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Russian World
Épisode 60
vendredi 11 juillet 2025 • Durée 08:34
At around the same time the video headlining this article was recorded, President Putin was hosting Russian Language, or Pushkin Day. This precedes Russia Day which is celebrated on 12 June. Putin spoke virtually from Novo Ogaryovo, his favoured residence on the outskirts of Moscow which boasts a heated, indoor, Olympic-sized swimming pool. Russian was one of the most expressive languages in the world, he extolled, 'reflecting our spiritual and moral traditions, culture, and unique identity.'
The Russian president often blathers about Russia as a great 'civilisational-state'. It is even written into the country's national security doctrine: 'Russian World'(Russkiy mir) as counterpoint to the wicked 'Collective West'.
A reader glancing at the image would likely imagine it shows two Ukrainian soldiers at the bottom of a sand pit. Not so. The two unfortunates are Russian soldiers - refuseniks. Not visible in the footage is another Russian firing live rounds into the sand around them and taunting them. This 'Russian World' - a reality far removed from the scented, polished corridors of presidential villas in Moscow - is the subject of this article.
'On the Russian Peasant'
In 1922, the Russian writer Maxim Gorky wrote a later much-quoted essay 'On the Russian Peasant'. Why, Gorky mused, were Russians capable of apparently bottomless cruelty? 'I experienced and saw many atrocities. I could never find a justification for their existence …Where does this human cruelty come from?' His view of the Muscovite (Russian) national character was low and deserves to be quoted in full:
'It seems to me that the most striking feature of the Moscow national character is actual cruelty, just like English humour. This is a special cruelty, and at the same time a cold-bloodedly invented measure of the degree of endurance and resistance in patience that man can attain…
The most interesting feature of Moscow brutality is its devilish finesse, its, I would say, aesthetic refinement. I do not think that these features can be explained by such words as "psychosis", "sadism" or similar. Because in essence, they do not explain anything. A consequence of alcoholism? - But I do not think that the people of Moscow were more poisoned by alcohol than other European nations.
However, it must be admitted that the influence of alcohol on the psyche of a Muscovite is particularly fatal because our nation is worse off than others.
I am not talking here about cruelty, which appears sporadically, like an explosion of a sick or perverted soul. These are exceptions that will chill a psychiatrist: here I am talking about mass psychology, about the nation's soul, about collective cruelty.'
In Russia, he concluded, almost everyone enjoys beating someone.
On the 'Special Military Operation'
Putin's 'Special Military Operation' will be remembered for its barbarism. The Russian president arrogantly presumed to take Kyiv in three days and the rest of eastern and southern Ukraine in two weeks. Instead he has mired Russia in a disaster and revealed to the world the true nature of 'Russian World'.
The Donbas, which he presumed to 'liberate', has been turned into a ravaged, depopulated wasteland, a region drained of children, jobs, hope or a future. Scores of settlements and towns have been erased from the map. The 'Russian way of warfare' has proved to be naked banditry.
'This is not the 'second army' of the world,' as one Ukrainian expressed following the invasion, 'this is a bunch of marauders, degenerates, executioners and rapists.' From Kherson to Kharkiv, daily and nightly drone attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure have not stopped for over three years.
Russian contempt for the Laws of Armed Conflict and International Red Cross (IRC) has been breath-taking. Ukrainian PoWs are currently dispersed in around 300 prisons across Russia (Ukraine maintains five transit centres and five permanent prisons).
Moscow will not allow the IRC anywhere near Ukrainian PoWs and...
Creating internal dilemmas: The Gendering of Grey-Zone Warfare
Épisode 59
mercredi 9 juillet 2025 • Durée 09:11
"Russia's hybrid attacks against NATO look like war", writes Deborah Haynes for Sky News. She is referring to grey-zone warfare, attacks that sit under the threshold of conventional war and include sabotage, cyber hacks, and assassination plots. Significantly, this is not the first caution published in the recent media of Russia's employment of this type of warfare and the risks of a failed NATO response.
As Edward Lucas warns in The Times, Russia's war in the grey zone is actually chipping away at the heart of NATO.
