Explorez tous les épisodes du podcast VoxTalks Economics
| Titre | Date | Durée | |
|---|---|---|---|
| S9 Ep63: Inflation and the polarisation of reality | 13 nov. 2026 | 00:25:56 | |
In recent years, shoppers in Türkiye do not need the evening news to tell them prices have been rising, because they see it at the till. But the till only tells you about the history of inflation. When they turn on the television, the news might tell them what to expect next, and which channel they choose will matter. Orkun Saka (City St George's, University of London) and his co-authors matched a monthly household survey to the transcripts of prime-time news on 13 Turkish channels. He tells Tim Phillips about how the way a channel talks more about inflation, and how often it mentions the word, affects what viewers expect will happen next. Do polarised TV channels lead to a "polarisation of reality"? The research behind this episode: Demiralp, Selva, Orkun Saka, and Michael Weber. 2026. "Polarized Media and Inflation Expectations." CEPR Discussion Paper 21747. Paris and London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Orkun Saka. 2026. “Inflation and the polarisation of reality.” VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Heterodox monetary policy. For several years the Turkish government argued that lower interest rates would bring inflation down, the reverse of the textbook view. In the experiment, respondents were asked whether they agree that "lower interest rates are needed to curb high inflation"; neutral-channel viewers whose inflation expectations rose became less likely to agree. Freedom House press rating. In 2014, Freedom House downgraded Türkiye's press from "partly free" to "not free" in its annual Freedom of the Press report. The paper uses this, with evidence on media ownership and regulation, as background to its classification of 13 channels as pro-government, neutral or pro-opposition. Koç University Household Inflation Expectations Survey (KUHIES). Koç University. 2024. Koç University Household Inflation Expectations Survey. A nationally representative monthly survey of about 2,500 Turkish adults, launched in January 2024. It asks respondents what inflation was over the past 12 months, what it will be over the next 12, which channel they watch for prime-time news and how they voted in 2023. In the paper's sample, mean expected inflation was 101%. News selection as a signal. Nimark, Kristoffer P., and Stefan Pitschner. 2019. "News Media and Delegated Information Choice." Journal of Economic Theory 181: 160-196. Newsrooms decide what is important enough to report, so the choice to cover a topic tells the audience something before they hear a word of the story. Orkun's finding that the amount of inflation coverage matters more than its tone fits this idea. The 2024 local elections. Turkey held local elections on 31 March 2024. In the run-up, election news crowded economic news out of prime time, so inflation coverage fell for reasons unrelated to viewers' beliefs. The authors use this as a natural experiment; as coverage fell, expectations fell with it. Bayesian updating. A way of describing how people revise beliefs; they start from a prior, see new information, and arrive at a posterior that weighs the two. People with weak priors move further when new information arrives. In the experiment, the test is whether the usual close link between a respondent's prior and posterior inflation expectation weakens after reading a news story. Experimenter demand effects. de Quidt, Jonathan, Johannes Haushofer, and Christopher Roth. 2018. "Measuring and Bounding Experimenter Demand." American Economic Review 108 (11): 3266-3302. Survey participants may give the answer they think the researcher wants. To reduce this, the experiment asked about posterior expectations using a differently worded question from the first. The polarisation of reality. Alesina, Alberto, Armando Miano, and Stefanie Stantcheva. 2020. "The Polarization of Reality." AEA Papers and Proceedings 110: 324-328. People with different political views hold systematically different beliefs about the same facts. Orkun argues that inflation is a particularly worrying place for this to happen, because monetary policy depends on a shared view of where prices are going. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Social media polarization. Yves Zenou on when social media pulls opinions apart and when it brings people together, the open question Orkun raises at the end of this episode. Related reading on VoxEU Household inflation expectations: Taking stock of the recent research insights for monetary policy, a VoxEU column by Francesco D'Acunto, Evangelos Charalambakis, Dimitris Georgarakos, Geoff Kenny, Justus Meyer and Michael Weber on how households form and act on inflation beliefs. Monetary policy in the news: The FOMC's media coverage and inflation expectations, a VoxEU column showing that hawkish media coverage of the Federal Reserve lowers households' inflation expectations, especially when inflation is high. | |||
| S9 Ep62: How well do bug bounties work? | 06 nov. 2026 | 00:20:12 | |
For three decades years, software makers have paid bug bounty hunters to break their code so they can make it more secure. Recently, some software companies have decided that bug bounties programmes aren't useful any more: Curl shut its bounty in January, and Intel suspended its own in September. And the discovery of the PHP flaw that sent websites offline in October came from researchers working with AI, not from a bounty hunter's report. Tobias Kretschmer (Imperial College London, CEPR) and his co-authors followed 86 programmes on Bugcrowd to discover how they work best. Do you run closed programmes, open only to invited hackers, or open them to all comers? And what happens now that AI is making a bug report cheaper to produce? Tim Phillips asks Kretschmer how well bug bounties are working. The research behind this episode: Zrahia, Aviram, Sarit Markovich, and Tobias Kretschmer. 2026. "Platform Openness: Evidence from Bug Bounty Programs." CEPR Discussion Paper 21970 (gated). To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Tobias Kretschmer. 2026. "How well do bug bounties work?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Bugcrowd connects organisations with independent security researchers. It gave the authors anonymised records of more than 480,000 submissions to 2,483 programmes, from mid-2012 to mid-2021. The data predates the widespread use of AI-generated submissions, so the paper measures the effect of openness, not the effect of AI. The authors argue that AI sharpens the same problem. Triage. Each submission is classified as rejected, duplicate, or unique. A unique report identifies a flaw nobody has reported before. Only the first valid report generally earns a reward, so a duplicate can be good work that arrived late. It must still be reviewed. Wisdom of the crowd. Francis Galton's "Vox Populi" (Nature, 1907) reported that the median of about 800 guesses at an ox's dressed weight, made at a Plymouth livestock show, was remarkably close to the true figure. Eric Raymond gave software its version in "The Cathedral and the Bazaar": "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow". Maillart and co-authors tested that idea on bug bounties in 2017. Kretschmer's point is that real attackers differ in their objectives and methods; a varied crowd resembles them more closely than one employee can. Open and closed programmes. Anyone can join a public programme; a private one is by invitation. Bugcrowd and many other bounty platforms leave that choice to the software company rather than setting one rule for all. Many other platforms keep far tighter control, which makes this the governance decision worth studying. Kretschmer and co-authors set out the wider argument about platforms as organisations in 2022. Among programmes that never switched, public ones were 7.6% of programmes but drew about half of all submissions. Private ones accounted for about 59% of unique discoveries and nearly 80% of dollar rewards. Comparing like with like. Firms choose their regime deliberately, so comparing open with closed programmes misleads. The authors focus on the 86 programmes that switched once from private to public, and compare them with programmes that stayed private. The main estimates are about 23 more submissions a week, nearly six more unique vulnerabilities, 10 more new researchers, and seven more duplicates. An alternative estimator built for staggered timing gives smaller figures: about 15, three, seven, and six. The effect is front-loaded. Weekly submissions averaged about five before opening, reached about 70, then settled near 20 within 10 weeks. Opening is a choice, not an experiment, and the authors say so. Quality mix. This is the share of incoming submissions that are unique. It is about 16 percentage points higher in private programmes, and it falls by about 17 points when a programme opens. Opening produces more discoveries in absolute terms and a smaller share of useful reports. Monitoring. The authors cannot see how much firms spend on review, so they count verdicts per submission. One more weekly verdict is associated with about $139 more in weekly rewards in public programmes and about $508 in private ones; this is an association, not a causal estimate. A rough calculation in the paper suggests that opening pays only when a programme's discoveries have fallen to fewer than about 3.5 a week, before review costs. Programmes that opened averaged about 2.2. The authors say they do not identify the best moment to open, and Kretschmer makes the same point in the episode. Programmes that have closed. Curl ended its bounty on 31 January 2026 after paying more than $100,000 for 87 confirmed vulnerabilities since 2019. Its creator, Daniel Stenberg, reported that the confirmed rate fell from more than 15% of submissions to below 5%, which he blamed in large part on AI slop. Intel suspended its programme in September 2026, which paid up to $100,000 per flaw, and replaced it with one that pays nothing. It gave no reason. Google stopped accepting product vulnerability reports to its open source reward programme on 1 October 2026, a change it calls temporary. PHP2Shell. Two critical flaws, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, were patched in PHP on 21 October 2026. PHP runs about 69% of websites whose server-side language is known, and many operators took sites offline as a precaution. Calif found the first route to an attack during an audit under OpenAI's Patch the Planet programme, and Wiz and OpenAI reported further ones; all used AI tools. The PHP Foundation says a core developer first saw signs of one flaw in 2024, then the fix stalled, and it calls that delay "a structural failure" of process and resources. It reports 15 CVEs and 106 reports closed as invalid, duplicate, or non-reproducible since 1 July, and says "the models don't make the calls". Open source software. Both curl and PHP are open source, maintained by small teams on which much of the web depends. Kretschmer argues that no single model fits. A firm may keep tight control of its core code and open the rest to its users. A related CEPR paper by Miklos Koren and co-authors, "Vibe Coding Kills Open Source", models how AI could weaken the user engagement that sustains these projects. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Will AI transform economic growth? Anton Korinek on what happens if AI starts to automate AI research. Related reading on VoxEU Cybersecurity vulnerabilities and their financial impact, a VoxEU column showing that firms with high cyber exposure earn about 0.42% lower excess returns per month. A brief look of the economics of open source software, a VoxEU column from 2011 by Neil Gandal on why volunteers contribute and how firms came to mix open and closed code. | |||
| S9 Ep61: Cooperatives in the 21st century | 30 oct. 2026 | 00:27:21 | |
Go to work, follow orders all day, and your living standards will rise. That is the deal behind the capitalist economy. In his forthcoming book, Cooperatives in the twenty-first century, Francesco Caselli (LSE, CEPR) argues that the deal has been broken for two generations. Pay at the top keeps climbing. Pay in the middle and at the bottom has barely moved. The usual fixes for spiralling inequality are higher taxes on the rich and stronger unions. Francesco's answer is to change who owns the firm. In a worker cooperative there are no outside shareholders, so the profits stay with the people who produce them. In conversation with Tim Phillips, he explains which of the economic objections to cooperatives are red herrings, and which ones are more serious. The research behind this episode: Caselli, Francesco. 2026. "Worker-Managed Firms Can Curb Inequality and Protect Free Markets." VoxEU.org, 7 October. Caselli, Francesco. Forthcoming. Cooperatives in the Twenty-First Century: How Worker-Managed Companies Can Curb Inequality and Support Free Markets. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Francesco Caselli. 2026. "Cooperatives in the 21st century." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Wealth taxes. Tim raises Thomas Piketty, who argues for higher taxes on top incomes and on wealth. Caselli agrees in principle, but says any victory is temporary because concentrated wealth funds the campaign to reverse it. For evidence on how people respond to a wealth tax in practice, listen to Marius Brulhart on Switzerland's cantons, linked below. Worker bargaining power. The other standard fix, associated with labour economists such as Suresh Naidu of Columbia University, is to strengthen unions and give workers more power to bargain. Caselli puts it in the same category as wealth taxes; desirable, but vulnerable to the same political erosion. Mondragon. The Mondragon group of cooperatives in the Basque Country of Spain is the best known example of worker ownership at scale. Caselli cites its rules that let members keep a stake in the returns to investment after they leave, which answers the worry that departing workers will vote against investing in a future they will not share. WBO Italcables. When the owners of a steel wire plant in Caivano, on the outskirts of Naples, gave up on it, the workers bought it and ran it as a cooperative. Il Manifesto reported its reopening in December 2015. Caselli says the firm has since grown, invested in new equipment and exports worldwide, and uses it to question whether closures are always healthy creative destruction. The residual claimant. The residual claimant keeps whatever is left after the bills are paid. In a conventional firm that is the shareholder; in a cooperative it is the workers. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972) used the idea to explain why firms have owners who monitor effort. Caselli turns it round: when a slacking colleague costs you money, you watch your colleagues. The compensating differential. A compensating differential is the pay people will give up for a job with other rewards, such as meaning or status; the idea goes back to Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776). Caselli says it is how cooperatives keep their most able members, and accepts there is a limit to it. The talent drain. Gabriel Burdin (2016) found that in Uruguay's worker-managed firms, where pay is more equal, the highest-ability members are more likely to quit. This is the objection Caselli treats as serious, and his answer may surprise listeners who expect a defence of strict pay equality. Pro-worker AI. Daron Acemoglu, David Autor and Simon Johnson argue that AI can be designed to complement workers rather than replace them, in CEPR Policy Insight 123, "Can We Have Pro-Worker AI?" (2023). Caselli argues that AI developers build what their customers want, and that cooperative customers would want something different. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Inequality and creative destruction. Richard Blundell on how to get innovation-driven growth without letting the churn widen inequality. Related reading on VoxEU Labour in the boardroom: The effects of codetermination on firm performance and wages. Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer and Joerg Heining find that giving workers seats on German company boards does little for wages, which suggests a minority voice is not the same as ownership. How AI can become pro-worker. Daron Acemoglu, David Autor and Simon Johnson propose policies to steer AI towards complementing workers rather than automating them away. | |||
| S9 Ep60: The challenges to the international financial system | 23 oct. 2026 | 00:27:17 | |
The 29th Geneva Report on the World Economy examines three pressures on the international financial system at once: global imbalances, the status of the dollar, and the stability of bond markets. Two of its authors, Valentina Bruno (American University, CEPR) and Cédric Tille (Geneva Graduate Institute, CEPR), tell Tim Phillips why stocks, the dollar and US Treasuries all fell on Liberation Day in April 2025, why that could happen again, and what we should do about it. So is this a rupture, or a transition in the world's financial system? The research behind this episode: Bruno, Valentina, Steven B. Kamin, Angel Ubide, and Cedric Tille. 2026. "Changing Structure and Challenges of the International Financial System: Imbalances, Currencies, and Financial Stability." Geneva Reports on the World Economy 29. Geneva: International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies; Paris and London: CEPR Press. Free to download. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Valentina Bruno, and Ceric Tille. 2026. "The challenges to the international financial system”. VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Cédric Tille is Professor of International Economics at the Geneva Graduate Institute, where he heads the Bilateral Assistance and Capacity Building for Central Banks programme. He is a Research Fellow of CEPR in the International Macroeconomics and Finance programme. His research spans financial globalisation, the dynamics of countries' external assets and liabilities, and the currencies used to invoice international trade. He sat on the Bank Council of the Swiss National Bank from 2011 to 2023 and previously worked for nine years at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Research cited in this episode Global imbalances. Large and persistent current account surpluses in some countries, mirrored by deficits in others. Imbalances were a major policy topic before 2008, faded after the global financial crisis, and are now back. Tille argues that the headline measures have risen only modestly; the concern is China, whose trade surplus is the largest ever recorded as a share of world GDP. The China shock. Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2013. "The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States." American Economic Review 103 (6): 2121-2168. Cheap imports from China benefited US consumers as a whole, but the job losses were concentrated in particular industries and places, furniture making among them. Tille uses it to explain why Germany's car workers see the current wave of Chinese competition differently from German consumers. The coordinated policy package. International Monetary Fund. 2026. "2026 External Sector Report: Amid Rising Imbalances, the Case for Rebalancing." The standard prescription is US fiscal consolidation, more consumption in China and more investment in Europe. The report cites IMF estimates that a coordinated package would narrow global imbalances by 0.5% of world GDP over the medium term, compared with a widening of 0.4% under current trends. Nearly all the narrowing comes from China. The renminbi debate. Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations argues that China holds its exchange rate down and that a stronger renminbi is part of the solution. Tille notes that other economists treat the exchange rate as a sideshow to China's high savings and weak domestic demand. The basis trade. Pension funds, insurers and asset managers often prefer to hold Treasury exposure through futures. Hedge funds take the other side; they sell the futures, buy the bonds and earn the small gap between the two prices, funded with overnight borrowing. In calm markets the trade links the futures and cash markets and helps the Treasury sell its debt. When lenders pull back, hedge funds must sell bonds at the same moment. The report cites estimates that Cayman Islands hedge funds alone held about $1.8 trillion of Treasuries. March 2020 and the UK gilt crisis. In March 2020, the Covid shock set off a scramble for dollars in which even Treasuries were sold, and the Federal Reserve bought Treasuries to restore order. In September 2022, UK pension funds using liability-driven investment strategies had to sell gilts as yields rose, which pushed yields higher still, until the Bank of England stepped in. Bruno cites both as examples of safe assets at the centre of stress, where falling prices force more sales. The 1970s and 2008. Bruno compares today with two earlier periods when imbalances, the dollar and bond markets came under pressure together: the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, when inflation also eroded bond values, and the years before 2008, when Asian savings and European bank lending flowed into US assets. In 2008 the stress sat in the banks. Today it sits with pension funds, insurers and hedge funds. Exorbitant privilege. The phrase, usually attributed to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as French finance minister in the 1960s, describes the advantage the US gets from issuing the world's main reserve asset; foreigners accept a low return to hold it. Tille points out that the US once ran a trade deficit while earning more on its foreign assets than it paid on its liabilities. That surplus on primary income has now gone. The market-based trilemma. The old trilemma of international finance, associated with Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming, says a country cannot have free capital flows, a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy all at once. The report proposes a new one. Governments want to issue ever more debt, regulators want tight limits on bank balance sheets, and investors expect bond markets to work smoothly every day. You can have any two, but not all three all the time. "Our currency, but your problem." John Connally, US Treasury Secretary, told European counterparts in 1971 that "the dollar is our currency, but it's your problem." The report updates the line; the dollar is no longer just a currency but the operating system of global finance. Rupture or transition? The report opens with a remark by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, at the 2026 World Economic Forum, that the world is "in the midst of a rupture, not a transition." The authors test whether the same is true of the international financial system. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Addressing Global Imbalances. Gita Gopinath and Philip Lane on why today's imbalances put more risk on government debt and non-bank lenders. Stablecoins and Global Imbalances. Gilles Moec on how dollar stablecoins could pull global savings into US Treasury bills. Related reading on VoxEU.org Geopolitical tensions and international financial fragmentation: The 28th Geneva Report on the World Economy, a VoxEU column on how geopolitical rivalry is pushing global finance to split along political lines. | |||
| S9 Ep59: Life after divorce | 16 oct. 2026 | 00:20:54 | |
Who gets the kids? Courts aim to decide custody in the child's best interests, but nobody has had the data to test how well those decisions work. Gordon Dahl (UC San Diego, CEPR), Costas Meghir (Yale, CEPR) and seven co-authors built the data themselves. They collected more than 56,000 Swedish custody rulings, scanning paper files by hand where no digital copy existed, and linked them to records of parents' earnings, prescriptions and children's school tests. It seems Swedish judges do not agree on how often to award joint custody. Some award it in about 60% of cases; others in about 20%. But that decision makes a huge difference to the lives, and happiness, of both parents and children. They tell Tim Phillips whether joint or sole custody has, on average, better outcomes. The research behind this episode: Canessa, Stella, Gordon Dahl, Anna Hasselqvist, Costas Meghir, Susan Niknami, Marten Palme, Helmut Rainer, Olof Rosenqvist, and Pengpeng Xiao. 2026. "Life After Divorce: Effects of Joint Custody on Parents and Children." CEPR Discussion Paper 21780. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Gordon Dahl, and Costas Meghir. 2026. "Life after divorce." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Costas Meghir is the Douglas A. Warner III Professor of Economics at Yale University and a CEPR Fellow in the Labour Economics, Development Economics and Public Economics programmes. His research spans labour supply and welfare programmes, marriage markets and how resources are shared within households, informal labour markets, and early childhood development. Research cited in this episode The tender years doctrine. Before the mid-19th century, English law treated children as their father's property. The Custody of Infants Act 1839, passed after a campaign by Caroline Norton, let mothers petition for custody of children under seven, and the presumption that young children belong with their mother spread across Europe. Dahl raises it to show how far the legal default has moved in less than two centuries, from father, to mother, to both. Random assignment of judges. Families who end up with joint custody differ from those who do not, so a simple comparison cannot separate the effect of the arrangement from the effect of the family. In Sweden, custody disputes go to judges at random, and judges differ in how often they award joint custody. Comparing families who drew a lenient judge with families who drew a strict one isolates the effect of the ruling itself. Economists have used the same design to study prison sentences, for example Jeffrey Kling in "Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings" (American Economic Review, 2006). The method only measures effects for cases where judges could disagree; it says nothing about cases where every judge would reach the same decision. Swedish court archives. Custody rulings are public records in Sweden, but no national database holds them. The authors requested files from all 48 district courts and received documents from 45. Digital archives covered cases from about 2010; for earlier years, the team visited court archives and scanned 19,491 paper rulings by hand. Dahl estimates that 80% of the project's time went on collecting data. Swedish administrative registers. Statistics Sweden registers cover the whole population and record earnings, employment, family links and place of residence. The authors linked these to prescription records, which show who takes antidepressant, anti-anxiety and ADHD medication, and to records of intimate partner violence. This is why the research could follow mothers, fathers and children for years after each ruling. National tests and school quality. All Swedish pupils sit the same national tests in Swedish and mathematics in grades three, six and nine. The authors use these scores to measure children's achievement, and build a measure of school quality from how much better or worse a school's pupils score than their backgrounds predict. In the paper, joint custody raises test scores by 0.47 of a standard deviation, which Meghir likens to about two extra years of schooling. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Love, money and parenting. Fabrizio Zilibotti on what economic research tells us about parenting, and about raising children who thrive. Related reading on VoxEU.org The effect of parental divorce on children's long-term outcomes, a VoxEU column using Austrian data to estimate how divorce affects children's education, employment and health as adults. | |||
| S9 Ep58: Not wearing Prada | 09 oct. 2026 | 00:18:58 | |
