When Diplomacy Fails Podcast – Détails, épisodes et analyse

Something special for you here - Alex and I had a great conversation about realism in international relations on his History Impossible podcast, and he was good enough to let me publish it on my feed. If you like political discussions, current affairs, and hearing a bit more about my academia journey, then have a listen to this episode. A huge thanksss to Alex for having me on, and make sure to check out History Impossible!

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What have we learned after 65 episodes of background, analysis, and day-to-day coverage of the most consequential diplomatic failure in human history? What can we say about those responsible for what happened, and is there any value in searching for guilt? Can we distinguish between guilt or responsibility? Is it a cop out to not look for culprits? Should we search for reasons instead?

The July Crisis is a story of human failure on a catastrophic scale, but not all failures were made equally. One is drawn to the behaviour of Austria, Russia, and Germany - the three Eastern powers - who made the war possible. But did they know what they were doing? Were they knowingly moving the world towards disaster, or simply making what they believed was the best choice available to them? Here we wrap up, as much as possible, this incredible story.

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The German army was firmly in control of German policy, but its next steps were obvious to any contemporary with even the slightest grasp of the situation. The detour into Belgium had been flagged long in advance by the French, and could only be looked at in one way. The solution, though not officially announced in Berlin, was to manufacture a wide range of rumours of French border violations into a kind of justification. This was brought to its logical conclusion, as the Germans tried to claim - with a straight face - that they needed to invade Belgium, because the French were about to invade there too, so it was essential for German security.

Who could possibly believe such a naked set of lies? Remarkably, the rumour mill was so effective, that it was persuasive enough within German society, and among German officials. Countless communiques emphasised the defensive nature of Germany's offensive actions, and chastised other Europeans for their lack of understanding. Berlin could try to create this alternative reality, but in truth the Schlieffen Plan was the real driving force behind their actions, and other powers could clearly see this truth. Yet, in a policy which was as cynical as it was cringeworthy, Berlin persevered, insistent to the end that offence was defence, and the invasion of Belgium was an urgent matter of national security.

Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:

1. Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!
2. Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!
3. Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need!

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1956 Episode 1.12 examines a key moment when a Hungarian student protest exploded into something far more encouraging, and for the Soviets, far more dangerous.

The demands of the protesters – joined by workers, peasants, Hungarian communists, soldiers and many more figures besides – were as disconcerting as the threat the protest posed to Soviet control. Still more incredible than the growth of the protest was the transformation of this protest into a riot, and the further transformation of this riot into a revolution.

From these process a rallying cry of hope seemed to spring, as independence and some freedom of action could at last be imagined. Hungarians who had never before dreamed of such things now engaged with all their enthusiasm this most dangerous task – that of standing up to the superpower of the era and their superior in almost every respect. Time would tell if this act would be tragic, or met with miraculous fortune. With far too many individual details to explain here, WDF is so excited to bring its patrons the latest piece of this fascinating story, so make sure you check it out and let me know what you all thought, perhaps by leaving a review in the section of the iTunes store where this series is hosted!

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1956 Episode 1.11 looks at what happened when Moscow decided it’d be a good idea to force Rakosi, the avowed Stalinist, to share power with Imre Nagy, his opposite in almost every respect.

Rakosi wished to maintain the status quo even as his favourite weapons like the secret police were taken away, yet Nagy recognised and appreciated from an early stage that much would have to change. Hungary couldn’t continue on in the manner of a repressed, unhappy vassal, especially if Moscow wished to guarantee the support of all Hungarian people. Nagy proposed limited reforms, but after 1953 it began to become apparent that with Stalin gone and Pandora’s Box opened, it was immensely difficult to keep that box closed.

Every concession granted to the Hungarians provoked calls for greater concessions – every bit of freedom given permitted Hungarians to become braver and more willing to question the apparatus which held them low. Every time Nagy said yes, the Hungarian people seemed to say more, and Rakosi tattled on him to the Soviet leadership. Since this Soviet leadership was undergoing great changes of its own at this stage – as Khrushchev attempted to manoeuvre his way past his rivals – the signals from Moscow were not always clear. Yet after a year it became largely certain that Nagy was on borrowed time.

As we’ll discover in this episode though, while Nagy hadn't done enough to ensure he remained in power, he had done enough to ensure that the Hungarian people did not forget him once he was removed. In a sea of sycophants, the courageous but otherwise bland Nagy stood out, and soon it was his name and his principles, regardless of his political persuasions, that positioned Nagy atop another pole – that of the public affections. As we’ll come to appreciate, this position was to be both a blessing and a fatal curse for Imre Nagy...

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1956 Episode 1.10 continues where we left off last time, and looks a bit more at the person of Matyas Rakosi.

Rakosi was the Stalinist dictator of Hungary from the late 1940s, and he set about establishing a Hungarian Stalinist regime, complete with all the trappings Stalin enjoyed. For every purge, every policy and ever character assassination that the man of steel engaged in, Rakosi felt compelled to demonstrate his loyalty by going still further. He would terrorise the people of Hungary into a burning, resentful, petrified silence, but his hold on power was only as strong as the secret police.

Imre Nagy, a passionate communist and eager reformer of all things Stalinism, was guaranteed to butt heads with a man like Rakosi, and in this episode we examine why this was the case. What were Nagy’s guiding principles, why was he such a committed communist, and what did he bring to the table that a man like Rakosi did not? Nagy was as complex as Rakosi was cruel, but this doesn’t mean we can’t give our best shot at analysing this fascinating individual who became, almost in spite of himself, a hero and then a martyr of the Hungarian people.