When I read these warnings, my gendered military experiences are at the forefront of my mind. I am a female, current serving RAF Reservist and former RAF Regular. I am also a PhD student, with my research centres around gender and RAF organisational culture.
Whilst connecting diversity, inclusion and sub-threshold warfare may seem a stretch to some and arguably to others, a further distraction from the more immediate threat of war, I am well aware that the impact of grey-zone warfare has far reaching consequences.
Grey-zone warfare conducted in 'peacetime' using information, money, or even physical force is powerful. Not only does it have a physical impact on UK and NATO defence through the seemingly endless impact of drones, hired thugs, and now "seabed sabotage" damaging infrastructure, energy, computer networks or transport systems; but most significantly, the cohesive nature in which we fight together, reducing the ability to defend against threats.
By "posing dilemmas and stoking divisions" the MoD is being pulled in ways which undermine the foundations of the organisations purpose.
The real target, as Edward Lucas writes, is decision making. The act of distracting and undermining decision making equates to sub-threshold warfare, reducing the ability to effectively operate. So where does gender and diversity link in?
In the real world?
In November 2024, the HMNZS Manawanui, a New Zealand Naval ship, crashed and subsequently sank under the command of Yvonne Gray, whose Naval career notably spanned over 30-years in both the New Zealand and Royal Navy. Despite this, her gender and sexuality were directly attributed to the incident. As a "diversity hire", she has faced a barrage of hostile and toxic abuse in the street.
Quoted directly in The Times, John Mclean, author of A Mission of Honour: The Royal Navy in The Pacific, clearly outlines the problem. "The Navy is over-promoting women beyond their capacity in order to meet gender and sexual orientation goals". In New Zealand, other women in uniform received similar abuse in the wake of the incident.
March this year saw one of the worst weeks for aviation history in the US, as a commercial jet and military helicopter collided in Washington DC. In immediate response, President Trump blamed D&I initiatives and so called 'diversity hires' as the reason for the accidents and a Transgender pilot was wrongly blamed and vilified for the crash.
When only 2 days later a small medical transport plane crashed in Philadelphia, it was unsurprising that the mourning family of one of the pilots refuses to release their name, out of concerns for gendered attacks and abuse.
Pervasive and closer to home, these type of gendered attacks are gaining momentum and increasing in prevalence. When a group of Palestine Action protestors recently broke into RAF Brize Norton and vandalise a Voyager aircraft, the Station Commander of RAF Brize Norton, a female Group Captain, was outwardly mocked as a 'woke wing commander' and forced to deactivate her social media due to gendered trolling attacks.
The attacks against her cite her gender as the reason for her position, and it is because of this that the airfield security failed.
In a paradoxical twist, the effort to resolve such issues of gendered discrimination is far reaching in its risk of being a mere rhetoric of inclusion. Within the same week of the sinking of the HMNZA Manawanui, Kevin Maher states in The Times, "I couldn't interview ...
The UK's F-35 Procurement Strategy: A Balancing Act
Épisode 58
vendredi 4 juillet 2025 • Durée 18:47
The United Kingdom's procurement of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, encompassing both the F-35B and F-35A variants, reflects a complex interplay of strategic, operational, political, and industrial considerations spanning decades. The 1998 decision to select the F-35B, driven by industrial pressures and inter-service rivalries, laid the foundation for the UK's Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) capability via the Royal Navy's Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers.
The recent announcement to procure 12 F-35A jets, as part of the planned 138 F-35s, introduces a tactical nuclear role for the Royal Air Force (RAF) within NATO's nuclear-sharing framework. This paper examines the 1998 F-35B selection, the rationale for excluding the F-35A and F-35C, the motivations for the 2025 F-35A acquisition, and the multifaceted challenges, including impacts on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), infrastructure, training, sovereignty, and CEPP.
It argues that while the F-35A's assignment to 207 Squadron (OCU) and short-term cost savings address immediate needs, the legacy of 1998 decisions, combined with current policy shifts, risks undermining GCAP, increasing long-term costs, and enables Lockheed Martin to exploit tensions with GCAP partners Italy and Japan, jeopardising the our strategic autonomy and future air combat capabilities.
