Explore every episode of the podcast Oral Arguments, with Context

The First Circuit hears a Haitian man's challenge to being sent to Mexico. An immigration judge had already granted him withholding of removal to Haiti, protecting him from deportation to that country. But in July 2025, the Department of Homeland Security told him it intended to remove him to Mexico instead. He says he was kidnapped and threatened with death in Mexico while traveling to the United States. He asked to reopen his immigration case and sought review in the First Circuit. Withholding is country-specific: protection against return to Haiti does not automatically prevent removal somewhere else. A motion to reopen asks the immigration agency to reconsider a completed case in light of new facts. You will hear ultra vires, meaning action beyond an official's lawful authority. Statutory withholding requires a connection between threatened persecution and a protected ground, such as race or nationality. Protection under the Convention Against Torture has a different focus: whether torture is more likely than not. Ralph Bronson Fils-Aime v. Todd Blanche (No. 25-1733) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording. The original cuts off during the judge's final administrative closing remark after all advocacy has ended; the gap is preserved and no speech reconstructed: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1733_20261103.mp3 Argument date — official First Circuit recording listing: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 Consolidated case/date — official First Circuit November calendar: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/calendar.pdf?TB_iframe=true Case background — filed D.N.H. habeas petition, August 3, 2025; public mirrored copy, allegations not findings: https://habeasdockets.org/media/documents/71006849/001_11703306062-48d4a290fdfe.pdf Country-specific statutory withholding — 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1231 Reopening proceedings — 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1229a Withholding, torture protection and third-country removal — 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/8/1208.16 Legal vocabulary — Cornell Wex definition of ultra vires: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ultra_vires

The Eleventh Circuit hears Solomon versus Isaac Btesh. The brothers are disputing their interests in a family bank in Panama and the proceeds of its sale. A family agreement referred disputes to procedures used by a Jewish congregation there. Solomon began arbitration in Panama, then pursued proceedings in Miami. A Miami rabbinical panel issued an award against Isaac, who did not participate in that arbitration. Solomon asked a Florida federal court to confirm the award, meaning turn it into an enforceable court judgment. The judge dismissed the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction: the court's power over Isaac. That differs from the arbitrators' authority under the family agreement. One route discussed here is Rule 4(k)(2), a federal rule for federal claims when no state's courts can exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. It looks beyond a single state, but exercising jurisdiction must still be constitutional. Another route, quasi in rem jurisdiction, concerns specified property, with recovery limited to that property rather than a general personal judgment. The judges also discuss dicta: observations in an earlier opinion that were not necessary to decide that case. Listen for the distinction between agreeing to arbitrate, choosing a particular tribunal, and giving an American court authority to enforce an award. Solomon Btesh v. Isaac Btesh (No. 25-11265) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Eleventh Circuit recording: https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/oral_argument_recordings/25-11265_11032026.mp3 Argument date — official Eleventh Circuit recordings listing: https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings?page=0 Argument calendar — official Eleventh Circuit panel release: https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/oral_arguments/cal2%28Rev.2panelrelease%29.pdf Case background and prior dismissal — district-court order, public copy hosted by A&O Shearman: https://us-arbitration.aoshearman.com/siteFiles/50610/2025.03.21%20Btesh%20v.%20Btesh%2C%20No.%2023-CV-23679-JB%20%28S.D.%20Fla.%20Mar.%2021%2C%202025%29.pdf Federal jurisdictional route — Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2): https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_4 Confirmation provision discussed — 9 U.S.C. § 9: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/9/9 Property-based jurisdiction — Supreme Court opinion in Shaffer: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/433/186 Legal vocabulary — Cornell Wex definition of dicta: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dicta

The First Circuit hears United States versus Jorge Mercado. After serving time for an armed robbery, Mercado was on supervised release, a period of court-ordered supervision after prison. During that supervision, he possessed a machine gun and ammunition. That conduct led to a new criminal sentence and a separate prison term for violating his release conditions. In an earlier appeal, the First Circuit left the machine-gun sentence in place but vacated the revocation sentence because the judge had not adequately explained why it exceeded the advisory sentencing range. This appeal returns to those limits on revocation sentencing. An upward variance means a sentence above that advisory range, not necessarily above the statutory maximum. Another distinction runs through the argument: retribution means punishment because past wrongdoing deserves it; deterrence aims to prevent future crime. The Supreme Court has held that judges may not rely on retribution for the original offense when revoking supervised release. That ruling left open whether retribution for violating supervision is permissible. Listen for how the judges distinguish punishment for past conduct from deterrence and protecting the public, and what explanation an above-guidelines sentence requires. United States v. Mercado-Cañizares (No. 25-1867) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1867_20261103.mp3 Argument date — official First Circuit recordings listing: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 Argument calendar — official First Circuit calendar: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/calendar.pdf?TB_iframe=true Case background and earlier remand — First Circuit opinion, April 2, 2025: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/21-1903P-01A.pdf Revocation and retribution — Supreme Court opinion in Esteras: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-7483_6k4c.pdf Supervised release — 18 U.S.C. § 3583: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partII-chap227-subchapD-sec3583.htm Sentencing factors — 18 U.S.C. § 3553: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title18/html/USCODE-2024-title18-partII-chap227-subchapA-sec3553.htm

The Eleventh Circuit hears Joy Laskar versus Phillip Hurd and Patrick Jenkins. Laskar was a Georgia Tech professor who also ran a wireless-technology startup. University auditors investigated whether the company had improperly used university money, microchips, facilities and staff. Their report was referred to state law enforcement, and a criminal investigation and arrest followed. Laskar denies wrongdoing, saying the company was permitted to use university resources through its research-center relationship. The criminal case was dismissed as time-barred: it was brought too late, not resolved by a jury verdict. Laskar then sued university officials for damages, alleging malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. That civil claim concerns an allegedly unlawful deprivation of liberty through criminal legal process. An earlier appeal allowed his claims against Hurd and Jenkins to proceed at the pleading stage, accepting his allegations as true rather than deciding whether they were proved. The dispute now centers on causation: whether these auditors can be held responsible for the allegedly unlawful arrest. The auditors also invoke qualified immunity, which protects officials from damages unless they violate clearly established federal law. Listen for the difference between criticizing an audit and proving that these particular defendants caused a constitutional violation. Joy Laskar v. Hurd et al. (No. 25-11296) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Eleventh Circuit recording: https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/oral_argument_recordings/25-11296_11022026.mp3 Recording listing — official Eleventh Circuit index: https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings?page=0 Argument date — official November 3, 2026 calendar: https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/oral_arguments/cal1%28panelrelease%29.pdf Earlier civil appeal — Eleventh Circuit opinion, August 28, 2020: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201911719.pdf Criminal case background — filed dismissal order, October 5, 2016 (party-hosted court copy): https://joylaskarstory.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Laskar.-Order-for-dismissal.pdf Party account — Laskar's chronology, not court findings: https://joylaskarstory.com/chronology/ Civil-rights claims — 42 U.S.C. § 1983: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1983 Constitutional protection — Fourth Amendment: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fourth_amendment Qualified immunity — Supreme Court opinion in District of Columbia v. Wesby: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-1485

The Federal Circuit hears Robocast versus Netflix. Robocast sued Netflix over patents for automatically presenting online content. Instead of a user repeatedly opening separate pages, the patents describe software that arranges content and presents it in sequence. A Delaware federal judge granted Netflix summary judgment, ruling before trial that the asserted patent claims were ineligible for protection. The court treated them as abstract content organization and display carried out on conventional computers. Robocast challenges that characterization. It says its software structure improves how the computer operates, not merely the user's experience. This appeal concerns patent eligibility, rather than whether Netflix infringed. Patent claims define what an invention's legal protection covers. Under the Supreme Court's Alice framework, the court first asks whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea. If so, it asks whether their features, individually and together, add an inventive concept that transforms the idea into a patent-eligible application. Generic computer implementation is not enough. Listen for whether these claims describe a specific technological means or only a desired result. Robocast v. Netflix (No. 25-1651) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1651_11032026.mp3 Argument date — official Federal Circuit listing: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/ Case background and prior ruling — district-court order, February 21, 2025: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ded-1_22-cv-00305/pdf/USCOURTS-ded-1_22-cv-00305-2.pdf Patent eligibility — Supreme Court opinion in Alice: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-298 Patent subject matter — 35 U.S.C. § 101: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title35/html/USCODE-2024-title35-partII-chap10-sec101.htm Patent claims — 35 U.S.C. § 112(b): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title35/html/USCODE-2024-title35-partII-chap11-sec112.htm Summary judgment — Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_56

The First Circuit hears Hospital Menonita Ponce versus the National Labor Relations Board. After a hospital-asset purchase in Puerto Rico in 2022, Menonita Ponce faced a dispute over its employees' union representation. The union had represented seven groups under the previous operator. Menonita Ponce recognized the union for two groups, then withdrew recognition, saying the union lacked employee support. The union filed charges alleging unlawful refusals to recognize or bargain and retaliation in hiring; the hospital denies violating labor law. It also filed a separate constitutional lawsuit. It challenges rules limiting the President's power to remove Board members and administrative law judges, the agency's hearing officers. The hospital sought a preliminary injunction, a temporary order stopping the agency proceeding. The district court refused, invoking the Norris-LaGuardia Act's restriction on labor-related injunctions and, alternatively, the hospital's failure to meet the ordinary injunction requirements. The statute reaches cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute. The hospital invokes Axon, a Supreme Court decision allowing certain structural constitutional claims to go directly to federal district court. The Board responds that permission to litigate a claim does not itself confer a right to stop the agency. Listen for that distinction between hearing a constitutional challenge and granting the requested remedy. Hospital Menonita Ponce v. National Labor Relations Board (No. 26-1589) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/26-1589_20261103.mp3 Argument date — official November 2026 index: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 Case background and prior ruling — district-court order, May 6, 2026: https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458427baf6 Labor allegations — General Counsel's post-hearing brief (not findings): https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45843b9f06 Hospital's account and denials — employer's post-hearing brief: https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45843b96a3 Labor-injunction restriction — Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title29/html/USCODE-2024-title29-chap6-sec101.htm Labor-dispute definitions — 29 U.S.C. § 113: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29/113 Constitutional-claim jurisdiction — Supreme Court opinion in Axon: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/21-86 Legal terms — U.S. Courts glossary: https://www.uscourts.gov/glossary Amicus participation — Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frap/rule_29