Since March 2022, it has been harder to buy an iPhone in Russia, because Apple chose to stop selling there. So did Prada, Renault, Starbucks, Nike and more than 1,000 other firms. These private sanctions added to the official sanctions imposed by 45 countries. Beata Javorcik (EBRD, Oxford, CEPR) and her co-authors wanted to know if private sanctions did anything more than generate good headlines. To do this, they matched millions of Russian customs records to the trademarks on the goods, so they could tell an iPhone from a Samsung phone and a Gucci scarf from a Gucci bag. Would imports of goods under voluntary sanctions stop? Would the brands cheat? Would importers find an other way to get goods into the country through the back door? She tells Tim Phillips what private sanctions on Russia have achieved. The research behind this episode: Chupilkin, Maxim, Beata Javorcik, Alexander Plekhanov, and Aleksandra Peeva. 2026. "Not Wearing Prada: Do Private Sanctions Reinforce Official Sanctions?" CEPR Discussion Paper 21774. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Beata Javorcik. 2026. "Not wearing Prada." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Private sanctions and public opinion. Oliver Hart, David Thesmar and Luigi Zingales surveyed 2,915 Americans, a representative sample, in May and June 2022. Of these, 61% agreed that doing business in Russia is like being an accomplice to the war, and that firms should sever ties whatever the consequences. Javorcik raises the study to explain why firms with no legal obligation to leave Russia chose to go anyway: reputation, the threat of boycotts, pressure from investors, employees and business partners, and sometimes the values of managers. Hart, Oliver, David Thesmar, and Luigi Zingales. 2024. "Private Sanctions." Economic Policy 39 (117): 203-268. "The business of business is business." The phrase is a popular summary of the view Milton Friedman set out in a 1970 essay in the New York Times Magazine, "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." Hart and his co-authors found that only a minority of their respondents treated the decision to leave Russia as a purely commercial one. The Yale list. A team at the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute, led by Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, has tracked what more than 1,500 major companies said about their Russian operations since the invasion. To qualify, a firm must have revenue above $100 million, be majority owned from outside Russia and Belarus, and have meaningful operations in its home country, in Russia and in at least one other country. The team grades firms from full withdrawal to "digging in," and keeps a separate record of firms that reneged on their promises to leave. Javorcik and her co-authors use the list to classify the owners of 1,657 Western trademarks. Only 11 firms moved from strict private sanctions to doing little or nothing. Customs data with trademarks. The paper draws on transaction-level records of Russian imports from 2016 to 2023, about 12 million records in 2022 alone. Each record shows the product code, the value, the quantity, the trading partner and the trademark. The products are classified at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System, which has more than 5,600 categories. The trademark field contained more than 1.2 million spellings; the authors used a large language model to standardise them, which merged 600 versions of "Samsung" into one. Trade diversion through neutral countries. Countries that do not participate in sanctions, including China, Turkey and the UAE, do not monitor re-exports to Russia. After the invasion, the share of imports arriving via traders in these neutral jurisdictions rose by an additional 16 percentage points for brands whose owners announced private sanctions. The same authors traced a related route in "The Eurasian Roundabout: Trade Flows into Russia through the Caucasus and Central Asia" (Chupilkin, Javorcik, and Plekhanov 2026, European Economic Review). Tariff equivalent. Trade economists often express a barrier to trade as the ad valorem tariff, a tax set as a percentage of the value of the goods, that would cause the same fall in trade. On this measure, private sanctions against Russia equal a tariff of between 9% and 84%. The range is wide because the answer depends on the trade elasticity, which measures how strongly trade responds to a change in costs. The Clark Center Forum surveys. On 8 March 2022, the Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets at Chicago Booth asked its panels of leading economists if the sanctions already in place would lead to a deep recession in Russia. Of the respondents, 93% of the US panel and 94% of the European panel agreed. A deep recession did not follow. In June 2025, a majority of the European panel agreed that, on the evidence of the past 10 years, Western-led economic sanctions do not substantially deter target countries. Javorcik, a panel member, agreed, citing trade diversion and sanctions circumvention. The UN vote. On 2 March 2022, 141 countries in the UN General Assembly voted for a resolution that condemned Russia's invasion and demanded its withdrawal from Ukraine. Javorcik contrasts this with the 45 economies that impose sanctions. The effectiveness of sanctions depends on how many countries take part. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Trading around geopolitics Giancarlo Corsetti, Banu Demir and Beata Javorcik on whether Turkish exporters filled the gap in the Russian market, and an earlier sighting of the balloon. What impact have trade sanctions had on Russia? Dzhamilya Nigmatulina uses railway shipments, company accounts and procurement records to measure what official trade sanctions did inside Russia. Related reading on VoxEU Export bans that weren't really bans: How Russia kept importing military goods, a VoxEU column by Lisa Scheckenhofer, Feodora Teti, David Torun and Joschka Wanner on the gaps, transit loopholes and third-country routes that kept military components flowing. Economic consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine: Views of leading economists, Romesh Vaitilingam's March 2022 report on the Clark Center survey that predicted a deep Russian recession. | |||
| S9 Ep57: Merit, masters and China's imperial exam | 02 oct. 2026 | 00:21:03 | |
For more than 1,300 years, China chose its top officials by written exam. Its top officials were chosen meritocratic ally -- or were they? When the results came out, each successful candidate went to pay his respects to the men who had marked his exam. He called the examiner master, and the bond lasted for life. Ruixue Jia (UC San Diego, CEPR) and her co-author Ying Bai followed 24,269 graduates of the Qing dynasty's imperial examination, from 1644 to 1905, to see who reached the top of the imperial state. A high mark in the examination was important, but so did an examiner who later rose to power. Jia tells Tim Phillips how merit and patronage worked together. The research behind this episode To cite this episode Research cited in this episode How many took part. Every man could sit the exam in principle, but preparation cost years of study and lost income. Jia says that in the 18th century about two million men registered for the entry-level exam, roughly 2% to 3% of men aged 15 to 50, and that families often pooled resources to put one son forward. By her calculation, even a man who tried five times had less than a 1% chance of passing the entry level. These are her figures from the conversation. Fan Zhongyan. The Northern Song statesman and poet (989 to 1052) whose story Jia uses to show how the exam sold itself. He lost his father as an infant and grew up in modest circumstances, passed the national exam in 1015, and rose to become one of the empire's most senior officials. Stories like his, Jia argues, sustained belief in the system. What mattered was perceived mobility, not the realised rate. The high and low categories. Successful national candidates were ranked and divided at a cutoff. The top two groups received the jinshi degree; the third and largest group received the lesser tong jinshi ("similar to jinshi") degree. Bai and Jia compare the cutoff to the admission thresholds of elite universities today. Candidates just above it started their careers in better positions. Top office. Bai and Jia define top office as rank three or above in the nine-rank system, which covered ministers, governors general and provincial governors. Only about 12.6% of jinshi reached it, on average 16 years after passing the exam. In practice, appointments were shaped by a handful of Grand Secretaries and Grand Ministers of State; on average seven people held these posts in any year. The master and disciple relationship. Each national exam was overseen by one or two chief examiners and two or three vice examiners, all serving officials. After the results, graduates visited their examiners, called them "master teacher" and called each other "classmates". The historian Ichisada Miyazaki describes it as "a pledge between them to assist each other to weather the storms of political life" (Miyazaki, Ichisada. 1981. China's Examination Hell: The Civil Service Examinations of Imperial China. Yale University Press, p. 56). Philip Kuhn called the system "a veritable faction factory" (Kuhn, Philip A. 2003. Origins of the Modern Chinese State. Stanford University Press). Because papers were anonymous, the link between a candidate and his examiners was set by chance, which lets Bai and Jia treat it as a natural experiment. Power or mentoring. Bai and Jia measure ties to powerful examiners by counting how many years a candidate's examiners held key central posts in the decade after the exam. To separate a good teacher from a well-placed patron, they compare an examiner's power before and after the exam. Power that came later mattered more, which points to patronage rather than instruction alone. Merit and connections in modern China. Jia found a similar pattern in an earlier study of provincial leaders after 1993, in which neither strong economic performance nor links to the top leadership was enough for promotion on its own. Jia, Ruixue, Masayuki Kudamatsu, and David Seim. 2015. "Political Selection in China: Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance." Journal of the European Economic Association 13 (4): 631-668. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Related reading on VoxEU Institutions and power structure: Imperial China and feudal Europe compared. Gérard Roland, Yang Xie and Ruixue Jia on why Chinese emperors had reason to keep the route into the elite open to ordinary people. It's not what you know, but who you know: The role of connections in academic promotions. Manuel Bagues and Natalia Zinovyeva on randomly assigned evaluators in Spanish academic promotions, and how much a link to the committee was worth. | |||
| S9 Ep56: Decoupling from China after Trump's Trade Wars | 25 sept. 2026 | 00:29:25 | |
In March 2025, Apple chartered cargo flights to deliver 600 tonnes of iPhones from India to the United States. A year earlier, four in five smartphones that imported to the US came from China. One of the aims of US trade policy has been to decouple the US economy from China. So is the strategy working? Chad Bown (PIIE, CEPR) tells Tim Phillips how he examined the US import data product by product to see how American importers coped with Trump's second trade war. In consumer electronics, many firms quietly built a second supply chain in tariff-exempt countries before 2025, and switched sourcing away from China almost overnight in 2025. But clothing and footwear did not switch, because alternative source countries like Vietnam faced tariffs almost as high. When the US taxes imports from every country, the decoupling strategy gets lost. The research behind this episode: Bown, Chad P. 2026. "How Did Trump's 2025 Trade War Affect the Decoupling of US-China Supply Chains?" CEPR Discussion Paper DP21801 (gated). Forthcoming in Asian Economic Policy Review. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Chad P. Bown. 2026. "Decoupling from China after Trump's Trade Wars." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode The 2025 IEEPA tariffs on China. In February and March 2025, before Liberation Day, the US imposed two rounds of 10% tariffs on all imports from China under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, justified by concerns over fentanyl. For the first time this covered smartphones and other List 4B goods. One of the two was removed in November 2025 after Presidents Trump and Xi met in South Korea. Liberation Day. On 2 April 2025 the US announced tariffs on most of its trading partners, at rates that varied by country. A long list of products, including smartphones, was exempt under Annex II. On 9 April the country rates were paused and a 10% baseline applied while countries negotiated. China's rates escalated after retaliation on both sides; the Liberation Day actions on China alone reached 125% before a truce in Geneva in May. The exemptions matter to the episode. A tariff on China changes sourcing only if the alternatives face a lower one. The August 2025 tariffs on India. The US raised tariffs on India by a further 25 percentage points in August 2025, citing India's purchases of Russian oil. Smartphones were again exempt, so Apple's Indian supply chain stayed tariff free. For some clothing, India ended up facing a larger tariff increase than China. The Supreme Court ruling on IEEPA tariffs. On 20 February 2026 the US Supreme Court ruled that the country-level tariffs imposed under IEEPA were illegal. The Section 232 sectoral tariffs and the Section 301 tariffs on China were not part of the case. The administration removed the IEEPA tariffs and began imposing new ones under other legal authorities, which is why Bown warns that some of the 2025 effects may yet reverse. Apple's alternative supply chain in India. Apple and its contract manufacturers, including Foxconn and Tata Electronics, spent several years building iPhone assembly in India. Patrick McGee tells the story in Apple in China: The Capture of the World's Greatest Company (Simon & Schuster, 2026). Over the last nine months of 2025, 40% of US smartphone imports came from China and 46% from India. Laptops, monitors and video game consoles moved in a similar way, mostly to Vietnam. Inputs for AI. The paper defines AI inputs using the product codes that Nvidia publishes for export control compliance: certain semiconductors, printed circuit boards, servers and other data centre hardware. These made up about 14% of US imports in 2025. They grew by $183 billion that year, more than the $144 billion rise in total US goods imports. A separate classification by Michael Waugh (2026) finds a larger share, at 23%. US tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. In 2024 the Biden administration raised US tariffs on electric vehicles from China to 100%, using the authority of the 2018 Section 301 action. China exported 40% of the world's electric vehicles in 2024, according to the International Energy Agency, but almost none to the United States. China's export restrictions on rare earths. In April 2025 China restricted exports of rare earths and permanent magnets, of which it produces about 90% of world supply. Bown did not include these products in the paper, but they are the reverse of the decoupling story. They are goods for which the US found no alternative supplier. Tariff pass-through to consumer prices. Bown suggests that firms with an alternative supplier may explain why some prices, such as the iPhone's, did not rise. He points to work by Alberto Cavallo, Paola Llamas and Franco Vazquez (2025), "Tracking the Short-Run Price Impact of U.S. Tariffs," NBER Working Paper 34496, which tracks how the 2025 tariffs reached retail prices. How to Win a Trade War. Soumaya Keynes and Chad P. Bown. 2026. How to Win a Trade War: An Optimistic Guide to an Anxious Global Economy. New York: Simon & Schuster. The authors argue that the conflict with China will not reverse, and that other economies are now dealing with China-related shocks of their own. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Tariff Confusion, in which Kalina Manova explains how the frequency of tariff announcements in 2025 cut trade by more than the tariffs themselves. Related reading on VoxEU.org What comes next for global supply chains might be complicated, a VoxEU column on why a falling Chinese share of US imports does not mean Chinese firms have left the supply chain. Tariff confusion, a VoxEU column by Kalina Manova, Dennis Novy, Thomas Sampson and Aaron Tang on how confusion about current US tariffs reduced trade in 2025. | |||
| S9 Ep55: Loosening inheritance law | 18 sept. 2026 | 00:25:59 | |
In most of the world you do not get to choose who inherits your money. Across continental Europe, Latin America, and countries governed by Islamic law, a minimum share of your estate will be reserved for your children, your spouse, and in some places your surviving parents. Write a will that ignores them and the law overrules you. If you want a head start in life, choose your parents carefully. Switzerland changed the rules in January 2023. The compulsory share for children fell by one third and the share reserved for surviving parents disappeared altogether. In this week's VoxTalk, Marius Brülhart (University of Lausanne, CEPR) tells Tim Phillips how he had been following the reform with no way of observing its effects, until a website that helps Swiss people write their wills online offered him its anonymous data. People who were handed more freedom gave less to their children and their parents, and more to spouses and partners. About one third of every liberated franc went to recipients outside the family altogether. Liberalising the law spreads wealth without taxing anyone: politically, though maybe not democratically, attractive. The research behind this episode: Brulhart, Marius, and Laia Soler. 2026. "Unfree Wills: Inheritance Rules, Bequest Motives, and Wealth Diffusion." CEPR Discussion Paper 21811. The CEPR version is gated. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Marius Brulhart. 2026. "Loosening inheritance law." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode The 2023 reform. Parliament passed the change in December 2020 and it came into force on 1 January 2023. Minimum shares for direct descendants were cut by one third, those for surviving parents were abolished, and the share reserved for a surviving spouse was left alone. Averaged across family types in the data, the freely attributable portion of an estate rose by 19 percentage points, from 39% to 58%. DeinAdieu.ch. The Swiss online service that generated the data, funded by charities seeking legacies. Users answer questions about their family situation, the tool limits their choices to what the law allows, and they set the shares with a set of sliders. The sample covers 16,887 completed forms submitted between January 2020 and March 2024, which straddles the reform. Bunching. Before the reform, a large share of testators gave their protected heirs exactly the legal minimum and not a franc more; 52% of testators with children and 72% of those with living parents had been giving more than they wanted to. When the minimum fell, so did their allocations. Reference dependence. The whole distribution moved, not just the people who had been pinned to the legal floor. Testators who had voluntarily given their children more than the law required also gave less after the reform, which suggests the legal minimum works as a mental benchmark for generosity even when it is not binding. Marginal diffusion propensity. Brulhart and Soler's term for the share of each newly discretionary franc that goes to nonrelatives and charities. Their central estimate is 0.33. Applied to the whole population it implies that the reform moved more wealth outside family dynasties than Switzerland's inheritance taxes do, though Swiss inheritance tax is unusually light, with children inheriting tax free in most cantons. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Political inequality. Julia Cagé on what concentrated wealth does to democratic politics, which is the other half of the question Brulhart raises about who decides where wealth goes. Related reading on VoxEU.org How inheritances influence wealth inequality, by Mikael Elinder, Oscar Erixson, and Daniel Waldenstrom, using Swedish register data covering every heir of every decedent over several years. The intergenerational transmission of wealth in rich countries, by Salvatore Morelli and co-authors, on how large transfers push up wealth inequality across seven countries. | |||
| S9 Ep54: Does sacking the manager work? | 11 sept. 2026 | 00:18:23 | |
Your football team keeps losing. The season is slipping away. One thing can be changed by Friday, and the crowd is already singing about it: sack the manager. Jan van Ours (Erasmus School of Economics, CEPR, Feyenoord fan) has looked at seven seasons of the Dutch top flight and 31 managers who were sacrificed mid-season. To work out whether any of them deserved it, he uses bookmaker odds and expected goals to distinguish bad play from bad luck. The new-manager bounce is real: results improve after a new manager walks in. But also, not real: clubs that don't sack the manager have an upturn too. The message for the boardroom, in football and business, is that not doing anything might often be the best course of action. The research behind this episode: van Ours, Jan C. 2026. "Dust in the Wind: Causes and Consequences of Managerial Replacements." CEPR Discussion Paper DP21850, Centre for Economic Policy Research. The paper is gated. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Jan van Ours. 2026. "Does sacking the manager work?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Points surprise. The cumulative gap, from the first match of the season, between the points a club has won and the points the bookmakers implied it should have won. Bookmaker odds are used as the benchmark because they already contain everything the market knows about squad quality, home advantage and the opposition; van Ours confirms this in the data, finding that recent results add nothing to the odds as a predictor of the next match. Performance surprise. The same cumulative gap, but measured with expected points derived from expected goals rather than actual results. Points surprise catches a club that is losing. Performance surprise catches a club that is playing badly. A club can be one without being the other, which is how luck gets separated from ability. Expected goals. The probability that a given shot becomes a goal, estimated from thousands of comparable attempts and conditioned on the distance and angle of the shooter, the body part used, and the type of pass and attack. Van Ours converts expected goals scored and conceded into a distribution of match outcomes, and from that into expected points. His data come from fbref.com; the paper notes that match-level expected goals were discontinued in January 2026 after a dispute between fbref and Opta. The counterfactual replacement. The device that carries the paper. For each actual sacking, van Ours searches the same club in a different season for a moment when the sum of points surprise and performance surprise was almost identical, and the manager survived. Of the 31 replacements, 22 have a counterfactual, 19 of them unique. Clubs that sacked the manager gained 0.21 points per match afterwards. Clubs in the same trouble that did not sack the manager gained 0.38. Scapegoating. William Gamson and Norman Scotch set out the idea in "Scapegoating in baseball" in the American Journal of Sociology in 1964, describing the sacking of a manager as an anxiety-reducing ritual that participants treat as an improvement whether or not anything improves. Van Ours returns to it to explain why a decision with no measurable effect keeps being taken. Managers in regular firms. Stuart Gilson's 1989 study in the Journal of Financial Economics found that replaced executives were not employed by another firm for at least three years. Football managers are frequently back in work within weeks, which is one reason the job pays what it does. Hilger, Mankel and Richter reviewed 91 studies of top executive dismissals published between 1960 and 2010 and concluded that the effects of managerial turnover are not statistically different from zero. Related reading on VoxEU.org Racial bias in newspaper ratings of professional football players, a VoxEU column using match ratings to test for discrimination in a labour market where output is measured in public every week. | |||
| S9 Ep53: Lessons from Populism in Latin America | 04 sept. 2026 | 00:33:19 | |
The new episode of VoxTalks Economics traces the effects of South Americans populism, left and right. Alejandro Werner (Georgetown Americas Institute) is one of the authors of a new paper that traces populist governments across Latin America back to 1970. He argues that they follow a strikingly similar script: they expand spending, weaken the institutions built to restrain them, and ride the wave until inflation catches up with them. But the most recent generation of leaders -- Chávez and Maduro, the Kirchners, Correa, and Morales -- lasted longer than their predecessors. Why? The research behind this episode: Magud, Nicolás E., Antonio Spilimbergo, and Alejandro Werner. 2026. "Lessons from Populism in Latin America." Paper presented at the second Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues Conference, June 2026. Forthcoming in Economic Policy. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Alejandro Werner. 2026. "Lessons from Populism in Latin America." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Dornbusch and Edwards' "macroeconomics of populism," from their 1991 edited volume of the same name, was the first systematic account of how Latin American leaders combine expansionary spending with price controls, and how the resulting shortages and capital flight bring the cycle to an end. The new paper tests whether that pattern still holds three decades on. Funke, Schularick and Trebesch (2023), published in the American Economic Review, built an alternative populism index from historical case studies rather than speeches, and found that populist leaders leave a drag on economic activity that can persist for up to fifteen years after they leave office. Werner and his coauthors use this index as a robustness check on their own results. Local projections, a method developed by the economist Oscar Jorda in 2005, trace how a variable such as inflation or the real exchange rate evolves in the years after a shock, in this case the arrival of a populist government, without imposing the structure of a full macroeconomic model. The commodity terms of trade windfall, a measure developed by Gustavo Adler and Magud, calculates the extra income a country earns when its export prices rise relative to its import prices. The paper uses this measure to show that the populist governments with the largest windfalls, including Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, stayed in power the longest. More VoxTalks Economics episodes The Dollar Anchor Is Slipping, Tarek Hassan talks to Tim Phillips about what happens when the dollar's role as the world's safe asset comes under strain. Related reading on VoxEU.org Effects of commodity price windfalls on external debt: the role of political institutions, a VoxEU column by Rabah Arezki showing that commodity windfalls tend to be saved where executive power is constrained, and spent where it is not, a pattern that echoes this paper's account of institutional decay under populist rule. | |||
| S9 Ep52: The Dollar Anchor Is Slipping | 02 sept. 2026 | 00:26:21 | |
April 2025: Liberation Day. President Trump announces sweeping new tariffs. And then, the dollar did something a safe haven currency is not supposed to do: it fell. Tarek Hassan (Boston University, CEPR), working with Thomas Mertens, Jingye Wang and Tony Zhang, has been investigating what makes a currency the global anchor. Being the world's biggest economy helps, but what really matters is how far an economy's shocks affect world prices. Tariffs reduce this effect. But are we near a tipping point, when the euro takes over as the global reserve currency? We might be closer than you think and, if a change happens, it might happen more quickly than you think too. This is the third of four episodes drawn from papers commissioned for the second Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues conference, held in Venice on 19 and 20 June 2026 and organised by CEPR, CESifo and Sciences Po. The research behind this episode: Hassan, Tarek A., Thomas M. Mertens, Jingye Wang, and Tony Zhang. 2026. "Openness, Integration, and the International Monetary Order." Conference draft, presented at the 2nd Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues Conference, Venice, 19 to 20 June 2026. Forthcoming in Economic Policy. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Tarek A. Hassan. 2026. "The Dollar Anchor Is Slipping." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Exorbitant privilege. A term coined in the 1960s for the advantage the United States gets from issuing the world's reserve currency, since foreign investors will hold dollar assets at a lower return than they would demand elsewhere. Hassan uses it to explain why Americans can borrow more cheaply than almost anyone else, and why losing anchor status would raise the US government's own borrowing costs. Effective size. The paper's central idea. It is not simply how big an economy is, but how much weight its shocks carry in setting world prices, which depends on both actual size and openness to trade and capital flows. Tariffs and capital controls both reduce a country's effective size without touching its GDP, which is how they can knock a currency out of contention as a global anchor. The Budget Lab at Yale's tariff tracker. The paper draws its estimate that the current average tariff on US imports and exports, once retaliation is included, runs at around 12% from The Budget Lab at Yale (2025), Where We Stand: The Fiscal, Economic, and Distributional Effects of All US Tariffs Enacted in 2025 Through April 2, a running assessment of US trade policy maintained by the nonpartisan Budget Lab at Yale. Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff's exchange rate classification. Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff. 2019. "Exchange Arrangements Entering the Twenty-First Century: Which Anchor Will Hold?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 134 (2). This dataset classifies the de facto exchange rate regime of 141 economies. Hassan and his co-authors use it to calibrate their model and to show that the share of countries pegging tightly to the dollar falls with country size almost exactly as their theory predicts. The Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness. Chinn, Menzie D., and Hiro Ito. 2006. "What Matters for Financial Development? Capital Controls, Institutions, and Interactions." Journal of Development Economics 81 (1): 163 to 192. This widely used index scores how open a country's capital account is to cross-border investment. China scores close to the bottom, in the same range as India, Russia, Brazil and Pakistan, while the United States and the eurozone score close to the maximum, which is central to why Hassan treats the renminbi as a non-contender for anchor status while capital controls remain in place. More VoxTalks Economics episodes How Exchange Rates Responded to Tariffs, in which Giancarlo Corsetti also tells Tim Phillips what happened to the dollar after Liberation Day, and why the textbook response did not show up. Related reading on VoxEU.org Tariffs, Global Imbalances, and the Dollar, in which Oleg Itskhoki and Dmitry Mukhin examine whether tariffs aimed at shrinking the US trade deficit can actually work, and what trying would mean for the dollar. | |||
