Limits of Duty – Details, episodes & analysis

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Limits of Duty

Cambridge University

Frequency: 1 episode/0d. Total Eps: 5

Talks recorded at the Limits of Duty workshop at Newnham College Cambridge on 14th June 2013. The purpose of the workshop is primarily to foster engagement with issues of supererogation, (over) demandingness, and the value and foundation of duty, and other issues surrounding the limits of duty broadly construed. (Photograph copyright Ad Meskens)

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Demandingness objections in ethics

Friday, June 21, 2013 • Duration 31:22

Paper given by Brian McElwee (University of St. Andrews). Moral theories are frequently rejected on the basis that they are too demanding. I aim to establish what structure convincing demandingness objections must have. Firstly, demandingness objections apply to a theory not primarily in virtue of its ranking of actions, but in virtue of its account of moral requirement. This suggests that theories with consequentialist rankings need not be any more vulnerable to demandingness objections than other plausible moral theories. Secondly, I consider the role that an appeal to cost should have in demandingness objections. I argue that the claim must be understood as an appeal to the costs that the theory calls on moral agents (as opposed to ‘patients’, those affected by the behaviour which the moral theory assesses) to bear. I argue that a plausible account of moral demands must take account of (a) the spontaneous verdicts of our reactive attitudes to agents and (b) typical levels of altruistic motivation.

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Will You Still Love Me Tomorrow? Specifying the Limits of the Robustness of Associative Duties across Change

Friday, June 21, 2013 • Duration 31:28

Paper given by Robbie Arrell (Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne). Special relationships generate associative duties that exhibit robustness across change. It seems insufficient for friendship, for example, if I am only disposed to fulfil associative duties towards you as things stand here and now. However, robustness is not required across all variations. Were you to become monstrously cruel towards me, we might expect that my associative duties towards you would not be robust across that kind of change. The question then is this: is there any principled way of distinguishing those variations that require robustness of the disposition to fulfil associative duties from those that don’t? In this paper I suggest a way of answering this question that draws on the distinction between how things have value, and how we value things – a distinction that is central to the broader account of the sources and generation of associative duties that I propose.

Limits of Duty – Details, episodes & analysis

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Limits of Duty – Details, episodes & analysis

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