The Federal Circuit hears Fraud Free Transactions versus Ping Identity. Fraud Free sued Ping for allegedly infringing two patents on checking online users' identities. One adjusts verification requirements to the risk associated with an access request. The other uses an app on a registered phone to approve or deny access from another device. This is out-of-band verification: using a separate channel to confirm the request. The patent owner says its phone-app method improves security over verification by text message or phone call. A Delaware federal judge dismissed the asserted patent claims before trial, finding them ineligible for patent protection. The appeal concerns that threshold, not whether Ping infringed. Patent claims define the invention for which protection is sought. The question is whether these claims cover a specific technological solution or an abstract way of verifying identity. Under the Supreme Court's Alice framework, the court first asks whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea. If so, it asks whether their additional features, considered individually and together, supply an inventive concept beyond that idea. Merely using generic computers is not enough. Listen for the distinction between a useful security result and the claimed means of achieving it. Fraud Free Transactions v. Ping Identity (No. 25-1830) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1830_11032026.mp3 Argument date — official November 2026 calendar: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/OralArguments/PublicCalendar-November2026.pdf Case background and prior ruling — district-court order, April 29, 2025: https://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/ded/files/opinions/24-1218.pdf Patent eligibility — Supreme Court opinion in Alice v. CLS Bank: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-298 Patent subject matter — 35 U.S.C. § 101: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title35/html/USCODE-2024-title35-partII-chap10-sec101.htm Patent claims — 35 U.S.C. § 112(b): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title35/html/USCODE-2024-title35-partII-chap11-sec112.htm

The First Circuit hears Audrey McCarthy versus the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families. McCarthy worked as an administrative manager for the department. In 2021, she asked for a medical exemption from the employee COVID vaccination requirement, citing a heart condition. The department's letter acknowledged a medical contraindication, a reason a treatment may be unsuitable, but denied the exemption, citing workplace safety and operational concerns. She brought a disability-discrimination case under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The district judge ruled for the department without a trial. The court found that the evidence did not establish a workable accommodation or adequately connect the requested exemption to her asserted disability. McCarthy contends that her own medical record and job duties called for an individual assessment. A qualified individual is someone able to perform a job's essential duties with or without a reasonable accommodation: a workplace adjustment that helps a person with a disability do the job. The argument also concerns direct threat: a significant safety risk that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce. Listen for the difference between a policy's general justification and the evidence about this employee, this job, and the requested exception. McCarthy v. Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (No. 25-1508) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1508_20261103.mp3 Argument date — official November 2026 calendar: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/calendar.pdf?TB_iframe=true Case background and prior ruling — district-court order, April 23, 2025: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-mad-1_23-cv-11258/pdf/USCOURTS-mad-1_23-cv-11258-0.pdf Disability employment definitions — 42 U.S.C. § 12111: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title42/html/USCODE-2024-title42-chap126-subchapI-sec12111.htm Accommodation and direct-threat definitions — 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/29/1630.2 Decision without trial — Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_56 Medical term — contraindication (general definition, not a patient assessment): https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/002314.htm

The First Circuit hears United States versus Luz Paulino. The case grew out of a tax-refund-loan scheme in Massachusetts. Investigators described stolen identities and false tax returns being used to obtain and cash bank loans against expected refunds. Paulino later received a prison sentence, and this appeal challenges the calculation of her advisory sentencing range. Those federal guidelines guide the judge, but do not dictate the final sentence. For financial crimes, the amount of loss can increase that range. Actual loss is financial harm the offense caused; intended loss is harm the defendant purposely sought. The central question is whether the court could count intended loss under commentary: explanatory notes accompanying the guideline. The Sentencing Commission later moved that rule into the guideline itself. The judges will discuss whether that change merely clarified the earlier rule, and whether a prior robbery-conspiracy case called Walker controls here. They will also discuss Kisor, a Supreme Court decision about when courts give special weight to an agency's reading of its own rules. Listen for two distinctions: interpreting a rule versus enlarging it, and clarifying an old rule versus changing it. United States v. Luz Paulino (No. 24-1979) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/24-1979_20261103.mp3 Argument date — official November 2026 calendar: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/calendar.pdf?TB_iframe=true Original scheme allegations — filed FBI affidavit, December 14, 2020 (archival copy): https://originals.pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/complaint-united-states-v-paulino-dkt-1-2-d-mass-f0c3b528a1/1-att2-complaint.pdf Later prosecution background — U.S. Attorney's Office sentencing announcement, October 11, 2024: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/owner-tax-preparation-company-sentenced-more-four-years-prison-bank-fraud-and-21-million Intended-loss rule and amendment — Sentencing Commission, Amendment 827: https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/827 Prior robbery-conspiracy precedent — First Circuit, United States v. Walker (2023): https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/22-1929P-01A.pdf Agency-interpretation framework — Supreme Court, Kisor v. Wilkie (2019): https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-15_9p6b.pdf Advisory sentencing and clarifying amendments — Sentencing Commission application principles: https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2026-guidelines-manual/annotated-2026-chapter-1

The Eleventh Circuit hears National Wildlife Federation versus the Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps operates reservoirs in the Apalachicola, Chattahoochee, and Flint river system, known as the ACF basin. Those operations affect freshwater reaching Florida's Apalachicola River, floodplain, and bay. In 2017, the Corps adopted updated operating rules for water supply, flood control, and other authorized uses. Conservation groups challenged the manual and its environmental analysis, saying the Corps had understated future harm to downstream habitats and dismissed reasonable alternatives. The Corps, Georgia, and local water providers defend the manual. The district court ruled for the Corps. The appeal centers on NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Water Resources Development Act. NEPA calls for environmental review, not a particular environmental outcome. An environmental impact statement, or EIS, examines effects and alternatives. The Supreme Court's Seven County decision stresses deference to agency judgments about the scope and detail of that review. A separate question is whether water-resources law required a mitigation plan here: measures to lessen or offset ecological harm. Listen for the difference between telling the agency its study was legally inadequate and asking judges to choose how the water system should operate. National Wildlife Federation v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (No. 21-13104) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Eleventh Circuit recording: https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/oral_argument_recordings/21-13104_11032026.mp3 Argument date — official November 3, 2026 calendar: https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/oral_arguments/cal1%28panelrelease%29.pdf Case background and prior ruling — district-court opinion, August 11, 2021: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-gand-1_18-mi-00043/pdf/USCOURTS-gand-1_18-mi-00043-0.pdf Environmental-review framework — Supreme Court, Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County (2025): https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-975_m648.pdf Disputed mitigation provision — 33 U.S.C. § 2283(d)(1): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/33/2283 Counsel identity — historical appellate clerk entries (2021): https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/ca11/21-13104

The Federal Circuit considers Super Lighting's LED tube-lamp patent. The design places a strip of LEDs inside the tube and its power supply in one or both end caps. The patent has faced challenges in infringement litigation and Patent Office reexamination. The owner has brought that Patent Office dispute to the Federal Circuit. This appeal focuses on a proposed change to an earlier lamp: moving its power supply from the LED strip into an end cap. Earlier published technology is called prior art. The question is whether the office gave a sufficient reason for an engineer to make that change. Obviousness is the legal test for whether a claimed design would have been an ordinary step for a skilled engineer, rather than a patentable advance. The Supreme Court's KSR decision allows a flexible, common-sense analysis, but calls for a reasoned explanation. Listen for the difference between a predictable design choice and using the patent itself as a recipe to reconstruct the invention. In re Jiaxing Super Lighting Electric Appliance Co., Ltd. (No. 25-1465) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1465_11032026.mp3 Argument date and counsel — official November 2026 calendar: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/OralArguments/PublicCalendar-November2026.pdf Patent design and related proceedings — PTAB IPR2023-00271 institution decision (not the reexamination ruling on appeal): https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1550671/download-documents?artifactId=C0fI744282NNoitrKQ4aPGwPImRo-ij5qzgbh5lzERkSGX6VfIz71lA Obviousness framework — Supreme Court, KSR v. Teleflex (2007): https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-1350.ZO.html Non-obvious subject matter — 35 U.S.C. § 103: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/103

The Federal Circuit hears Monette versus Collins. James Monette sought veterans' disability benefits for a mental-health condition he linked to military service. The Board of Veterans' Appeals denied the claim in 1990. Old service records were later added to his file, and the Board denied the claim again in 2004. The Board recognized the condition as linked to service in 2014, but Monette now seeks to have the earlier denial revisited. He filed a motion alleging clear and unmistakable error, or CUE. This is a very narrow way to attack a final decision for an undebatable, outcome-changing mistake, based on the record and law at the time. The Board rejected that attack, and the Veterans Court affirmed. The Board had held that the later-added records were not legally before it in 1990. That finding concerned constructive possession: treating records as legally available even though they were not actually in the claim file. A separate regulation, section 3.156(c), can require reconsideration when relevant old service records are added later. The question here is whether VA had to address that route before ruling on CUE. Listen for the difference between fixing an undebatable error in an old decision and reconsidering a claim because of later-added service records. Monette v. Collins (No. 25-1451) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1451_11032026.mp3 Argument date and counsel — official November 2026 court calendar: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/OralArguments/PublicCalendar-November2026.pdf Facts and prior ruling — Veterans Court No. 23-3628, November 15, 2024: https://efiling.uscourts.cavc.gov/docs1/012010938569 Service-record reconsideration — 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c): https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/38/3.156 Clear and unmistakable error — 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/38/20.1403 Final Board decisions — 38 C.F.R. § 20.1400: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/38/20.1400

