Explore every episode of the podcast Safe As Podcast

“There’s nothing new since the 1980s there”In part 1 of my interview with Dr Steven Shorrock. He's worked for about 30 years as a psychologist and human factors engineer in aviation, air traffic management, rail, healthcare and chemical manufacturing. Steven questions how much of HOP and the “new view” really comes from human factors and ergonomics research. He argues that many principles popularises older ideas rather than adding truly new thinking. And while some of its claims have strong evidence behind them, others have little, and few seem to come with methods you can actually use.We unpack:a. Safety as a feeling and a belief & why people at the sharp and blunt ends experience it so differentlyb. How his views have developed over the years since the Safety-I/Safety-II white paper with Dr Erik Hollnagelc. Why the evidence is strong (e.g. how WAI differs from real work and why people have to adapt), and where evidence is thind. What's changed in aviation & healthcare over time, including team-based quality reviewse. How storytelling can make systems thinking accessible, rather than jargonf. Why investigations often stop at human errorSteve’s blog: humanisticsystems.comResources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

This ep unpacks the 1998 Esso Longford gas plant explosion in Victoria, drawing on the safety science and sociological research from Emeritus Professor Andrew Hopkins.

We move past proximal causes (like equipment failure) to unpack:

a) how organisations construct causes

b) manage chronic alarm fatigue

c) distort safety metrics

d) process critical operational feedback

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Are higher-energy hazard interactions more likely to seriously injure or kill people?In this ep, we unpack the empirical link between energy exposure and SIFs - where over 500 injury reports were analysed, and injury energy magnitude was estimated using leading information.Key concepts were energy magnitude - being the amount of energy present; and energy intensity - how concentrated that energy is over the contact area. E.g. a sharp object can create greater harm than a blunt object carrying the same energy.Study Reference:Hallowell, M. R., et al. "Energy-based safety risk assessment: does magnitude and intensity of energy predict injury severity?" Construction Management and Economics.

Can AI help us identify critical safety blind-spots before disaster?Part 2 interview with Professor Robin Dillon-Merrill (Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business), who unpacks her 20+ years of research on decision-making under risk, outcome bias, and how organizations misinterpret near misses.We discuss:a) why near-miss biases shape human decision-making & how we can build robust systems to counter them catch them b) why technical experts are uniquely positioned to simulate counterfactuals ('what could have happened, but didn't')c) how well-intended safety messaging becomes background noise without institutional actiond) how cutting-edge AI & machine learning can triage gigantic incident datasets before catastrophe.Plus, Robin discusses real-world safety challenges with autonomous vehicles, such as Waymo vehicles illegally passing school buses in Texas.Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Today we unpack a study tracking 1,422 procedural steps across 40 petrochemical operations. Using their Skip-Order-Action (SOA) Framework, they explored how frontline personnel navigate written instructions in practice: revealing that roughly 1/3 of steps depart from prescribed methods even when tasks are completed successfully. We explore how: a. the SOA framework functions b. how workers using paper instructions followed fewer steps as the task progressed (e.g. dropping from ~75% adherence to 55%)c. what these findings mean for safety professionals advancing a Safety-II / HOP approachReference: Ashraf, A. M., Peres, S. C., & Sasangohar, F. (2025). Beyond Compliance: Investigating Work-as-Done in Procedural Work with the Systematic Skip-Order-Action (SOA) Framework. Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

What happens when a high-authority automated system operate with an incorrect model of reality?This question is explored via Dekker & Woods’ (2024) article on automated systems that are Strong, Silent, and Wrong.We explore the breakdown of human-automation coordination, mode confusion, and automation surprises, using the Boeing 737 MAX MCAS accidents as a central example. Learn how complex system design must prioritize observability, redirectability, and graceful failure.Ref: Dekker, S. W., & Woods, D. D. (2024). Wrong, strong, and silent: What happens when automated systems with high autonomy and high authority misbehave? Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making, 18(4), 339–347.Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Can fatigue cause visual blindness in plant operators and drivers?In this video, I review a 2019 study from Li et al. (Automation in Construction) who used wearable eye-tracking tech to measure how prolonged excavator operation / time-on-task fatigue impacts hazard detection and visual attention.Namely, whether the operators notice workers walking behind the excavator over a shift.Key findings:a. Hazard miss rates increased over 40% after 60 mins. Overall detection rates dropped to 70% at 36 minutes and down to 60% by the 60-minute mark.b. Operators took significantly longer to recognize peripheral hazards as fatigue increased.c. Visual attention on the excavator side mirrors and rearview mirrors decreased over the task. Operators stopped scanning peripheral blind spots and focused almost exclusively on the central display directly in front of them.

Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Do we routinely mistake good luck with systemic resilience – until something blows up?

Today I speak with Professor Robin Dillon-Merrill (Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business), who breaks down her 20+ years of research on decision-making under risk, outcome bias, and how organizations misinterpret near misses.

We discuss:

• The differences between resilient vs vulnerable near misses: How the perceived ‘margin of safety’ desensitizes organizations to risk when luck is the primary reason failure was averted.

• Managing outcome bias: Why leaders who experience lucky successes are possibly judged as more competent and promotable than those who face bad luck, even when their underlying decision quality is identical.

• Counterfactual thinking: How processes used by NASA facilitate teams to evaluate alternative outcomes and decouple decision quality from outcomes.

• Gathering info: Why decision makers consistently stop searching for critical warning signs long before they have sufficient data.

• Why ‘speaking up’ campaigns fail: Safety reporting programs may be ineffective for recognising an issue since the issue isn’t recognised as danger in the first place.

Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Does a Human & Organizational Performance (HOP) initiative improve learning and the quality of actions? And what happens when the initiative stops?This quickisode unpacks Christopher Mastrangelo’s 2026 Master’s thesis examining a multi-year HOP implementation at a large biopharmaceutical company. His project tracked operational data from 2020 through July 2025 across key metrics: a. deviation initiation ratesb. root cause classification practicesc. CAPA types, andd. cultural persistence after formal support was removed. The HOP initiative seemingly resulted in:a. A drop in quality deviationsb. A shift away from findings of 'human error' towards organisational improvementsc. Fixing systems rather than retraining peopleAnd what happens when the HOP initiative and key stakeholders are dissolved? After the dedicated HOP team was dissolved in mid-2024, formal training scores dropped, and 'human factors' classifications (e.g. focusing on people rather than the system) crept back in. But, frontline work execution and proactive learning mindsets persisted. Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

In a 5-year petrochemical study examining over 1,400 work steps, 1/3 were performed differently from what was written in the procedure, but every task was completed successfully.Is this non-compliance or a display of worker aptitude and resilient skill?

In Part 2 of our series on procedures, we look beyond the "100% compliance" rhetoric and unpack the gap between work-as-imagined (WAI) and work-as-done (WAD).

We explore why workers adapt rules, how to categorise workarounds, and how to redesign safety procedures as resources for action rather than as tools for worker control.

We cover:

a. why procedures assume work is linear, predictable and controllable - and why real-world conditions constantly force adaptation

b. The RES framework which explores three drivers of procedural adaptation: Routine, Efficiency, and Safety

c. The difference between viewing procedures as top-down mandates (Model 1) vs localised, situated tools (Model 2)

d. The limits of compliance checks, and how 'pencil whipping' procedures fails to assure adequate rule following, and why procedure quality and safety climate may matter more

e. How airline pilots handle complex emergencies by drawing on fragments from checklists and SOPs rather than following linear scripts

f. The challenges of over-specification vs under-specification, and why cramming in more details forces workers into a 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' trap

g. Using Scenario-Based Training (SBT) & Gary Klein’s ShadowBox approaches, and HPOG’s Walk-Through Talk-Through to build expertise & redesign work systems

Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Do traditional approaches unintentionally blame front-line workers instead of fixing broken organisational systems?This Quickisode unpacks how an international energy company redesigned its Just Culture (JC) framework to shift focus from individual culpability to systemic weaknesses.This company found that traditional approaches relied on judgement terminology, like violation or negligence, and frequently misapplied as disciplinary tools.Their redesigned JC tried to address these limitations, including:a. decoupling the analysis from disciplineb. separating the evaluation of system conditions from HR disciplinary actionsc. neutral language by removing terms like violationd. evaluating supervisory influence and management decisions alongside worker actionsBased on this case study, they found that 90% of non-conformances stemmed from underlying system weaknesses, like from unclear procedures, resource constraints, or task complexity.The revised tool led to 55% of corrective actions being tied to system improvements, whereas disciplinary action occurred in only 5% of cases.Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Part 2 discussion with Dr Linda Bellamy on SIFs, fatal accidents, and barrier failures.

Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Do your investigations often conclude when you've identified 'human error', or a pesky person not following rules?Do you want to improve the quality and depth of your learning opportunities?One way is via local rationality: understanding why decisions & actions made sense to people at the time. It's a core feature in human factors / safety-II / and Human and Organizational Performance (HOP).This episode unpacks Louise Roe's Local Rationality Question Tool in her article presented at the Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors (CIEHF) 2025 conference.The tool covers things like: - workload, time pressure & environmental cues; goals, assumptions & information available- training, policies & useable job aids- team dynamics & information flow- Expectations & imagined outcomes/'what ifs'Ref: Roe, L. (2025). Local rationality question tool: understanding why it made sense at the time. In Golightly, D., Balfe, N., & Charles, R. (Eds.), Contemporary Ergonomics and Human Factors 2025: Proceedings of the Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors Annual Conference (pp. 360-362). CIEHF. Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Why are so many procedures technically accurate, but barely workable in practice?In Part 1 of this two part series on procedural systems, we unpack the technical side of writing better, more useable procedures: exploring how to reduce safety clutter, choosing the right type of rule, and structure instructions so they support work.We unpack:• Types of rules: performance goal vs. process vs. action rules & how they limit or enable discretion• Formatting: Action-verb steps, concrete language & single-action steps• Critical steps: Highlighting actions where mistakes cause immediate or unrecoverable harm• Warnings & alerts: What guidelines and research suggests about effective warning placementAnd more.In Part 2, we go beyond technical writing and structure to unpack procedures from a Resilience Engineering and Safety-II perspective – procedures as resources for action.Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

This quickisode races through a Safety-II / HOP inspired debrief tool which can help unearth 'hidden' insights about work that doesn't rely on incidents for learning.Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Is there a relationship between fatal and minor hazard exposures? Recent SIF research & movements suggest 'NO' - what kills people aren't the same as what hurts them.

But is that scientifically accurate?

Part 1 discussion with Dr Linda Bellamy, who undertook perhaps the largest study of this kind exploring the connection - and, there ** is ** a connection.

We discuss barrier/control systems & how they fail and succeed, weak signals, indicators and more.

Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

A bowtie or critical control register may be useful tools, but they aren't the work.In Part 4 of this series, I unpack what control / barrier models can leave out: e.g. changing conditions, competing goals, control dependencies, unintended consequences and the adaptations people make to keep work functioning.I also explore how controls can change the systems they are introduced into, why more barriers don't always mean greater risk control, and why successful work may conceal degraded controls and poor design.We should specify, support and verify barriers but also ask: "What do the people using the control know that the bowtie doesn’t show?"Part 1: https://youtu.be/qQfORHGC4BsPart 2: https://youtu.be/7sPqw5NAyiEPart 3: https://youtu.be/Ly1mEn_KCLQResources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Today I interview Dr Marcin Nazaruk, who shares his practical experience and research on learning from normal work / daily work, HOP / New View / Safety-II, to improve learning and risk management.The discussion also explores themes around risk controls, work constraints, risk assessments, and error traps.Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

How do we set realistic and effective human performance expectations in our barrier approaches?In part 1 we looked at definitions of controls and barriers, whereas in part 2 we explored a deeper dive into their applications and escalation factors.This episode unpacks a few key sources to explore critical human factors and human performance considerations for barrier / control systems.Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSubscribe to the series for Part 4.Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Today I interview Dr Marcin Nazaruk, who shares his practical experience and research on learning from normal work / daily work, HOP / New View / Safety-II, to improve learning and risk management.The discussion also explores themes around risk controls, work constraints, risk assessments, and error traps.Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