| S9 Ep51: Fiscal Populism and Monetary Policy | 28 août 2026 | 00:16:24 | |
There is a saying in Spanish: get burned by hot milk, and the sight of a cow makes you cry. New research implies that, decades after a populist government leaves office, the central bank it once tried to control is still flinching. Martín Uribe (Columbia) and Nicolás Magud (IMF) have investigated the long-run effect of populist governments that leaned on their central banks to print money and feed inflation. They find that these central banks raise interest rates more aggressively than others when inflation drifts above target, even decades later. This is the second of four episodes drawn from papers commissioned for the second Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues conference, organised by CEPR, CESifo and Sciences Po. The research behind this episode: Jácome, Luis, Nicolás E. Magud, Samuel Pienknagura, and Martín Uribe. 2026. "Fiscal Populism and Monetary Policy Rules." Conference draft, presented at the 2nd Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues Conference, Venice, 19-20 June 2026. Forthcoming in Economic Policy. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Martín Uribe, and Nicolás E. Magud. 2026. "Fiscal Populism and Monetary Policy." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Nicolás E. Magud is a Senior Economist in the International Monetary Fund's Western Hemisphere Department. His research spans open-economy macroeconomics, with a focus on fiscal policy, exchange rates, capital flows, and capital controls, much of it drawn from Latin America's long experience of inflation and central bank reform. Research cited in this episode Deficit monetisation and "unpleasant monetarist arithmetic." Sargent, Thomas J., and Neil Wallace. 1981. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic." Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 5 (3). The paper that established the mechanism this episode turns on: when a government's deficit is financed by its own central bank printing money rather than by selling bonds to the public, the result is inflation. It gives the paper's account of populism and central bank credit its theoretical backbone. Local projections difference-in-differences. Dube, Arindrajit, Daniele Girardi, Oscar Jorda , and Alan M. Taylor. 2025. "A Local Projections Approach to Difference-in-Differences." Journal of Applied Econometrics 40 (7): 741-58. The statistical method behind the paper's headline charts. It compares countries that have just installed a populist government against "clean" control countries with no recent populist history, tracking central bank credit year by year after the change of regime. The Central Bank Independence Extended (CBIE) index. Romelli, Davide. 2022. "The Political Economy of Reforms in Central Bank Design: Evidence from a New Dataset." Economic Policy 37 (112): 641-88. A dataset scoring central bank laws on their independence, including limits on lending to government. The paper uses it to show that countries with a populist past, especially a left-wing one, now have stricter legal limits on central bank lending than countries with no such history. Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. The paper's three historical case studies. In Argentina, governments from Perón onward repeatedly rewrote central bank law to permit financing of the treasury, contributing to repeated bouts of high inflation and, eventually, hyperinflation in the 1980s. In Chile, the Allende government printed money to fund an expansion of the state, and inflation reached roughly 600% in 1973 before the government was overthrown. In Mexico, President EcheverrÃa's public investment drive in the 1970s was financed in part by the central bank, feeding an inflation and currency crisis that culminated in the country's 1982 default. Uribe and Magud point to these episodes as the historical template their statistical results describe. Related reading on VoxEU Recent trends in central bank independence, in which Davide Romelli, whose index this paper uses to track legal independence, documents a fresh wave of reforms strengthening central banks worldwide since 2016. | |||
| S9 Ep50: Tariffs, Uncertainty, and the Exchange Rate | 26 août 2026 | 00:24:27 | |
Textbook economics says a tariff should strengthen a country's currency. Since the start of 2025, as US tariffs rose ... and the dollar fell. In the first of four episodes of Voxtalks based on papers presented at the second Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues conference, Alfonso Merendino (Bocconi University) and Tommaso Monacelli (Bocconi University, CEPR) tell Tim Phillips what they found when they looked for reasons. Their conclusion: for tariffs, it's not size, it is how permanent people expect it to be. They call this structural trade policy uncertainty. When that uncertainty is low, a tariff behaves exactly as the textbook says. When it's high, the same tariff can weaken the currency, shrink output and pull down inflation instead. The research behind this episode: Merendino, Alfonso, and Tommaso Monacelli. 2026. "Tariffs, Uncertainty, and the Exchange Rate." Conference draft, presented at the 2nd Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues Conference, Venice, 19-20 June 2026. Forthcoming in Economic Policy. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Tommaso Monacelli, and Alfonso Merendino. 2026. "Tariffs, Uncertainty, and the Exchange Rate." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Alfonso Merendino is a PhD student in Economics at Yale University and a Research Fellow at the Social Economics Lab. He recently completed a research placement in macroeconomic modelling at the European Central Bank, and holds a Bachelor's and Master's degree in Economics from Bocconi University, where this paper was written. Research cited in this episode The 2017 US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The authors' example of a pure S-TPU shock. The withdrawal changed no tariff rate on impact, but it reshuffled expectations about the durability of US trade policy, and their index of structural uncertainty spikes at this point. "Liberation Day" tariffs, April 2025. The sweeping tariff package announced by the Trump administration on 2 April 2025. The paper treats this, alongside the 2018 Section 301 tariffs on China, as one of two clearly identified tariff shocks used to anchor its statistical model. Aggregate trade-policy uncertainty index. Caldara, Dario, Matteo Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea Prestipino, and Andrea Raffo. 2020. "The Economic Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty." Journal of Monetary Economics 109: 38-59. This newspaper-based index of trade-policy uncertainty mixes announcement noise with genuine regime change; Merendino and Monacelli show that conditioning on it, rather than on their narrower S-TPU measure, erases the state-dependent pattern they document. Narrative-dominance identification. The technique the authors use to isolate tariff shocks in their statistical model, adapted from Juan Antolín-Díaz and Juan F. Rubio-Ramírez. 2018. "Narrative Sign Restrictions for SVARs." American Economic Review 108 (10). Rather than imposing a full statistical model, the method anchors identification to a small number of clearly documented policy events, such as the 2018 and 2025 tariff rounds, and lets everything else, including the sign of the exchange-rate response, be estimated freely from the data. More VoxTalks Economics episodes What's next for Ukraine: Investment, in which Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Maurice Obstfeld argue that forgiving Ukraine's war debt, rather than treating it as an obstacle, is essential to attracting the $40 billion a year that reconstruction needs. What's next for Ukraine: Reconstruction, in which Edward Glaeser, Martina Kirchberger, and Andrii Parkhomenko argue that postwar Tokyo, not Warsaw or Berlin, is the right model for rebuilding Ukraine's cities. What's next for Ukraine: The labour market, in which Giacomo Anastasia documents the surprising resilience of Ukraine's wartime labour market. Related reading on VoxEU Tariffs, the dollar, and equities: High-frequency evidence from the Liberation Day announcement, in which Jonathan Hartley and Alessandro Rebucci show that the dollar depreciated on impact on 2 April 2025, against the standard prediction, and trace this to foreign investors rebalancing away from US equities. | |||
| S9 Ep49: Combatting sexual harassment in the military | 21 août 2026 | 00:21:19 | |
Norwegian conscripts arrive at boot camp straight out of school. They are assigned at random to a shared room and they live in it for the next eight weeks. Whatever the culture of that room turns out to be, they are stuck with it. We know that the military everywhere has a poor record on sexual harassment. Johanna Rickne (Stockholm University, CEPR) and her co-authors wanted to reduce its acceptance, and the number of incidents. Compulsory training, standing a in a room a showing a PowerPoint, has a poor record. It can even inspire a backlash. Instead, they included two pieces of information in a 20-minute enrolment survey. One fact was about how women score on the army's own end-of-service assessments. The other was about what last year's recruits really thought about crude sexual jokes. Eight weeks later, the researchers came back to see what had changed for the 949 recruits. The research behind this episode: Olle Folke, Torbjørn Hanson, Åshild A. Johnsen, Andreas Kotsadam, and Johanna Rickne. 2026. "Targeting Attitudes to Combat Sexual Harassment: A Randomized Intervention in the Norwegian Military." CEPR Discussion Paper 21475. The discussion paper is gated. It is also published in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Johanna Rickne. 2026. "Combatting sexual harassment in the military." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Gender harassment is one of three categories in the standard model of sexual harassment, alongside unwanted sexual attention and sexual coercion. It covers hostile or demeaning conduct based on someone's sex or gender that is not necessarily sexual in nature, including remarks that a person is not suited to the job. In this boot camp it was the most common behaviour reported by women. Backlash from compliance training is the reason the intervention avoids looking like training at all. Mark Roehling, Dongyuan Wu, Mahl Geum Choi and James Dulebohn's 2022 meta-analysis in Personnel Psychology gathers the evidence on what harassment training does and does not shift; other studies find that employees most inclined to harass become more tolerant of the behaviour after being told how to behave. Voluntary sessions have the opposite problem, in that those employees do not turn up. Misperceived social norms supply the mechanism for the second piece of information. Leonardo Bursztyn, Alessandra Gonzalez and David Yanagizawa-Drott's study of Saudi Arabian husbands showed that men privately supported their wives working outside the home while badly underestimating how many other men agreed; correcting the misperception changed what those men did. The boot camp version asks recruits what their predecessors thought about sexualised jokes, then tells them the answer. The Norwegian Armed Forces service statement is the source of the first piece of information. Recruits are assessed at the end of service on leadership, responsibility, collaboration, professional competence and judgement. Average scores show no gender gap; the graph was shown to the treated recruits in this experiment. The vignette holds the harassment event constant across everyone who answers. Recruits read a short scenario set in a room like their own and rate six statements about it, covering whether the conduct counts as harassment, what the woman should do, and what any bystanders owe her. Because the incident is fixed, differences in the answers cannot be explained away by differences in what people happened to experience. Sexual harassment and gender inequality is the wider agenda this episode sits inside. Olle Folke and Johanna Rickne's 2022 paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics uses Swedish survey and administrative data to show that harassment risk falls hardest on whichever sex is in the minority in a workplace, and that it pushes people out of jobs. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Violence against women at work. Abi Adams-Prassl on Finnish police records linked to employment data, and what happens to the careers of the victim and the perpetrator after one colleague assaults another. Related reading on VoxEU.org | |||
| S9 Ep48: What price to save Japan's ghost towns? | 14 août 2026 | 00:18:12 | |
In the oldest Japanese municipalities, close to half the residents are already over 65. As young people move to cities, the retailers close, then the clinics, then the bus that used to reach the next town. Rural Japan is not simply ageing: it is emptying. Elisa Giannone (CREI, CEPR) and her co-authors have analysed Japan's 1,741 municipalities from 1980 onwards. The oldest quarter of them lost around 26% of their population by 2010; the youngest quarter grew by 22%, and the gap between them is still widening. Taxing city dwellers could reverse the trend. But that's a century-long policy, that would also lower national income per head by about 1.3%. There is no version of this without a bill attached, she warns. The research behind this episode: Giannone, Elisa, Yuhei Miyauchi, Nuno Paixão, Xinle Pang, and Yuta Suzuki. 2026. "Living in a Ghost Town: The Geography of Depopulation and Aging." CEPR Discussion Paper 21447 (gated). To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Elisa Giannone. 2026. "What price to save Japan's ghost towns?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Scale economies in local public services. A 1% increase in local population is associated with a 0.53% fall in municipal government spending per head. Roads, schools, clinics and administration carry a large fixed cost, so the cost of serving each remaining resident rises as a town shrinks. This is the fiscal arithmetic that makes depopulation expensive. Consumption-equivalent flow utility. The paper's measure of quality of life, amenity-adjusted real income. It captures what the residents of a place can actually buy and enjoy rather than what they earn on paper, which matters when the shops and the doctors are leaving. The five oldest prefectures. Kochi, Shimane, Tokushima, Tottori and Yamagata, ranked by elderly share in 2015. They are the target group in every policy simulation, and their combined elderly share reaches nearly 60% by 2215 under the baseline projection. Municipal extinction. Hiroya Masuda's 2014 book Chiho Shometsu warned that unipolar concentration in Tokyo would drive hundreds of rural municipalities out of existence. It set the terms of Japan's regional revitalisation debate, and the paper's projections give that warning a number. United Nations World Population Prospects. Giannone's figures for the global picture, including the count of countries that have already passed peak population and those projected to do so by the mid 2050s, come from the UN projections rather than from the paper itself. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Related reading on VoxEU.org Japan's age wave: Challenges and solutions, a column by Andrew Stawasz, Paige Kirby, JP Sevilla and David Bloom on the national scale of the problem this episode breaks down by region. Mobile seniors and local economic development. Marco Badilla-Maroto, Benjamin Faber, Antoine Levy and Mathilde Munoz find that retirees moving into poorer French regions bring economic gains with them, a useful counterweight to the Japanese story. Population shrinking and the future of European municipalities, in which Friedrich Heinemann, Alexander Kalb and Benny Geys set out the scale economies problem for Europe's own shrinking towns. | |||
| S9 Ep47: The Next Generation: PSE 2026 | 07 août 2026 | 00:33:20 | |
Travel broadens the mind. So the Voxtalks visits a conference, we find the most interesting research from economists just starting out, and hand three of them a microphone. Ad that is today's episode, recorded at the CEPR Paris School of Economics Policy Forum 2026. Listen to hear three findings that undercut conventional wisdom. Guido Lamarmora (University of Nottingham) argues that the usual policy prescription for developing economies that want to industrialise of raising agricultural productivity can deepen their reliance on farming rather than break it. Costanza Tomaselli (Imperial College London) studies what an energy price shock in Mexico does to employment: she finds that firms without access to credit hire rather than fire. Mushegh Tovmasyan (University of Paris-Saclay) follows Armenia after Russia was sanctioned in 2022, where trade doubled but the gains went to incumbents and their workers, not to new firms. The research behind this episode: Lamarmora, Guido. 2026. "The Food Problem in an Open Economy." Tomaselli, Costanza, and Armando Rangel Colina. 2026. "Energy Shocks, Employment Response, and Heterogeneous Credit Access." Tovmasyan, Mushegh. 2026. "Trade and Firm-Level Adjustments to Geopolitical Shifts: Evidence from Armenia." To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Guido Lamarmora, Costanza Tomaselli, and Mushegh Tovmasyan. 2026. "The Next Generation: PSE 2026." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Costanza Tomaselli is a PhD candidate at Imperial College Business School, with research spanning financial economics, industrial organisation, and energy economics. Mushegh Tovmasyan is a PhD candidate at University Paris-Saclay, RITM, with research spanning international trade, sanctions, and firm and worker outcomes, built on newly accessible Armenian administrative microdata. Research cited in this episode Land as a fixed factor. Agriculture uses land, which is fixed, as well as labour. Ignore it and a country with many workers per hectare looks unproductive when it is not. Once land is accounted for, low-income countries turn out to have relatively high agricultural productivity, which flips the conventional diagnosis. Input-output linkages. Industry is wired into the rest of the economy through supply chains, so a rise in industrial productivity or cheaper industrial imports lowers costs everywhere, including on the farm. In Lamarmora's estimates the gains from industry run roughly twice those from raising agricultural productivity. Storm Uri. The February 2021 winter storm that damaged the natural gas pipeline supplying Mexico's electricity, producing a sharp and spatially uneven jump in power prices. Tomaselli uses distance to gas-fired capacity as the source of variation to isolate the labour-market effect of an energy shock. Credit access as a shock absorber. Mexico gave firms no fiscal support after the shock, which let Tomaselli see what finance alone can do. Firms with credit did not change production or employment; they borrowed to smooth the shock. The suggestive model implication is that easing credit frictions could do the work of a blanket energy subsidy at lower cost to the public purse. Sanctions and the neutral economy. Sanctions destroy trade between the sanctioning and target countries but open opportunities for neutrals. Armenia, a landlocked transition economy with trade near 100% of GDP and Russia as its largest partner, saw trade double to triple after 2022. Tovmasyan uses Armenian customs and matched employer-employee microdata to ask whether this is new production, rerouting, or just higher prices. Incumbent-led intermediation. The trade boom was driven by existing large firms scaling up relationships and adding sanctioned goods such as electronics and machinery, not by broad new entry. Employment barely moved; gains showed up as more hours and higher wages for existing workers, which Tovmasyan reads as intermediation rents shared with labour. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Paris 25: Ali Bakhtawar, Lucie Giorgi, and Alishuba Philip discuss Lawfare, single sex schooling, and slum clearance. PSE 25: Pelin Ozgul, Deepakshi Singh, and Nathan Vieira on AI in call centres, female employment in India, and short-time work in Europe. Paris 24: Laura Arnemann, Gustavo Julio García Bernal, and Matyas Molnar tall Tim about performance-related pay, intergenerational wealth, and international exhibitions. PSE 24: Alice Chiocchetti, Yuan Hu, and Christoph Semken describe their research on profit-shifting, green tech, and the effect of changing to a greener lifestyle. Follow VoxTalks to discover more of yesterday’s stars of tomorrow. | |||
| S9 Ep46: Absorbing shocks since 1891 | 05 août 2026 | 00:20:25 | |
Recorded at the PSE-CEPR Policy Forum 2026. A country wants a stable exchange rate, it wants money to move freely across its borders, and it wants to set its own interest rates. It's a well-known trilemma. Central bankers must pick any two, because you cannot have all three. History, it turns out, did not read that memo. Eric Monnet has spent years reading the balance sheets that central bankers kept on each other. Since 1891 the Bank of France paid teams of multilingual economists to copy out the weekly and monthly accounts of every other central bank in the world. Those ledgers, now digitised, show that central banks have been far more than interest-rate setters. For more than a century they have quietly expanded their balance sheets to cushion their economies against shocks arriving from abroad. In this week's VoxTalk, Monnet argues we have seriously underestimated how much room to manoeuvre they have used since the 19th century. The research behind this episode: Bazot, Guillaume, Eric Monnet, and Matthias Morys. 2024. "Central Banks and the Absorption of International Shocks (1891-2019)." CEPR Discussion Paper No. 19646. (Gated.) To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Eric Monnet. 2026. "Absorbing shocks since 1891." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode The global financial cycle and the dilemma. Helene Rey argues that even a floating exchange rate does not buy full monetary autonomy, because a common global financial cycle, driven by the risk appetite of large financial institutions, moves interest rates and exchange rates across countries at once. A shock in one emerging market prompts investors to demand higher compensation across others they treat as similar. The trilemma, in this view, is really a dilemma. The Bank of France archive. The research department of the Bank of France was founded to track the financial operations of foreign central banks, collecting their weekly and monthly balance sheets from 1891 onward. The dataset assembled from these records covers 23 countries, essentially every central bank in existence by the late 1930s, and combines balance-sheet data with monthly figures on industrial production, consumer prices, and stock markets. Discount loans, open market operations, and foreign exchange interventions. The specific tools have changed completely; the behaviour has not. In the 19th century central banks intervened by discounting commercial bills and holding gold or foreign deposits; today they conduct open market operations in government bonds and hold US Treasury bills. Across all these forms, the response to an external shock, expanding domestic assets to supply liquidity, has been consistent. Taming the Global Financial Cycle. The predecessor study by the same authors: Bazot, Monnet, and Morys, "Taming the Global Financial Cycle: Central Banks as Shock Absorbers in the First Era of Globalization," Journal of Economic History 82(3), 2022, which established the pattern for the classical gold standard period. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Related reading on VoxEU.org | |||
| S9 Ep45: Tariff Confusion | 31 juil. 2026 | 00:31:16 | |
If you run a business that exports to the United States, how big is the tariff you have to pay? In 2025 that question was hard to answer. Between February and December, 53 separate announcements introduced, delayed, reinstated or changed US tariffs, with different countries and products pulled in or exempted each time. Kalina Manova (UCL, CEPR) and her colleagues built a database of every one of those announcements, but they also measured the confusion that those announcements created. She tells Tim Phillips about how tariff confusion has become a second tax on trade, as confusion puts off exporters: but it's one that raises no revenue. On average, uncertainty about the actual tariff doubled the damage done to trade by the tariff hikes themselves. For some countries it tripled it. Does this result mean that, if the US cleared up the confusion by not changing its tariffs regularly, it could double tariff income for the same impact on trade? The research behind this episode: Manova, Kalina, Dennis Novy, Thomas Sampson, and Aaron Tang. 2026. "Tariff Confusion." CEPR Discussion Paper DP21688 (gated). To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Kalina Manova. 2026. "Tariff Confusion." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode The four confusion measures. With no direct way to measure confusion, the paper proxies it four ways: the cumulative number of relevant announcements a firm had to track; the number of possible tariff calculations those announcements could produce (labelled tariff mess, defined as two to the power of the number of announcements); the highest tariff a firm might infer if it heard only the bad news (tariff max); and how far that worst case sits above the true statutory rate (tariff miss). The firm survey. A survey of roughly 4,500 firms in the US and Canada in March and April 2025 found that around 45% believed tariffs on Chinese goods were below 20%, when the true average was about 42%; at the same time, 87% underestimated how many announcements had postponed or rolled back tariffs. Firms were wrong in both directions at once. Trade policy uncertainty. A prior literature on uncertainty about future tariffs, which tends to find that firms delay forming trade relationships when the future is unclear. The paper’s contribution is to separate confusion about current tariffs from uncertainty about future ones, and to show the former bites on its own. Relationship-specific investment and trust. Trade in goods that require buyers and suppliers to customise to one another, or that sit in stickier supply relationships, proved more resilient to confusion; so did trade with countries whose populations report higher trust in foreigners. Informal trust, rather than formal contract enforcement, did the work of cushioning the shock. The IEEPA ruling. In February 2026 the US Supreme Court ruled that the tariffs imposed in 2025 under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act were unlawful. The paper's data stops before the ruling, which generated fresh policy change and, presumably, fresh confusion. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Europe in the Middle. Pol Antrà s and Beata Javorcik on where redirected Chinese exports go when they can no longer sell in the US, and what that means for European firms and consumers. How exchange rates responded to tariffs. Giancarlo Corsetti on why the dollar fell after Liberation Day when tariffs should, in theory, have pushed it the other way. Related reading on VoxEU.org | |||