The Federal Circuit hears Vicor Corporation versus the International Trade Commission. Vicor supplied power-converter modules to Foxconn affiliates for use in electronic systems. It later alleged that imported systems used competing modules that infringed its patents, and sought relief from the Commission, or ITC, which can bar infringing imports. Foxconn answered that its purchase-order terms already gave it a patent license: permission to use the patented technology. An administrative law judge rejected that defense. The Commission reversed on that issue and found that two Foxconn affiliates had a license to the patent ending in seven-six-one. Vicor appeals. The dispute turns on routine sales paperwork. Foxconn's purchase orders included a license clause; Vicor's sales-order acknowledgments said no license was granted. The question is whether earlier delivery-date emails had already accepted Foxconn's terms. This is a battle of the forms: buyer and seller exchange documents with conflicting standard terms. Massachusetts's Uniform Commercial Code, or UCC, governs these sales contracts. Listen for when the contract became binding, and whether years of similar transactions change how the documents should be read. Vicor Corporation v. International Trade Commission (No. 25-1616) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1616_11032026.mp3 Argument date and counsel — official November 2026 court calendar: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/OralArguments/PublicCalendar-November2026.pdf Prior Commission determination — Federal Register, February 20, 2025: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02831.pdf Commission reasoning and appeal — filed Doc. 80, January 2, 2026, including agency opinion pp. 97–113 (filed-copy mirror): https://fedcircuitblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/25-1616_Vicor_Corrected-Opening-Brief-1.pdf Case background — First Circuit companion opinion, March 6, 2025 (court-authored copy hosted by Justia): https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1620/24-1620-2025-03-06.pdf?ts=1741294804 Contract rule — Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 106, section 2-207: https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleXV/Chapter106/Article2/Section2-207

The Second Circuit hears Kalshi and Coinbase's requests to block state gambling enforcement while their appeals are pending. Kalshi is registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, or CFTC, as a designated contract market, or DCM: an exchange. Coinbase is registered as a futures commission merchant, or FCM: a broker giving customers access to Kalshi's contracts. Here, people buy and sell yes-or-no positions on sports outcomes; the contracts pay according to whether those outcomes happen. New York and Connecticut directed Kalshi to stop what they described as unlicensed sports wagering. Kalshi challenged those directives in federal court, and Coinbase separately challenged Connecticut's authority over the same contracts. The district courts denied preliminary injunctions, leaving the companies without the temporary protection they sought. The central issue is preemption: whether federal law displaces state law. The companies say these contracts are swaps under federal commodities law, bringing them under the CFTC's exclusive regulation. The states say their gambling laws still apply. Much of the argument concerns the statutory requirement that a swap's underlying event have a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence. Does a sporting outcome meet that requirement, or does that reading sweep in ordinary sports betting too? The judges will also consider irreparable harm, meaning injury that cannot adequately be repaired later, and balance the companies' claimed business harms against the states' arguments about protecting residents. These requests concern protection during the appeals, not final decisions on the full cases. KalshiEX / Coinbase v. New York & Connecticut Officials (No. 26-1835, 26-2239, 26-2297) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Second Circuit consolidated motions recording (26-1835, 26-2239, 26-2297): https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/audio/26-1835%20mtn%3B%2026-2239%20mtn%3B%2026-2297mtn.mp3 Case and argument date — official Second Circuit recording index: https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/oral_arguments.html KalshiEX v. Williams — court-authored SDNY preliminary-injunction decision, Doc. 106 (hosted by NY Attorney General): https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/court-filings/kalshiex-llc-v-new-york-state-gaming-commission-et-al-opinion-and-order-2026.pdf KalshiEX v. Cafferelli — official Connecticut preliminary-injunction decision, Doc. 94: https://ecf.ctd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2025cv2016-94= Coinbase Financial Markets v. Tong — official Connecticut preliminary-injunction decision, Doc. 93: https://ecf.ctd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2025cv2121-93=

The First Circuit considers a sex-discrimination suit by the former communications director of Puerto Rico's State Elections Commission. He says that after a new commission president took over, she stripped him of duties, assigned work to women, and fired him. The commission responds that he held a confidential trust position and that the president could choose the people she trusted to do that work. A trust position is generally subject to hiring and removal at will, rather than the protections of a career post; that does not itself permit sex discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, deciding the case without a trial because it found insufficient evidence that the stated reason for firing him concealed sex discrimination. He seeks a jury trial instead. Pretext means a stated explanation alleged to hide the real reason. But first, listen for a separate legal question about discharge in Puerto Rico's debt-restructuring process. A discharge releases covered obligations. The judges will ask whether getting the job back is different from receiving money for losing it, and whether the case can proceed at all. Alvarado-Solivan v. Comisión Estatal de Elecciones (No. 24-1891) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/24-1891_20261103.mp3 Case and argument date — official First Circuit recording index: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 Facts and prior ruling — district court summary-judgment decision, July 25, 2024 (Doc. 148): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-prd-3_16-cv-01458/pdf/USCOURTS-prd-3_16-cv-01458-1.pdf Discharge provisions — 11 U.S.C. § 944 (statutory text hosted by Cornell LII): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/11/944 PROMESA's incorporation of bankruptcy provisions — 48 U.S.C. § 2161 (statutory text hosted by Cornell LII): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/48/2161 Bankruptcy claim definition — 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (statutory text hosted by Cornell LII): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/11/101

We hear the First Circuit. The litigation began with drivers who already had private auto insurance but also paid Puerto Rico's compulsory-insurance premium. They sought refunds of those duplicate payments and challenged the notice they received about recovering their money. A settlement eventually established a refund-claim process. It also provided for the lawyers to receive twenty percent of the reimbursement claims paid under the agreement. That fee provision is the focus of this argument. As you listen, distinguish approval of a refund claim from actual payment: the agreement ties the fee to claims that are paid. You will also hear an initial discussion of appellate jurisdiction, meaning the appeals court's authority to decide the appeal. Those are separate questions: what the agreement requires, and whether this is the stage at which the appellate judges can decide the dispute. Gracia Gracia v. FOMB (No. 25-1155) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording; the judge's final administrative closing word may be cut short; all substantive argument is included: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1155_20261103.mp3 Case and argument date — official First Circuit recording index: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 Settlement and prior proceedings — First Circuit opinion, September 25, 2019 (court-authored PDF hosted by Justia): https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/18-1463/18-1463-2019-09-25.pdf?ts=1569441604 Underlying duplicate-premium and notice dispute — official First Circuit opinion, December 2, 2011: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/10-2507P-01A.pdf

The Federal Circuit hears Buergofol versus Omega Liner Company. The dispute concerns technology for repairing underground sewer pipes without digging them up. A resin-soaked liner is placed inside the old pipe and hardened, and a thin inner film is then pulled out. If that film sticks to the cured resin, it can tear and leave fragments behind. Buergofol's patent concerns coatings intended to help the film release. Omega asked the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to review the challenged patent claims. The Board found them unpatentable as obvious over earlier patent disclosures, and Buergofol appeals. A patent claim is the wording that defines the protected invention. One question is whether claim eleven requires a release compound to migrate from inside the film to its surface, or also covers a coating applied directly to that surface. That matters because the Board relied on earlier work describing directly applied coatings. Obviousness asks whether a skilled person would have had a reason to combine earlier teachings in the claimed way, with a reasonable expectation of success. Buergofol will argue that the earlier work did not identify the chemical-sticking problem its inventors solved, and that unexpected results support patentability. Omega will defend the Board's reading and its finding that known release agents offered a predictable solution. Buergofol GmbH v. Omega Liner Company, Inc. (No. 25-1796) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1796_11032026.mp3 Case and argument date — official Federal Circuit recording index: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/ Prior proceeding and reasoning — PTAB final written decision, March 14, 2025 (IPR2023-01372, Paper 85): https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/ptab-filings/IPR2023-01372/85 Argument date and PTO origin — official November2026 calendar, revised November3: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/OralArguments/PublicCalendar-November2026.pdf

We hear the D.C. Circuit in Rural Empowerment Association for Community Help versus the Environmental Protection Agency. The dispute concerns air emissions from farm animal waste, including ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, and whether farms must notify state and local officials about hazardous releases. In 2018, Congress exempted those air emissions from federal reporting under CERCLA, the federal Superfund law. EPA followed in 2019 by exempting them from emergency reporting under EPCRA, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. Environmental groups challenged that rule, saying it cut off nearby communities' access to information about hazardous releases. The district court upheld it, reasoning that Congress had exempted a manner of release that also falls outside EPCRA's reporting requirement. The groups appeal. The question is what the words occurs in a manner mean: does releasing chemicals into the air from animal waste at a farm describe how a release happens, or merely its source and location? The dispute is about reporting obligations, not permission to pollute. Rural Empowerment Association for Community Help v. EPA (No. 25-5354) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official D.C. Circuit recording (judge's final closing word may be clipped; all argument included): https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/docs/2026/11/25-5354.mp3 Case, argument date and advocates — official D.C. Circuit recording index: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/bydate/2026/11 Background and prior ruling — district court memorandum opinion, August 7, 2025: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-dcd-1_18-cv-02260/pdf/USCOURTS-dcd-1_18-cv-02260-1.pdf Agency action — EPA final rule, June 13, 2019 (84 FR 27533): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-06-13/pdf/2019-12411.pdf