The 1998 Decision to Select the F-35B and Inter-Service Pressures
The UK's commitment to the F-35B originated in the late 1990s, formalised in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), which prioritised restoring a credible carrier strike capability lost with the retirement of the Invincible-class carriers and Sea Harrier FA2 by 2006.
As a Tier 1 partner in the US-led Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme, the UK evaluated three F-35 variants: the F-35A (conventional take-off and landing), F-35B (Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing, STOVL), and F-35C (carrier-based, catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery, CATOBAR).
The Royal Navy initially favoured the F-35C, which offered greater range (1,200 nautical miles versus 900 for the F-35B), higher payload, and compatibility with CATOBAR systems, aligning with ambitions for a more capable Queen Elizabeth-class carrier design. However, political and industrial pressures tipped the scales toward the F-35B.
Rolls-Royce exerted significant influence, advocating for the F-35B due to its role in developing the LiftSystem for STOVL operations, securing substantial workshare and economic benefits for British industry. Other UK firms, including BAE Systems, supported the F-35B, as it ensured integration with the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers' STOVL configuration, avoiding costly CATOBAR retrofits estimated at £2 billion per carrier.
The Labour government, under Tony Blair, prioritised industrial jobs and domestic manufacturing, aligning with the SDR's emphasis on economic dividends from defence spending. The F-35B's selection promised thousands of jobs in Rolls-Royce's Bristol facilities and BAE's supply chain, outweighing the Royal Navy's operational arguments for the F-35C.
Inter-service rivalries further shaped the decision. The RAF, keen to consolidate its dominance in fixed-wing aviation, supported the F-35B's joint RAF-RN operation, arguing it could serve both carrier and land-based roles, simplifying logistics and training. This contrasted with the F-35C, which would have entrenched the Royal Navy-centric carrier operations.
To fund the F-35B programme and the carriers' development, the MoD faced intense inter-service pressures, leading to the controversial early retirement of the Harrier fleet. The RAF lobbied to retire the Royal Navy's FA2 (Sea Harrier) by 2006, citing its limited air-to-air capabilities compared to the F-35B's multi-role potential. Subsequently, the 2010 SDSR accelerated the retirement of the RAF's Harrier GR9 fleet, completed by 2011, despite its proven effectiveness in Afghanistan and Libya.
RAF leaders argued that resou...
#WavellReviews War in the Smartphone Age by Matthew Ford
Épisode 57
mercredi 2 juillet 2025 • Durée 06:45
War in the Smartphone Age explores how modern technologies, particularly smartphones, are transforming the character of conflict. Dr Matthew Ford, an Associate Professor in War Studies, makes a compelling case that "peeling back the layers of technology makes it possible to use the smartphone for the purposes of war." The smartphone is no longer just a communications tool; it is rapidly becoming both a weapon and a battlefield. Military readers may think we already know this.
We argue that you don't, and that War in the Smartphone Age will add to any readers understanding.
But this is not a book solely about phones. Rather, War in the Smartphone Age is a study of the wider technological infrastructure, physical and data, that underpins modern warfare. Ford examines the evolving relationships between governments and tech companies, the weaponisation of information, and the role digital platforms play in shaping conflict.
Through case studies from the Middle East, Ukraine, and the Israeli Defence Force, using both conventional militaries and other groups, he demonstrates how these technologies are being deployed in powerful and transformative ways.
Things we can now see and do on a smartphone have already changed how wars are conducted . This is not the future, the smart phone age is now.
One of the book's core concepts is the "stack": a layered model that connects physical systems with abstract decision-making. At the top is data storage; at the bottom, the human decision-maker. Ford argues persuasively that to navigate or fight effectively in this new battlespace, we must understand every layer in between.
Through the case studies, Ford shows how different actors have weaponised the smartphone environment. The Israeli Defence Force's tight control of data and infrastructure is one such example, albeit dependent on physical infrastructure. The limits and dependencies of the strategy are explored and Ford shows that a whole society approach is needed to fight effectively in the smartphone age.
From the selection of the future fighters to how the power of data is used by the most simple soldier, War in the Smartphone Age left us feeling that we probably should have had a better understanding of it all before we did.
But Ford doesn't stop at strategy. He also explores the moral and legal questions these technologies raise. Should facial recognition be permitted as a tool of war? When civilians use their phones to collect targeting data, do they become combatants? These questions strike at the heart of international humanitarian law in an era of participative warfare.