This episode is a pivotal instalment as we examine the background to what was to come in Hungary, and how a quiescent vassal became the centre of anti-Soviet sentiment within only a few stormy months. All of this began, of course, in the eventful year of 1956.

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1956 Episode 1.9 takes a somewhat depressing journey into post-war Hungary, to present a story and a people which suffered much over the course of the Soviet occupation – also known as the Soviet ‘liberation’.

Liberation from what, one may ask? Well how about liberation from national pride, freedom of conscience and that all too valuable commodity in history – freedom from fear. Fear was the key ingredient in the Soviet-Hungarian relationship between 1945-56, and in this episode we detail its key characteristics. Why were some Hungarians so eager to serve the Soviets, who were the most loyal Hungarian servants above all, and what were the consequences of this partnership by the time Khrushchev’s secret speech shattered all notions of Stalin-worship?

These are questions we get into in great detail here, so I hope you’ll join us. The story of Hungary is as fascinating and inspiring as it is depressing and tragic, but either way, it is a story worth committing to audio podcast format, because it tells us so much about what life was really like under the Soviet writ, and how the end of the Second World War did not mean the end of foreign rule. The Hungarians had merely swapped one regime, one centre of power, for another, and this one was more determined than ever to hold sway over every aspect of their lives. The Hungarians were desperate for sure, but as 1956 would demonstrate, their spirits and dreams were far, very far, from crushed.

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We continue our story from last time, as the Polish situation is connected to other fascinating questions.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of this chapter in Soviet-Polish relations was the notable involvement of China. The Chinese, it emerged, were very interested in seeing that other peoples travelled their own ‘road to socialism’ as they had done. A Polish road to socialism would validate the unique Chinese experience of struggle over the last few decades, and it would also confirm that Moscow didn’t have the authority to dictate how a communist satellite would feel.

Under the Chinese direction and approval, Poland’s limited revolution and Gomulka’s leadership would be safe, but only because, as we’ll see, Gomulka had zero intentions of truly changing any status quos. Unfortunately, Gomulka’s tenure in office was not destined to be a completely wholesome one. His behaviour over the 1960s would confirm that he was far more loyal and far less independently minded than his initial behaviour may have initially suggested, yet in 1956, Gomulka was the right man for the Polish leadership, and so long as the Polish people agreed, Poland was to be kept within the Soviet orbit, and Gomulka was to be the star pupil of the tumultuous year of 1956, especially in comparison to his Hungarian counterpart Imre Nagy, who we’ll meet in the next few episodes. 

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1956 Episode 1.7 examines the continuing deterioration of the Polish situation, as Polish citizens dared to ask more and more questions, and to criticise the Soviet order, on their lips was one figure above all – Vladislav Gomulka (pictured).

Gomulka was one figure among many who had been disgraced and imprisoned during Stalin’s numerous purges. Gomulka, it was said, was too vocal a critic, and too independent or nationalistically inclined to rule Poland in Moscow’s name. Now though, the Polish people were calling for him, and they were demonstrating on the streets in increasing numbers to do so.

Here we detail how the Soviets dealt with this challenge in one of their most sensitive satellites, and what the major concerns of Polish citizens were in light of the revelations of the secret speech. The story involved a face-off between Gomulka and Khrushchev, as the latter made a stormy visit to Warsaw to see for himself in late October exactly what had gone down in Poland. Khrushchev left not with Gomulka’s head, but with a tacit acceptance of that man’s leadership. The question of why this occurred holds several fascinating answers, so make sure you join us here as we attempt to unpack this incredible episode in Soviet-Polish relations.

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1956 Episode 1.6 examines the tumultuous fallout of Khrushchev’s February speech in the context of Poland.

What was the Polish experience of living in the Soviet orbit? Here we set the scene and trace a bit of the background. It’s a tragic kind of story if you happen to be a Pole, or care about the sovereignty of independent states, but it also makes for fascinating listening. Here we look at a specific example of a revolutionary study, which tore the lid off of Soviet occupied Poland and which exposed its worst excesses to the world. The release of 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘓𝘰𝘯𝘨 𝘞𝘢𝘭𝘬, adopted in 2010 as the film 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘞𝘢𝘺 𝘉𝘢𝘤𝘬, proved to be an indication of things to come in 1956.

The Soviet-Polish relationship both before, during and after the Second World War was a difficult one, fraught with historical grievances, mutual distrust and grand ambitions. After all that had occurred in this portion of the world over the centuries, it was perhaps inevitable that the two peoples could never live peacefully side by side, yet the policies enacted by Stalin immediately following the victories of the Red Army in Poland from late 1944 nonetheless make for startling listening.

Stalin’s approach to Poland was to treat it as the troublesome if necessary little brother of Moscow – to be dominated by its larger neighbour, and always to be suspected and feared. Poles suffered terribly under Soviet rule from 1944-1989, and in the episode we’ll provide the background details for one of the most notable chapters in this 45 year history, as we explain how the Poles responded to news of Khrushchev’s speech.

Remember history friend, if you want extra content and to support my ventures then make sure you head to Patreon! Hours of additional content and other goodies await!

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