We hear the Supreme Court in Saint Mary Catholic Parish versus Roy. Colorado pays for up to fifteen hours of weekly preschool for four-year-olds at participating public, private, and religious schools. Providers must offer an equal opportunity to enroll regardless of listed characteristics, including a child's or family's religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity. The parish schools require parents to support Catholic teachings, including on marriage and gender. They say accepting those enrollment conditions would conflict with their religious mission. The Archdiocese directed its parish preschools not to join, and schools and parents sued in two-thousand-twenty-three. After trial, the district court upheld the sexual-orientation and gender-identity conditions; the Tenth Circuit affirmed. A separate religious-affiliation ruling led Colorado to remove an earlier preference for congregation members. The question here is funding and admissions, not whether schools may teach their faith. Two paths to stronger constitutional review are in play. Under Employment Division versus Smith, a neutral, generally applicable law can ordinarily be enforced even when it incidentally burdens religious exercise. The schools will argue that secular enrollment preferences and official discretion mean Colorado's requirements are not generally applicable. The state will answer that those arrangements support equal access, rather than permit the discrimination the schools seek to practice. Separately, the Carson decision barred exclusion from a tuition program because schools provided religious instruction. The justices will consider whether that benefits principle reaches funding conditions that do not expressly exclude religion. Strict scrutiny means the government must justify a restriction with a compelling interest and a narrowly tailored approach; it does not automatically guarantee an exemption. Nicholas Reaves, of the Becket Fund, will argue for the schools and parents. Sarah Harris will support them for the United States, which is participating without being a party. Helen Norton, Colorado's Deputy Solicitor General, will defend the state. St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy (No. 25-581) — Supreme Court of the United States, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — Supreme Court official recording: https://www.supremecourt.gov/media/audio/mp3files/25-581.mp3 Official transcript — November 3, 2026: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2026/25-581_3ebh.pdf Case, granted questions and speaking counsel — Supreme Court docket: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-581.html Case history and ruling below — Tenth Circuit, September 30, 2025 (appendix 1a–47a): https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-581/384425/20251113161200771_No.-__Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari.pdf Schools' and parents' account and position — Petitioners' merits brief: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-581/415025/20260625143739952_St%20Mary%20Opening%20Br%20FINAL.pdf Colorado's account and position — Respondents' merits brief: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-581/419261/20260817140909161_25-581%20Brief.pdf United States' supporting position — Amicus merits brief: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-581/415681/20260702225636069_25-581tsacUnitedStates.pdf

We hear the Federal Circuit in Heron Therapeutics versus Fresenius. This dispute grew out of a proposed generic version of Heron's drug formulation. Fresenius sought federal approval, and Heron sued over patents covering the formulation. After a trial, the district court found infringement and rejected Fresenius's challenge that the asserted claims were obvious. Fresenius now appeals. The formulation carries the drug aprepitant in an emulsion: tiny oil droplets dispersed in water. Egg-yolk lecithin acts as an emulsifier, helping stabilize that mixture. The claims at issue require fourteen percent lecithin by weight. An earlier Chinese patent application disclosed concentrations from half a percent to ten percent. The question is whether reaching fourteen percent would have been ordinary formulation work rather than a patentable advance. Obviousness asks what a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to do, with a reasonable expectation of success, based on what was already known, not merely whether an earlier recipe was identical. Fresenius will argue that the judge effectively treated ten percent as a ceiling and wrongly discounted another article describing higher concentrations. Heron will defend the judge's assessment of the experimental evidence and the differences between the formulations. Listen for the distinction between an error of law and disagreement with the trial judge's factual findings. Heron Therapeutics, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC (No. 25-1355) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1355_11032026.mp3 Case and argument date — official Federal Circuit daily schedule: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/daily-schedule/ Case background and prior ruling — district court findings, December 3, 2024 (unsealed December 16): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ded-1_22-cv-00985/pdf/USCOURTS-ded-1_22-cv-00985-0.pdf Generic application, lawsuit and trial result — Heron Form 8-K, December 3, 2024: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/818033/000095017024132874/hrtx-20241203.htm

We hear the Eleventh Circuit in United States versus Charles Williams. The dispute grew out of a drug investigation involving two residences connected to Williams. Police collected drug evidence from trash at one address and obtained a warrant to search the other. Williams challenged the connection between that second property and the evidence sought there. The district court adopted a magistrate judge's recommendation and denied his request to exclude the evidence. The argument begins with how a guilty plea affects appellate review of that ruling. Rule Eleven allows a conditional plea reserving a specified pretrial issue for appeal in writing, with the court's and government's consent. Then the discussion turns to probable cause for the warrant and the good-faith exception associated with United States versus Leon. That exception can permit evidence obtained under a warrant later found invalid when officers relied on it objectively reasonably. A judge's signature alone is not enough: reliance on a plainly deficient warrant or an affidavit lacking even a reasonable basis for probable cause can fall outside the exception. United States v. Charles Williams (No. 25-11666) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, argued November 3, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Eleventh Circuit recording: https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/oral_argument_recordings/25-11666_11032026.mp3 Case and argument date — official Eleventh Circuit hearing calendar: https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/oral_arguments/cal1%28panelrelease%29.pdf Prior suppression ruling — Williams, district court order, January 24, 2024: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-alnd-2_23-cr-00288/pdf/USCOURTS-alnd-2_23-cr-00288-0.pdf Williams search background — judicial account in Valeriani, page 7: https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2024-00304-77-8-cr= Conditional pleas — Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2): https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_11 Warrant-reliance good faith — United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/468/897

The Federal Circuit considers Jefferson Street Holdings' appeal from reexamination, the Patent Office's review of an already granted protective smartphone-case patent. The case is designed to shield the phone while leaving its screen accessible, using higher edges at the ends and lower edges along the sides. The patent's claims, its written boundaries of protection, describe a lower side-edge height that is continuous between two transitions. The key question is whether that height must stay constant, or may vary as long as the side remains above zero. That interpretation affects comparison with earlier case designs relied on as prior art. The judges also examine obviousness: whether the claimed arrangement would have been obvious to a skilled designer at the time. A claim can fail that test even without an identical earlier disclosure. So interpreting continuous more narrowly would not, by itself, decide whether making the side height constant was obvious. In re Jefferson Street Holdings LLC (No. 25-1661) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1661_11022026.mp3 Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/ Technology and claim language — issued U.S. Patent 11,399,606 B2: https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/8e/d3/ae/a9116686af80db/US11399606.pdf Patent-to-appeal cross-reference — Google Patents litigation metadata: https://patents.google.com/patent/US11399606B2/en Obviousness — 35 U.S.C. § 103: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/103 Reexamination requests — 35 U.S.C. § 302: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/302 Court review after reexamination — 35 U.S.C. § 306: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/306

The Federal Circuit reviews LPP Combustion's challenge to rulings in its patent dispute with General Electric. The patents address how fuel burns and how to prevent premature ignition. One patent uses an inert diluent, a lower-oxygen gas intended to keep fuel from igniting before the combustion chamber. The dispute is whether inert, or non-reactive, excludes every gas containing hydrocarbons, common fuel components. The trial court read the term to exclude those gases. LPP will argue that reactivity depends on the conditions, not just a gas's hydrocarbon content. Patent claims are the written statements that define what a patent protects; claim construction is interpreting them. The other issue involves two patents that sense fuel or combustion characteristics and trigger an additive to adjust combustion when a reading falls outside an acceptable range. The trial court held the challenged claims ineligible under Section one oh one: it viewed them as an abstract idea of sensing, comparing and adjusting without an additional inventive concept. Eligibility asks whether the claims satisfy the threshold for patent protection, not simply whether General Electric infringes. LPP will argue that the ordered combination is a specific technical improvement, even if individual components are conventional. General Electric will defend the court's reading of the gas limitation and its view that the other claims describe a generic feedback system. General Electric Company v. LPP Combustion, LLC (No. 25-1821) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1821_11022026.mp3 Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/ Technology and inert-gas claim construction — D. Del. Doc. 66, September 6, 2023: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ded-1_22-cv-00720/pdf/USCOURTS-ded-1_22-cv-00720-0.pdf Section 101 judgment on the pleadings — D. Del. memorandum opinion and order, March 28, 2025: https://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/ded/files/opinions/22-720_0.pdf

A Puerto Rico developer says the public water and sewer authority is using a privately built sewage pump station without paying the costs it imposes. The developer built the station for a residential project. A nearby housing community was then connected, sending additional wastewater through it. The developer says the authority refuses to take over the station, leaving it to pay for operation and maintenance while the authority continues collecting sewer fees. It filed a federal lawsuit in twenty twenty, seeking compensation and other relief. The Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay just compensation for private property taken for public use. The dispute includes whether the company has a protected property interest in the station, and whether the authority's conduct is a physical taking or instead a restriction on how property may be used. Physical takings concern occupation or appropriation of property; regulatory takings concern restrictions that go far enough to require compensation. There is also a statute-of-limitations question, the deadline for bringing a lawsuit. Does continued sewage flow keep the claim timely, or did the clock begin with government actions years earlier? Finally, the court will explore what process was available for the company to challenge the authority's refusal to accept the station and its repair demands. Estancias de Cerro Mar, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (No. 25-1161) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1161_20261102.mp3 Case and argument date — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 Pump-station background and earlier housing-secretary ruling — D.P.R. Doc. 119, November 15, 2023: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-prd-3_20-cv-01664/pdf/USCOURTS-prd-3_20-cv-01664-1.pdf Claimed operating burden and earlier preliminary-injunction ruling — D.P.R. Doc. 141, January 23, 2024: https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/puerto-rico/prdce/3%3A2020cv01664/161839/141/0.pdf?ts=1706201712 Physical and regulatory takings — Supreme Court, Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, No. 20-107: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/20-107