| S9 Ep44: How superpowers shape trade | 29 juil. 2026 | 00:15:54 | |
Recorded at the PSE-CEPR Policy Forum, Paris School of Economics. Tariffs move trade around, but so does economic power. When one economy dominates, other countries fall into step with it. They trade with the dominant economy, and also with each other. Alberto Martin (Barcelona School of Economics, CEPR) is one of a team that has tracked the influence of hegemons, large dominant economies, on trade from the start of the 19th century. In our latest VoxTalk he tells Tim Phillips about how they used treaties (not necessarily about trade) as a proxy for alignment, and built a database of 77,000 of them signed between 1800 and 2020 to test their theory. Hegemons sign a disproportionate share of these international agreements. After treaty-signing, trade links become stronger. But treaty-signing has fallen sharply over the past 15 years, as much as it did during the two world wars. If we are heading towards a multipolar world, might what will the absence of a global hegemony do to trade? The research behind this episode: Broner, Fernando, Alberto Martin, Josefin Meyer, and Christoph Trebesch. 2025. "Hegemonic Globalization." CEPR Discussion Paper 20339 (gated). To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Alberto Martin. 2025. "How superpowers shape trade." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Hegemonic stability. The idea, introduced by Charles Kindleberger in 1973, that an open and stable world economy needs a single dominant power to underwrite it. This paper builds a formal model of the mechanism Kindleberger described, and asks what happens to openness when dominance is contested. Alignment and UN voting. The most common existing proxy for how closely two countries are aligned is whether they vote together at the United Nations. The authors' treaty measure correlates with UN voting in some periods and less in others, partly because many UN votes turn on narrow questions; treaties cover more policy areas and reach back 200 years, which UN voting cannot. The recent decline in treaty-signing. Since 1800 treaty-signing has trended upward, interrupted by three sharp falls: the First World War, the Second World War, and a decline over the last 15 years that is proportionally comparable to the first two. The authors checked large-country sources directly to rule out a reporting lag, and the fall appears real. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Related reading on VoxEU.org From bilateralism to a system: Europe's early trade treaties and lessons for EU trade policy in a contested world, a VoxEU column by Laura Panza and Maria Ptashkina drawing on nearly 900 commercial treaties from 1815 to 1919 to argue for expanding networks of agreements even without universal multilateralism. | |||
| S9 Ep43: Navigating industrial policy | 24 juil. 2026 | 00:21:23 | |
Recorded at the PSE-CEPR Policy Forum, Paris. Zsóka Kóczán (EBRD) was one of the leads on the Transition Report 2024-25, which draws on a database of more than 31,000 industrial policies in 150 economies. She talks to Tim Phillips about who is using these policies, and the mistakes that happen when they aren't managed well. They multiply before elections, they discriminate against foreign interests, many are firm-specific - and until recently few had an end date, whether they worked or not. Picking winners is hard. Letting go of losers is even harder, she warns. The research behind this episode: EBRD. 2024. "Transition Report 2024-25: Navigating Industrial Policy." London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The digital edition, with country assessments and interactive charts, is at 2024.tr-ebrd.com. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Zsoka Koczan. 2026. "Navigating industrial policy." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode The Juhász, Lane, Oehlsen and Pérez dataset. The report builds on the industrial policy dataset assembled by Réka Juhász, Nathan Lane, Emily Oehlsen, and Verónica C. Pérez in "The Who, What, When, and How of Industrial Policy: A Text-Based Approach" (STEG Working Paper No. WP050, 2023), which uses natural language processing to identify industrial policies in the Global Trade Alert repository; the EBRD team extended its coverage of emerging markets. The Global Trade Alert. An independent monitoring initiative that has documented policy interventions affecting international commerce since 2009; it is the underlying source for both datasets above. The policy that shall not be named. Cherif, Reda, and Fuad Hasanov. 2019. "The Return of the Policy That Shall Not Be Named: Principles of Industrial Policy." IMF Working Paper No. 19/74. The title captures how unfashionable the subject was among economists before its recent revival, which is Koczan's point in raising it; the interventions themselves never went away. Reagan's nine words. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan remarked that the nine most terrifying words in the English language were "I'm from the government and I'm here to help." Koczan cites the line as a marker of the era when industrial policy fell out of favour, and as a reminder that government failures can replace the market failures these policies are meant to correct. The Industrial Accelerator Act. The European Commission's proposal, presented in March 2026, would introduce "Made in EU" and low-carbon requirements for public procurement and support schemes in strategic sectors. Koczan cites it as evidence that the upward trend in industrial policy adoption is continuing. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Addressing Global Imbalances, also from the forum, in which Gita Gopinath and Philip Lane discuss the third wave of global imbalances and what central banks can and cannot do about it. Related reading on VoxEU The new economics of industrial policy, a VoxEU column by Réka Juhász, Nathan Lane and Dani Rodrik summarising the recent empirical literature on when these policies work. The return of industrial policy in data, a VoxEU column introducing the New Industrial Policy Observatory and documenting the recent wave of interventions. | |||
| S9 Ep42: The Safety Paradox | 22 juil. 2026 | 00:20:00 | |
Recorded at the PSE-CEPR Policy Forum, Paris School of Economics, June 2026. Isabelle Méjean (Sciences Po, CEPR) calls this "The safety paradox". Trade between rivals makes war more expensive. Cut that trade to protect your interests, and you make conflict cheaper, for your rival as well as for you. In a new VoxTalk she talks to Tim Phillips about economic coercion, decoupling, and why Europe should treat its trade agreements as insurance. Méjean and her co-authors simulated the US decoupling from China. Raising tariffs by 20 percentage points, roughly what the first Trump administration did, raises the probability of war by 2%, she estimates. That sounds small until you consider what a war between the US and China would mean. The research behind this episode: Mayer, Thierry, Isabelle Méjean, and Mathias Thoenig. 2025. "The Fragmentation Paradox: De-risking Trade and Global Safety." CEPR Discussion Paper 20564 (gated). To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Isabelle Méjean. 2026. "The Safety Paradox." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois (1748). The earliest statement of the idea, Méjean notes, that interdependence between nations raises the cost of conflict and strengthens the hand of diplomacy; what was trade dependence in the 18th century now includes finance and technology. The US oil embargo on Japan, 1941. Méjean's historical example of the safety paradox in action; a policy designed to impose costs on Japan is widely credited by historians with accelerating its entry into the Second World War. China's trade ban on Lithuania. After Lithuania allowed a Taiwanese representative office to open in Vilnius in 2021, China blocked Lithuanian products from its market; the episode's example of open economic coercion, and one that prompted the EU's Anti-Coercion Instrument, in force since 2023. Liberation Day tariffs. The US tariffs announced in April 2025; Méjean points to the tariff on Brazil, justified by the treatment of former president Jair Bolsonaro, as a tariff with an explicitly geopolitical rather than economic purpose. Rare earths. China holds a near monopoly across mining, refining, and magnet production; Méjean's example of where future trade agreements could act as insurance, because deposits outside China offer more scope for diversification than mining in Europe. More VoxTalks Economics episodes World War Trade. Richard Baldwin on how world trade was weaponised, and where the trading order goes from here. Trading Around Geopolitics. Giancarlo Corsetti, Banu Demir, and Beata Javorcik on why trade sanctions can be like squeezing a balloon. Related reading on VoxEU How geopolitics is changing trade, a VoxEU column documenting the fragmentation of trade flows along geopolitical lines. Geopolitical risk and supply chain diversification, a VoxEU column on how firms respond to geopolitical risk in their sourcing decisions. | |||
| S9 Ep41: Making teenagers read newspapers | 17 juil. 2026 | 00:20:29 | |
French teenagers carry a smartphone with access to almost anything, but few of them have been using it to read the news. Julia Cagé (Sciences Po, CEPR) ran an experiment to test the one barrier everyone assumes matters most: the price of a newspaper. She and her co-authors gave free digital subscriptions to Le Monde and media education to thousands of French high school students for a year, and then tracked what the students actually read. It's a bit like persuading kids to eat vegetables when there are fries on the table, she tells Tim Phillips. Can a free subscription persuade France's teens to use their phones differently and eat their media greens, and what changes when they do? The research behind this episode: Briole, Simon, Julia Cagé, and Andrea Prat. 2026. "Making Teenagers Read Newspapers: A Nationwide Experiment in French High Schools." CEPR Discussion Paper 21706. Gated. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Julia Cagé. 2026. “Making teenagers read newspapers”. VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Post-Broadcast Democracy, a book by the political scientist Markus Prior, argues that the shift from a small number of broadcast TV channels to an environment of unlimited media choice let people who were never especially interested in news opt out of it entirely. Cagé uses Prior's framework to argue that the internet did not create this problem; television did, and the internet simply deepened it. Information inequality describes the finding that lower-income, less-educated citizens draw on fewer sources of political information than wealthier, better-educated ones, widening gaps in political knowledge. The concept draws on earlier work by Cagé's co-author Andrea Prat, and it motivates the experiment's focus on whether free access to quality journalism narrows that gap for teenagers from poorer backgrounds. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Related reading on VoxEU | |||
| S9 Ep40: Are net zero commitments greenwash? | 15 juil. 2026 | 00:24:11 | |
Sixty-three percent of large companies worldwide had made a net zero commitment by 2023, up from close to none in 2018. But if the target date is 2050, that's several corporate lifetimes away, and the planet needs emission reductions today. What actually changes in the boardroom when a pledge is signed? Simon Dietz (LSE, CEPR) has tracked climate management practices and emissions at nearly 2,000 companies to find out. He tells Tim Phillips that the picture is not the one that either side of the debate might expect. A net zero pledge doesn't usually signify an immediate cut in emissions, but there is a clear and early shift in how companies plan for net zero that has often started before the announcement. What is left is something is harder to spot: firms making a strategic pivot, of which the public commitment is only one part. The research behind this episode: Dietz, Simon, and Nikolaus Hastreiter. 2026. "Corporate Net Zero Targets: Have They Achieved Anything?" CEPR Discussion Paper 21441 (gated). To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Simon Dietz. 2026. "Are net zero commitments greenwash?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest Simon Dietz is Professor of Environmental Policy at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Research Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, and Research Director of the LSE Transition Pathway Initiative Global Climate Transition Centre. He is a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. His research spans climate change economics, corporate sustainability, decision-making under uncertainty, and climate finance. Research cited in this episode The Paris Agreement and the 1.5°C target. The 2015 UN Paris Agreement on Climate Change set a goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C, with a stretch target of 1.5°C. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change subsequently concluded that meeting the 1.5°C goal requires global emissions to reach net zero by around mid-century, giving corporate net zero pledges their scientific rationale. Science Based Targets initiative, UN Race to Zero, and the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero. These are among the organisations that encouraged corporations to adopt long-term net zero commitments following the Paris Agreement, helping drive the rapid diffusion of pledges that Dietz and Hastreiter document. Trucost and the Transition Pathway Initiative (TPI). Dietz and Hastreiter combine two emissions datasets to overcome measurement problems in this area. Trucost provides broad coverage of around 1,600 large listed firms, combining self-reported data with modelled estimates. TPI provides sector-specific, physically normalised emissions intensity data for a smaller sample of roughly 200 companies in the highest-emitting sectors; Dietz is Research Director of the TPI Global Climate Transition Centre, which is based at LSE. Difference-in-differences with matching. To separate the effect of a net zero pledge from the fact that greener firms are more likely to make one in the first place, the authors compare firms before and after adoption against similar firms that have not yet adopted, using propensity score matching to build a comparable control group. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures framework. The paper groups management practices into four pillars from this framework: governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets. It finds no significant effect of net zero pledges on governance, risk management, or metrics and targets, but a significant and positive effect on strategy, including climate scenario planning and internal carbon pricing. More VoxTalks Economics episodes A big push for climate policy, in which Rick van der Ploeg argues that gradual policy change risks backsliding, and sets out what a genuinely transformative climate push would require. Related reading on VoxEU.org Corporate net zero targets: Neither greenwashing nor a gamechanger, in which Dietz and Hastreiter set out the findings behind this episode in their own words. Corporate climate commitments: A profit-driven strategy, not just empty promises, in which Viral Acharya, Robert Engle, and Olivier Wang model when large firms and their investors have a financial incentive to follow through on climate pledges. Business as usual: Bank net zero commitments, lending, and engagement, in which Parinitha Sastry, Emil Verner, and David Marques-Ibanez find that banks' net zero pledges predict decarbonisation of their loan portfolios, but not reduced lending to high-carbon sectors. | |||
| S9 Ep39: Europe in 2050 | 10 juil. 2026 | 00:20:57 | |
Recorded at the Paris School of Economics-CEPR Policy Forum 2026. That is Olivier Blanchard's diagnosis. Blanchard (MIT, Paris School of Economics, Peterson Institute) is one of four economists leading Europe 2050, a new CEPR initiative asking where Europe wants to be in 25 years, and how it gets there. Blanchard's overriding principle: a vision without plumbing goes nowhere, and plumbing without vision is just reacting to the next tweet. Who can combine the vision and the plumbing, and produce ideas that we haven't seen before? Europe might be short of solutions to its current malaise, but it is not short of people with ideas: the project sent out 50 invitations for policy papers. Blanchard expected 30 replies. He got 48. The research behind this episode: Blanchard, Olivier, Pascal Lamy, Enrico Letta, and Beatrice Weder di Mauro. 2026. "Europe 2050: Geometries of Peace, Power, and Prosperity." VoxEU column, CEPR, 16 March 2026. The CEPR Europe 2050 initiative launched by Blanchard, Lamy, Letta and Weder di Mauro is generating a rolling series of commissioned policy papers and shorter open call submissions. The full set of contributions can be found at cepr.org/europe-2050-geometries-peace-power-and-prosperity. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Olivier Blanchard. 2026. "Europe in 2050." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest Olivier Blanchard is the Robert M. Solow Professor of Economics emeritus at MIT, Professor of Economics at the Paris School of Economics, and Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He is a CEPR Distinguished Fellow. Blanchard's research spans macroeconomics, monetary and fiscal policy, and the economics of European integration; he was chief economist and director of research at the IMF from 2008 to 2015. Research cited in this episode Europe 2050: Geometries of Peace, Power, and Prosperity is the CEPR initiative behind this episode, launched by Blanchard, Lamy, Letta and Weder di Mauro. It commissions longer policy papers and runs an open call for shorter pieces, five to fifteen pages, on what Europe should aspire to become by 2050. Blanchard describes it as a box of tools rather than a single blueprint, deliberately open to contributors who disagree on fundamentals, including whether Europe should become a federation. The Draghi report refers to Mario Draghi's 2024 report for the European Commission, The Future of European Competitiveness. It diagnosed Europe's weak productivity growth, fragmented capital markets and insufficient scale financing for innovative firms. Blanchard contrasts it with Europe 2050, which he says is not trying to produce a similarly prescriptive plan. The Letta report refers to Enrico Letta's 2024 report Much More Than a Market, commissioned by the European Council, which set out proposals for deepening the EU single market. Letta is one of the four leaders of Europe 2050. "Getting to Denmark" is a concept popularised by the political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his 2011 book The Origins of Political Order, describing the temptation to picture a distant, well governed destination without a plan for the institutional steps needed to reach it. Is this a risk for Europe 2050? Schengen is raised by Blanchard as a working example of a "coalition of the willing": a group of countries, not all of them EU members, that agreed to abolish border controls between themselves without waiting for unanimous agreement across the whole Union. He points to it as a template for how Europe might make progress on other issues where full consensus is unlikely. More VoxTalks Economics episodes This episode was recorded at the Paris School of Economics-CEPR Policy Forum 2026, alongside a series of conversations with forum speakers. Europe in the Middle, the previous episode, features Pol Antràs and Beata Javorcik on how the US-China trade war is reshaping trade flows into Europe, and who wins and loses from it. Related reading on VoxEU Europe's challenge and opportunity: Building coalitions of the willing, a VoxEU column by Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry, sets out the coalition of the willing idea in more detail, working through how it might apply to climate, trade and tax policy. Capitalising on Europe's strengths, a VoxEU column by Debora Revoltella and colleagues at the European Investment Bank, looks at what Europe already does well and how policy can build on it rather than only cataloguing weaknesses. Addressing European competitiveness: Investment, integration, and simplification, another VoxEU column from the European Investment Bank, sets out the scale of Europe's investment gap and where past bursts of EU investment have come from. EU capital markets reform should focus on innovation investment, a VoxEU column, argues that capital markets union, a project Blanchard mentions in the episode, should be judged by whether it gets money to innovative firms, not just by market integration for its own sake. | |||
| S9 Ep38: Europe in the Middle | 08 juil. 2026 | 00:20:35 | |
China cannot sell as much as it used to in the United States. That trade has to go somewhere, and somewhere might be Europe. In this week's VoxTalk, Tim Phillips asks Pol Antràs (Harvard) and Beata Javorcik (EBRD, Oxford) what this means for European producers and consumers. Antràs and Andrea Presbitero have mapped which countries and sectors face the sharpest competition from redirected Chinese exports, and which stand to gain. Does cheap Chinese tech ease Europe's energy cost crisis, or squeeze European manufacturers of wind turbines and electric cars? If Europe decides to take the gains where consumers and firms can get them, and compensate the producers who are legitimately hurt, how do they go about it? And can raising tariffs in a world of global value chains protecting one sector without damaging others? New episode, recorded at the PSE-CEPR Policy Forum 2026 in Paris. The research behind this episode: Antràs, Pol, and Andrea F. Presbitero. 2026. "The Remains of the Trade: The U.S.-China Trade War and its Aftermath." Preliminary version To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Pol Antràs, and Beata Javorcik. 2026. "Europe in the Middle." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guests: Pol Antras is Robert G. Ory Professor of Economics at Harvard University, a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a Research Affiliate at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. His research spans global value chains, the organisation of multinational firms, and, most recently, the intersection of trade policy and geopolitics. Beata Javorcik is Chief Economist of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, on leave from her position as Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford and Fellow of All Souls College. She is Director of the International Trade Programme at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Her research spans foreign direct investment, industrial policy, and, increasingly, the economics of geopolitical fragmentation. Research cited in this episode: The Great Reallocation is the term coined by Laura Alfaro and Davin Chor for the reorganisation of United States sourcing away from direct imports from China and toward alternative suppliers such as Vietnam, Mexico, and Taiwan. Antrà s and Presbitero's paper extends this idea to third countries, showing that Chinese exports displaced from the American market are increasingly landing in Europe and Asia rather than disappearing. Geopolitical externality is a concept developed by Laura Alfaro, Maggie Chen, and Beata Javorcik in their working paper "The Battle over Knowledge: Multinationals, Diffusion, and Governance." It describes how knowledge transferred abroad by multinational firms can strengthen a rival state's strategic capability in ways the firm never intended and the market never prices, which is why governments increasingly restrict flows of codified, tacit, and organisational knowledge that would once have passed unremarked. Voluntary export restraints were the mechanism used to defuse the United States' trade conflict with Japanese carmakers in the 1980s. Rather than imposing tariffs, Japan agreed to limit its car exports, and Japanese manufacturers responded by building plants directly in the United States. Javorcik cites this as the precedent for how the current standoff over Chinese electric vehicles and knowledge transfer might eventually be resolved. The Draghi report on European competitiveness, published by the European Commission in September 2024, recommended conditioning Chinese investment in the European electric vehicle sector on mandatory knowledge transfer. Javorcik notes the difficulty of calibrating such requirements: demand too little and Europe gains nothing from the technology; demand too much and Chinese investors have no reason to come at all. "Industrial Policies for Multi-stage Production: The Battle for Battery-powered Vehicles," by Keith Head, Thierry Mayer, Marc Melitz, and Chenying Yang, models how tariffs and subsidies reshape the location of battery and vehicle assembly plants across a multi-stage supply chain. Antrà s cites the paper's finding that protecting the electric vehicle sector through tariffs can produce worse outcomes than the problem it was meant to solve. Export controls and innovation, discussed by Javorcik with reference to Chinese firms such as DeepSeek and Huawei, illustrate a pattern in which restricting a country's access to a technology, in this case advanced semiconductors, can accelerate that country's innovation in adjacent areas rather than simply constraining it. She draws a parallel with rare earth export restrictions, which have historically spurred substitute technologies rather than suppressing them. More VoxTalks Economics episodes: In a conversation recorded at the CEPR Annual Forum in Paris called "What should Europe do about Trump?" Tim Phillips spoke to Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Ugo Panizza of the Graduate Institute Geneva, about how Europe should respond to the second Trump administration's trade policies. Listeners interested in how firms navigate geopolitical trade disruption should also hear "Trading around geopolitics," in which Giancarlo Corsetti, Banu Demir, and Beata Javorcik discuss how Turkish exporters filled the gap left by sanctions on Russia. Related reading on VoxEU: "An update on the great reallocation in US supply chain trade" uses detailed United States import data through 2025 to track the scope and pace of the reallocation discussed in this episode. "From tariffs to trade flows: Diversion effects and China's exports to the EU" examines the evidence for and against the trade deflection story that Antras and Javorcik discuss, and finds the picture more mixed than a simple diversion narrative suggests. "China shock 2.0 and the euro area: Cheaper imports, tougher competition" decomposes the recent surge in Chinese exports to the euro area and argues that structural forces within China, rather than diversion from the American market, explain most of it. "The impact of trade wars on firms in third countries" proposes a model of how bilateral trade shocks spill over to bystander economies, applying it to Italian firms during the 2018 to 2019 trade war. | |||
| S9 Ep37: Addressing Global Imbalances | 03 juil. 2026 | 00:24:43 | |