How do we translate a paper barrier system into one that's functional and verified as effective?Whereas part 1 looked at key definitions of control, barrier, safeguard, support, and verification activity - this episode dives deeper into the use of such frameworks.In particular, we unpack escalation / degradation / erosion factors, and the necessary support mechanisms to ensure controls work as intended, when intended.Key sources analysed in this episode:International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) – Critical Control Management FrameworkThe Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors (CIEHF) – Human Factors in Barrier ManagementConstruction Safety Research Alliance (CSRA) & Professor Matthew HallowellPetroleum Safety Authority (PSA) NorwayResources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSubscribe to the series for Parts 3, and 4.Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Part 2 of our interview with Dr. Guido Carim Junior, Associate Professor of Aviation, pilot, researcher, and safety scientist. We pick up the conversation with digital checklists, examining the potential role of AI and how "smart" features risk narrowing human decision-making rather than supporting it.Guido shares critical thoughts on the line between genuine organizational resilience and workarounds that mask underlying brittleness. We discuss the "tragedy of adaptability" and potential blind spots within Safety-II and HOP when organizations over-rely on human adaptation instead of fixing flawed systems.We also cover how to surface informal practices for learning without turning them into rigid, bureaucratic rules, and why safety audits need to look past green-checking compliance documents to tune into weak signals and daily operational reality.Please Like, Subscribe and Share. Also check out my blog at https://SafetyInsights.OrgSupport the channel here: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Is that a control, barrier, safeguard, support, or verification activity? Is it an object, a human act, a system or just a procedure? Does it actually address the hazardous energy, or does it sound good on paper?If we label every single checklist and administrative task a "critical control," do we risk diluting the operational focus required to prevent high-consequence events? If everything is critical, nothing is.Part 1 of this 4-part series unpacks how these terms are used (and misused) across the industry, evaluating the baseline definitions that dictate how we manage risk.Key sources analysed in this episode:International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) – Critical Control Management FrameworkThe Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors (CIEHF) – Human Factors in Barrier ManagementConstruction Safety Research Alliance (CSRA) & Professor Matthew HallowellPetroleum Safety Authority (PSA) NorwayResources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSubscribe to the series for Parts 2, 3, and 4.Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Interview with Guido part 1

When you're standing on the front line making an operational call, risk doesn't come with a green or red light. You have to make a binary decision: stop or go.We don't necessarily make it easy for our decision-makers to make good, defendable decisions.This video unpacks Andrew Hopkins’ 2011 Safety Science article, "Risk Management & Rule Compliance: Decision-making in hazardous industries". Hopkins argues that choosing between risk management and rule compliance is a false choice - they're complementary, not contradictory.Because risk sits on a continuum but decisions require a definitive line in the sand, high-hazard industries must translate broad risk management principles into clear operational rules for the sharp end.What is covered:a. Why risk management and rule compliance must co-exist and complement each other.b. Why frontline workers need clear "do it or don't" thresholds rather than numerical risk criteria.c. Goal, Process, and Action Rulesd. Why risk assessments can be more 'legitimation rituals'Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

On April 15, 2010, BP CEO Tony Hayward reassured shareholders that the company was safer and more efficient than ever. Five days later, the Deepwater Horizon disaster happened. This video unpacks a study that evaluated CEO speeches and how rhetoric and slogans can be disconnected with actual behaviour and resourcing.It explores how relentless cost-cutting and corporate rhetoric set the stage for catastrophe.Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

In 1994, two US Air force F15 fighters shot down two friendly US Army Black Hawk helicopters.This event shouldn't have been possible: there were experts, radio communications, radar, AWACS and more.However, this isn't a tragedy due to human error or a lack of safeguards, it happened in spite of the safeguards.This episode unpacks a few findings from the seminal book from Scott Snook called 'Friendly Fire'. We’ll explore how "Practical Drift" - the slow, invisible uncoupling of local practice from centralised procedure, turned a routine mission into a catastrophe. This book is a masterclass in what can happen when our Work-as-Imagined has little to do with the reality of Work-as-Done on the frontline.Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

Can our safety reporting and indicators mask signals that organizations are drifting to major accident?This episode unpacks two reports from O'Neill and colleagues looking at the pitfalls of safety reporting measures, and also explores weaknesses in annual safety reports - particularly how reports may be 'safewashing'.

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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This ep unpacks two articles from Andrew Hopkins, exploring the similarities between the Gretley and Moura mine disasters.Namely, Hopkins argues that a 'culture of denial' existed at both mines, and probably exists across large, high-risk organisations, too. This culture of denial involved a series of beliefs that dismissed warning signs of danger.

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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Our mental shortcuts (heuristics) serve us well. They help us navigate a complex, ambiguous world normally safely and efficiently.

But in modern organisations, they can sometimes lead us astray - via biases.

In this context biases are systematic distortions away from an expected decision or judgement.

This article, with Daniel Kahneman and colleagues, unpack some ways to help debias critical decisions.

In their words: "Dangerous biases can creep into every strategic choice. Here's how to find them--before they lead you astray".

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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Is 'Safety Culture' a nebulous construct, or even a myth, that obscures more than it reveals?

Or is its persistence because it provides a useful vehicle for explaining phenomena in organisations and groups?