A federal prisoner's effort to finish his sentence outside prison becomes a Supreme Court dispute over access to judicial review. Maxwell is serving a twenty-year sentence for racketeering and related offenses arising from a scheme to take over a mortgage-loan company and drain its assets. The First Step Act lets eligible prisoners earn time credits through qualifying programs and productive activities. Maxwell says his credits entitle him to move to home confinement or a halfway house, a supervised residence in the community. That would not erase his sentence: those placements still impose restrictions and remain under Bureau of Prisons control. To challenge his continued imprisonment, he filed a petition for habeas corpus, a procedure asking a court to examine whether custody is lawful. The district court dismissed his First Step Act claim because it found he had not properly presented it through the prison's administrative grievance process. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on a different ground: moving to home confinement or a halfway house would not amount to release from custody, so habeas was the wrong procedure. Maxwell will argue that leaving prison for a distinctly lower level of custody is precisely the kind of relief habeas can provide. The government agrees that the Fifth Circuit drew the line incorrectly, but it still raises other barriers, including administrative exhaustion and a statute limiting judicial review of prison placements. Agreement about the legal procedure is not agreement that Maxwell must be transferred now. The Court appointed an amicus curiae, a friend of the court, to argue in support of the judgment. He will maintain that these transfers change the conditions or location of imprisonment rather than end it. The practical question is whether a prisoner can use habeas to seek this move into the community, not whether Maxwell's underlying conviction was valid. Maxwell v. Dinis (No. 25-5930) — Supreme Court of the United States, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Supreme Court recording: https://www.supremecourt.gov/media/audio/mp3files/25-5930.mp3 Official transcript — November 2, 2026: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2026/25-5930_4f14.pdf Case, granted question and appointed amicus — Supreme Court docket No. 25-5930: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-5930.html District court rulings and Fifth Circuit decision — petition appendix: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-5930/380263/20251022122808387_20251022-122353-00000694-00000144.pdf Maxwell's factual account and habeas argument — petitioner merits brief: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-5930/418167/20260805123041240_25-5930%20opening%20brief%20final_PDFA.pdf Government's position and remaining objections — respondent merits brief: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-5930/418232/20260805174545194_25-5930UnitedStates.pdf Argument supporting the judgment — court-appointed amicus brief: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-5930/424858/20260918142656288_25-5930_Amicus%20Brief.pdf Habeas corpus — 28 U.S.C. § 2241: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/2241 First Step Act earned time credits — 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3632 Prerelease custody — 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3624 Prison placement and reviewability — 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3621

The Federal Circuit reviews Jefferson Street Holdings' challenge to patent rejections involving a protective phone case. The design uses lower side edges alongside higher sections, intended to preserve screen access while protecting the device. The Patent Office reexamined the issued patent against earlier case designs, and its appeal board upheld the rejections now challenged in court. A patent claim defines the features for which protection is sought. Here, much turns on whether a height that continuously spans a side must stay constant, or may curve while never dropping to zero. The lawyers will compare differently worded claims, including dependent claims that add restrictions to a broader claim. That is claim differentiation: differences between claims can help determine their scope. Anticipation asks whether one earlier reference already disclosed every claimed feature in the required arrangement. Obviousness asks whether the claimed arrangement, as a whole, would have been an ordinary, predictable choice for someone skilled in the field, in light of earlier designs. The Patent Office will argue that making the side edges straight instead of curved was such a design choice. Jefferson Street will insist that the geometry has functional significance, combining protection with screen access, and that the office has not adequately justified the change. Winning the wording dispute alone may not defeat the separate obviousness grounds. In re Jefferson Street Holdings LLC (No. 26-1008) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording, docket 26-1008: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/26-1008_11022026.mp3 Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/ Patent background and reexamination ruling — PTAB Appeal 2025-000827, July 29, 2025, reproduced by CaseMine: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/6889ab1877b6a5b6e3e1e0a7 Claim interpretation — USPTO Manual §2111: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2111.html Obviousness and changes in shape — USPTO Manual §2144: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2144.html

The Federal Circuit considers patents for mobile-device location services asserted against Uber. The patents describe ways to request location data within geographic regions and determine whether devices are moving together. The patent owner says these methods address network overload and tracking problems. It sued Uber for infringement, but the district court dismissed the case without a trial, finding the patent claims ineligible because they covered abstract information processing rather than a technological improvement. A related appeal involving Lyft is being heard alongside it. Eligibility concerns what patent law protects, not simply whether an invention is new. A patent claim defines the invention's legal boundaries. Under the Supreme Court's Alice framework, a claim directed to an abstract idea needs an additional inventive concept to qualify, considering its elements both individually and together. Merely using ordinary computer components is not enough. The patent owner's lawyer will argue that geographic limits change how the network works and that the court overlooked differences among the claims. Uber will answer that selecting less location information is merely filtering, not a specific technical advance. Listen also for whether one representative claim can stand in for the rest, and whether the alleged technical improvements could be rejected at the pleading stage, before factual disputes were developed. Enovsys LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (No. 25-1982) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1982_11022026.mp3 Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/ Case background and eligibility ruling — N.D. Cal. reconsideration order, June 30, 2025: https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/california/candce/5%3A2023cv04549/417867/77/0.pdf Consolidated Uber and Lyft appeals — appellate docket index: https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/cafc/25-1982 Patent-eligible subject matter — 35 U.S.C. §101: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/101 Abstract ideas and inventive concept — Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-298 Motion to dismiss — Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_12

The First Circuit considers when Puerto Rico can be sued over alleged police misconduct. A woman brought federal civil-rights and Puerto Rico tort claims alleging excessive force by police officers. She also sought to hold the Commonwealth and its police agency liable. The district court dismissed the claims against those government defendants on immunity grounds, without deciding whether the officers had used unlawful force. The appeal is being heard together with a second police-related case. The plaintiffs will ask the court to reconsider treating Puerto Rico like a state for sovereign immunity, a protection against being sued in federal court. They will rely on a Supreme Court decision about Puerto Rico's powers and double jeopardy, the constitutional protection against repeated prosecutions for the same offense. That criminal-law ruling did not itself decide this civil-immunity question. The judges will also focus on Section nineteen eighty-three, which allows suits for violations of federal rights by people acting under government authority. Whether Puerto Rico counts as a suable person under that law is distinct from its constitutional immunity. There is also a procedural hurdle: whether the challenged rulings are final enough to appeal now. The Commonwealth will argue that these appeals fail that requirement. Roldan-Cruz v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (No. 24-1803) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit consolidated hearing: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/24-1803_20261102.mp3 Case and argument date — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 Lead-case background and dismissal — D.P.R. Opinion and Order, July 18, 2024: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-prd-3_24-cv-01101/pdf/USCOURTS-prd-3_24-cv-01101-0.pdf Federal civil-rights remedy — 42 U.S.C. §1983: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1983 Final decisions and appeal — 28 U.S.C. §1291: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1291 Multiple-party judgments — Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b): https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_54 Double-jeopardy context — Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-108

The Fifth Circuit considers whether federal Medicaid funding rules reach private agreements among hospitals. Texas allows local governments to tax healthcare providers to help finance its share of Medicaid, a joint federal-state healthcare program. Federal matching funds are added, and hospitals receive Medicaid payments. CMS, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, is targeting private agreements that redistribute those payments so taxpaying hospitals recover their tax costs. This is the hold-harmless issue: whether providers are being protected from the cost of the tax. CMS says private redistribution can amount to an indirect government guarantee. Texas says the statute requires a guarantee from the state or local government itself, not merely a private agreement. A district judge set aside the challenged rule provisions and bulletins, and the federal government now appeals. Its lawyer will argue that private intermediaries do not remove these arrangements from Congress's prohibition. Texas's lawyer will defend the district court's reading and argue that CMS changed its position without adequately explaining the shift. You will also hear about the major-questions doctrine, which calls for clear congressional authorization for extraordinary claims of agency power. If the ruling stands, how broadly should it operate? Vacatur means setting an agency action aside; the government will argue for relief limited to Texas rather than across the board. State of Texas v. Oz (No. 25-40766) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Fifth Circuit recording: https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/25/25-40766_11-2-2026.mp3 Case and argument date — Fifth Circuit official recording archive: https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/results?from=2026-08-01&to=2026-11-03 District court decision and funding background — September 24, 2025, Doc. 92: https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/texas/txedce/6%3A2023cv00161/221363/92/0.pdf?ts=1758805152 Medicaid funding and hold-harmless provisions — 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1396b Judicial review and setting aside agency action — 5 U.S.C. § 706: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/706

The Federal Circuit considers a dispute over antidumping calculations for mattresses from Indonesia. These duties are extra import charges addressing below-fair-value sales that materially harm or threaten a domestic industry. Some mattress models came from multiple countries, and Zinus's warehouse records could not trace every sale back to its origin. That mattered because Commerce needed to identify Indonesian sales, not all sales from the warehouse. The agency estimated the Indonesian share using quarterly ratios. After twice sending the calculations back to Commerce for further work, the Court of International Trade upheld the revised result. Brooklyn Bedding and other domestic producers and unions will seek another remand, meaning a return to the agency for further work. Their lawyer will argue that Commerce rejected some estimates as impossible while accepting inventory data with the same problem: sales apparently exceeding the available mattresses. The government and Zinus will defend the estimate as reasonable despite small anomalies in imperfect records. Substantial-evidence review asks whether the record adequately supports the agency's decision. Another dispute concerns the benchmark for components purchased from a related company rather than an independent seller. The panel will also consider whether new inventory information needed additional checking, and whether that objection was raised too late. PT. Zinus Global Indonesia v. United States (No. 25-1674) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1674_11022026.mp3 Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official recording index: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/ Prior trade-court decision and background — Slip Op. 25-15, February 18, 2025: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cit-1_21-cv-00284/pdf/USCOURTS-cit-1_21-cv-00284-0.pdf Appeal parties and procedural entries — First-party court docket republished by Justia: https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/cafc/25-1674 Antidumping duties — 19 U.S.C. § 1673: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1673 Substantial-evidence review — 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1516a Related-party input valuation — 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(2)–(3): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1677b Information and verification — 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e), (i): https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1677m

The First Circuit considers whether a Bitcoin prosecution was tainted by references to unrelated fraud. Alan Joseph exchanged cash for Bitcoin. In undercover meetings, an agent presented himself as a seller of counterfeit designer goods who needed Bitcoin to pay a supplier. Prosecutors said Joseph knew what those transactions were meant to support. A jury convicted him of money laundering and operating an unregistered money-transmitting business. The jury acquitted him on one other laundering count. The appeal concerns trial testimony about romance scams and cryptocurrency investment fraud, not charges that Joseph ran those schemes. His lawyer will argue that these references portrayed him as a habitual criminal and denied him a fair trial. This is a propensity concern: treating someone's supposed criminal character as proof of the charged conduct. The government will acknowledge that some fraud references were unnecessary, but will argue that the judge's warnings kept jurors focused on the actual charges. A limiting instruction tells jurors how they may use particular evidence. The government will also point to the undercover evidence and the mixed verdict. Even if testimony should have been excluded, the court must consider whether it affected the verdict. That is the harmless-error question at the heart of this appeal. United States v. Joseph (No. 25-1610) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1610_20261102.mp3 Case and argument date — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 Case background and convictions — U.S. Attorney's Office, November 25, 2024: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/lancaster-man-convicted-money-laundering-and-operating-unlawful-money-transmission Original allegations and undercover transactions — U.S. Attorney's Office, March 4, 2021: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/fitchburg-man-charged-money-laundering-and-illegal-money-transmission-converting-cash Unfair prejudice — Federal Rule of Evidence 403: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_403 Character and propensity evidence — Federal Rule of Evidence 404: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_404 Limiting instructions — Federal Rule of Evidence 105: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_105 Harmless error — Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a): https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_52