Episode recorded on 19 June 2026 at the PSE-CEPR Policy Forum in Paris. Twice before, the world's savings and debts have piled up in the wrong places, and twice the imbalance broke something. The first time it took the Plaza Accord to fix it. The second time it took a global financial crisis. Now we are in a third wave. Gita Gopinath (Harvard, former IMF Chief Economist and First Deputy Managing Director) and Philip Lane (European Central Bank, CEPR) join Tim Phillips to ask what is different this time. Household and bank balance sheets are stronger than before 2008. But the fragility has moved to governments carrying much higher debt, and to non-bank financial institutions whose exposures and links to banks are only partly visible. Foreign investors hold US$40.7 trillion of US equities, 44% of world GDP outside the US, much of it riding on the AI boom. Lane's overriding principle: central banks can calm bond markets under stress, but they must be just as clear about what they will not do if debt is unsustainable. The research behind this episode: Bai, Chong-En, Gita Gopinath, Hélène Rey, and Axel Weber. 2026. "G7 Economists Memo on Global Imbalances." Prepared for the French Presidency of the G7, 28 March. The panel also draws on the fourth CEPR/Bruegel Paris Report, Paris Report 4: The New Global Imbalances, edited by Hélène Rey, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (CEPR Press and Bruegel, 2026), free to download at cepr.org. Gopinath made the keynote presentation “The Third Wave: Addressing Global Imbalances” on 19 June at PSE. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Gita Gopinath, and Philip Lane. 2026. "Addressing Global Imbalances." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Philip Lane is Chief Economist and a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, and a Fellow of CEPR's International Macroeconomics and Finance programme. He was Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland from 2015 to 2019, and remains an honorary professor of economics at Trinity College Dublin, where his research covered financial globalisation and European monetary integration. Research cited in this episode Foreign holdings of US equities. Gross foreign holdings of US equities stood at US$40.7 trillion, 44% of world GDP excluding the US (Gopinath 2026, citing US Treasury data). Gopinath's slides show 54% of gross foreign inflows into US government debt since 2007 and estimate that 61% of the deterioration in the US net international investment position since the global financial crisis has been driven by valuation effects rather than trade deficits. Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Hedge funds, private credit funds, insurers and other institutions outside the regulated banking system now intermediate a large and growing share of global finance. Gopinath's slides show leveraged intermediation migrating from households and banks before the 2008 crisis toward government and non-bank financial institutions today, echoing the concerns set out in the G7 memo and the CEPR Paris Report. The 2020 "dash for cash." In March 2020, US Treasury yields rose sharply even as investors would normally be expected to flee to safety, a sign that market functioning, not just prices, can break down under stress. Gopinath cites the episode as evidence that hedge funds, now bigger players in Treasury market-making, can amplify rather than absorb shocks. ECB crisis tools: PEPP, OMT and TPI. Lane describes three instruments built since 2012 to separate monetary policy from market functioning: the Outright Monetary Transactions programme (2012), designed to backstop governments already in an ESM assistance programme; the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (2020), the ECB's flexible, country-varying response to Covid-19; and the Transmission Protection Instrument (2022), intended to calm unwarranted bond market panic without financing unsustainable debt. US federal debt and the fiscal deficit. Gopinath's slides put federal debt at 108% of GDP in 2025, up from 41% in 2007 and 39% in 2000 (source: Federal Reserve, FRED). In conversation she cites the US fiscal deficit at close to 7% of GDP, at a point in the cycle when the economy is strong. Note this is federal debt specifically; the G7 memo cites a broader measure, US general government debt, at around 120% of GDP, projected to reach around 140% by 2031. The two figures are not directly comparable and should not be conflated in the notes or on air. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Global Imbalances Redux, in which Maurice Obstfeld sets out the history of the three waves of imbalances and what today's policymakers can learn from how the first two were resolved. Rebalancing the Chinese Economy, in which Yiping Huang explains why decades of investment-led growth suppressed Chinese household consumption, and what it would take to reverse that. Stablecoins and Global Imbalances, in which Gilles Moec examines how dollar-backed stablecoins help fund the US deficit, and the regulatory gaps that leaves behind. Related reading on VoxEU Industrial policy, tariffs, and the return of global imbalances, which finds that tariffs are a weak tool for correcting current account imbalances and that industrial policy's effects run mainly through its impact on domestic saving and consumption. | |||
| S9 Ep36: Helping the over-50s find work | 01 juil. 2026 | 00:19:13 | |
Lose your job at 25 and someone will help you find another. Lose it at 55 and the talk quietly turns to how you might wind down towards retirement. Policymakers tend to assume job search training works for the young and not the old, so they rarely spend money trying. Bas van der Klaauw (Tinbergen Institute) thinks they got that wrong. In this week's VoxTalks Economics, he tells Tim Phillips about a Dutch experiment that put older unemployed workers through an intensive programme built on one idea: teach people over 50 to find work the way younger workers already do, by working their social network. Participants left unemployment faster, there was a 10% increase in job finding, and the savings in benefits more than covered the cost. The catch: it helped the better educated most and was tested in a recession. Will it work just as well in today's labour market, where even the young and well-educated are struggling to find good jobs? The research behind this episode: de Groot, Nynke, and Bas van der Klaauw. 2026. "A Randomized Experiment on Improving Job Search Skills of Older Unemployed Workers." CEPR Discussion Paper 21464. (Gated) To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Bas van der Klaauw. 2026. “Helping the over-50s find work.” VoxTalks Economics (podcast). The paper is co-authored with Nynke de Groot, an economist at the National Health Care Institute (Zorginstituut Nederland) who took her PhD at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Her earlier work with van der Klaauw includes a study of how cutting the unemployment insurance entitlement period affects job finding. Research and concepts discussed in this episode STEP (Successfully to Employment Program). A Dutch job search assistance programme developed during the post-2008 recession for unemployed workers aged 50 and above who had not found work within a few months of claiming unemployment insurance. It ran to 10 group sessions of around four hours each plus two individual meetings, covering interview practice, CV writing and social media, with a particular emphasis on activating the participant's social network. Participants were encouraged to have at least one conversation a week with a contact about possible work. The programme cost roughly 470 euros per participant. The experiment. The study covers everyone aged 50 to 63 who entered unemployment insurance in the Netherlands between November 2014 and July 2015 and remained unemployed for three months, about 50,000 people. Assignment to treatment or control was based on the last digit of the social security number, putting roughly 20% in the control group. Because participation was voluntary (an encouragement design), the authors report both the effect of being offered the programme and, using random assignment as an instrument, the effect of actually taking part. Around 54% of those in the treatment group took up STEP. What it did to job search behaviour. The job application register lets the authors watch how people searched. Participants made fewer applications to posted vacancies and did more networking, exactly the shift the programme was designed to produce. The change in method did not raise the number of job interviews, but it was accompanied by faster exits from unemployment. Cost effectiveness. Participation cut cumulative benefit payments by about 715 euros within 18 months, comfortably above the 470 euro cost, making STEP cost effective for the benefits administration. For participants, the lost benefits were almost fully offset by higher earnings from working sooner, so there was no large income gain to the individual, but no loss either. Who it helped. Effects were strongest for the better educated, those with higher pre-unemployment earnings and those not previously working through a temporary work agency. There was little or no effect on the lowest educated, who also had the lowest take-up. The authors find no significant difference by gender or by age band within the 50 to 63 range. Trainers and group composition. Effectiveness varied significantly across trainers, but no observed characteristic (gender, age, experience, contract type) explained which trainers did better. Group composition mattered too: participants did better when their group contained some lower-educated members, which argues for mixed rather than streamed training groups. One reading is that trainers may concentrate their attention on the more employable members of a group. Does it generalise? Two caveats. The programme was evaluated in a recession, when people were losing jobs through no fault of their own (frictional unemployment), and it may do less when work is easier to find. And it was designed for that kind of unemployment, not for the structural problem of workers whose skills no longer match available jobs, where van der Klaauw suggests training or retraining, rather than job search help, is the relevant tool. | |||
| S9 Ep35: The success of the embedded state | 26 juin 2026 | 00:20:21 | |
Who kept the courts sitting and the streetlights lit when the state had almost no money to pay anyone? Two hundred years ago, British local government ran on unpaid labour. In a parliamentary survey of the boroughs from 1835, two in three of the people doing local government work were not paid at all. James Robinson (University of Chicago, CEPR) explains how this succeeded in this week's episode of VoxTalks Economics. Robinson and his co-authors call this the "embedded state". Members of the elite willingly took the unpaid jobs because the postings carried prestige and led to Parliament, promotion or a paid post. Less glamorous or dead-end postings -- the jailer for example -- had to be paid But the unpaid officers were more productive than the paid ones. Robinson argues this is not a quirk of England at that time. Rwanda runs a high-capacity state today on much the same basis, without ever raising the taxes the IMF says a proper government needs. The lesson for anyone trying to make government work: start with the society, not the tax code. New episode of VoxTalks Economics. Link in bio. Image: William Benjamin Watkins by George Patten / Manchester Town Hall. The research behind this episode: Heldring, Leander, Davis Kedrosky, James A. Robinson, and Matthias Weigand. 2026. "The Success of the Embedded State in England." CEPR Discussion Paper No. 21460. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and James A. Robinson. 2026. "The success of the embedded state." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode The fiscal-military state. The dominant account of British state formation comes from John Brewer's The Sinews of Power (1989), which traces the rise of a tax-raising, salaried fiscal state after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Robinson's point is that this describes 20,000 officials in London; across the rest of the country, where fiscal resources were thin, most government work was done for free. Mark Goldie and the unpaid office-holder. The historian and political theorist Mark Goldie documented the scale of unpaid local office-holding in earlier work; Robinson and his co-authors took that observation and asked how to study it systematically, which led them to the 1835 report. The embedded state. A state has high capacity when it can implement policy and provide public goods. The embedded state does this without the fiscal resources to fund a modern bureaucracy, by drawing on the social structure of the society it governs to motivate people to do government work unpaid. Because that social structure differs from place to place, embedding looks different in 1830s Britain, in modern Rwanda, and in 1970s South Korea; understanding the state means understanding the sociology beneath it. Rwanda's state capacity. Robinson and Leander Heldring also study the organisation of the state in Rwanda, where most government workers are unpaid and the country has never raised the 15% of national income in taxes that the International Monetary Fund treats as the threshold for a functioning state, yet implements policy effectively. Elinor Ostrom and the commons. Elinor Ostrom won the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize for showing that communities can organise to provide and govern shared resources without the state. Robinson's argument is that the interface between such collective provision and the state is productive rather than antagonistic. Somaliland and the Guurti. Somaliland has an elaborate clan structure, and its upper house, the Guurti, represents the clans. Robinson offers it as a case where anyone trying to improve public good provision should start from the existing social structure rather than from tax reform. The History of British Local Government. Beatrice and Sidney Webb's nine-volume history of English local government documents the medieval charters, inherited land and bequests that determined how much fiscal capacity each borough had. That historically determined variation in whether a borough could afford to pay its officers is what the paper uses to identify the effect of pay on performance. More VoxTalks Economics episodes | |||
| S9 Ep34: Making defence spending pay | 19 juin 2026 | 00:26:28 | |
Defence spending is rising whether voters like it or not. The UK has committed to 2.5% of national income and aims for nearer 3.5% over the next decade, £30bn a year for each percentage point. What does the country get back? Can defence spending be pro-growth? In this week's VoxTalk, John Van Reenen (LSE) argues that getting a return on investment based on innovation need not be left to luck. For example nuclear power, GPS and the internet all began as military projects. The spillovers can be planned for; the trick is to make defence spending innovation-rich, and make procurement work better. Traditional top-down procurement mostly produces lock-in: the same firms winning over and over. Van Reenen's study of a project at the US Air Force shows the difference: when it asked firms what they could build, rather than telling them what to make, the competitions brought in startups, generated more original patents, and spilled ideas into the civilian economy. The research behind this episode: Moretti, Enrico, Claudia Steinwender, and John Van Reenen. 2025. "The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense R&D, Productivity, and International Spillovers." The Review of Economics and Statistics 107 (1). An ungated version is available as NBER Working Paper No. 26483. Howell, Sabrina T., Jason Rathje, John Van Reenen, and Jun Wong. 2025. "Opening Up Military Innovation: Causal Effects of Reforms to US Defense Research." Journal of Political Economy 133 (11). An ungated version is available as NBER Working Paper No. 28700. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and John Van Reenen. 2026. “Making defence spending pay.” VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode The SBIR Open Topics reform. The US Air Force Small Business Innovation Research programme traditionally ran "conventional" competitions specifying the technology wanted; from 2018 it added "open" competitions inviting firms to propose any idea useful to the Air Force. Howell, Rathje, Van Reenen and Wong compared near-winners with near-losers and found the open awards produced new military technology, more original patents, and civilian spillovers such as venture capital funding; the conventional awards mostly produced lock-in. Spin-offs from military research. Nuclear power, GPS and the internet each began as military projects before becoming civilian technologies; Van Reenen reaches back further to the claw of Archimedes, built to fend off the Roman fleet at Syracuse, as an early example of defence invention finding a wider use. The Draghi report. Van Reenen worked with Mario Draghi on his 2024 report on European competitiveness; he draws on it to argue that fragmented standards and duplicated procurement across Europe waste money, and that common standards and joint procurement would let countries specialise where they hold a comparative advantage. More VoxTalks Economics episodes | |||
| S9 Ep33: Did the sewing machine liberate women? | 12 juin 2026 | 00:19:09 | |
In January 1860 the New York Times gave its blessing to a new machine: the sewing machine. These "iron needle-women", it wrote, were the only invention that could be claimed “chiefly for women's benefit”. Sewing was women's work in the nineteenth century, rich or poor, and a machine could now do it in a fraction of the time. So did it set women free? Philipp Ager and Davide Coluccia have traced the adoption of the sewing machine in Massachusetts between 1850 and 1900, using census records and digitised business directories to work out who was exposed to it, in the factory and in the home. For poorer women the machine meant work, in garment factories and in boot and shoe production; they married later, had fewer children, and many never married at all. For wealthier women, who had few acceptable jobs open to them, the hours it saved went into earlier marriage and earlier motherhood. Philipp tells Tim Phillips the story of a machine that had very different impacts in different social classes. The research behind this episode: Ager, Philipp, and Davide Coluccia. 2026. "Liberation Technology? The Impact of the Sewing Machine on Women." CEPR Discussion Paper No. 21496. CEPR Press, Paris and London. CEPR Discussion Papers are gated; CEPR members and subscribing institutions can download the paper at the link. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Philipp Ager. 2026. "Did the Sewing Machine Liberate Women?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research and sources cited in this episode Godey's Lady's Book. The most widely read women's magazine in the US at the time crowned the sewing machine "the queen of inventions" in 1860, having calculated that a man's shirt took 20,620 stitches and 14 hours to sew by hand, against an hour and a quarter by machine. Singer and the Sewing Machine: A Capitalist Romance. Ruth Brandon's 1977 biography of Isaac Singer (Google Books) is the source for both Singer quotations read in this episode. . How the Other Half Lives. Jacob Riis, a Danish-born police reporter in New York, published his account of tenement and sweatshop life in 1890 (free at Project Gutenberg). The shirtmaker's testimony read in this episode was given to the State Board of Arbitration during the shirtmakers' strike and reported by Riis in his chapter on the working girls of New York. The household appliance revolution. Philipp contrasts the sewing machine with the washing machines and vacuum cleaners that arrived two generations later, which economists have credited with freeing women to join the workforce; "Engines of Liberation" by Jeremy Greenwood, Ananth Seshadri and Mehmet Yorukoglu, Review of Economic Studies, 2005, covers this topic. The sewing machine saved time in the same way, but in the 1860s far fewer acceptable jobs awaited the women whose time it saved. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Related reading on VoxEU | |||
| S9 Ep32: The digital money supply | 05 juin 2026 | 00:27:19 | |
Every day, billions of transactions settle between strangers who have no idea which bank the other uses. That lack of friction is not automatic. Nine-tenths of the money in daily circulation has been created by commercial banks, but it stays trustworthy only because central banks stand behind it, and keep the system in balance. In this week’s episode Tim Phillips talks to Stephen Cecchetti (Brandeis University, CEPR) about what happens when new forms of digital money test that architecture. Cecchetti is one of the authors of the eighth Barcelona Report in The Future of Banking series, part of the Banking Initiative at IESE Business School, just published by CEPR as a free download. Will retail central bank digital currencies, tokenised deposits, and stablecoins upset the delicate balance of system that has been running for decades? Stablecoins, for example, do not create money, but they claim the status of money without the institutional guarantee that makes money trustworthy. Three jurisdictions — the US, the EU, and the UK — are each resolving the same underlying contradiction in different ways. None has fully resolved it. The research behind this episode: Niepelt, Dirk, Stephen G. Cecchetti, Hélène Rey, and Xavier Vives. 2026. Digital Money: The Future of Banking 8. London: CEPR Press. Available as a free download from CEPR. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Stephen G. Cecchetti. 2026. “The digital money supply.” VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Monetary uniformity, mobility, and elasticity. The three institutional conditions underpinning general acceptance of money, developed in analysis by the Bank for International Settlements and discussed extensively in the report. Uniformity means a pound is a pound regardless of which bank holds it. Mobility means claims move between users and institutions at low cost and settle with finality. Elasticity means the supply of money can expand when it is under stress. Together they explain why we accept a deposit at face value without doing any analysis of the bank that issued it; and together they identify exactly where new forms of digital money create institutional gaps. Silicon Valley Bank failure, March 2023. SVB's collapse illustrates both the lender of last resort functioning and the limits of no-bailout commitments. Cecchetti notes that SVB's liabilities were still trading at par on the Thursday before its Friday failure because the Federal Reserve stood behind them. He also notes that Circle, the issuer of USDC, held $3.3 billion of its reserves at SVB and was effectively bailed out in the resolution. The episode is one of two occasions in the past twenty years where money market fund-like instruments have been backstopped by the Federal Reserve under stress. Genius Act (United States). Principle-based stablecoin regulation expected to come into effect in the US around 2027. Under its provisions, only stablecoins issued by bank-affiliated issuers will have access to the Federal Reserve; only those will therefore have the institutional backing needed to function as money. Stablecoins issued by non-bank entities will not. Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation (MiCA), European Union. The EU framework for crypto assets, which entered into force in 2024. For stablecoins, MiCA requires issuers to hold 30 to 60% of their reserves in bank deposits, with no provision for central bank backing. The stated rationale is to keep deposits within the banking system; Cecchetti notes this creates a different category of vulnerability and leaves the question of what happens under stress unresolved. Bank of England stablecoin proposal (United Kingdom). The Bank of England's approach differs from both US and EU frameworks by explicitly requiring large stablecoin issuers to hold significant reserve deposits at the Bank of England, making them in effect narrow banks with a direct central bank backstop. Cecchetti regards this as the most coherent of the three approaches in terms of institutional logic, though the same fundamental question applies: whether holding to that design under stress would be politically sustainable. Tether and the jurisdictional challenge. Tether, the largest stablecoin issuer, is registered in El Salvador having previously operated out of the British Virgin Islands. Its tokens are held by users in multiple countries, traded on exchanges in multiple jurisdictions, and backed by US Treasury securities. Cecchetti uses this to illustrate why local regulation, however well-designed, is necessary but not sufficient; effective oversight of instruments that are genuinely global requires international standards and coordination. Fractional reserve banking and the goldsmith model. The institutional structure described in the episode has roots in mid-seventeenth century England, when goldsmiths began issuing more paper receipts than they had gold in their vaults. The goldsmiths became bankers; the paper became money; the vulnerability to runs became a structural feature of private money creation that persists today. Cecchetti uses the history to make the point that while technology changes how we store and transmit information, the underlying architecture of trust in private money is as old as Newtonian physics. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Related reading on VoxEU | |||
| S9 Ep31: How well does patent screening work? | 29 mai 2026 | 00:32:46 | |
Someone once held a patent on the swing. A piece of wood. Two ropes. The US Patent Office granted it. How often does that actually happen, and what does it cost when the system gets it wrong? Or, how often is a valid patent claim rejected? Until now, no one knew. Tim Phillips talks to Mark Schankerman of LSE and CEPR, who with co-authors William Matcham spent eight years building the tools to find out. Using natural language processing across a dataset of around one million patent applications, twenty million claims, and fifty-five million examiner decisions, they measure how similar each incoming claim is to the hundred million claims that preceded it, going back to 1976. They find that 81% of initial patent claims fall below the patentability threshold; examiners must negotiate that figure down round by round. And they do a pretty good job. But around a third of all abandoned applications contain at least one valid claim the system failed to protect. You don’t see patents that aren’t awarded, so those errors have, until now, been invisible. The research behind this episode: Matcham, William, and Mark Schankerman. Forthcoming. "Screening Property Rights for Innovation." Econometrica. Available as CEPR Discussion Paper DP18334 (gated). Current version dated January 2026. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Mark Schankerman. 2026. “How “well does patent screening work? VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Type I and Type II errors in patent screening. A Type I error occurs when an examiner grants a claim that should have been rejected, typically because it is too similar to prior art. This allows the holder to charge royalties and, in the US context especially, to bring litigation. A Type II error occurs when a valid claim is refused or abandoned, depriving the applicant of protection they deserve and reducing future incentives to innovate. Schankerman argues that Type II error is systematically under-discussed in public debate: you can point to a patent that should not have been granted; you cannot point to the invention that was never protected. Structural model. The paper uses a dynamic structural model, meaning it models the actual institutional rules, incentives, and decision sequences that govern patent prosecution at the USPTO. Structural models allow researchers to run counterfactual experiments, asking what would happen if specific rules or incentives were changed, without running those experiments for real. This is the methodological basis for the paper's policy analysis. Patent distance measure. The paper's key methodological innovation is a quantitative measure of how similar a patent claim is to existing claims, constructed using natural language processing. The algorithm is trained on existing patent documents and compares the textual content of each incoming claim against all prior claims, covering roughly a hundred million filings going back to 1976. This produces a scalar distance figure that can be compared against an estimated patentability threshold. Deadweight loss. The standard economic term for the welfare cost created when prices are raised above competitive levels. In the patent context, a wrongly granted claim allows its holder to charge higher licensing fees than the market would otherwise bear, generating a cost for users without a corresponding social benefit. Request for Continued Examination (RCE). A procedural mechanism in the US patent system that allows applicants to re-open a finally rejected application in exchange for a fee. Unlike the European Patent Office or China's patent system, the USPTO places no hard limit on how many times an applicant can return. Schankerman's counterfactual analysis finds that restricting rounds to one substantially reduces screening costs and discourages strategic padding of claims. Unified Patent Court (UPC). A specialised European court that began operating in June 2023. Its remit covers the enforcement of patent rights across participating EU member states; it does not conduct patentability examinations. Schankerman argues that by reducing the cost of enforcement, the UPC raises the stakes of the upstream screening process: a wrongly granted patent becomes cheaper and easier to assert. Amazon one-click patent. Amazon received a US patent on the one-click online purchasing process. Schankerman uses the case to illustrate the core economic argument: the relevant question is not whether an invention is valuable, but whether patent protection was necessary to induce its development. If the invention would have occurred regardless, the grant creates costs without providing the intended innovation incentive. Intrinsic motivation. The tendency for individuals to pursue a task for its own sake rather than for external rewards. Schankerman's model estimates that USPTO examiners exhibit substantial intrinsic motivation and that this is the primary driver of screening quality. In counterfactual simulations, removing intrinsic motivation causes outcomes to deteriorate markedly; removing the credit-based extrinsic incentive system has a much smaller effect. Padding. Schankerman's term for the strategic behaviour in which patent applicants include claims that are broader than what is strictly novel, hoping some will survive examiner scrutiny and expand the scope of their eventual property right. The paper measures the extent of padding directly from the distance data and confirms it is widespread. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Related reading on VoxEU | |||