This idea, participative warfare, is a central theme. Ford highlights, for instance, Ukrainian civilians uploading images to military apps, directly contributing to the targeting process. Civilians have always reported enemy activity, but smartphones make this instantaneous, radically increasing the speed and precision of strikes.
War in the Smartphone Age also adds insights to legal and operational debates. For example, how can evidence gathered from open-source intelligence meet legal thresholds for prosecution? Ford notes that states, corporations, and individuals apply different ethical standards, and he questions whether big data companies should play a greater role in regulating wartime data flows.
There are areas you could find to disagree. The prevalence of data networks, which seem easily targetable in a 'real' war, or the resource required, and surely not all war will be this way in the future, we'll run out of energy before it can happen? Futurists have been wrong before, after all. And then the books title will bring you back to earth as you pick up your smart phone.
Smartphones are everywhere, as Ford notes they are the last things we lose and have a global dependency on them far deeper and more engrained than most imagine. Ford doesn't offer easy answers, but he certainly raises the right questions.
Perhaps the most sobering chapter is the last, titl...
Making NATO More Agile and Lethal: A Digital Insurgency is Underway
Épisode 56
vendredi 20 juin 2025 • Durée 18:07
"Nothing After Two O'clock" or "No Action, Talk Only" are well-worn jabs at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that once resonated with a certain truth. They conjured images of bureaucratic inertia and a disconnect between lofty pronouncements and concrete action. This has changed. NATO's Allied Command Operations is shifting its culture to rapidly adopt new technologies and capabilities at record breaking speed.
A prime example is the recent acquisition of Palantir's Maven Smart System in under six months - a process that previously took up to two decades. A surging movement of digital insurgents within NATO is redefining what is achievable. The time for talk has ended; it is now an era of relentless execution and swift delivery of crucial capabilities to the warfighter.
A landscape rewritten
While the Alliance's core mission of collective defence enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains sacrosanct, the strategic environment has undergone a seismic shift, demanding a fundamental reassessment of NATO's capabilities and operational posture. This is not your father's NATO.
The comfortable certainties of the Cold War era, with its clearly defined adversary and predictable battlefields, have given way to a complex and fluid landscape characterised by resurgent great power competition, the weaponisation of information, the blurring lines between peace and war, and the rapid advance of technology transforming how wars are fought and won.
As underscored by the 2022 Strategic Concept and the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area strategy, NATO faces a multitude of evolving threats, from state-sponsored aggression and terrorism to cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, and the disruptive potential of emerging technologies. These all converge to challenge the international rules-based order that underpins the security of NATO's nearly one billion citizens.
This necessitates a renewed focus on deterrence and defence across all domains, including the increasingly critical digital sphere.
The rise of artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and other advanced technologies is not merely a technological evolution; it represents a revolution in military affairs, fundamentally altering the character of contemporary warfare. The analytic horsepower backing these technologies creates an unmatched acceleration within a decision cycle. This reality has spurred a top-down and bottom-up movement for change within Allied Command Operations, the Alliance's military instrument of power.
Led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Allied Command Operations is driving a transformation aligned with NATO's evolving strategy and plans, ushering in a renaissance in Allied operations.
From within the ranks
At the forefront of this effort is a nascent but increasingly influential bottom-up group of "digital insurgents," a cross-generational, multinational cohort of tech-savvy individuals. These insurgents are working to drive NATO's transition towards rapid and effective technology adoption, focused on warfighting and warfighters.
This is not a nostalgic yearning for a romanticized past or empty slogans; it's about recognising the imperative for NATO to be more agile and lethal, leveraging the most powerful technologies available to maintain its strategic edge. The world's most powerful Alliance in history needs the most powerful tools to plan, operate, and fight.
We, the authors, are active participants in this digital insurgency - we are Task Force Maven. On March 25, 2025, the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) and Palantir Technologies Inc. (Palantir) finalised the acquisition of the Maven Smart System for employment within the Alliance. Our task now is implementation and fostering an environment of speed, agility, and adaptability.
Yet, this is not a story about a specific technology but one about NATO's people, culture, and the fight to keep pace with an accelerating future.