The First Circuit considers whether a defense lawyer's failure to challenge a phone search undermined a murder conviction. Felix Melendez was convicted in Massachusetts after two earlier juries failed to agree on the murder charge. Prosecutors linked him to the victim's jewelry, some of which he had pawned, and used material from his phone to support their account of his motive and conduct. His trial lawyer did not seek suppression of those phone contents on constitutional grounds. The state's highest court later found that the search-warrant affidavit did not connect the phone to the crime. It nevertheless upheld the conviction, relying on other evidence. Melendez now seeks federal habeas relief, a challenge to the legality of his imprisonment. His lawyer will argue that asking whether the remaining evidence could support a conviction is different from asking whether the lawyer's error creates a reasonable probability of a different result. That probability must be enough to undermine confidence in the verdict; acquittal need not be more likely than not. The state will defend the ruling, arguing that the state court's review adequately protected his federal rights. The judges will also explore exhaustion: whether the state courts had a fair opportunity to decide the federal constitutional claim before it reached federal court. Federal law generally requires that opportunity and gives substantial deference to state decisions resolving federal claims on their merits. Melendez v. Kennedy (No. 25-2151) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-2151_20261102.mp3 Case and argument date — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 Case background and phone-search ruling — Commonwealth v. Melendez, 490 Mass. 648 (2022): https://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/volumes/490/490mass648.html Ineffective-assistance prejudice standard — Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694–696 (1984): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/466/668/ Federal habeas, exhaustion and deference — 28 U.S.C. § 2254: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/2254

Damilola Kumapayi challenges the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to a wire-fraud conspiracy. The broader prosecution involved romance scams, fraudulent unemployment claims, and moving the proceeds through bank accounts. He received one hundred nine months in prison. His guilty plea distinguishes him from co-defendants who went to trial. To follow the argument, it helps to separate several legal questions. An appeal waiver is a promise in a plea agreement to give up certain appeals. In Hunter versus the United States, the Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception for sentencing errors so egregious that enforcing the waiver would undermine the justice system's integrity. Ordinary disagreements over sentencing calculations do not meet that standard. A separate question is harmless error: a procedural mistake does not require reversal if it did not affect substantial rights. You will also hear about the presentence report, or PSR, prepared by a probation officer to help the judge determine the sentence. It can contain sentencing calculations and information about victims' losses. Restitution is money ordered repaid to victims for legally attributable losses, not simply a measure of how much a defendant personally kept. Keep those questions distinct as you listen: whether an appeal can proceed, whether a sentencing error warrants correction, and what losses the law permits the judge to charge to the defendant. United States v. Damilola Kumapayi (No. 25-40379) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Fifth Circuit recording: https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/25/25-40379_11-02-2026.mp3 Case and argument date — Fifth Circuit official recording archive: https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/results?from=2026-08-01&to=2026-11-03 Plea, sentence and broader scheme — U.S. Attorney's Office sentencing release, June 16, 2025: https://www.justice.gov/usao-edtx/pr/conspirators-sentenced-engaging-multitude-fraud-schemes-including-romance-scams Appeal-waiver exception — Hunter v. United States, June 18, 2026: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1063new_l5gm.pdf Fifth Circuit application of Hunter — United States v. London, August 21, 2026: https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/25/25-20102-CR0.pdf Presentence reports — Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_32 Harmless error — Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_52 Victim restitution — 18 U.S.C. 3663A: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3663A

A Texas city and environmental groups challenge renewed federal approval of the Rio Grande liquefied natural gas terminal and its supply pipeline in South Texas. The developer had proposed adding carbon capture and sequestration: collecting carbon dioxide from the terminal and storing it underground. The proposal referred to storage sites close to the terminal. In an earlier appeal, the court required the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC, to examine that proposal even if the developer withdrew its application. The developer did withdraw it, and FERC reaffirmed approval after a supplemental environmental review. FERC declined to recommend carbon capture, citing uncertainties over permitting, timing, cost, and infrastructure. The challengers will argue that evaluating a storage site about a hundred miles away did not answer whether the nearby option was workable. FERC and the project companies will defend that investigation and the agency's discretion to decide which alternatives are feasible. You will hear NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act, which requires environmental review rather than a particular environmental outcome. Another dispute concerns a sixth liquefaction train, meaning a gas-processing production line, not a railroad train. The challengers say its effects should have been evaluated with the approved project. FERC says there was no pending expansion proposal at the relevant time. This raises segmentation: whether treating parts of a larger undertaking separately improperly obscures its environmental effects. The judges will examine how the agency's discretion fits with their earlier remand, or instructions sending the matter back to FERC. South Texas Environmental Justice Network v. FERC (No. 25-1284) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official D.C. Circuit recording: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/docs/2026/11/25-1284.mp3 Case and argument date — D.C. Circuit official November 2026 archive: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/bydate/2026/11 FERC order addressing rehearing arguments — March 19, 2026: https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2026-03/C-1-CP16-454-009.pdf Prior court opinion — City of Port Isabel v. FERC, August 6, 2024 (remedy later modified): https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2024/08/23-1174-2068430.pdf Petitioners' request for agency rehearing — September 29, 2025: https://earthjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/sotxejn-et-al-request-for-rehearing-re-rio-grande-lng.pdf

Honda and Tesla challenge a Patent Office decision concerning Neo Wireless's patent for organizing wireless transmissions. Think of the available transmission capacity as a grid with time on one axis and frequency on the other. The patent describes arranging data streams into resource segments, aiming to reduce the control information needed to tell devices where their data begins. After automakers challenged the patent, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found they had not proved the challenged claims unpatentable. A central issue is the meaning of starting time-frequency coordinate: whether separate time and frequency values can satisfy that language. The board relied partly on arguments Neo had made in an earlier Patent Office challenge brought by Dell. You'll hear prosecution disclaimer, the rule that a patent owner's clear and unmistakable statements to the Patent Office can narrow the scope of its claims. This is claim construction, interpreting the words that define patent protection, rather than physically changing the invention. The challengers' lawyer will argue that the board applied that narrowing incorrectly and should reconsider the earlier technical disclosures, called prior art. Neo's lawyer will defend the interpretation and the board's findings. The judges will also explore whether the patent itself supports the same interpretation and whether the challengers properly preserved their separate attack on the prior-art analysis. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Neo Wireless LLC (No. 25-1354) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1354_11022026.mp3 Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official recording archive, November 2, 2026: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/ Patent specification — U.S. Patent No. 10,447,450 B2: https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/d5/32/90/abf0661270033e/US10447450.pdf Board final written decision — IPR2022-01567, Paper 59, November 1, 2024: https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1553858/download-documents?artifactId=ZdirWU30L_8UYaOOEHp4bgVm2GlcvRQ_g_ath-dveoOUZgLjDDnREaw Honda notice of appeal — January 2, 2025: https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1550343/download-documents?artifactId=MHLdrPvy3ho0pDORGZ7ZU1_LcCbP5Keg7j92VXbS1wwIvGiyPqtuHSE

The Fifth Circuit considers Charles Ray Keys' challenge to drug and firearm convictions arising from a New Orleans house search. Investigators were looking into a child's fentanyl death connected to the property. A later search uncovered cocaine, fentanyl and guns. A jury convicted Keys of possessing drugs with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The central dispute concerns the sworn statement used to obtain the search warrant. A local detective signed it, but an FBI agent supplied much of the underlying investigation. Several statements incorrectly credited the detective with investigative steps. The trial judge allowed the evidence, finding no intent to mislead or reckless disregard for the truth. Keys' lawyer will argue that the misstatements undermined the warrant; the government will defend the ruling and argue that sufficient grounds for the search remained. Under Franks, deliberate or reckless falsehoods can invalidate a warrant if the remaining facts do not establish probable cause. The lawyers will also dispute constructive possession: whether Keys had control over the drugs and guns, even without holding them. Sentencing questions involve the Armed Career Criminal Act, which increases penalties for defendants with certain qualifying prior convictions. United States v. Charles Ray Keys (No. 25-30664) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Fifth Circuit recording: https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/25/25-30664_11-2-2026.mp3 Case and argument date — Fifth Circuit official calendar, November 2, 2026: https://www-dev.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-information/court-calendars/Details/1982/ Search background and warrant ruling — district court Doc. 56, April 7, 2025: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137/pdf/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137-0.pdf Trial and Armed Career Criminal Act ruling — district court Doc. 102, June 2, 2025: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137/pdf/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137-1.pdf Trial evidence and constructive possession — district court Doc. 104, filed June 9, 2025: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137/pdf/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137-2.pdf