| S9 Ep30: Redefining the monetary standard | 22 mai 2026 | 00:26:24 | |
The fiat money system has survived the Great Inflation, the global financial crisis, and a pandemic. But can it survive digital currencies? Bitcoin and the blockchain solved a genuine problem in computer science: how to stop people spending the same money twice. Forty years of successful inflation control means central bank money is stable; that is the stability in stablecoins, attempting to solve the volatility problem. What's next? What if the unit of account itself were indexed to consumer prices? Digitalisation might finally make that approach viable at scale. Price stability, by design. Will we still need cash? Maybe not now, But if you never use it, it may not be there if the blackout comes. The research behind this episode: Stracca, Livio. 2025. Redefining the Monetary Standard in the Digital Age: Digital Innovations and the Future of Monetary Policy. Springer Nature. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Livio Stracca. 2026. "Redefining the monetary standard." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode The blockchain. A distributed ledger in which transactions are grouped into sequential blocks, each cryptographically linked to the one before. Reversing any transaction requires rewriting every subsequent block, which demands enormous computational effort. This design solves the double-spend problem in a decentralised network but makes the system slow and costly to operate at scale. The payment trilemma. A framework discussed in the episode and in Stracca's book: any digital payment system can optimise for at most two of three properties simultaneously (universal access, security against fraudulent transactions, and privacy). Cash is the only instrument that escapes the trilemma; digital systems must accept a trade-off among the three, and the choice is often made implicitly by the designer of the system rather than through democratic deliberation. Hayek, Friedrich A. 1976. Denationalisation of Money. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. The classic argument for currency competition: let currencies compete freely and the one providing the most stable prices will win. Economists, including Milton Friedman, largely rejected the proposal on the grounds that money exhibits strong network externalities; the more people use a currency, the more attractive it becomes to the next user, producing a natural tendency towards monopoly. A formal modern revisitation, finding similar conclusions, is Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús, and Daniel Sanches. 2019. "Can Currency Competition Work?" Journal of Political Economy 127 (3): 1017 to 1058. Irving Fisher's compensated dollar. A proposal published in Fisher, Irving. 1913. "A Compensated Dollar." Quarterly Journal of Economics 27 (2): 213–235 (the same year the Federal Reserve was created). Fisher argued for a dollar whose purchasing power was held constant by adjusting its gold content in line with prices. The mechanical details of his proposal are no longer relevant, but its animating idea (indexing the unit of account to a price level) has gained new plausibility in a digital context. The Unidad de Fomento. Chile's inflation-indexed unit of account, in operation since 1967 and updated daily against the consumer price index. It is used widely in long-term contracts, including mortgages, and functions as a security that can be traded. Stracca cites it as evidence that an indexed monetary standard is operationally feasible, and as a prototype for what a digital equivalent might look like at larger scale. The Great Moderation. The period of low and stable inflation in advanced economies running roughly from the mid-1980s until the inflation episode of 2021 to 2023. Economists attribute it to improved monetary policy frameworks, particularly central bank independence, inflation targeting, and (crucially, in Stracca's account) the introduction of interest on reserves, which gave central banks precise control over the short-term interest rate without draining liquidity. Stracca treats the Great Moderation as the benchmark against which any proposed reform of the monetary standard must be judged. Programmable money. A form of digital money in which payment is conditional on an independently verifiable event, potentially confirmed by a machine rather than a human intermediary. Example: a payment that executes automatically when a delivery is confirmed by a sensor. Decentralised ledgers make such conditional payments technically straightforward; traditional banking systems can approximate them but with far greater friction. Stracca notes significant enthusiasm for programmable money but also real scepticism about whether the benefits outweigh the complexity in practice. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Can blockchain decentralise money, contracts, and finance? Bruno Biais on blockchain’s potential, its flaws, and its future. Do stablecoins threaten financial stability? Richard Portes thinks so. | |||
| S9 Ep29: Guns and Butter | 15 mai 2026 | 00:21:02 | |
Europe's NATO members have pledged 3.5% of GDP to rearmament. The political argument is already about which social programmes will be sacrificed to pay for this, when the government chooses guns instead of butter. What does history tell us about what politicians will do? Christoph Trebesch and Johannes Marzian spent four years assembling the Global Budget Database: 150 years of primary government budget documents from 20 countries, with 116 identified military spending booms in peace and war. They find that governments almost never cut social spending when they rearm; they expand both military and welfare budgets simultaneously. The bill arrives later, as higher taxes. Top income rates typically rise by 10 to 15 percentage points in the decade following a military boom, funded mainly through broad-based income and value-added taxes. With rearmament underway, will history repeat itself? The research behind this episode: Marzian, Johannes, and Christoph Trebesch. 2026. "Guns and Butter: The Fiscal Consequences of Rearmament and War." CEPR Discussion Paper 21193. [Gated] To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Christoph Trebesch. 2026. "Guns and Butter." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode The Correlates of War (COW) Military Expenditures Dataset is one of the most widely used secondary-source datasets for historical military spending, maintained by the Correlates of War Project. Trebesch uses the Swiss case to illustrate the limitations of secondary-source data: the COW series misses off-budget military items that primary archival documents capture, producing a significantly distorted picture of wartime mobilisation in a number of countries. Credit booms methodology provided the template for identifying military spending booms. Trebesch and Marzian define a boom as an increase of at least 6.5 percentage points of military spending as a share of GDP over two consecutive years, ending when spending growth falls to zero. This approach, adapted from the literature on financial credit expansions and their economic consequences, allows systematic cross-country and cross-period identification without relying on retrospective classification alone. Each algorithmically flagged episode was then verified against historical sources. Local projections are the main statistical technique used to trace the long-run fiscal path following military booms. The method estimates how a variable (here, tax revenues and top income rates) evolves over time following an identified shock. It is well suited to the protracted dynamics Trebesch and Marzian observe: tax rates rising over a decade or more after a military buildup and, critically, not returning to pre-boom levels once the spending episode ends. Exogenous military shocks are the basis of the paper's causal identification strategy. To separate the fiscal effects of military spending from broader economic conditions, the authors distinguish episodes triggered by external geopolitical events from those driven by domestic factors. France's rearmament in the mid-1930s, forced by Nazi Germany's military expansion regardless of French domestic politics, is used as an example of an exogenous peacetime boom. Germany's own rearmament in the same period would not qualify as exogenous, since Germany initiated the shock. The same logic applies to wars: a country attacked faces an exogenous event; the attacker does not. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Related reading on VoxEU Macroeconomic impacts of defence spending, a VoxEU column modelling the EU-wide effects of raising NATO members' defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035; projected GDP gains are modest and come at the cost of higher debt-to-GDP ratios. Converging military spending and its fiscal consequences, a VoxEU column examining long-run trends in military expenditure across countries and the fiscal footprint they leave behind. The economic effects of military support for Ukraine: evidence from fiscal multipliers in donor countries, a VoxEU column finding that spending multipliers for military expenditure can exceed those for other categories of public spending. | |||
| S9 Ep28: Immigration and integration in Europe | 08 mai 2026 | 00:25:27 | |
More than one in eight people living in the EU today was born in another country. In fourteen of the bloc's largest economies, it is closer to one in six. For ten years, the same team of researchers has asked what happens to those people next: do they find work, close the gap with their native-born neighbours, and build a settled life? The tenth Migration Observatory report is about to be published, and the decade-long picture it paints is not what the political debate might lead you to expect. Tommaso Frattini of the University of Milan, one of the report's editors, joins Tim Phillips to examine what a decade of consistent, comparable data actually reveals about immigrant integration across Europe. Who are Europe's immigrants, and has that changed? Is the employment gap between migrants and natives closing, stable, or widening? And does it matter whether a migrant arrives from inside the EU or out? The politics of migration is often poisonous, but the data tells a different story. The research behind this episode To cite this episode Research cited in this episode The employment gap. A measure of labour market integration defined as the percentage-point difference in the probability of being employed between migrants and native-born residents of the same country. A gap of zero would indicate full employment parity. The Migration Observatory computes the gap both raw and adjusted for observable characteristics such as age, education, and gender; the adjusted figure isolates the portion of the gap that cannot be explained by differences in workforce composition between the two groups. Migration Observatory Annual Report series. Published annually since 2016 by the Collegio Carlo Alberto and the LdA (Laboratorio di Economia Applicata), in partnership with CEPR. Each edition uses the EU-LFS to benchmark migrant labour market outcomes against those of natives across EU member states. The tenth edition, published in 2026, is the first to offer a consistent decade-long comparison across the full series. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Agreed by EU member states in 2024, the Pact is the EU's most significant attempt to harmonise migration and asylum policy across member states. Frattini describes it as a step forward on harmonisation; he also notes that European policy continues to prioritise border control over integration, a balance he argues the data does not support. More VoxTalks Economics episodes | |||
| S9 Ep27: The right to choose to die | 01 mai 2026 | 00:23:00 | |
Content note: this episode discusses assisted dying, end-of-life choices, and suicide. Some listeners may find the content distressing. This week Tim Phillips talks to Al Roth of Stanford University about how economics can contribute to the debate on medical aid in dying (MAID). Roth, a Nobel Prize laureate, has written a new book that argues this, and similar debates, often miss the key insight: the binary choice of “allow” versus “ban” rarely reflects reality. For example, in the United States, he explains that physicians in jurisdictions where assisted dying is illegal are familiar with the practice of administering doses of drugs that will relieve pain, but also end life. Roth's argument is not that assisted dying is always right. It is that a moral position that ignores the costs of a ban is not more ethical — it is less honest. Economists, he says, bring one specific thing to this debate: the insistence that trade-offs be made explicit. The book discussed in this episode: Roth, Alvin E. 2026. Moral Economics: What Controversial Transactions Reveal about How Markets Work. Basic Books. Published 21 May 2026. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Alvin Roth. 2026. “The right to choose to die." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Oregon's Death with Dignity Act (1997) was the first US state law permitting physician-assisted dying. It requires a terminal diagnosis with death expected within six months, confirmation from two physicians, a waiting period, and self-administration of the medication by the patient. According to the 2024 report of the Oregon Health Authority, assisted dying accounts for roughly 0.9% of all deaths in Oregon; many patients who obtain a prescription never use it. Oregon's 27 years of data make it the most-studied model for the policy, and its take-up rates and population demographics have informed both advocates and critics in other jurisdictions. Ezekiel Emanuel and vulnerable populations: A 2016 paper by physician and bioethicist Ezekiel Emanuel and co-authors examined the demographics of patients who access assisted dying in jurisdictions where it is legal and found no evidence that vulnerable populations — defined by disability, age, mental illness, or socioeconomic status — accessed it at higher rates than the broader population of dying patients. Roth cites this as evidence against the argument that legalisation creates pressure on the vulnerable to choose death, while noting that this population-level finding does not rule out individual cases of pressure. The Hippocratic Oath is the earliest recorded professional commitment by physicians not to participate in assisted dying. Roth notes that Hippocrates formulated the oath in the fifth century CE, and that the very inclusion of a prohibition on helping patients die implies the practice was already occurring — physicians were being asked to do it. The religious objection — that decisions about life and death belong to God — and the medical objection — that a physician's role is to save life, not end it — have both been consistent features of opposition to assisted dying across more than two millennia. The Canadian Supreme Court decision (Carter v. Canada, 2015) struck down Canada's criminal prohibition on physician-assisted dying on the grounds that it infringed Canadians' constitutional rights to life and to security of the person. The court's reasoning included the counterintuitive argument that denying access to assisted dying could cause people to end their lives earlier and less safely — while still capable of doing so — out of fear of being unable to later. The Canadian framework that followed is more permissive than US state laws: it does not require a terminal diagnosis but instead an irremediable condition causing intolerable suffering. Canada has since debated, and repeatedly delayed, extending the framework to mental illness as a sole underlying condition. Mechanism design is the field of economics concerned with designing rules, institutions, and processes to achieve desired outcomes, particularly in settings where participants have private information or conflicting interests. Roth is one of its leading practitioners. In the context of assisted dying, mechanism design asks: who can apply, through what process, verified by whom, with what waiting periods, and with what safeguards against coercion or mistaken diagnosis? The differences between Oregon's model (terminal diagnosis, self-administration, annual reporting), Canada's model (irremediable suffering, physician or nurse practitioner administration permitted), and Switzerland's model (available to non-residents) are, in Roth's framing, different mechanism designs with measurably different outcomes. More VoxTalks Economics episodes | |||
| S9 Ep26: The public origins of American innovation | 24 avr. 2026 | 00:31:09 | |
The standard story of American innovation features Silicon Valley, venture capital, and the heroic startup founder.When you trace the history of the internet, GPS, mass-produced penicillin, or the COVID vaccine, the starting point is not a term sheet but a government grant. How much does this matter, and can we measure it? Tim Phillips speaks to Paolo Surico of London Business School and CEPR who, working with Andrea Gazzani, Joseba Martinez, and Filippo Natoli, has built the first systematic empirical account of how government-funded innovation has shaped US productivity since the Second World War. The headline result: government-funded patents account for roughly 2% of all patents filed in the post-war period, but explain around 20% of medium-term fluctuations in total factor productivity and GDP growth. The return on every dollar of public R&D is more than double the return on every dollar of private R&D. The key mechanism is not that government crowds out private investment; it crowds it in. For every dollar of public research, roughly another dollar of private investment follows, as talent from universities and research institutes moves into startups that commercialise what the public sector seeded. The logic is high-risk, high-reward: the government takes on the uncertainty and fixed costs that the private sector will not bear, accepting a large number of failures in order to find the breakthroughs that private capital would never have funded. The model is now under pressure: 2025 brought the largest cuts to US federal science funding in the post-war period. AI adds a further complication: for the first time, a general-purpose technology is being driven primarily by private capital, and that capital is now pulling the best scientific talent out of research institutes and universities and into industry. If that shift becomes permanent, the direction of innovation will be shaped by profitability rather than by broad productivity and living standards. The paper discussed in this episode: Gazzani, Andrea, Joseba Martinez, Filippo Natoli, and Paolo Surico. 2026. "The Public Origins of American Innovation." CEPR Discussion Paper DP20788. Centre for Economic Policy Research. [gated] To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Paolo Surico. 2026. "The Public Origins of American Innovation." VoxTalks Economics (podcast/video).Assign this as extra viewing. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE. Research cited in this episode The NIH and NSF are the two federal agencies whose funded innovations show the strongest subsequent links to productivity growth in the paper's results. The NIH (National Institutes of Health) funds health and biomedical research; the NSF (National Science Foundation) funds basic research across science and engineering. Both are predominantly funders of university and research-institute work — which is, Surico argues, precisely why their output generates larger productivity gains than defence-funded innovation. The result is not that health research is inherently more productive than defence research; it is that both the NIH and NSF fund more basic, frontier-pushing work, and that basic research generates the largest spillovers regardless of the department that pays for it. Crowding in versus crowding out is the central empirical question in the public R&D literature. Crowding out would mean that government spending on research displaces private spending that would have happened anyway, leaving total innovation roughly unchanged. Crowding in means the opposite: public research creates opportunities and trains talent that then attracts additional private investment. The paper finds consistent evidence of crowding in, particularly when government funds flow to universities and research institutes. For every dollar of public R&D, roughly another dollar of private investment follows, typically as researchers from publicly funded institutions move into startups to commercialise what they developed. This is why the aggregate return on public R&D is more than double the return on private R&D, even though government-funded patents are only two percent of the total. The Solyndra and Tesla parallel is used to illustrate why anecdote-based arguments about public R&D are unreliable. Solyndra — a solar energy company that received a US government loan guarantee and then failed spectacularly — is a frequently cited example of government waste in innovation funding. Tesla received a loan guarantee in the same round of funding and became one of the most valuable companies in history. Surico's broader point is that the government's logic for innovation investment is high-risk, high-reward: it should expect and accept a large number of failures, because the gains from the successes — when they are large enough — more than compensate for the losses. Evaluating public R&D by its failures misses this; evaluating it by its headline successes also misses it. Systematic analysis across the whole portfolio is required. Philippe Aghion's Nobel Prize lecture is cited by Surico on the relationship between innovation, competition, and market structure. Aghion, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2018, developed Schumpeterian growth theory — the idea that economic growth is driven by creative destruction, with new entrants displacing incumbents through innovation. The key implication Surico draws on is that incumbents have a structural incentive not to innovate disruptively, because doing so would destroy the market position they already hold. Startups, which have no existing position to protect, are the natural vehicle for disruptive innovation. This is why the paper finds that government-funded startups generate larger macroeconomic impacts than government-funded incumbents: startups have both the mandate from public funding and the commercial incentive to take market share. DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) is the US defence department's high-risk research arm, responsible for funding some of the most consequential technologies of the post-war era, including early internet infrastructure. Surico mentions a less celebrated DARPA project — an attempt to embed microchips into bags for tracking, before drone technology made the approach obsolete — as an example of a genuine failure. It illustrates the high failure rate that comes with high-risk public R&D, and the importance of evaluating the portfolio rather than individual projects. The Draghi report on European competitiveness is cited by Surico as a potential catalyst for a different model of European public investment in innovation. Europe's problem, in his analysis, is not the level of public spending but its composition: too much goes to procurement and too little to basic research and later-stage startup support. Europe has the talent, the research institutes, and the early-stage startups. What it consistently lacks is the capacity to fund the scaling-up phase, which causes European innovations and innovators to be commercialised in the United States. A reallocation of spending toward public R&D that acts as a venture catalyst for later-stage startups — analogous to what Vannevar Bush's framework did for the US after 1945 — is what Surico believes the Draghi report could enable, if acted on. | |||
| S9 Ep25: Rebalancing the Chinese economy | 20 avr. 2026 | 00:27:52 | |
In 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao warned that China's growth model was unbalanced between supply and demand, over-reliant on investment and exports. More than 20 years later, the imbalance is smaller — but China is vastly larger. What its economy produces and exports now moves global markets. The argument about China's external surplus is no longer just a spat between Beijing and Washington. Yiping Huang, Dean of the National School of Development at Peking University, has written a chapter in the fourth Paris Report, published jointly by CEPR and Bruegel, examining China's structural imbalances from the inside. His argument: the same policies that powered 45 years of growth also suppressed household income and consumption. Factor market distortions, especially artificially low interest rates, kept the cost of capital down and subsidised state-owned enterprises; decentralised GDP-target competition pushed local governments toward investment and industrial expansion rather than services and household support. The result was a powerful supply side with a persistently weak domestic demand side. When you produce more than you can sell at home and you are a small economy, you export the rest. When you are the world's second largest economy, the world notices. China's consumption share of GDP rose from around 50% in 2010 to 57% in 2024, still well below the mid-seventies average of comparable economies, and two fresh crises complicate the path. The property market has been contracting since mid-2021 and it is now a drag on local government finances, household wealth, and bank balance sheets. Local government subsidies have created overcapacity in new industries such as electric vehicles and batteries. Huang's conclusion is that rebalancing is necessary and achievable, but it requires the government stepping back from direct resource allocation, the private sector and market taking on larger roles in innovation, and a significant strengthening of social protection to give households both the income and the confidence to spend. The report discussed in this series of episodes: Rey, Hélène, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (eds). 2026. The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. Free to download at cepr.org. The chapter discussed in this episode: Huang, Yiping. 2026. "Rebalancing of the Chinese economy: Challenges and policy options." In Rey, Weder di Mauro, and Zettelmeyer (eds), The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Yiping Huang. 2026. “Rebalancing the Chinese Economy”. VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest Research cited in this episode Involution (Chinese: 内卷, nèijuǎn) is a term in wide use in China to describe a particular form of competitive overextension: effort that intensifies without producing proportional gains in quality, efficiency, or welfare. In the economic policy context Huang uses it, involution refers to the overcapacity problem in China's newer industries, including electric vehicles, batteries, and solar panels. Local governments, motivated by GDP targets and decentralised competition, have subsidised capacity expansion in these sectors without requiring corresponding advances in technology or product quality. The result is high-volume, low-margin competition that can suppress prices globally while leaving firms unable to earn sustainable returns domestically. Huang distinguishes this from the property market crisis, which has a different structure and cause. New quality productive forces is the term used in China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026 to 2030) to describe the supply-side transformation the government is aiming for: a shift away from labour-intensive, low-value-added manufacturing toward high-technology, innovation-driven sectors. It reflects the recognition that the industries China dominated in its first decades of reform — low-cost assembly, commodity manufacturing — are no longer competitive given rising domestic wages and costs, and that the next stage of growth has to be driven by productivity and technology rather than factor accumulation. The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026 to 2030) is China's current medium-term planning document. Huang identifies two key anchors: the development of new quality productive forces on the supply side, and a shift toward domestic demand — particularly private consumption — on the demand side. The plan signals a different role for government, more focused on providing social infrastructure, basic research, and protection for households, and less focused on direct resource allocation and industrial project selection. Huang describes the two anchors as a circuit: if supply-side innovation and demand-side consumption can be connected efficiently, the Chinese economy can sustain growth for much longer without relying on external demand. The Japan comparison is used by Huang to set expectations for China's consumption rebalancing. Japan's private consumption share of GDP was at its lowest in 1970 and did not reach the average of comparable advanced economies — around the mid-seventies — until around 2010: a process of roughly forty years. China's consumption share is currently around fifty-seven percent, still well below that average. Huang acknowledges the parallel but expresses hope that China can close the gap faster than Japan did; the point of the comparison is that raising household consumption is a structural, decades-long process, not a policy lever that can be pulled in a single plan cycle. It requires sustained growth in household income and improvement in the social safety net to reduce precautionary saving. China's current account surplus peaked at 9.8% of GDP in 2007, immediately before the global financial crisis. Huang notes that significant adjustment has already taken place: the average surplus between 2018 and the mid-2020s was below two percent of GDP, and the investment share of GDP fell from a peak of forty-seven percent in 2011 to forty-one percent in 2024. The surplus rose to 3.7% of GDP in 2024 partly as a result of weak domestic demand following the property market correction. Huang's argument is that the external imbalance and the internal consumption shortfall are the same problem viewed from different angles; fixing one requires fixing the other. More VoxTalks Economics episodes For an interview with two of the report's editors, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, on the problem of global imbalances, listen to The Sound of Economics, Bruegel's podcast. Available at bruegel.org. | |||