This episode unpacks several articles (at least 10), from authors like Borys, Guldenmund, Schein, Silbey, Hopkins, Cooper and more, to unpack safety culture from both an interpretative and functionalist perspective.

The episode covers common critiques from the research, proposed links with areas of performance, and some lingering ambiguity.

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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Leadership walkarounds seem simple on paper: get a leader to walk around, talk with some people, and then bounce out with a gleeful smile, and warm hearts.But is it that simple? Do walkarounds improve any measures of teams or organisations? Do they improve safety climate, engagement, or even safety incidents?Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinsonToday's episode explores these questions with these sources:1. Foster, M., Mha, B. S., & Mazur, L. (2023). Impact of leadership walkarounds on operational, cultural and clinical outcomes: a systematic review. BMJ Open Quality, 12(4), e002284.2. Thomas EJ, Sexton JB, Neilands TB, et al. Correction: the effect of executive walk rounds on nurse safety climate attitudes: A randomized trial of clinical units [Isrctn85147255]. BMC Health Serv Res 2005; 5.3. Shaw KN, Lavelle J, Crescenzo K, et al. Creating unit-based patient safety walk-rounds in a pediatric emergency Department. Clinical Pediatric Emergency Medicine 2006; 7:231–7.4. Purvis S, Kennedy GD, Knobloch MJ, et al. Incorporation of leadership rounds in CAUTI prevention efforts. J Nurs Care Qual 2017; 32:318–23.5. Luria, G., & Morag, I. (2012). Safety management by walking around (SMBWA): A safety intervention program based on both peer and manager participation. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 45, 248-257.6. Rotteau, L., Shojania, K. G., & Webster, F. (2014). ‘I think we should just listen and get out’: a qualitative exploration of views and experiences of Patient Safety Walkrounds. BMJ quality & safety, 23(10), 823-829.7. Singer SJ, Tucker AL. The evolving literature on safety Walkrounds: emerging themes and practical messages. BMJ Qual Saf 2014; 23:789–800.

Does using AI make us smarter, or just more confident?This ep covers a recent study on how generative AI affects our "metacognition" - our ability to judge our own performance. Researchers tracked hundreds of people solving logical reasoning problems with and without AI.They found: a) AI improved scores, but people overestimated their results even more, b) people who knew more about AI were less accurate judging their own work, c) the Dunning-Kruger effect disappeared, where everybody becomes equally overconfidentRef: “AI Makes You Smarter, But None the Wiser: The Disconnect between Performance and Metacognition” (Fernandes et al., 2026).

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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There are a lot of safety practices in industry. How do we know which are the most effective interventions to use?This systematic review of the evidence assesses the best evidence to answer this question.

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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When I say BBS - what is your initial impression? A big smile and thumbs up, or visible disgust?It certainly divides people. But is that division deserved? What does the evidence say are both the pros and cons of BBS approaches?And, how can we move forward with this debate and incorporate the best of both? Or, should we?This episode references 7 articles to provide an overview and balanced discussion of BBS in contemporary organisations.

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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This episode unpacks the Dreamworld Thunder Rapid ride disaster, using the Ten Pathways to Failure model.

Ref: Gregson, S., & Quinlan, M. G. (2024). Death at Dreamworld: Ten pathways to disaster and failure to learn. The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 35(2), 436-453.

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More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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How can you develop better indicators targeting the effectiveness of your risk control system?This episode draws on a few sources, including the HSE UK's HSG254 and the ICMM's critical control framework, among others, outlining an approach to safety indicators that targets measuring the most important elements of your risk control systems.

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More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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Re-recording of an older episode for YouTube

Does counting change what counts? If we create indicators on actions that we'd like to monitor, like injuries, profits, tendering, productivity, do we inadvertently focus on managing the numbers instead of the core issues?Source: Chang, L. W., Kirgios, E. L., Mullainathan, S., & Milkman, K. L. (2024). Does counting change what counts? Quantification fixation biases decision-making. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121(46), e2400215121.Support the channel at: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinsonMore research at SafetyInsights.OrgOutro music "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)

Seven hours before the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded, four senior executives were on-site congratulating the crew for achieving seven years without a lost-time injury. It wasn’t that these leaders ignored risk; it’s that they were systematically blinded to it by a focus on the 'wrong' metrics. In this episode, we break down Andrew Hopkins’ analysis of that final visit to explore the important distinction between personal safety and process safety. We look at why injury measures may be next to useless in preventing major disasters. This isn't a story about incompetent people or 'bad apples', but how well-intentioned leadership behaviours can quietly reinforce organizational risk blindness.Source: Hopkins, A. (2011). Management walk-arounds: Lessons from the Gulf of Mexico oil well blowout. Safety Science, 49(10), 1421-1425.Support the channel at: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinsonMore research at SafetyInsights.OrgOutro music "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)

Leadership captures the headlines and conference topics worldwide, but what is the role of followers in team and organisational performance?