The Federal Circuit reviews Jefferson Street Holdings' patent for a protective phone case. The patent describes higher corners and lower side sections, intended to protect the screen while leaving it easier to reach. After reexamining the issued patent against earlier case designs, the Patent Office's appeal board upheld rejections of its claims. A patent claim defines the features the patent seeks to protect. Here, much turns on whether a height that continuously spans a side must stay constant, as the company contends, or can vary while remaining above zero, as the board concluded. The lawyers will also dispute whether curved edges satisfy requirements about extending perpendicular, or at right angles, to the back panel. You'll hear two different patentability tests. Anticipation asks whether one earlier reference already disclosed every claimed feature in the required arrangement. Obviousness asks whether the claimed design, as a whole, would have been obvious to someone with ordinary skill in the field. Different claims were rejected on different grounds, so winning one interpretation issue would not necessarily resolve them all. Jefferson Street will seek relief from those rejections; the Patent Office will defend the board's analysis. In re Jefferson Street Holdings LLC (No. 25-2037) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-2037_11022026.mp3 Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official recording archive, November 2, 2026: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/ Patent specification and claims — U.S. Patent No. 10,820,675 B2: https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/25/29/ea/0725c3d0f093b7/US10820675.pdf Board decision — PTAB Appeal 2025-000826, reproduced by CaseMine: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/68872442778e584c8de8dd34 Claim interpretation — USPTO Manual § 2111: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2111.html Anticipation — USPTO Manual § 2131: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2131.html Obviousness — USPTO Manual § 2141: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2141.html

The D.C. Circuit reviews a defamation verdict over a confidential report. Businessman Christopher Chandler sued a private investigator and his company over a 2003 report accusing Chandler of money laundering. Chandler denied the allegations, and said he first saw the report when British journalists showed it to him in 2018. The report had originally gone to a client; years later, its contents appeared in the British press. An earlier appeal allowed the claim over the investigator's original publication to proceed, but barred damages for the later British-media republication. A jury later awarded Chandler about eight million dollars. In defamation law, publication means communicating a statement to someone else, not necessarily printing it in a newspaper. The damages dispute concerns which harm came from the original circulation rather than the excluded media coverage. You'll also hear about presumed damages: compensation for reputational injury without proving a specific financial loss. The discovery rule asks when Chandler knew, or reasonably should have known, of injury from the investigator's wrongdoing. Jim Campbell will argue for the investigator and his company; Daniel Watkins will defend Chandler's verdict. Christopher Chandler v. Donald Berlin (No. 26-7008) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official D.C. Circuit recording: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/docs/2026/11/26-7008.mp3 Case, argument date and advocates — official court listing, November 2, 2026: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/bydate/2026/11 Earlier appeal and factual background — Chandler v. Berlin, May 28, 2021: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-caDC-20-07020/pdf/USCOURTS-caDC-20-07020-0.pdf District court background and defamation principles — September 5, 2023 opinion, reproduced by Midpage: https://app.midpage.ai/document/chandler-v-berlin-1000370721785 Trial verdict — October 23, 2024 first-party report by Chandler's trial counsel: https://www.mwpp.com/news-stories/meier-watkins-phillips-pusch-llp-secures-8-million-defamation-verdict-for-philanthropist-and-investor-christopher-chandler

The First Circuit considers whether a murder defendant was denied a fair opportunity to present his defense. A 1994 Massachusetts shooting killed one man and injured another. Jermaine Celester was convicted of second-degree murder at a retrial. His defense was that someone in a passing car fired the shots. Jurors heard evidence about the car and two occupants fleeing police. But the judge excluded the occupants' identities, their relationships with the victims, and conflicting accounts of their whereabouts. Celester says those details would have supported his claim that someone else was responsible. After state courts upheld his conviction, a federal judge denied his habeas petition, a challenge to the legality of his imprisonment. He now appeals that denial. His lawyer will argue that excluding the evidence undermined his only defense. The state will defend the ruling as a reasonable response to speculation. Federal habeas review is not an ordinary appeal of an evidence ruling; it gives state-court decisions substantial deference. The central question is whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law protecting the opportunity to present a defense. Celester v. Lynds (No. 23-1973) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/23-1973_20261102.mp3 Argument date and case — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 District court decision and case background — October 24, 2023, Doc. 35: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-mad-1_21-cv-11523/pdf/USCOURTS-mad-1_21-cv-11523-0.pdf

A pregnancy-discrimination lawsuit becomes a Supreme Court dispute about a defense raised late. Jasmine Younge served as deputy chief of staff and director of policy and programs for the elected district attorney in Fulton County, Georgia. She says she was fired two weeks after announcing her pregnancy and sued under Title Seven, the federal employment-discrimination law. The office later invoked the personal-staff exception to that law's definition of employee, saying her senior role put her outside its coverage. That defense was missing from the office's answer, its formal response to her complaint. After discovery, the evidence-gathering stage, the office raised it and later sought summary judgment: a ruling without trial. The lower courts allowed the defense, finding that the delay had not unfairly harmed Younge's case, and ruled against her. The Supreme Court is examining that procedural ruling, not deciding whether pregnancy discrimination occurred. An affirmative defense supplies a separate legal reason to defeat a claim. Prejudice here means unfair litigation harm, not personal bias. Eric Schnapper will ask the Court to require the normal standards for amending an answer, including good cause when scheduling rules apply. Stephen Petrany will defend the office's position that a late legal defense is permissible when nothing material could have changed. Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office (No. 25-352) — Supreme Court of the United States, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Supreme Court recording: https://www.supremecourt.gov/media/audio/mp3files/25-352.mp3 Official transcript and speaking counsel — November 2, 2026: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2026/25-352_p8k0.pdf Case, granted question and counsel — Supreme Court docket No. 25-352: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-352.html Facts, Title VII coverage and procedural rulings — Eleventh Circuit opinion, April 1, 2025: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-352/368820/20250804175508953_YoungeOpinionsPDF.pdf Younge's allegations and amendment argument — petitioner merits brief: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-352/412882/20260608170007524_25-352%20Brief.pdf Office's coverage and prejudice argument — respondent merits brief: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-352/418311/20260806134746085_25-352%20bs.pdf Discovery and summary judgment — U.S. Courts legal glossary: https://www.uscourts.gov/glossary

A fight over a Rhode Island pond has become a fight over which court gets to decide its price. In 2024, Coventry took Johnson's Pond, its dam, and nearby land from private owners through eminent domain: the government's power to acquire private property for public use with just compensation. The town deposited an estimated one hundred fifty-seven thousand dollars in state court. Soscia Holdings and related companies later sued in federal court for compensation and other damages; they no longer seek to undo the taking. A federal judge halted the state-court compensation proceedings, and the town appealed. The owners rely on Knick, a Supreme Court decision allowing federal takings claims without first litigating for compensation in state court. The question here is whether that access to federal court also justifies stopping the state case. A state compensation judgment might bind the federal court, a concern called preclusion. You'll also hear about abstention: circumstances in which a federal court steps aside despite having authority to hear a case. Nicole Benjamin will argue for the town and its officials. Greg Estabrooks will defend the owners' federal forum. Soscia Holdings, LLC v. Town of Coventry (No. 26-1272) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording (ends during the marshal's administrative adjournment, after all advocacy): https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/26-1272_20261102.mp3 Argument date and case — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 District court injunction and background — March 12, 2026, Doc. 60: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-rid-1_25-cv-00274/pdf/USCOURTS-rid-1_25-cv-00274-1.pdf State condemnation proceedings — Kent County Superior Court, November 7, 2025: https://cases.justia.com/rhode-island/superior-court/2025-24-578.pdf?ts=1762554705 Appellate docket and counsel appearances — No. 26-1272: https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/ca1/26-1272

The First Circuit hears Sandoval versus Mennonite General Hospital, a medical-malpractice appeal from Puerto Rico involving the care of a patient who died. The plaintiffs say doctors failed to obtain follow-up imaging recommended by a radiologist. Their expert would have said that this violated the required standard of medical care. The district judge excluded his testimony, finding that he had not reliably explained the basis for that standard. Without admissible expert evidence, the judge dismissed the claims against the doctors and the treating hospital without a trial. Mennonite General Hospital had already won judgment in an earlier ruling. Much of the appeal concerns whether the expert's report and later affidavit sufficiently explained his opinion. Daubert refers to the judge's screening of expert evidence for relevance and reliability. Sua sponte means acting on the court's own initiative. David Efron will speak for the plaintiffs. Sandoval, et al. v. Mennonite General Hospital, Inc., et al. (No. 25-1270) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording (ends during the court's administrative closing phrase, after all advocacy): https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1270_20261102.mp3 Case and argument date — official First Circuit index: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 Prior ruling and background — D. Puerto Rico, Document 133: https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/puerto-rico/prdce/3%3A2022cv01136/169565/133/0.pdf?ts=1742053882 Counsel appearances — appellate docket, public mirror: https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/ca1/25-1270 Expert-evidence screening — Supreme Court, Kumho Tire: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/97-1709.ZO.html Sua sponte — Cornell Legal Information Institute: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sua_sponte Sua sponte — U.S. Courts glossary: https://www.uscourts.gov/glossary

The First Circuit hears United States versus Trung Nguyen. The prosecution arose from cash-to-Bitcoin conversions through a business called National Vending. Nguyen was convicted of operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business and money laundering. At trial, the judge excluded a proposed defense expert. Nguyen sought a new trial, saying that exclusion had undermined his defense; the request was denied. Expert testimony must be relevant and reliable, and the trial judge screens whether it qualifies. Abuse-of-discretion review gives that judge latitude; an appeals court does not simply replace the trial judge's assessment with its own. A vagueness challenge asks whether a law gives ordinary people fair notice of prohibited conduct and adequate standards against arbitrary enforcement. Bradford Keene will speak for Nguyen. United States v. Trung Nguyen (No. 25-1562) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official First Circuit recording: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1562_20261102.mp3 Case and argument date — official First Circuit index: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11 Case background and verdict — U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/danvers-man-convicted-money-laundering-and-operating-unlicensed-money-transmitting Defense new-trial request — Law360 contemporaneous public case coverage: https://www.law360.com/cases/648355b872d83d05532b8632/articles Prior proceedings — district-court order, Document 134: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-mad-1_23-cr-10148/pdf/USCOURTS-mad-1_23-cr-10148-0.pdf Expert testimony — Federal Rule of Evidence 702: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_702 Expert reliability and review — Supreme Court, Kumho Tire: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/97-1709.ZO.html Expert-evidence review — Supreme Court, General Electric v. Joiner: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-188.ZO.html Fair notice — Supreme Court, Johnson v. United States: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-7120 Fair notice — Supreme Court, FCC v. Fox Television Stations: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/10-1293 Counsel appearance — appellate docket, public mirror: https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/ca1/25-1562