| S9 Ep24: Stablecoins and Global Imbalances | 13 avr. 2026 | 00:31:02 | |
A radical macroeconomic experiment is under way at exactly the moment the US external position is showing signs of real stress. Gilles Moëc, Chief Economist at AXA, has written a chapter in the fourth Paris Report, published jointly by CEPR and Bruegel, on stablecoins: what they are, why the US government is so keen to promote them, and what risks they carry. His argument is that stablecoins are a fast-growing digital asset backed almost entirely by short-dated US government debt. When investors buy a dollar stablecoin, they are effectively buying into a US T-bill at zero interest; the platform keeps the yield. The US government likes this because it draws global savings into dollar assets at minimal cost, extending the dollar's reach and helping fund the deficit. But the regulatory framework has a three-year grace period and leaves supervision partly to the states, which compete to attract platforms. And there’s the historical parallel: find out how the National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 give us an insight into the attraction, and risks, of using stablecoins in this way. The report discussed in this series of episodes: Rey, Hélène, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (eds). 2026. The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. Free to download at cepr.org. The chapter discussed in this episode: Moëc, Gilles. 2026. "Stablecoins and global imbalances: Attempting to preserve the US exorbitant privilege." In Rey, Weder di Mauro, and Zettelmeyer (eds), The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. Chapter 9, p. 210. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Gilles Moëc. 2026. "Stablecoins and Global Imbalances." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest Research cited in this episode The GENIUS Act (Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for US Stablecoins) is the US federal legislation organising the stablecoin market. It requires platforms to hold back-to-back liquid assets as reserves and establishes common minimum standards across states. Regulatory competition across states means platforms can seek the most permissive jurisdiction. European regulation, MiCA, is more detailed and already in force but has not yet generated European platforms. Exorbitant privilege describes the advantage the US gains from issuing the world's dominant reserve currency. For decades, foreigners were content to hold low-yielding dollar assets while Americans invested in higher-returning foreign assets; the result was a positive US income balance despite a large trade deficit. In 2024, for the first time in modern records, the income balance turned negative: the US was paying more on its foreign liabilities than it was earning on its foreign assets. The National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 created a system of private national banks that issued dollar banknotes backed by US government bonds. The structure is the closest historical parallel to today's stablecoin framework: private platforms issuing dollar-denominated tokens backed by government debt. The system required over-collateralisation (one hundred and ten dollars of bonds for every one hundred dollars of notes) and included a Treasury backstop. Milton Friedman, in his Monetary History of the United States, identified the key flaw: money supply became tied to the quantity of public debt rather than the needs of the economy. The system was replaced by the Federal Reserve in 1913. De-dollarisation refers to the trend in some countries toward conducting trade and holding reserves in currencies other than the dollar. Moëc notes examples such as Iranian demands for non-dollar payments for passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Stablecoins work against this trend by making dollar access easier and cheaper for people in developing countries with weak or distrusted domestic financial systems; rather than buying dollars directly, they can buy a dollar-pegged token through a digital platform. More VoxTalks Economics episodes For an interview with two of the report's editors, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, on the problem of global imbalances, listen to The Sound of Economics, Bruegel's podcast. Available at bruegel.org. | |||
| S9 Ep23: Global imbalances redux | 13 avr. 2026 | 00:34:18 | |
Three times since the 1970s, global imbalances have grown large. In the 1980s, the US trade deficit ballooned under Volcker's tight money and Reagan's tax cuts and military spending. In the 2000s, a global savings glut and then a US housing credit boom pushed the deficit to 6% of GDP. Today, the imbalances are back. The US current account deficit stood at 3.9% of GDP in 2025. The policy medicine this time: tariffs. Maurice Obstfeld of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and CEPR has written a chapter in the fourth Paris Report, published jointly by CEPR and Bruegel, examining that history, how policymakers responded, and what it can tell us about the effectiveness of policy remedies in 2026. He tell Tim Phillips that blaming foreigners misdiagnoses the problem if the US saves too little and invests heavily. The gap has to be financed from abroad. Good policy for the new global imbalances would requires three actors to move together: fiscal consolidation in the US, stronger consumption in China, and more investment in Europe. All three would benefit, none are close to doing it. The longer the can is kicked, Obstfeld warns, the greater the risk that the resolution arrives the way it always has: not through policy, but through crisis. The report discussed in this series of episodes: Rey, Hélène, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (eds). 2026. The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. Free to download at cepr.org. The chapter discussed in this episode: Obstfeld, Maurice. 2026. "Global imbalances redux." In Rey, Weder di Mauro, and Zettelmeyer (eds), The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Maurice Obstfeld. 2026. “Global imballances redux”, VoxTalks Economics (podcast). About the guest Research cited in this episode The Louvre Accord (1987) was a follow-up agreement among the same countries to stabilise the dollar once it had depreciated far enough. Obstfeld uses both episodes to illustrate that exchange rate agreements address the symptom, not the cause, and tend to sidestep the hard political decisions about fiscal policy. The global savings glut hypothesis, associated with Ben Bernanke, holds that rising savings outside the US in the early 2000s, particularly from Asian economies building dollar reserves after the Asian financial crisis and from oil exporters, depressed global interest rates and drove capital into US assets. Obstfeld argues that from around 2002 onward the better explanation is US demand pulling capital in: loose Fed policy, the housing boom, subprime lending, and equity extraction from rising home values all drove US spending higher, and the current account deteriorated as the dollar fell rather than rose. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act is US tax legislation that prevents the expiration of tax cuts that had been written into law, effectively delivering a tax reduction. Obstfeld points out that by lowering national saving it pushes the current account in the opposite direction to what the administration wants, partly undoing whatever modest deficit-reducing effect the tariffs might have through their revenue. The Draghi report and the Letta report are European policy documents calling for deeper integration, more investment, improved competitiveness, and a completion of the EU's capital markets and banking unions. Obstfeld cites them as pointing in the right direction for reducing Europe's current account surplus, alongside the defence spending increases that European countries are now pursuing. More VoxTalks Economics episodes For an interview with two of the report's editors, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, on the problem of global imbalances, listen to The Sound of Economics, Bruegel's podcast. Available at bruegel.org. | |||
| S9 Ep22: World War Trade | 02 avr. 2026 | 00:26:52 | |
On 2 April 2025, the United States imposed tariffs on almost every country on earth. The next day, China responded with export controls on the entire world. In the space of one week, world trade had been weaponised as it has never been in peacetime. Richard Baldwin of IMD Business School, the founder of VoxEU and a former president of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, wrote World War Trade to make sense of the events of the last 12 months. The dramatic April salvos have settled into a trade Cold War; US tariffs and Chinese export controls are lodged in place, with neither side expecting the other to back down. And yet world trade grew in 2025; exports from every country rose except from the US, which recorded its largest trade deficit. The rest of the world is self-organising a new order. When one country joins a rules-based regional agreement, the cost of staying out rises for the next. EU-Mercosur and EU-Australia deals, stalled for years, crossed the line. An expanding CPTPP and early alignment talks between the EU and CPTPP blocs are pulling more partners in. The old system was a cathedral built and maintained largely by the US; the architect burned it down. Something else is being built in its place. The book discussed in this episode: Baldwin, Richard. 2026. World War Trade: Conflict, Containment, and the Emergent World Trading Order. Rapid Response Economics 6. CEPR Press. Free to download from CEPR Press. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Richard Baldwin. 2026. "World War Trade." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Domino regionalism describes the self-reinforcing logic by which regional trade agreements attract new members. When one economy gains preferential access to a large market, the cost of staying outside that agreement rises for its trading partners; that pressure brings in the next country, which raises the cost for the next, and so on. Baldwin identified this mechanism in the regional trade wave of the 1990s and argues it is now operating again, accelerated by the uncertainty created by US and Chinese trade weapons. The EU-Mercosur deal unblocking was the trigger; EU-Australia followed within weeks. G-0 world is a concept developed by political scientist Ian Bremmer to describe a world in which no single country or group of countries provides consistent global leadership. Baldwin draws on this framework to explain why regional conflicts and trade disputes have become harder to contain since the US began stepping back from its hegemonic role; the trade cold war is one expression of that leadership vacuum, but so is the reduced capacity to broker deals in the Middle East or manage the Black Sea grain corridor. CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) is a rules-based regional trade agreement covering eleven countries across Asia and the Pacific, including Japan, Canada, Australia, Vietnam, and the United Kingdom. It operates without US or Chinese membership and maintains deep disciplines on intellectual property, investment, and trade in services. Baldwin identifies it, alongside the EU, as one of the two main "pools of predictability" around which the new post-war trading order is forming. The two blocs have opened alignment discussions that, if concluded, would bring a very large share of world trade under compatible rules. RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) is a large but shallower regional agreement covering much of Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the ten ASEAN nations. It involves Chinese leadership and does not carry the depth of disciplines found in CPTPP. Baldwin notes that it is rules-based and that as long as China plays by those rules it could enlarge; but it has not attracted the same wave of new joiners as CPTPP and the EU framework. The EU Anti-Coercion Instrument is a European Union mechanism, adopted in 2023, allowing the EU to retaliate against third countries that use trade or economic measures to coerce member states into changing their policies. Baldwin cites it as an example of the "building bunkers" response adopted by many economies; rather than retaliating directly against US tariffs, countries are changing their domestic laws to give themselves tools to counter future coercion without breaching WTO rules. More VoxTalks Economics episodes | |||
| S9 Ep21: The Bank of England's capital mistake? | 27 mars 2026 | 00:24:39 | |
"When you look at the world now, does it look more uncertain or less uncertain?" In December 2025, the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee (FPC) answered that question by cutting the equity capital requirement for UK banks. David Aikman (NIESR) and John Vickers (University of Oxford), two former senior Bank insiders who helped to design the regulatory framework post-GFC, think the committee got it wrong. The FPC lowered the benchmark capital requirement from 14% to 13% of risk-weighted assets, a move that could free up roughly £30 billion of capital across the UK banking system. Aikman and Vickers see no compelling economic reason for the change. They argue that the 2015 benchmark was already set too low, built on questionable assumptions about how well resolution frameworks would work. Since 2015, Brexit, the pandemic, and a sharply stretched fiscal position have all increased the likely cost of a future crisis. The practical effect of the loosening may not even be more lending, but higher dividends and share buybacks. And the December decision may signal a weakening of the leverage ratio backstop, the constraint that limits bank borrowing regardless of how risk weights are applied. The research behind this episode: Aikman, David, and John Vickers. 2026. "The Bank of England's Capital Mistake." VoxEU, 15 January 2026. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, David Aikman, and John Vickers. 2026. "The Bank of England's Capital Mistake." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Sir John Vickers is Warden of All Souls College and Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford. He served as Chief Economist and a member of the Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England, and chaired the Independent Commission on Banking from 2010 to 2011, which recommended substantially higher capital requirements than those subsequently adopted. His research spanning industrial economics, competition policy, and financial regulation has shaped UK banking policy for two decades. Research cited in this episode Risk-weighted assets (RWAs) are the denominator against which capital requirements are measured. Rather than applying the capital ratio to the raw value of all assets, the framework deflates each asset by an estimated risk factor: a mortgage backed by collateral is treated as less risky than an unsecured corporate loan, for example. Capital requirements are then expressed as a percentage of this risk-adjusted total. The approach creates significant complexity and depends heavily on the accuracy of the risk weights; much of the story of 2008 was that regulators allowed banks to attach implausibly low risk weights to their exposures, understating the true leverage in the system. The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) is the Bank of England body responsible for macroprudential oversight of the UK financial system. Created in 2013, it sits above the individual regulators to take a system-wide view of whether risks are building and whether the financial system as a whole has adequate resilience. One of its primary tools is setting the overall capital requirement benchmark for UK banks. In 2015 it set that benchmark at 14% of risk-weighted assets; in December 2025 it reduced it to 13%. The leverage ratio is an alternative measure of bank capitalisation that does not apply risk weights. It expresses equity as a simple percentage of total assets, regardless of what those assets are. The UK leverage ratio backstop currently stands at around 3 to 4%, implying maximum leverage of roughly twenty-five to thirty times for systemically important banks. Vickers and Aikman note that for some UK banks the backstop has become the binding constraint, which they regard as a warning sign: it suggests that risk-weighted measures are understating actual leverage, not that the backstop should be relaxed. Resolution frameworks are the legal and operational mechanisms that allow regulators to manage the failure of a bank without a taxpayer bailout, by imposing losses on shareholders and creditors in an orderly way. A central assumption in the FPC's 2015 capital benchmark was that resolution would work effectively in a future crisis, which justified a lower capital requirement. Vickers and Aikman are sceptical: the experience of Credit Suisse in 2023, which required a state-assisted rescue despite the existence of resolution plans, illustrates that orderly resolution of a major institution cannot be taken for granted. Basel 3.1 is the latest package of international banking regulatory standards agreed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, designed to address weaknesses in how risk weights are calculated. Its implementation in the UK is scheduled for 2027, nineteen years after the 2008 crisis. The FPC's December 2025 decision is partly contingent on Basel 3.1 being implemented as planned; Aikman notes that there have been repeated international delays and rollbacks, and that the UK's ability to move ahead unilaterally is constrained by what other major jurisdictions do. The 2023 banking stress saw three US regional banks (Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and First Republic) fail in quick succession in March 2023, followed by the forced rescue of Credit Suisse by UBS. These events occurred in what was, by historical standards, a relatively stable macroeconomic environment. Vickers cites them as evidence that banking sector vulnerabilities have not been eliminated by post-2008 reforms, and as a caution against complacency about the effectiveness of current safeguards. More VoxTalks Economics | |||
| S9 Ep20: What triggered January 6? | 20 mars 2026 | 00:20:59 | |
Two explanations circulated immediately after the March to Save America on January 6, 2021 turned into a riot: a mob manipulated by a demagogue, or ordinary citizens defending democracy against a stolen election. Konstantin Sonin, David Van Dijcke, and Austin Wright have used anonymised location data from forty million mobile devices to investigate why the protests escalated so dramatically. No surprise: partisanship was the strongest predictor of attendance, proximity to Proud Boys chapters and use of the far-right social network Parler also increased participation. But political isolation amplified the movement: the communities most over-represented among those who traveled to Washington were small Republican enclaves surrounded by Democrat-leaning areas, politically and socially cut off from their neighbours. And participation also spiked in counties that experienced a "midnight swing," where the reported vote count favoured Trump on election night before shifting to Biden as mail-in ballots were counted. These were precisely the counties where the "Stop the Steal" narrative landed hardest. The research behind this episode: Sonin, Konstantin, David Van Dijcke, and Austin L. Wright. 2023. "Isolation and Insurrection: How Partisanship and Political Geography Fueled January 6, 2021." CEPR DP18209. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Konstantin Sonin. 2026. “What triggered January 6?” VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode The "midnight swing" refers to the shift in reported vote tallies that occurred in many counties on election night 2020 as large batches of mail-in ballots were counted. Because mail-in voters skewed heavily Democratic, counties where in-person votes were reported first showed strong Trump leads that reversed overnight as the mail-in totals arrived. For professional observers and election administrators, this pattern was entirely expected; it followed directly from the different rules different states used to count mail-in ballots during the pandemic. For many voters, particularly those already primed to distrust the electoral process, it read as suspicious. The paper finds that communities exposed to larger swings sent disproportionately more participants to Washington on January 6. Network Exposure design is a methodological innovation introduced in this paper. It measures how much exposure a given community had to election-denial signals flowing through its social networks, and distinguishes this from exposure arising simply through geographic proximity to other communities. Isolated communities proved hypersensitive to information traveling through their social networks, but not to information spreading through neighbouring areas. This suggests the amplification mechanism was social, not spatial. Political isolation in this paper refers to being a minority political community within a larger, differently-leaning area. A small Republican-voting enclave inside a Democrat-leaning county or district is politically isolated in this sense. The paper finds that isolation of this kind was a strong amplifier of partisanship in predicting participation. Two other measures of isolation, one based on mobile device travel patterns ("locational isolation") and one based on Facebook connections ("social media isolation"), produce consistent results, suggesting the effect is not an artefact of how isolation is measured. The Proud Boys are a far-right extremist organisation active in the United States. The paper finds that communities with a local Proud Boys chapter were over-represented among those who traveled to Washington on January 6, making proximity to the organisation a robust correlate of participation, independent of general partisan leanings. Parler was a social media platform popular among far-right users in the United States during the period leading up to January 6, 2021. Communities where Parler usage was relatively higher were also over-represented among participants in the March to Save America, suggesting that the platform played a role in amplifying mobilisation signals within the networks most susceptible to them. Collective action theory is the study of how individuals decide to participate in group action, particularly when the costs fall on participants individually but the benefits are shared. Sonin, Van Dijcke, and Wright contribute behavioural evidence on the specific role of political isolation and network-amplified grievance in driving participation. More VoxTalks Economics How protests are born, and how they die Every year we see thousands of protest movements on our city streets. Benoît Schmutz-Bloch explains why do some protests persist, and some disappear, and some remain peaceful, but others become violent. | |||
| S9 Ep19: Can blockchain decentralise money, contracts, and finance? | 17 mars 2026 | 00:33:12 | |