Task Force Maven was for...
S-400 Debut in South Asia: Limits of Tech Supremacy
Épisode 55
mercredi 18 juin 2025 • Durée 07:22
Amongst contemporary systems, the Russian S-400 has been perceived as one of the most advanced air defence system. With a layered defence of 4km, 120 km, 250km and 400km respectively, the system is claimed to cover a wide range of aerial threats ranging from aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), ballistic and cruise missiles. In South Asia, the S-400 was perceived as a one-stop solution for protecting India's airspace against aerial threats.
In fact, the system was tagged as Sudarshan Chakra in India, signalling divine power. However, the recent India-Pakistan conflict has helped debunk such heightened claims.
Till now, three batteries have been deployed by India near the border region, with the remaining two expected to be delivered in late-2025 and 2026. The technology is aimed at augmenting India's layered defence system comprising Prithvi Air Defence System (PAD), Advanced Air Defence System (AAD), Barak-8 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile System, Aakash Area Defence Missile System, and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System II (NASAMS-II)
India's S-400 system made its debut in South Asia in the recent Indo-Pak standoff, where the robustness of aerial assets was extensively tested via the use of aircraft, missiles, loitering munitions and advanced drones. One key takeaway from the brief conflict appears to be the vulnerability of the system. This is despite official claims from the Indian Air Force of its robustness..
While such high-profile systems may serve symbolic or deterrent functions, their limited coverage often creates exploitable gaps, enabling the intrusion of aerial assets
It has been claimed that a Chinese-made CM-400AKG air-to-surface missile, launched by Pakistan Air Force JF-17s was used successfully against the S-400 batteries in Adampur and Poonch, inflicting damage to the radar components. In order to refute the claim, Prime Minister Modi's media team used an image of an S-400 launcher in the background of his address at Adampur base. However, the image of the intact launchers does not negate Pakistan's stance.
Merely attacking the launchers is not the only way to render an ADS ineffective given that the same can be achieved via attacking its radars, sensors and network nodes. The fact remains that during combat, the S-400 failed to intercept or protect against the downing of six Indian aircraft by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).
Notably, Pakistani JF-17s, operating well within the S-400's stated engagement envelope, evaded detection and successfully penetrated the defensive shield to strike at the system's radar. This reflects PAF's effective use of deception, strong electronic jamming, and BVR strike capabilities.
The fog of war further complicates air defence operations. On May 7th, India deployed nearly 70 aircraft against 42 advanced Pakistani jets creating overlapping tracks that strained its air defence system (ADS). Low- and high-altitude threats can also challenge the system's readiness, with success rates varying across different target types, including ballistic and cruise missiles.
Integration is further hampered by India's multi-origin arsenal from the United States, Israel, Russia, and France, which limits interoperability and network cohesion. Pakistan's use of largely Chinese-sourced air defence systems removes this level of complexity. Compounding this is the lack of seamless coordination between the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, undermining unified ADS performance. Hypersonic technology adds a new layer of complexity for any ADS.
While the S-400 is technically mobile, its relocation is logistically complex and resource-intensive. Each battery comprises heavy transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), multiple radar units, command and control vehicles, and trained personnel making rapid redeployment during conflict both time-consuming and operationally demanding.
Relocation also creates a vulnerability window that can be exploited through preemptive strikes.In future aerial...
The false promise of new technology: the British Army and the (new) calibre debate
Épisode 54
mercredi 11 juin 2025 • Durée 18:53
It is the lot of the infantry to hold ground and get shot at. This is the mundane history of the infantry, not the story you hear during training at Catterick or Brecon. But our social media feeds show us the reality. Soldiers in Ukraine are repeatedly filmed sitting in trenches waiting to be mortared, attacked by artillery or chased by a suicide FPV drone.
Encounters involving small infantry units engaging each other are rare; instead, remote firepower remains the dominant killer on the 21st century battlefield. Despite this, however, we are once again considering changes to small arms and small arms ammunition. This is being driven by discussions of lethal effect against body armour at over 600 metres.
In this short commentary piece, I want to put the selection of a new rifle and ammunition into its wider societal, historical and organisational context. In the process I hope to persuade readers that the Army should not put new ammunition at the top of its priority list.
