World War II and believed in the liberal project of European integration. The Euro-lawyers saw that – by crafting the right test cases, educating judges in European law, and sometimes literally ghostwriting their referrals and judgments – they could set in motion a juridical logic that would turn ordinary national courts into street-level enforcers of EU law. 

This is a conversation about how on-the-ground actors – who have little formal authority of their own – can bring about massive macro-institutional change by identifying and exploiting ambiguities in the rules of the game. 

We also talk with Tom about how the argument of his book took shape. He tells us about the moment when the whole direction of the project shifted, from a study of the judges who signed the referrals to an examination of the lawyers who put them up to it. We talk about how he reconstructed the behind-the-scenes work of 12 teams of attorneys who, in the key period, solicited almost half of all referrals to the European Court of Justice. 

And we press Tom on what all of this Euro-lawyering means for democracy. How should we feel about the fact that the European project emerged, in part, from the stratagems of these unelected elites operating by stealth? And what about today’s Euro-lawyers? In an era of mounting Euroskepticism and rising populism, is there scope for them to leverage the European legal order to protect liberal institutions from the predations of would-be authoritarians?

In this episode of Scope Conditions, we ask: what happens when your favorite candidate isn’t even running?

We often think about the quality of democratic representation in terms of the outcomes that citizens get. For instance, we compare the policies a government enacts to what citizens say they want in surveys. Alternatively, we might compare the demographic characteristics of the candidates who make it into office with the demographic makeup of their constituents. 

Our guest today, Dr. Sergio Montero, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, argues that, if we want to understand representation, it’s helpful to take a step back from the outcomes voters get and to start thinking about the alternatives available to them. If many voters don’t get what they want out of politics, is that because their preferred candidates are losing elections – or because the candidates they’d like to see aren’t even running? After all, if the option you want isn’t even on the menu, there’s a good chance you won’t be happy with the outcome. 

We talk with Sergio about a new paper he has written with Matias Iaryczower and Galileu Kim that develops a novel approach to measuring representation failures in terms of what’s missing from the menu of options. Their approach involves comparing what voters want to the range of candidates available. A big part of the challenge here is figuring out what it is voters want in the first place. This isn’t just a problem of knowing which policies voters prefer, but also identifying what individual characteristics – like gender or level of education – they look for in a legislator. And, crucially, Sergio and his coauthors need a way of assessing how voters trade off between the two: how much voters care about policy positions compared to personal qualities.

We talk with Sergio about how he and his coauthors uncover voter preferences as well as how they place candidates in an ideological space. And we hear what they find when they use their approach to assess the quality of representation in Brazil. We also get into some interesting conceptual questions around what the normative representational standard ought to be: for instance, if it turns out that voters prefer male candidates with business backgrounds, should we call it a representation failure if the slate of options is more female and more working class? And should we call it a democratic deficiency if more extreme voters don’t see their ideal candidates on the ballot?

Today on Scope Conditions, we’re speaking with Dr. Dana El Kurd, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Richmond, about her recent book, Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine. In this book, Dana seeks to unravel a puzzle of Palestinian political development. With the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1994, Palestinians gained the prospect of democratic self-government, with the establishment of an elected Palestinian National Authority and a process intended to culminate in the creation of a Palestinian state. The Palestinian people entered Oslo with a highly mobilized and well-organized civil society — conditions that should, in theory, have set the stage for vibrant civic engagement and the development of responsive institutions.

What Dana observes, however, in the period after Oslo is just the opposite. Not only did Palestinian institutions evolve in an increasingly authoritarian direction, but Palestinian society ended up far less mobilized and much more polarized than it had been under direct Israeli rule. “How,” Dana asks in her new book, “did the [Palestinian Authority] demobilize society, when years of Israeli occupation had failed to do the same thing?” Her argument is that international interference distorted the process of political development, leading the PA to practice a form of “indigenous” autocracy that proved highly effective at dis-organizing and deactivating civil society.

We hear about how Dana brought together interviews with Palestinian officials, protest data, survey experiments and lab experiments to trace out the dynamics of demobilization. We also ask her to reflect on how her argument travels: Does international involvement generally serve to undercut democracy? Is political polarization always demobilizing? Lastly, Dana reflects on her experiences as a Palestinian researcher studying Palestine: both the access that her identity gives her in the field and the ways in which her work is challenged due to her identity.

Today’s episode is Part 2 of our conversation about metaketas with Dr. Tara Slough, an Assistant Professor of Politics at NYU, who co-led with Daniel Rubenson a metaketa on the governance of natural resources that was published this year in PNAS; and Dr. Graeme Blair, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at UCLA, who co-led a metaketa with Fotini Christia and Jeremy Weinstein testing the effects of community policing. The main paper from that project was just published last month in Science.

In Part 1, we learned what a metaketa is, how it’s typically organized, and what the benefits are of having coordinated teams experimentally test the same (or very similar) interventions across multiple contexts. We also talked about each of the two EGAP metaketas that Tara and Graeme co-led – the first on natural resource governance and the second on community policing. 

In today’s episode, we talk with Tara and Graeme about deeper conceptual issues, practical constraints, and equity considerations around metaketas. It’s fairly simple to interpret the results if we find the same effect across settings -- but what do we conclude if we see different treatment effects across the different sites? We also ask how far metaketas can get us toward generalizability: it’s one thing to compare results across 6 test sites, but can we extrapolate to other contexts outside of the metaketa?

And while metaketas are a powerful tool, we also learn from Tara and Graeme about their challenges and limitations. What was it like coordinating across six research teams, all with their own local constraints, timelines, and publication incentives? What are the equity concerns that come up when so many resources are allocated to a single question? And we talk about the professional considerations that scholars, particularly junior scholars, should keep in mind when signing up to participate in a metaketa.

As a reminder, we left off in Part 1 discussing how to pool estimates across study sites to get an average treatment effect. This is where we pick up the conversation. 

For references to all the academic works discussed in this episode, visit the episode webpage at https://www.scopeconditionspodcast.com/episodes/episode-24-randomizing-together-part-2-with-tara-slough-and-graeme-blair