How can one lead, without those that follow?

Refs:

1. Leung, C., Lucas, A., Brindley, P., Anderson, S., Park, J., Vergis, A., & Gillman, L. M. (2018). Followership: a review of the literature in healthcare and beyond. Journal of critical care, 46, 99-104.

2. Hay-David, A. G. C., Herron, J. B. T., Gilling, P., & Brennan, P. A. (2022). Assertive followership: how to make a team safer. British Journal of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, 60(5), 558-562.

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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How well do Learning Teams compare to RCAs for the number and quality of findings? This study compares the two.

Note: Update and reupload of a previous episode, now in video format.

Ref: Robbins, T., Tipper, S., King, J., Ramachandran, S. K., Pandit, J. J., & Pandit, M. (2021). Evaluation of learning teams versus root cause analysis for incident investigation in a large United Kingdom National Health Service Hospital. Journal of Patient Safety, 17(8), e1800-e1805.

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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What are the precursor factors that kill people at work? And are our investigations effectively fixing these factors?

Ref: Stockel, L. R. (2023). What Causes Accidents at Work? Workplace Serious Incident & Fatality Investigations: A Study of Precursors.

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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You saw the sign, and read the words. So, apparently you understand the risk, or do you?Source: Hancock, P. A., Kaplan, A. D., MacArthur, K. R., & Szalma, J. L. (2020). How effective are warnings? A meta-analysis. Safety Science, 130, 104876.Support the channel at: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinsonMore research at SafetyInsights.OrgOutro music "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)

How can we design better - as in safer, healthier, more productive shift work systems and rosters? Let's find out.

Sources:

QGN 16. Guidance Note for Fatigue Risk Management. Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy

Knauth, P. (1996). Designing better shift systems. Applied ergonomics, 27(1), 39-44.

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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Are AI models BS'ing you? Do they have such an indifference--a lack of understanding even--about the truth, that their outputs constitute BS?

Note: This is an update and recording of #33, where I rerecord interesting topics for my YouTube channel.

Source: Hicks, M. T., Humphries, J., & Slater, J. (2024). ChatGPT is bullshit. Ethics and Information Technology, 26(2), 1-10.

Support the channel at: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

Outro music "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)

Safety indicators, metrics, measures, KPIs...whatever.

Are these indicators used primarily for genuine learning and improvement - or more often misinterpreted and misused?Ref: Oswald, D., Zhang, R. P., Lingard, H., Pirzadeh, P., & Le, T. (2018). The use and abuse of safety indicators in construction. Engineering, construction and architectural management, 25(9), 1188-1209.Support the channel at: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinsonMore research at SafetyInsights.OrgOutro music "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)

This paper explores how complex systems not only fail, but succeed, and provides 9 ways that we can move beyond simplistic notions of system failure due to 'human error'.

Ref: Woods, D. D., & Cook, R. I. (2002). Nine steps to move forward from error. Cognition, technology & work, 4(2), 137-144.

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

Intro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)

Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on Spotify/Apple, and if you find it useful then please help share the news, and leave a rating and review on your podcast app.

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'Safety Culture' is treated by some as the holy grail of organisational safety concepts: valourised and promoted uncritically.

But should we, or even can we, analyse 'safety culture' in investigations?

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

Intro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)

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What do we mean when we say 'human error'? Do you mean as a cause, event, or harm?

And does error language more broadly mask more underpinning human variability, and increase the risk of blame?

Sources:

1. Hollnagel, E. (2007). Human error: Trick or treat. Handbook of applied cognition, 219-238.

2. Read, G. J., Shorrock, S., Walker, G. H., & Salmon, P. M. (2021). State of science: evolving perspectives on ‘human error’. Ergonomics, 64(9), 1091-1114.

More research at SafetyInsights.Org

Intro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)

Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on Spotify/Apple, and if you find it useful then please help share the news, and leave a rating and review on your podcast app.

I also have a Safe As LinkedIn group if you want to stay up to date on releases.