Although relative to the specific environment and type of conflict, comparatively speaking, the infantry is the least lethal branch of the armed forces.1 Paradoxically, however, the infantry sits at the heart of the army's identity and purpose. As representatives of the polity, infantry soldiers embody the social contract between the citizen and the nation.
As I argue in Weapon of Choice this contract is underwritten by the engineer and the rifles they create.2 Framed this way, the rifle is more than a weapon. It becomes the tangible symbol of the bond between the state and its soldiers.
If the state cannot provide a reliable and effective rifle, then it has failed at upholding its side of this foundational bargain. Getting small arms acquisition wrong not only jeopardises military effectiveness but it also risks the legitimacy of the sovereign state. The stakes are therefore far greater than the practicalities of small arms calibre or the frailties of weapon design. They touch on the very principles of governance and trust between the nation and its defenders.
If the state cannot provide a reliable and effective rifle, then it has failed at upholding its side of this foundational bargain.
Unfortunately, since at least the middle of the 19th century, the introduction of every new service rifle with the British Army has been associated with controversy of some sort. The Martini Henry failed in the Sudan in 1884. The Short Magazine Lee-Enfield heralded arguments about the utility of the cavalry. The introduction of Fabrique Nationale's Self-Loading Rifle occurred only because the Americans rejected an intermediate calibre in the 1950s.
And of course, the SA80 failed in the desert during the First Gulf War and was subsequently suspended - at the request of the UK's NATO delegate on small arms - from the Alliance's Nominated Weapon List.3
Rifle failure
Given the symbolism and significance of the rifle and the long history of failure associated with its introduction into the Army, buying a new design of small arms and ammunition needs to be done with considerable care. In part this is because the UK no longer has the industrial capacity to produce a large fleet of weapons and will need to recalibrate existing ammunition production for a new calibre.
Buying small batches of bespoke ammunition and specialist weapons does not necessarily create problems. However, buying a new fleet of rifles to fill the requirements of an entire Army brings with it unique practical challenges associated with introducing a new system, a new ammunition and the development of a new production line.
Take, for example, the Enfield Weapon System (EWS). The EWS was the pre-cursor to the SA80. Initially designed for a 4.85mm round, the weapon was specifically intended to allow the infantry to fight from an armoured fighting vehicle and be used in close quarters.
The small calibre was selected primarily because 7.62mm ammunition was completely inappropriate for use in Northern Ireland wher...
Is Autonomy the End of the Naval Warfare Officer
Épisode 53
mercredi 4 juin 2025 • Durée 14:53
The end of the Warfare Officer?
You're not unskilled, they're the wrong skills.
In a rain-beaten marina on a rugged coastline, near a nameless village more familiar with fishing than fleet operations, a teenage Able Seaman sits inside a converted shipping container. Watching a laptop screen, they remotely pilot a small crewless boat through choppy waters via a suite of cameras and RADAR feeds. For all intents and purposes, they are the Captain.
Down the road, on a slipway framed with lobster pots and fishing gear, a Petty Officer and Leading Hand haul 15-metres of uncrewed craft onto a trailer. With a police escort arranged and explosives securely stowed in a separate vehicle, they tow it down narrow B-roads to its next launch site. Followed by a small convoy of HGVs containing ancillary equipment and spares.
Armed with little more than an expense account the skill to reverse an oversized trailer, they fulfil the traditional roles of Navigator and Officer of the Watch where moving naval fighting capabilities is concerned.
These scenes stand in stark contrast to the age-old image of a Commanding Officer directing a Frigates movement across open sea from his chair on the bridge. Modern navies are undergoing a seismic shift in relevance, away from the skill set of their senior officers who cut their teeth on 5,000-tonne, 130-metre warships and bigger, and toward young operators and technicians independently deploying tiny uncrewed systems from the backs of lorries to greater maritime effect.
The hierarchy of most navies has long been built around crewing entire flotillas of ships, with only a limited number of shore-based roles supporting operations from the rear. But the rise of autonomous platforms is disrupting that structure, challenging the relevance of the traditional command pipeline.