Every Bitcoin transaction needs to be verified on the blockchain. There is no central authority that does this, but Bitcoin's blockchain has run uninterrupted since 2009 and now carries a market capitalisation of $1.3 trillion, roughly 4% of US GDP. Its original promise was more radical: that we do not need a trusted intermediary to spend money, write contracts, or create finance. In the fifth LTI report, published today, Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Bruno Biais, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni ask how much of that promise has held. Bruno talks to Tim Phillips about blockchain’s potential, its flaws, and its future. It is a Nash equilibrium: if you believe others will follow the rules, it is in your interest to follow them too. On that foundation Bitcoin’s ledger has been running continuously for 16 years. Smart contracts, pioneered by Vitalik Buterin's Ethereum, extend the logic to financial agreements. Decentralised finance promised to cut out rent-seeking intermediaries. Cryptocurrencies can step in where banks are broken or currencies have collapsed; in Lebanon, when bank accounts were frozen and payments stopped, businesses switched to crypto and kept operating. But the technology's libertarian origins may need to be sacrificed: As Bruno says, without transparency there is no trust, and transparency in this market may require regulation. The research behind this episode: Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley, Bruno Biais, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. 2026. "Can Blockchain Decentralize Money, Contracts, and Finance?" LTI Report 5. CEPR and Long-Term Investors@UniTo. Freely available to download at cepr.org. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Bruno Biais. 2025. "Can Blockchain Decentralize Money, Contracts, and Finance?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Research cited in this episode Nash equilibrium is a concept from game theory, named for the mathematician John Nash, describing a situation in which each participant's strategy is the best response to the strategies of all others; no individual has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. Biais and co-authors identify the Bitcoin protocol as a Nash equilibrium: if you believe others will follow the rules, it is in your own interest to follow them too. That self-reinforcing alignment of incentives, rather than goodwill or central enforcement, is why the blockchain has remained valid since 2009. Smart contracts are lines of code deposited on a blockchain that execute automatically when specified conditions are met: if X, then Y. Vitalik Buterin introduced them through the Ethereum platform, which offers a richer programming language than Bitcoin and allows users to hold collateral on-chain to guarantee the contract will pay out. Smart contracts underpin automated market makers, decentralised lending, and a wide range of financial applications that require no counterparty or intermediary to enforce the agreement. Oracles are third-party services that transmit data about real-world events to a blockchain, allowing smart contracts to respond to things that happen off-chain. A contract that pays out when a house burns, for example, requires an oracle to report that event to the network. Oracles introduce a point of fragility: the authenticity and accuracy of off-chain information must be established before the network accepts it, and that verification is more vulnerable to error and manipulation than the on-chain consensus mechanism itself. Front-running and miner extractable value (MEV) describe the practice by which technically sophisticated actors exploit the public visibility of pending transactions to extract profits at the expense of ordinary users. Because transactions on public blockchains are broadcast to all nodes before they are confirmed, an actor who sees a large pending purchase can execute the same trade first, drive the price up, and then sell at a profit once the original transaction goes through. The cost falls on the smaller trader. Biais notes that the barriers to entry and economies of scale in this activity have concentrated power in the hands of a small, technically skilled group, recreating the kind of intermediary rents that decentralised finance was designed to eliminate. Automated market makers are smart contracts that provide continuous liquidity for trading between two assets by holding reserves of both in a pool and setting prices according to the ratio of the reserves. A large purchase of one asset depletes that side of the pool and raises its price; a large sale depresses it. Automated market makers have become a central mechanism of decentralised finance, replacing the order-book systems used in traditional exchanges. Stablecoins are cryptocurrency tokens designed to maintain a fixed value relative to a conventional currency, typically the US dollar. They are issued by private entities that hold reserves intended to back the peg. Tether, the largest stablecoin by market capitalisation, holds its reserves in a mix of Treasury bills, Bitcoin, and precious metals; in 2021, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission fined Tether for misrepresenting those reserves and required it to disclose their composition, making this information publicly available for the first time. Dai is an algorithmically managed stablecoin that maintains its peg through over-collateralisation in cryptocurrency rather than conventional reserves. The Diamond-Dybvig model is a theoretical framework developed by Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig explaining why financial intermediaries that hold illiquid assets while issuing liquid claims are inherently vulnerable to runs. When enough depositors demand withdrawal simultaneously, the institution is forced to sell assets at a loss, making further withdrawals impossible and confirming the fears that triggered the run. Biais applies this logic to stablecoins: if enough holders attempt to redeem simultaneously, the issuer must sell its reserves in volume, driving down their price and potentially breaking the peg. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are digital tokens issued and managed by central banks, distinct from both commercial bank deposits and private stablecoins. Biais distinguishes two potential use cases: retail CBDCs, which would allow individuals to hold central bank money directly, and wholesale CBDCs, which would facilitate settlement between large financial institutions. He regards the wholesale application as the more promising; a wholesale CBDC could enable fast, low-cost atomic settlement of cross-currency transactions between banks under central bank oversight, a significant improvement on current interbank settlement systems. MiCA (Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation) is the European Union's regulatory framework for crypto-asset service providers, which came fully into force in December 2024. It requires licensing for issuers and service providers operating within the EU and imposes disclosure, reserve, and conduct requirements intended to align the sector more closely with the standards applied in traditional financial markets. Hayek's currency competition refers to the argument by Friedrich Hayek that competition between privately issued currencies would discipline monetary policy: users would switch away from currencies managed irresponsibly, and that threat would encourage better central bank behaviour. Biais applies this argument to cryptocurrencies and stablecoins in countries where the domestic currency has been mismanaged. He cites Nigeria, where sharp depreciation of the naira was accompanied by rising crypto adoption; over the following period, Nigeria's central bank raised interest rates and created a more transparent foreign exchange market. Biais suggests, tentatively, that the competitive pressure from crypto alternatives may have contributed to that improvement. More VoxTalks Economics In coin we trust Crypto investors make a lot of noise, but who are they, and do they behave differently to other retail investors? Do cryptocurrencies matter? Can cryptocurrencies be useful? Not just for crypto bro speculators, but as a shield against the depreciation of the official currency if a government is determined to pursue inflationary policies. | |||
| S9 Ep18: Will AI transform economic growth? | 13 mars 2026 | 00:31:21 | |
Could AI transform our economies to produce explosive growth? Most economists are sceptical at best. Anton Korinek of the University of Virginia, leader of the CEPR research policy network on AI, thinks the threshold is closer than those models suggest. In his latest work, Korinek, Tom Davidson, Basil Halperin, and Thomas Houlden, have built a growth model that captures what happens when AI starts automating AI research itself. Automation does two things simultaneously: it accelerates research, and it offsets the diminishing returns that have historically stopped self-improving processes from compounding. Three reinforcing feedback loops: software quality, hardware quality, and general technological progress, each amplify the others. Korinek's findings are more optimistic than even the AI labs' own roadmaps, which focus on software capability alone. The research behind this episode: Davidson, Tom, Basil Halperin, Thomas Houlden, and Anton Korinek. 2026. "When Does Automating AI Research Produce Explosive Growth? Feedback Loops in Innovation Networks." Working paper, January 2026. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Anton Korinek. 2026. "When Does Automating AI Research Produce Explosive Growth?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Visit the CEPR Research Policy Network on AI. Research cited in this episode Recursive self-improvement. The idea that an AI system, once capable enough, could design improved versions of itself, triggering an accelerating cycle of capability gains. The concept was first articulated by John von Neumann in the 1950s and has since become central to debates about transformative AI. All major AI labs, Korinek notes, are working towards some version of this vision; the economic question is whether the resulting growth would be explosive or would be damped by diminishing returns. Semi-endogenous growth models. A class of economic growth models in which long-run growth depends on the scale of the research workforce and the returns to research effort. The canonical insight, associated most closely with Nicholas Bloom and co-authors, is that "ideas get harder to find"; maintaining a given rate of progress requires ever-increasing research investment. Korinek and co-authors use and extend this framework, showing that automation can counteract diminishing returns by replacing human labor with capital in the research process, creating a new feedback loop that was absent from earlier models. Kaldor's balanced growth facts. Nicholas Kaldor's observation, made in the mid-twentieth century, that the major macroeconomic aggregates, including the capital-output ratio, the labor share of income, and the rate of return to capital, remain roughly stable over long periods. Growth economists built their models, including the Solow and Ramsey models, to fit these regularities. Korinek notes that those models were appropriate precisely because they matched the historical data; the question his paper raises is whether the data of the next few decades will look different enough to require a different class of models. Moore's Law. The empirical regularity, observed in computing hardware since the 1960s, that the number of transistors on a chip approximately doubles every two years. Korinek uses chip progress as a calibration benchmark: maintaining that rate of doubling has historically required roughly an eight percent annual increase in the scientific workforce working on chips. This figure allows the model to be parameterised with a real-world measurement of how much additional research input is needed to sustain a given rate of technological progress. Consumer surplus from digital technologies. Korinek raises the problem that GDP statistics are designed to measure market transactions and therefore do not capture the value people derive from digital goods and services beyond what they pay for them. He references research from the Stanford Digital Economy Lab as an example of work attempting to quantify this surplus. The implication for the paper's argument is that explosive AI-driven growth could be underestimated even in the statistics used to monitor it. More VoxTalks Economics episodes Related reading on VoxEU How AI is affecting productivity and jobs in Europe, firm-level evidence on AI’s effects in Europe. The authors find that AI adoption increases labour productivity levels by 4% on average in the EU, with no evidence of reduced employment in the short run. From AI investment to GDP growth: An ecosystem view, how the current AI wave is contributing to US GDP, both directly through investment and indirectly through ongoing service flows. | |||
| S9 Ep17: Sanctions and financial repression | 06 mars 2026 | 00:18:05 | |
Financial repression forces banks and citizens to hold government debt on terms the market would never accept. Economists have called it distortionary for fifty years. It never went away. Oleg Itskhoki and Dmitry Mukhin study what happens when a government runs out of options. Their paper traces how Russia deployed financial repression in 2022 to survive the largest sanctions package in postwar history. The ruble was in freefall; banning cash withdrawals and forcing exporters to hand over foreign currency revenues stopped the crisis. The measures worked because Russia kept earning export income, and the sanctions never closed that tap. But with government debt in advanced economies now at historic highs, financial repression is no longer confined to authoritarian regimes under siege. It is a path of least resistance for a government that would rather suppress the symptoms of unsustainable debt than carry out the fiscal reforms needed to fix it. The research behind this episode: Itskhoki, Oleg, and Dmitry Mukhin. 2026. "Sanctions, Capital Outflows, and Financial Repression." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim. 2026. "Sanctions, Capital Outflows, and Financial Repression." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues (podcast). Research cited in this episode Financial repression is any government intervention that distorts the private financial decisions of domestic agents. In its traditional form, it meant forcing the banking sector to hold government debt at below-market returns, crowding out private investment and reducing the fiscal cost of high debt levels. The term covers a wide range of tools: restrictions on cash withdrawals, requirements that exporters convert foreign currency revenues to the central bank, interest rate ceilings, and policies designed to prevent citizens from holding savings in foreign currencies. Itskhoki distinguishes between its use in normal times (which he regards as distortionary and unjustified except as a last resort) and its deployment in emergencies such as financial crises, bank runs, or external sanctions, where it may be the only available stabilising instrument. Capital controls are government restrictions on cross-border capital flows. They are related to but distinct from financial repression: capital controls concern what money can cross borders; financial repression concerns what domestic agents can do with money at home. The two are often deployed together under external pressure. Dollarization describes the tendency of households and businesses in economies with weak or unstable currencies to save and transact in foreign currency, typically US dollars, rather than the domestic currency. Governments often use financial repression to discourage dollarization, restricting access to foreign currency holdings domestically. Itskhoki notes this is one of the many forms the policy takes beyond its traditional debt-management role. Russia's use of financial repression after the 2022 sanctions. Following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western governments imposed an unprecedented package of financial sanctions, trade restrictions, and asset freezes. The ruble depreciated sharply. Russia's response included a tax on foreign currency purchases, mandatory conversion of exporters' foreign currency revenues to the central bank, and direct restrictions on cash withdrawals from bank accounts. The ruble stabilised and recovered within weeks. Itskhoki argues the measures succeeded in the short term not because financial repression is inherently powerful against sanctions, but because the sanctions failed to close off Russian export income; Russia kept receiving substantial foreign currency from energy sales, reducing the pressure on the tools of repression. The structural gap in the sanctions regime was the failure to curtail Russian export revenues. The "What's Next for Ukraine?" series Giacomo Anastasia, Tito Boeri, and Oleksandr Zholud: what the data from Ukraine's wartime labour market reveal about employment, displacement, and the economic costs of the war. Also in the series: Maurice Obstfeld and Yuriy Gorodnichenko on financial inflows, integration, and the growth prospects of a westward-facing Ukraine. Also in the series: Edward Glaeser, Martina Kirchberger, and Andrii Parkhomenko on how to rebuild Ukraine's cities, and why the choice of what to reconstruct matters as much as the scale of investment. | |||
| S9 Ep16: What's next for Ukraine: The labour market | 04 mars 2026 | 00:17:05 | |
Ukraine has lost close to a quarter of its civilian workforce since the invasion. Three and a half million workers left government-controlled areas: mobilised into the armed forces, displaced inside the country, gone abroad as refugees, or killed. Giacomo Anastasia, Tito Boeri, and Oleksandr Zholud draw on an unprecedented wartime dataset to document how Ukraine's labour market adapted under that pressure. What they find is not what you might expect. Aggregate matching efficiency fell by only about 15%; less than the decline recorded in the United States during the 2008 financial crisis. Firms hired women into roles previously closed to them by law, took on older workers and people with disabilities, and expanded remote work to keep displaced employees and refugees connected to Ukrainian payrolls. The collapse was real, but concentrated: in contested territories near the frontline, employment fell to less than half its pre-war level and vacancy postings dropped to virtually zero. The question the paper poses for reconstruction is how to sustain that resilience, absorb close to a million returning soldiers, and begin to reverse what five years of disrupted schooling has done to a generation. The research behind this episode: Anastasia, Giacomo M., Tito Boeri, and Oleksandr Zholud. 2026. "A Wartime Labor Market: The Case of Ukraine." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues, special issue: "What's Next for Ukraine?" To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim. 2026. "What's Next for Ukraine: A Wartime Labour Market." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues (podcast). Tito Boeri is Professor of Economics at Bocconi University and one of Europe's leading authorities on labour markets, unemployment insurance, and welfare state reform. He served as President of INPS, Italy's national social security institution, from 2015 to 2019. Oleksandr Zholud is a researcher at the National Bank of Ukraine. He was central to maintaining the economic data systems that continued to function through the war, and which made the empirical work in this paper possible. Research cited in this episode Work.ua is the largest online job-search platform in Ukraine, covering around 125,000 firms and 4.5 million workers. The paper draws on weekly data from Work.ua on vacancy postings, job-seeker resumes, and offered and expected wages to track labour market dynamics across sectors and regions throughout the war. This platform data continued to be updated through the conflict and provided the primary source for the paper's matching analysis, replacing the State Statistics Service household survey, which suspended publication after the invasion. The InfoSapiens household survey, commissioned by the National Bank of Ukraine since 2021, serves as the wartime replacement for the State Statistics Service quarterly Labour Force Survey. It interviews around 1,000 individuals per quarter on employment, unemployment, and labour force participation, stratified by gender, age, region, and settlement size. Despite its smaller sample, it remains the primary regular survey-based source on Ukraine's labour market since the full-scale invasion. The State Employment Service (SES) firm survey, conducted in January 2025 in cooperation with Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation, covered 55,000 enterprises employing 4.2 million workers plus 70,000 registered unemployed persons. This cross-sectional survey provided the paper's evidence on how recruitment practices, remote work adoption, and workforce composition changed after the invasion; it is described in the paper as one of the largest wartime enterprise surveys of its kind. Air raid alarm data are used as the paper's proxy for regional exposure to the war. When missiles or drone attacks are detected, sirens activate across affected areas; the authors use the frequency and duration of these alarms to classify Ukrainian regions on a spectrum from low-exposure (western oblasts such as Lviv) to high-exposure (eastern regions such as Kharkiv) to contested (partially or fully occupied territories including parts of Donetsk and Luhansk). This classification is the basis for the paper's finding that war intensity is the primary driver of differences in labour market outcomes across regions. Matching efficiency is a standard labour economics measure of how effectively the market converts a given stock of unemployed workers and open vacancies into new hires. A fall in matching efficiency means that jobs and workers exist but find each other more slowly. The paper estimates that Ukraine's aggregate matching efficiency declined by about fifteen per cent after the invasion; a smaller fall than the more than twenty per cent recorded in the United States during the 2008 financial crisis, though with severe deterioration concentrated in frontline and contested regions, where matching efficiency dropped by close to twenty-five per cent. Remote work as a retention mechanism. A survey of Ukrainian refugees abroad found that roughly forty per cent of those in employment were working for Ukrainian firms remotely. Those maintaining an employment link to a Ukrainian company reported a significantly higher intention to return to Ukraine after the war compared with refugees employed by foreign firms. Anastasia argues this makes remote work not only an economic adaptation but a tool for sustaining the connection between displaced workers and the country they may one day return to rebuild. More in the "What's Next for Ukraine?" series Episode 1, with Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Maurice Obstfeld: why $40 billion a year in investment is more achievable than it sounds, why deep debt restructuring is a prerequisite for attracting private capital, and what the Euroclear frozen assets could unlock. Episode 2, with Edward Glaeser, Martina Kirchberger, and Andrii Parkhomenko: why the right model for rebuilding Ukraine's cities is postwar Tokyo rather than postwar Berlin or Warsaw, and why directing reconstruction spending towards the most damaged regions would be rebuilding in the wrong direction. Related reading on VoxEU You only live twice: A growth strategy for Ukraine, Gorodnichenko and Obstfeld's companion column to Episode 1, making the case for $40 billion a year in investment and explaining why EU and NATO accession momentum is the key enabling condition. Rebuilding cities in Ukraine, a VoxEU column on the spatial and urban decisions that will shape how Ukraine's cities develop in the decades after the war, and why the Tokyo model of decentralised land readjustment is the right precedent. | |||
| S9 Ep15: What's next for Ukraine: Reconstruction | 27 févr. 2026 | 00:16:58 | |
Ukraine's cities were failing long before the Russian invasion began. Kyiv and Lviv ranked among the 40 most congested cities in the world, yet neither makes the top 100 by population. Ninety per cent of Ukraine's housing stock was built before 1990. Its urban infrastructure was designed for a Soviet economy and never properly adapted for the one that followed. So when reconstruction begins, the question is not simply how to repair what was there: it is whether repairing what was there is the right goal. Edward Glaeser of Harvard, Martina Kirchberger of Trinity College Dublin, and Andrii Parkhomenko of the University of Southern California argue that the most instructive precedent is not post-USSR Warsaw, or postwar Berlin, it is postwar Tokyo. Firebombed into ruin, Tokyo rebuilt in a way that was strikingly decentralised: master plans quickly abandoned, local communities empowered to combine small lots through land readjustment, and figure it out from the bottom up. Before the war, Ukraine's economic activity was already shifting away from heavy industry and the east, towards services and the west. Reconstruction that concentrates investment where the damage is greatest, rather than where people want to build a new life, would repair the buildings and miss the point. The research behind this episode: Glaeser, Edward L., Martina Kirchberger, and Andrii Parkhomenko. 2025. "Rebuilding Ukraine's Cities: Maximizing Benefits and Minimizing Costs." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues, special issue: "What's Next for Ukraine?" To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim. 2026, "What's Next for Ukraine: Reconstruction." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues (podcast). Martina Kirchberger is a CEPR Research Affiliate and Assistant Professor in Economics at Trinity College Dublin. Her research focuses on structural transformation, urban economics, and development in low- and middle-income countries. Andrii Parkhomenko is Assistant Professor of Real Estate at the USC Marshall School of Business and a researcher at the Kyiv School of Economics. His work centers on urban and spatial economics, with a particular focus on housing markets and city growth. Research cited in this episode The concept of investing-in-investing, referenced by Kirchberger, originates in work by Paul Collier on how resource-rich developing countries can scale up capital investment effectively. It refers to the prior investments in institutions, skills, and capacity that must be made before large-scale capital flows can be productively absorbed. The implication for Ukraine: there is work to do now, before reconstruction begins at scale. The Tokyo land readjustment model, which Glaeser cited as the most instructive reconstruction precedent, allowed owners of small fragmented lots to pool their land, redevelop it jointly, and receive a share of the new property in exchange for their stake in the old. It enabled large-scale urban reconstruction without central expropriation, and without waiting for government direction. The mechanism remains in active use in Japanese urban planning. The Solidere reconstruction of central Beirut was raised as a cautionary counterexample: a centralised, top-down rebuild that produced a high-end commercial district with questionable benefit to ordinary Lebanese, and which substantially enriched its private shareholders. The contrast with Tokyo's decentralised model is the episode's sharpest illustration of what reconstruction can and cannot achieve when organised from above. More in the "What's Next for Ukraine?" series Episode 1: Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Maurice Obstfeld on the investment and financing challenge: $40 billion a year, debt restructuring as a prerequisite for private capital, and why the number is more achievable than it sounds. Episode 3: Demobilisation and the labour market: getting soldiers back into work without breaking the economy that kept the country going. Related reading on VoxEU A blueprint for the reconstruction of Ukraine: A comprehensive VoxEU overview of the reconstruction architecture: what institutions are needed, how international financing can be coordinated, and what the sequencing of investment should look like. Completing Ukraine's reconstruction architecture: On the remaining gaps in the international framework for financing and coordinating Ukraine's rebuild, and what needs to happen before reconstruction can begin at the required scale. Lessons for rebuilding Ukraine from economic recoveries after natural disasters: What the evidence from post-disaster reconstruction in other countries tells us about what works, what fails, and how quickly economies can return to their pre-shock trajectories. | |||
| S9 Ep14: What’s next for Ukraine: Investment | 25 févr. 2026 | 00:20:45 | |
Ukraine will emerge from this war with enormous debt. The conventional wisdom treats that as an obstacle: investors weigh it before committing capital, and the burden slows the recovery before it starts. Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Maurice Obstfeld of UC Berkeley argue the opposite. A thorough restructuring of Ukraine's war debts – including, for sufficiently large obligations, outright forgiveness – is not just politically defensible but economically essential for attracting private investment. The bill for rebuilding and growing Ukraine, Gorodnichenko estimates, is $40 billion a year: $20 billion to replace destroyed capital, $10 billion to stop Ukraine falling behind its Eastern European peers, and $10 billion to start closing the gap. Put that figure next to what Poland absorbed in FDI during its post-communist transition, or the €200 billion of Russian state assets currently immobilised in Euroclear, or the budgetary support Ukraine has been receiving since 2022 – and it looks achievable. The harder challenge, they argue, is not raising $40 billion. It is directing it: towards investment rather than consumption. Ukraine didn’t grow in the post-Soviet era at the rate that its neighbours achieved. EU accession momentum and secure borders can be a signal to investors that this time the trajectory will be different. The research behind this episode: Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, and Maurice Obstfeld. 2026. "You Only Live Twice: Financial Inflows and Growth in a Westward-Facing Ukraine." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues, special issue: "What's Next for Ukraine?" To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim. 2025. "You Only Live Twice: Financial Inflows and Growth in a Westward-Facing Ukraine." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues (podcast). Assign this as extra listening — the citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE. Maurice Obstfeld is a CEPR Distinguished Fellow and Class of 1958 Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley. He served as Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund from 2015 to 2018, and as a member of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Obama from 2014 to 2015. He is also a Fellow of the Econometric Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Research cited in this episode The €200 billion figure for immobilised Russian central bank assets held at Euroclear is the basis for Obstfeld's proposal of a reparations loan that would give Ukraine immediate access to large-scale resources, with repayment contingent on Russian reparations. This is discussed in more detail in the related reading below. More in the "What's Next for Ukraine?" series Related reading on VoxEU Euroclear and the geopolitics of immobilised Russian assets — The legal and financial context behind the €200 billion of Russian central bank assets frozen at Euroclear, and what it would take to use them for a reparations loan to Ukraine. Using the returns of frozen Russian assets to finance the victory of Ukraine — A VoxEU proposal for channelling the interest income generated by frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine's needs, without requiring the more politically contested step of confiscating the assets themselves. Ukraine's recovery challenge — An earlier VoxEU overview of the reconstruction task: the scale of damage, the role of EU accession, and the two-phase approach to restoring growth. | |||