The Federal Circuit hears Orckit's appeal over a patent for moving data through network equipment. The patent describes using one calculation to choose two physical links that a piece of data will travel through. The dispute also involved a federal patent lawsuit between Orckit and Cisco. Cisco asked the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to review the patent. The Board ruled for Cisco and Juniper Networks, finding the challenged claims unpatentable based on an earlier disclosure called Bruckman. Orckit challenges how the Board interpreted its claims: the words defining what the patent protects. Does choosing one link also select a second when the first choice fixes the second? And what must be arranged in parallel? Legal interpretation is reviewed de novo, meaning afresh. Factual findings need substantial evidence: enough relevant evidence for a reasonable mind to accept. George Stamatopoulos of Kobre and Kim will seek reversal for Orckit. Orckit Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (No. 25-1319) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1319_11022026.mp3 Case and argument date — official Federal Circuit index: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/ Background, patent and Board ruling — PTAB IPR2023-00401, Paper 39: https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1550831/download-documents?artifactId=nLhHXQsvAR860QuhZOLR6pUFYI12-HiMehB1Ic0QK1nDzjb27wLi3iI Related patent litigation — D. Del. court-endorsed stipulation, December 4, 2023: https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/ptab-filings%2FIPR2024-01238%2F1014 Patent claims — 35 U.S.C. § 112: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/112 Review standards — Federal Circuit, Apple v. Smart Mobile, page 9: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders/24-1607.OPINION.8-27-2026_2746211.pdf Review standards — Federal Circuit, ST Case1Tech v. Squires, page 6: https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders/23-2387.OPINION.2-18-2026_2649137.pdf Counsel appearances — Federal Circuit docket 25-1319, public mirror: https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/cafc/25-1319 George Stamatopoulos — current Kobre & Kim profile: https://kobrekim.com/people/george-stamatopoulos/

The D.C. Circuit hears from people denied payments from the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund. The fund's administrator, called the Special Master, ruled that they were not eligible for compensation. They sued, saying she had misread the eligibility law. The district court did not decide whether they qualified. It dismissed the lawsuit because it held that Congress had barred court review of compensation decisions. The claimants will argue that deciding eligibility is different from deciding how much to pay, and that legal mistakes remain reviewable. The government will contend that the review ban covers eligibility decisions too. The lawyers also discuss mandamus: a court order directing a government official to carry out a legally required duty. One procedural dispute is whether the claimants properly requested that remedy. The threshold question is whether a court can review the denial, not what payment to award. Roberta Agyeman v. Todd Blanche, et al. (No. 25-5360) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, argued September 28, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official D.C. Circuit recording: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/docs/2026/09/25-5360.mp3 Case, counsel and argument date — official D.C. Circuit listing: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/bydate/2026/9 Background and dismissal — D.D.C. memorandum opinion, September 17, 2025: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-00529/pdf/USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-00529-0.pdf Fund administration and judicial-review provisions — 34 U.S.C. § 20144: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/34/20144 Mandamus jurisdiction — 28 U.S.C. § 1361: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1361

The Ninth Circuit hears the government's appeal over the dismissal of charges against Carlitos Ricardo Parias. He was shot during an immigration arrest in Los Angeles, then charged with assaulting a federal officer. A criminal court approved his release on bail, but ICE transferred him to immigration detention in Adelanto. Permission requirements and scheduling barriers then kept his defense lawyers from consulting with him as trial approached. The district court found a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and dismissed the indictment with prejudice. With prejudice means prosecutors cannot simply refile the same charges. The government will argue that ending the prosecution was too drastic and that lesser remedies were available. Parias will contend that delay would not fix the access problems and would unfairly let prosecutors repair their troubled case. The argument also contrasts the Bail Reform Act, governing release before a criminal trial, with the Immigration and Nationality Act, which separately authorizes immigration detention. USA v. Parias (No. 25-8156) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, argued October 30, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Ninth Circuit recording: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/media/2026/10/30/25-8156.mp3 Case, panel and argument date — official Ninth Circuit archive: https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/cases/streams-videos/archive?case=25-8156&hearingDate=2026-10-30 Counsel-access findings and dismissal — C.D. California, December 27, 2025, court order hosted by NACDL: https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/0838792a-74b1-4f98-b892-e21b4c6f0e9e/gov-uscourts-cacd-995241-76-0.pdf Original assault allegation — federal criminal complaint, October 21, 2025, hosted by NACDL: https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/9688d172-1d90-4270-a287-2059edd1649a/gov-uscourts-cacd-995241-1-0.pdf Arrest and shooting — Los Angeles Times original reporting, October 21, 2025: https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-10-21/immigration-enforcement-hurt-operation-southla

The Fourth Circuit hears Jonathan Green's challenge to his placement on South Carolina's sex-offender registry. A Virginia juvenile court adjudicated him delinquent as a teenager. After his family moved to South Carolina, the local sheriff's office told him to register or face arrest. Green says that requirement was unlawful. He sued for damages and an order removing his information. South Carolina later approved his removal from registration, but the dispute continued over retained historical records. The district court dismissed the damages claims as too late, distinguishing an ongoing unlawful act from the continuing effects of an old act. Green will argue that repeated changes to his registry status and failure to correct it amounted to continuing violations, not merely lasting harm. The defendants will contend that the damages claims came too late and that the remaining records do not justify an order to erase them. An injunction is a court order telling someone to do or stop doing something. Jonathan Green v. Mark Keel (No. 25-6781) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, argued October 30, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — official Fourth Circuit recording: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/25-6781-20261030.mp3 Case and argument date — official Fourth Circuit audio listing: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/oral-argument-audio-files Argument calendar and case synopsis — Fourth Circuit, October 30, 2026: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/cal/internetcalOct272026.pdf Registration background, removal approval, retained records and earlier dismissal — D. South Carolina, August 21, 2023, actual court order reproduced by CounselStack: https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/green-v-dorchester-county-sheriff-office-scd-2023

The Seventh Circuit considers how far police could go after a traffic stop in Wisconsin. After roadside searches found no drugs, deputies handcuffed Justin Bartz, took him to the county jail, and used a body scanner to look for concealed contraband. The scan found no drugs, and he was released. He sued the county and its officers for what he says were unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. The district court ruled for the defendants, finding that officers already had probable cause to arrest him and that the additional searches were reasonable. Bartz's lawyer will argue that the detention was used to gather the evidence needed to justify an arrest, rather than to secure a prompt check by a judge. The defendants will argue that the officers could gather more evidence after an arrest that was already justified. The judges also ask about qualified immunity, which can protect individual officers from damages when existing law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful. Justin Bartz v. Columbia County, Wisconsin (No. 26-1525) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, argued October 30, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/external/nv.26-1525.26-1525_10_30_2026.mp3 Recording listing — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, October 2026: https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/oralArguments/oar.jsp?amonth=10%2F2026&aMonth=List+case%28s%29 Background and summary judgment — Western District of Wisconsin, March 2, 2026, Doc. 49 (public court-file mirror): https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/wisconsin/wiwdc/3%3A2024cv00671/53306/49/0.pdf Qualified immunity — Harlow v. Fitzgerald, Court opinion at 457 U.S. 818–819: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/457/800/

The Fourth Circuit hears a challenge to the Army Corps of Engineers' approval of the Point Farm Mitigation Bank in coastal South Carolina. Mitigation banks provide credits developers can use to compensate for permitted wetland damage elsewhere. The plaintiffs say this bank generates credits by preserving marsh that already had legal protection. So, in their view, the credits do not provide a real environmental offset. The government disputes that premise. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing, treating construction-related harms as over and future development harms as too speculative. Standing requires a concrete personal injury connected to the challenged approval that a court can remedy. The plaintiffs will argue that ongoing credit sales still threaten wetlands they use and enjoy. The government will argue that those concerns depend on hypothetical projects, and that reversing this approval would not remedy the claimed harm. The appeal is about who can bring suit, not yet whether the bank was lawfully approved. Frederick Stuhr v. United States Army Corps of Engineers Charleston (No. 25-1843) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, argued October 30, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/25-1843-20261030.mp3 Recording listing — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/oral-argument-audio-files Argument calendar and case synopsis — Fourth Circuit, October 30, 2026: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/cal/internetcalOct272026.pdf Background and standing dismissal — District of South Carolina, May 1, 2025, Doc. 57 (public court-file mirror): https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/south-carolina/scdce/2%3A2023cv03357/282115/57/0.pdf Standing and reconsideration — District of South Carolina, June 24, 2025, Doc. 65 (public court-file mirror): https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/south-carolina/scdce/2%3A2023cv03357/282115/65/0.pdf

The Fourth Circuit considers whether Timothy Guess can bring another challenge to his federal sentence after receiving a sentence reduction. A judge shortened his prison term but did not give him the full reduction he requested. The order he received did not explain the judge's reasons, a problem noted in the earlier appeal of that reduction. Section twenty-two fifty-five allows federal prisoners to challenge the legality of their convictions or sentences. But strict rules limit second or successive motions. The judges will explore two different ideas: whether a later reduction creates a new judgment, and whether a newly arising claim should count as a repeat challenge. Guess seeks to have his proposed motion treated as a first motion. This hearing concerns whether the motion can proceed, not whether its underlying challenge should win. In re: Timothy Guess (No. 26-0110) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, argued October 30, 2026. Sources: Argument audio — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/26-0110-20261030.mp3 Recording listing — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/oral-argument-audio-files Argument calendar and case synopsis — Fourth Circuit, October 30, 2026: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/cal/internetcalOct272026.pdf Earlier sentence-reduction appeal — United States v. Guess, June 23, 2025, No. 25-6095: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/256095.U.pdf Federal postconviction motions — 28 U.S.C. § 2255: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/2255 Sentence modifications and reductions — 18 U.S.C. § 3582: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3582 Later-arising claims — Panetti v. Quarterman, Court opinion, Section II: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/551/930/