In tomorrow's navy, do expert leaders qualified in seamanship and commanding operations from capital ships offer more value than an Able Seaman who can command multiple vessels from a single screen? What does it mean to grow officers through the classic path of shipboard appointments when the conventional warship is fast becoming the exception, not the rule? If most naval capability in the future is delivered from shore, operated remotely, or automated entirely, then is the role of the seagoing
'sailor' now something rare and specialised, less a core function and more a niche within a much broader system biasing towards land operations with maritime effectors deployed at reach?
Today, battles at sea are already being won by lone teenagers remotely piloting a USV with helm controls mapped to a modified Xbox controller and laptop from miles away, supported by a mechanic with a Cat C+E licence hauling the latest capability on a trailer, as by a seasoned commander on the bridge of a warship with charge of a crew several hundred strong.
Modern Navies are discovering that expertise in the latest iteration of nautical skills no longer guarantees expert opinion in utilising modern technology. This article argues that autonomy and uncrewed systems are reshaping naval power, placing greater importance on digital literacy and low level mechanical skills found in trades once considered vocational, rather than the strategic conversations based on traditional strategic warfare roles.
Navies around the world are rapidly adopting uncrewed systems, on the surface, underwater, and in the air, to take on roles once reserved for fully crewed warships. The U.S. Navy's Ghost Fleet Overlord programme, for example, fields 90-metre drone ships that have sailed thousands of miles and even launched missiles under remote supervision by operators too junior to stand a traditional bridge watch.
Australia has followed suit with Sentinel, a converted patrol boat and now the country's largest autonomous vessel, monitored by a skeleton crew of engineers camping onboard and advanced autonomy software.
The Royal Navy, meanwhile, has demonstrated this shift through its NavyX...
On Warrior Culture
Épisode 52
samedi 31 mai 2025 • Durée 09:07
Editor's note: This piece is slightly different to our normal ones. It's more akin to a blog and written in the first person. However, we deemed it interesting given the writer, where they are, and the wider context.
Although I am not an infantryman, I am assigned to an infantry unit here in the USA. At our recent dining out, talk inevitably turned to Saint Maurice. For those who do not know, Saint Maurice is the patron saint of infantrymen. When it came time for the commander to induct a select few into the Order of Saint Maurice, I heard the script - which includes the story of Saint Maurice - as if it was for the first time.
Maurice was ordered to have his legionnaires offer pagan sacrifices before battle near the Rhone at Martigny. The Theban Legion refused to participate, and also refused to kill innocent civilians in the conduct of their duty, and withdrew to the town of Agaunum. Enraged, Maximian ordered every tenth man killed, yet they still refused. A second time the General ordered Maurice's men to participate and again they refused.
Maurice declared his earnest desire to obey every order lawful in the eyes of God. "We have seen our comrades killed," came the reply. "Rather than sorrow, we rejoice at the honor done to them."
I had been in a funk for the preceding few weeks. Like all members of the profession of arms I had been trying to make sense of the changes in Department policy and U.S. foreign policy that had been cascading out of the National Command Authority. Everything seemed to be in flux. Opinions among my peers differed. Nothing seemed to make sense. And then I heard this story and suddenly I felt better.
I am not a religious man. And even if I were, the religion of my ancestors did not include the veneration of saints (if you must know, I'm Jewish, but you can only get military inspiration from the stories of the Maccabean Revolt so many times before you need to look further afield for inspiration). But in a time when everyone is talking about "warrior culture" - and not necessarily in a way that made good sense - the story of Saint Maurice seemed like it held some sort of answer.
As a good cavalryman, I went straight to the story of Saint George.
As a result of his personal bravery, this man - then known as Nestor of Cappodocia - became a member of the Roman Emperor Diocletian's personal bodyguard. In 303 AD, Diocletian issued an edict in Nicodemia, now a part of Turkey, that ordered the destruction of all Christian Churches, sacred writings and books, and outlawing all Christians who did not, on the surface at least, conform to paganry.
Upon seeing the edict, Nestor tore it down. For his act and his refusal to abide by the pagan emperor's edict, Nestor was imprisoned, tortured, and executed. Early Christians changed Nestor's name to George, and he became associated with bravery, dedication to faith, and decency.
The legend of St. George's defeating the dragon perpetuates the might of the mounted warrior over the forces of evil. It is an Italian legend dating from the 12th Century, and the story goes like this: Near the city of Silene, a frightful dragon came to live in a marshy swamp, and its breath poisoned all who attempted to drive it away. To protect themselves, the citizens offered the dragon two sheep every day. Soon, however, they ran out of sheep, and human sacrifices were then drawn by lot.
One day, the lot fell to the king's daughter. She was left in the swamp to face the dragon, and this is where St. George finds her during his travels. In a fierce combat, George defeats the dragon but does not kill it. Instead, he ties the princess' waistband around the dragon's neck and has her lead it back to the city. There he promises to slay the dragon if the people will embrace the Christian faith. This they agree to do, and he kills the dragon.
Later, of course, the dragon came to represent the embodiment of evil and hatred rather than an animal, but the moral remained. The heroism and faith of S...
Cheap is good enough
Épisode 51
mercredi 14 mai 2025 • Durée 12:01
With the imminent publication of the new government's first Strategic Defence Review this article throws out a challenge. Can we make the first cheap British Army division of the modern period? Can we afford not to?
The 'world-beating' delusion
Britain has a 'world-beating' epidemic. It would be funny if we were not paying such a high cost for this delusion. Who started it may be debated. That it has become an empty boast is indisputable. The graph below shows the frequency of use of the phrase in Parliament. It has only got worse.
How is Britain world-beating? Our social statistics certainly attract attention:
40% of adults pay no income tax, because their annual income does not exceed the £12,570 personal allowance threshold;
One third of 35-45 year olds in England now rents (it was one in ten at the beginning of the century), and four in every ten of the private renters is receiving housing benefit (or they would be on the street);
By the time Universal Credit is fully rolled out, one in four working age households will be receiving it;
Almost one fifth of Britain's school children, apparently, have special educational needs;
At the other end of the scale, Britain's graduates now collectively owe around £240 billion in student loans;
Over one million16-24 years olds are neither in education, employment nor training (the NEETs), the main reason cited is 'mental health', remedied by a Personal Independence Payment (PIP) (over 3.3 million Britons in England and Wales were claiming a PIP last year).
And so we could go on.
How the British Army is 'world-beating' also raises questions. Marlborough's Grand Alliance army at the beginning of the 18th century was bigger. Cromwell had more cavalry regiments. The country that invented the tank can today deploy and sustain one tank regiment (plainly, there must be a reserve or you would be unable to rotate troops). The British Army is effectively air defenceless.
In one of the most painful sagas of many in recent times, the Army will finally be receiving a new armoured personnel carrier, 20 years late, and with no weapon beyond a machinegun. And personnel statistics, perhaps reflecting wider society, do not make happy reading. Just five years ago, around 4,500 service personnel brought claims against the MOD.
Today the number has jumped to almost 7,000 - or roughly, one in every 17th serviceman or woman on a parade square is making a claim against the MOD. Is serving in the (smaller) non-operational Army really so dangerous? Has the MOD become more negligent in the last five years?
We can't go on like this. The first thing we must do is face reality and drop the 'world-beating' delusion.
Good, better, best
In the early 1960s, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara - America's most talented holder of the post in the second half of the 20th century - coined the phrase 'Good, better, best', in an interview with LIFE magazine. The Ford 'whizz kid' ('human IBM machine' was his other nickname) had been recruited by Kennedy to reform the bloated Department of Defence. He did, against some opposition.
'Good, better, best' referred to defence kit. The majority of defence kit, McNamara argued, just needs to be good. A small proportion needs to be better. And the smallest proportion needs to be 'the best'. The reason was cost. If each of the services proposed the best kit, every time, the defence budget would be bankrupted. Who knows what McNamara would make of Washington's trillion dollar defence budget today. His wisdom is certainly missed.
Or cheap is good enough
Or, perhaps, we could shorten McNamara's dictum and simply state cheap is good enough, most of the time. We were good at cheap. It was the foundation for what today would be called 'success stories'. The Land Rover story began in 1947 with Rover responding to a War Department requirement for a cheap, jeep-like, utility vehicle. Millions have since rolled off the production line.
In contrast, a recently procured patrol vehicle (this auth...
